alexander rabinowitch, the bolsheviks come to power (1976)Introduction(xvi): "I have elected to focus attention on the revolution in Petrograd for several related reasons.
First, Petrograd was, after all, the capital... of immense significance in determining the course of the revolution throughout the country... the country's most important commercial and industrial center...
finally, because in 1917 the national headquarters of the Bolshevik Party and the center of Bolshevik activities were in Petrograd, it is there that one can best study botht he party's operations from top to bottom..."
(xvii): "Historians in the Soviet Union have stressed historical inevitability and the role of a tightly knit revolutionary party led by Lenin in accounting for the outcome of the October revolution, while many Western scholars have viewed this event either as an historical accident or, more frequently, as the result of a well executed coup d'etat...
I find, however, that a full explanation of the Bolshevik seizure of power is much more complex than any of these interpretations suggest. Studying the aspirations of factory workers, soldiers, and sailors as expressed in contemporary documents, I find that these concerns corresponded closely to the program of political, economic, and social reform put forth by t he Bolsheviks at a time when all other major political parties were widely discredited because of their failure to press hard enough for meaningful internal changes an immediate end to Russia's participation in the war. As a result, in October the goals of the Bolsheviks, as the masses understood them, had strong popular support" [more or less the argument]
(xvii): "In Petrograd in 1917 the Bolshevik Party bore little resemblance to the by-and-large united, authoritarian, conspiratorial organization controlled by Lenin depicted in most existing accounts... "
(xvix): "...To judge by his writings of March 1917, he seems not to have appreciated the degree to which socialist leaders in Petrograd had cooperated with liberals in the formation of the Provisional Government, or the extent to which the population at large, at least for the moment, acquiesced in this development. Lenin asumed that revolutionary Russian workers, having helped bring down the regime of Nicholas II, would instinctively see that a bourgeois government would do no more than the tsarist regime to fulfill their keenest aspirations..."
(xx): Kamenev, a Bolshevik since 1903, did not agree with Lenin -- working class was too weak, neither the peasantry nor the foreign bourgeosie would permit socialism. supported the war pending negotiated peace.
(xx-xxi): Rabinowtch highlighting the lack of influence of the Central Committee over 'regional organizations' at this time; "...the doors opened wide to tens of thousands of new members..., so that to a significant degree the party was now both responsive and open to the massess..."
(xxi):
key--"...my research suggests that the relative flexibility of the party, as well as its responsiveness to the prevailing mass mood, had at least as much to do with the ultimate Bolshevik victory as did revolutionary discipline, organizational unity, or obedience to Lenin..."
(xxii): John Harold Snodgrass in NYT in March 1917: "'Nowhere in their country could the Russian people have found better men to lead them out of the darkness of tyranny... Lvov and his associates are to Russia what Washington and his associates were to America...'"
(xxii): "... most friends of Russia abroad believed that because the new ministers had been selected by the Duma... they could speak for the population. This was not an altogether valid assumption.
The Fourth Duma, in session in 1917, had been elected in 1912 under regulations that excluded the bulk of the population from the franchise..."
(xxiii): May and June saw All-Russian Congress of Peasant and Worker/Soldier Soviets, respectively -- and, with this, the formation of the respective Executive Committees
(xxiii): "The situation that confronted Lenin upon his return to Russia in April, therefore, differed dissapoinintgly from what he had anticipated." [weak Bolshevik influence among workers and soldiers / most socialists supported Provisional Government and war effort / and moderate Bolsheviks within his ranks]
(xxiv): Lenin intransigent on war effort, scuppering hopes of Bolshevik-Menshevik unity
(xxiv): April Theses published April 7th in Pravda; situation in Russia was between 'bourgeois democratic' and 'socialist' phases. "Yet Lenin's message no longer included an immediate call to arms. As long as the masses retained faith in the bourgeoisie, Lenin explained, the party's primary task was to expose the fradulence of the Provisional Government..." [This marginal moderation, Rabinowich is arguing, allowed him to win majority of Bolsheviks to his side--won a resolution condeminng the Provisional Government in April Petrograd Conference. At the All-Russian Conference, also won victories, reflected in the conference resolution condemning the PG as an ally of counterrevolution. But moderate influence still existed within the Party...]
(xxv): "Taken together, the April Conference resolutions pointed the party vaguely toward the socialist revolution while leaving unanswered the crucial questions 'How?' and 'When?'"
(xxv): "...
Yet in the weeks that followed, among workers, soldiers, and sailors in the capital, support for the repudiation of the Provisional Government and the transfer of state power to the soviets grew with astonishing speed. This was partly because of widespread disenchantment with the results of the February revolution. Deteriorating economic conditions... critical shortages of housing, food, clothing, fuel, and raw materials... the gap between wages and the rising cost of living widened... The February revolution did not aleviate these difficulties; on the contrary, administrative confusion increased in March and April... [resulting in] extensive additional layoffs..."
(xxvi): "... this traditional core had been squandered in the campaigns of 1914-1916... Consequently, by 1917 most of the troops stationed in and around Petrograd, including those in regiments of the guard, were poorly trained wartime recruits... Military discipline was foreign to these soldiers; a high percentage had had their fill of duty at the front... The Provisional Government's patriotic declarations...were to them understandably disturbing.
For these reasons, by the late spring of 1917 rapidly growing numbers of Petrograd workers and soldiers and Baltic Fleet sailors viewed the Provisional Government increasingly as an organ of the propertied classes..."
(xxvi-xxviii): April Crises prompt shakeup of PG; among others, Tsereteli (Mensehvik) and Chernov (SR) take positions in the PG (six socialists, in all, enter -- not including Kerensky). This is out of 15, total. But this coalition, formed in
May, was incapacitated by the split in its ranks -- "in the realm of foreign policy the government chose simultaneously to upgrade the combat readiness of the armed forces in preparation for a summer offensive and to encourage negotiations aimed at achieving a compromise peace..."
(xxviii): "Once they had joined the first coalition, the moderate socialists became identified in the popular mind with the shortcomings of the Provisional Government.
Only the Bolsheviks, among the major Russian political groups, remained untainted by association with the government and were therefore completely free to organize opposition to it..."
(xxviii): "To the peasant-soldiers of hte garrison, the Bolsheviks proclaimed: If you don't want to die at the front, if you don't want the reinstitution of tsarist discipline... power must be transferred to the soviets. Of particular interest to workers, the Bolsheviks demanded tight soviet control over all phases of the economy, higher wages, an eight-hour working day, worker control in the factories, and an end to inflation..."
(xxviii-xxix): Petrograd membership numbers: February,
2,000; April,
16,000; June,
32,000.
(xxx-xxxi): June 9 Bolshevik demonstration against war cancelled; June 18th mass march organized by Congress of Soviets. "Though the Mensheviks and SRs worked feverishly to insure the success of the march, their plans backfired... the moderate socialist Soviet leadershp watched long columns of workers and soldiers... parade by, holding aloft crimson banners bearing the slogans: 'Down with the Ten Minister-Capitalists!'... The sea of Bolshevik banners and placards, all contemporary observers agreed, was broken only occasionally by slogans endorsed by the Congress..."
(xxxi):
important--Bolsheviks strong in capital, but country-wide balance of forces "was mirrored in the makeup of the First Congress of Soviets (June 1917): in attendance were 533 registered Mensheviks and SRs, and 105 Bolsheviks."
(xxxii): July 4 rising, despite Lenin's attempts to restrain the more radical elements in the party.
Chapter 1, The July Uprising(3): "despite differences as to the precise issue that had triggered the movement... virtually all commentators seemed agreed that the Bolsheviks, more than any other political group, were to blame for the trouble.."
(3): dimensions of food crisis
(4): factory owners suffering lack of fuel and raw materials, "urg[ing] that the government inform the public of the nature and causes of the developing situation so that laid-off workers would not hold factory owners responsible for their situation."
(4): land seizures in rural areas, as government conducts hearings on land reform
(5): announcement from Germany that military high command tightened grip with resignation of Bethmann-Holweg
(5): Kerensky offensive on June 18; German counterattack on July 6
(6): "the objectives of the war were incomprehensible to most of the soldiers, and they were angered by the knowledge that while the Soviet was trying to arrange a just peace, the government was preparing to launch a new offensive..."
(7-8): description of a segregated Petrograd -- workers clustered around the peripheries, center as the site of the elite
(8-9): Bolsheviks headquartered in the Kshesinskaia mansion
(9-10): Lenin speaking to Kronstadt sailors very ambivalently (initially refused to speak at all), calling for peaceful demonstration
(10):
key--"The previous day's developments had reconfirmed that among workers and soldiers in the capital, the Provisional Government had little support. The Soviet leadership, however, was still determined not to yield to mass pressure. Majority socialists remained convinced that neither the provicial population nor the army at the front would support a transfer of power to the soviets... They feared that by breaking with the liberals and the business and industrial circiles who supported them they would run the risk of weakening the war effort and enhancing the likelihood of successful counterrevolution...
In weighing these alternatives Lenin [too] considered the potential reaction of the provinces and the front to be of decisive importance..." [this last point is quite critical--to be cited when the Bolsheviks are chastized for not having roots in the provinces. they knew this, and wrestled with it.]
(12): "Other authoritative figures who probably appealed for caution on this occasion were Trotsky and Grigorii Zinoviev... They were adamant in their insistence that the demonstrations should be peaceful [once to both of them it became clear that the masses could not be restrained]"
(12-13): Volodarsky calling for an all-Socialist provisional government (aware of loyalty of workers to Soviet)
(13): and radicals calling for "decisive military action"
(14): Lenin as "German agent" [a portion of German money was funneled to the Bolsheviks, apparently--but made no difference, and most Bolshevik leaders unaware...]
(15): Soviet statement of support for PG
(16):
sum of July Days--"...the goal of the radical elements in the Petrograd garrison and of the Bolshevik extremists... had been the overthrow of the PG. In belatedly supporting the movement, most party leaders probably held out the hope that the pressure of the streets would be enough to force the All-Russian Executive Committees to take power into their own hands. As it turned out, neither the extremists' aims nor the more limited hopes of party moderates were realized. The impatient workers, soldiers, and sailors of Petrograd who until now had flocked behind the Bolsheviks emerged from the July experience compromised and, temporarily at lest, demoralized..."
Chapter 2, The Bolsheviks Under Fire(19): Plekhanov far-gone -- accepting the accusations against Lenin as fact
(19): "...with the lone exception of Maxim Gorky's Novaia zhizn', the entire socialist press rejected Bolshevik claims that the July movement had been spontaneous and called for decisive measures to deal with extremism as insistently as did liberal and rightis papers..."
(21): Kerensky becomes Prime Minister, after Lvov and others resign from the cabinet ("Declaration of Principles" announced on
July 8, calling for land reform, labor legislation, etc.)
(24-25): Martov calling at meeting of Executive Committee for the taking of power in the name of the Soviet--"events would soon show that Martov's vision of a revolutionary soviet government uniting all socialist elements, carrying out a broad program of reform... corresponded quite closely to the aspirations of the politically conscious Petrograd masses. We shall see, for example, that precisely these goals were expressed in the disucssions and resolutions of most district-level soviets... Within the SR-Menshevik eladersihp at this time, however, Martov's views were shared by a relatively small minority."
(25): Kerensky resignation/frustration, new cabinet formed instead late July--"this meant that the Soviet's leverage over the government was further reduced... On this basis, the second coalition... came into being (7 liberals, 8 socialists]"
(28): Kerensky in the AP--"'My government will save Russia, and if the motives of reason, honor, and conscience prove inadequate, it will beat her into unity with blood and iron.'"
(28-29): "Steps [were taken] ... military commanders were authorized to fire on Russian units fleeing the field of battle on their own. Bolshevik newspapers were banned from all theaters of military operations. Political meetings among front troops were strictly forbidden..."
(29-30): crackdown on Bolsheviks; Kamenev arrested.
(31): "As arrests of suspected leftists mounted, few non-Bolsheviks challenged the government. Among those who did were MArtov; Trotsky; and Anatolii Lunacharsky... At a Central Executive Committee meeting on July 17, for example, Trotsky staunchly defended the behavior of the Bolsheviks throughout the July days and mocked the idea of Lenin's being a German agent..."
(32): Trotsky arrested as well, July 23
(33-34): discussions about whether Lenin should be in hiding, or surrender to expose the regime in trial
(34-35): Lenin in Finland (works on The State and Revolution, at this time)
(37):
interesting--"There was no use talking further about a Constituent Assembly, Lenin felt, because the 'victors' would not convene it; the party ought therefore to marshal what stregnth it had left and go underground 'seriously and for a long time.'"
Chapter 3, Petrograd During the Reaction(41): Kerensky at the Cossacks' funeral, July 15
(42): "What was most astounding about the post-July days reaction in Petrograd was how quickly the prevailing political climate appeared to have shifted..."
(43): the days of reaction gave impetus to the Right, street violence placing the blame on Jews and workers... "...One speaker put particular emphasis on Jewish domination of the central organs of the Russian democracy.' The assembled crowd would not disperse until broken up by a detachment of soldiers and militiamen."
(45): reactionary sentiments expressed at meeting of the Provisional Committee of the Duma, July 18
(46): "...for the left and especially for the Bolsheviks these were indeed difficult days, subsequently remembered by many revolutionary veterans as perhaps the roughest in the history of the party..."
Chapter 4, The Ineffectiveness of Repression(51):
key--"...one can see that those who facilely wrote off Bolshevism as a potent political force in the mid-summer of 1917 failed completely to take account of the basic concerns and great potential power of the Petrograd masses and of the enormous attraction that a revolutionary political and social program like that of the Bolsheviks held for them. At the same time, such people were obviously misled by the torrent of toughsounding decrees emanating from the Winter Palace; the read into the actions of the Provisional Government a singleness of purpose and degree of strength and effectiveness that it simply did not possess... almost none of the major repressive measures adopted by the cabinet during this period either was fully implemented or successfully achieved its objectives..."
(52): "most of the [Bolsheviks'] roughly thirty-two thousand members were not disturbed by the authorities. Those leftists actually jailed were not formally indicted for some time, if at all, and the October revolution intervened before any of them were brought to trial..
The Provisional Government's fundamental weakness and lack of credibility among the masses were probably the main reasons for its lack of success in disarming civilians... "
(55-57): gov't botching the case of the imprisioned Bolsheviks, poor prosecution -- their release becoming cause celebre amongst socialists by late in July
(59):
July 13, secret Bolshevik strategy conference--"In these theses [for the conference] Lenin argued that the counterrevolution, fully supported by the Mensheviks and SRs, had managed to take full control of the government and the revolution. Not only the moderate socialist parties but also the Soviet had become 'mere fig leaves of the counter-revolution... Now that the counterrevolution had consolidated itself and the soviets were powerless, there was no longer, in his estimation, any possibility that the revolution might develop peacefully. The party's pre-July orientation toward transfer of power to the soviets... had to be abandoned. The only tactical course left to the party was to prepare for an eventual armed uprising and transfer of power to the proletariat and poorer peasantry..."
(60): "Lenin's ideas were the subject of fierce debate... When the theses were put to a vote, they were decisively rejected, ten of the fifteen party officials attending the conference voting against them...
(60): "In contrast to Lenin's view that the moderate socialists had completely sold out to the government..., this resolution, while acknowledging that the Kerensky government was a dictatorship, implied that it was not yet fully 'under the thumb of the counterrevolution.'" [demand was qualified to 'All Power to the Revolutionary Soviets']
(61): "When this resolution is compared with the course Lenin was advocating, one of the things that emerges most distinctly is the reluctance of its authors to give up the hope of cooperating with other socialist elements..."
(61-62): Lenin responds in 'On Slogans'
(62): "For the time being, however, Lenin was on the outside looking in..."
(62): damage,
in sum, to Bolsheviks was "superficial and easily overcome..."
(64): "...the one development that all feared most--mass defections--had not materialized..."
(66): " [in the context of Stalin's address to the Second Petrograd City Conference, July 16--his remarks, on behalf of the Central Committee, were very poorly received] Stalin's views on the development of the revolution corresponded closely to those of Kamenev, but after Lenin's return to Russia he swung sharply leftward. By the midle of June he could be counted among the ultramilitants within the Bolshevik leadership..."
(66-69):
important pages--here a discussion unfolding, at this meeting, about whether or not the soviets have betrayed the revolution, and to what extent can the reaction be considered a triumph of the counterrevolution. counter-argument is that the soviets are actually drifting leftward, even if the Menshevik-SR leadership is drifting to the right, that the counterrevolution has been temporary and the soviets are salvageable.
(70): "more markedly than in the case of workers, soldiers of the Petrograd garrison appear to have turned against the Bolsheviks after the July experience. This was probably in part because a relatively higher percentage of solider-Bolsheviks were undisciplined, politically inexperienced newcomers whose loyalty to the party were tenuous..."
(71):
int question of utility of specifically military organizing--"supporters of military organizations contended that regular military forces were a key factor in every modern revolution... critics of military organizations argued that the potential costs of such organs in terms of duplication of effort and loss of control far outweighted whatever benefits... it is not surprising, then, that the apparent involvement of the Bolshevik Military Organization in the preparation of the July uprising without authorization from the Central committee intensified criticism of the organization..." (
see intra party struggle between these organs, documented on the pages that follow)
(72):
July 28, Sixth Party Congress
(75): late July -- "'Among soldiers, Kerensky's latest decrees, especially his reinstitution of the death penalty, have caused a terrible stirr and explosion of hostility toward officers."
(76):
key--"The fact that repressive measures undertaken by the Kerensky administration had the entirely unintended effect of hieghtening popular suspicion of the government... is clearly reflected in numerous documents of the time..."
(76):
discussion of the formation of district soviets--Rabinowith's entirely plausible argument is that the proceedings of these soviets (some 12 by May) is the best indicator of the mood of the people. the Soviet, on the other hand, and the Executive Committees were staffed by intellectuals and politicos...
(77):
key--"One of the most striking observations that emerges from study of the district soviets between late April and early August is the divergence that developed during this time between the political outlook of the district soviets, on the one hand, and the central Soviet organs, on the other..."
(77): "A second feature that emerges... during the summer of 1917 is the expanding influence within them of leftist groups such as the Menshevik-Internationalists, the Interdistrict Committee, and the Bolsheviks..."
(78):
important, the reaction/conspiracy in context--"What the relevant documents indicate most clearly is that in the aftermath of the July uprising, most district soviets were not interested in either condemning or defending the Bolsheviks. Their primary concern was with such matters as the government's effort to disarm workers and to transfer radicalized soldiers from the capital, the reinstitution of capital punishment at the front..."
(79-80): absolutely brilliant communique against the reinstitution of the death penalty by a district soviet
Chapter 5, The Bolshevik Resurgence(83): The Sixth Congress opens
(84-85): Larin's appeal for unity, problematizing the soviets
(86-87):
key--"All Power to the Soviets" vs. 'All Power to the proletariat supported by the poorer peasants and revolutionary democracy organized in the soviets of workers, soldiers', and peasants' deputies' vs. what?
(88-89): compromise resolution adopted
(89):
in sum--"What then was the significance of the programmatic decisions of the Sixth Congress? Officially, the slogan 'All Power to the Soviets' was now withdrawn. It is missing from all official Bolshevik Party documents throughout the month of August. Beyond this, however, the decisions seem to have had little practical impact... the party's decisions notwithstanding, many mass organizations in Petrograd continued to view the creation of a revolutionary soviet government as the solution to their most pressing problems..."
(90): "by early August there were numerous unmistakable signs that with it apparatus intact, the Bolshevik Party had embarked on a new period of growth..."
(90):
nice--"Factory workers and garrison soldiers could recall their representatives in the Soviet whenever they saw fit, and during the first half of August Bolshevik supporteres... [substituted] Bolsheviks for deputies advocating the programs of the moderate socialists..."
(92-93): results of elections to the City Duma (Bolsheviks second to the SRs; then the Kadets, then the Mensheviks)
Chapter 6, The Rise of Kornilov(95): amid impending chaos (and triggered by German occupation of Riga)--"for these groups, the lone remaining hope of restoring order at the front and arresting chaos in the rear seemed to be an alliance of antisocialist liberal and conservative forces and the establishment of a strong dictatorship dedicated to the task of eliminating conflicting sources of political authority (most importantly, the Soviet0, bridling the revolution, and marshaling the Russian population in defense of the motherland..."
(95-96): gathering of various pro-coup factions, banker/industrialist alliance with military officers
(99): role of Savinkov, "a revolutionary extremist who turned rabid chauvinist under the impact of the Great War."
(99-100): one of Kerensky's first actions as Prime Minister (after July 8th) was to appoint Kornilov as commander of the southwestern front... Kornilov putting pressure for restoration of capital punishment, etc.
(100): "in rightist circles, Kornilov's stock soared while the government's took a corresponding plunge. Among the masses, meanwhile, Kornilov's image as perhaps the foremost symbol of counterrevolutionary was significantly reinforced..."
(100-101): July 16 council at General Staff HQ, "...one after one they blasted the Soviet and the PG in general, as well as Kerensky personally...
As one of the front commanders declared: 'There cannot be dual authority in the army. The army must have one head and one authority.'"
(102): after council, Kerensky promoted Kornilov to commander-in-chief. "It was probably Kornilov's reputation for severity and toughness, rather than his alleged readiness to accomodate revolutionary change, that now made him attractive to Kerensky. What the army needed... was a strong personality at its head... The selection of Kornilov had the added advantage of being extremely popular with disgruntled liberals and conservatives and with the nonsocialist press..."
(104-105): back-and-forth between Kerensky and Kornilov concerns use of repression in army, officers' authority, bounds of legitimacy of the democratic committees (Cheremisov as alternate candidate for commander-in-chief?).
(107): icy encounter between Kerensky and Kornilov in Petrograd, August 10, but Kerensky agrees, in principle, to Kornilov's August 3 program for restoration of authority in army
(109): "...In view of the unpopularity of the steps envisioned in Kornilov's program among the Petrograd masses and their likely response to its implementation, the roop dispositions made by Kornilov during the first half of August were advisable whether the army ultimately acted alone or in cooperation with Kerensky. It appears that Kornilov, unlike many of his supporters, still held out some hope that the government would take stock of its situation and submit to his authority peacefully..."
Chapter 7, Kornilov Versus Kerensky(110): Moscow State Conference, August 12 to August 14 (amid fear of Kornilov coup)--"...the delegates were split between liberals and conservatives, by and large staunchly supportive of Kornilov and of stringent measures to restore order, and moerate socialists, who recognized the need for firm government but continued to insist on tempting repression with at least modest steps toward reform."
(111): more-or-less successful Bolshevik-organized wildcat strike on the day of the conference--"the impact of the strike bore witness to the power and sentiment of the working classes and the resurgence of Bolshevik influence"
(113):
priceless--"Trying to walk a tightrope between the left and right, Kerensky in his opening address... sought salvation in strong words. Turning to the left, he thundered: 'Let everyone who has already tried to use force of arms against the power of the people know that such attempts will be crushed...' Turning next to the right, he roared...: 'At the same time let those who think the time is riped to overthrow the revolutionary government with bayonets, be even more careful...'
'[H]e appeared to want to scare somebody... In actuality he only engendered pity.'"(115): "The Moscow Conference ended on the night of August 15; as a device for uniting diverse elements of Russian society behind the Provisional Government, it had been a total failure. Kerensky came away from the ordeal with an increased awareness of his own isolation."
(116):
key--"...if Kerensky had now moved distinctly closer to Kornilov politically, there remained a crucial difference between the two men which goes far toward explaining the events that followed:
Kerensky and Kornilov each viewed himself... as the strongman in a new authoritarian government. More than ever, each was contemptuous toward and apprehensive of the other. Kerensky was determined to use Kornilov for his own ends, while Kornilov harbored similar intentions regarding Kerensky. Meanwhile, spurred by the Moscow conference, preparations for a coup by rightist groups at home and at the front were reaching a climax. The stage was set for a final, decisive confrontation."
(117): the putsch plan, for August 27
(124-125): Kerensky's dangerous balancing game comes unbalanced--"...seems to have decided that the wisest course of action was to forestall Kornilov's sympathizers in the canbinet from attempting to compromise with the general at his expense and to keep the lef uninfromed... , while at the same time removing Kornilov as commander-in-chief before the Third Corps reached the outskirts of Petrograd..."
(127): "A significant portion of the military high command now quickly registered solidarity with Kornilov..."
(128): "Almost from the start of the Kornilov crisis, socialist leaders, with a better sense of the mass mood, were confident that the forces bent on the creation of a strong military dictatorship would ultimately be rebuffed..."
Chapter 8, The Bolsheviks and Kornilov's Defeat(130): meeting of the All-Russian Executive Committees in Smolny, August 28--Bolsheviks talk of Kerensky having invited the crisis, not supporting the PG; moderate socialists accept Kerensky's version of events, support the government (though not his move to create a 'directory' on the model of France from 1795-1799). "
...Ultimately adopt[ed] a resolution proposed by Tsereteli pledging full support to the prime minister."
(132): Bolshevik dilemma at this time (moderate socialists needed them for the Committee for Struggle Against the Counterrevolution)
(133): Lenin vexed at fact of cooperation with Mensheviks and SRs in Moscow, for Moscow State Conference--he "was apprehensive that such predilections within the party would hamper the prospect of its acting boldly to take power at an opportune moment..."
(134): "It is well to bear in mind that within the party Soviet fractions, the influence of moderates such as Kamenev was strong throughout the summer of 1917. The right wing of the party had rejected Lenin's radical revolutionary course at the April Conference and later, with less energy, at the Sixth Congress. It did so again the night of August 27-28..."
(136-137): brilliant, inspiring editorial excerpt (from Paris 1871, to Petrograd 1917)
(137):
important--"As a sign that the moderate socialist majority in the Soviet was genuinely ready to break with the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie, the resolution demanded, among other things, the liberation of Bolsheviks jailed following the July uprising, the arrest of counterrevolutionary officers, the preparation of the Petrograd garrison for battle... The resolution also advocated the arming of the workers and the abolition of capital punishment at the front."
(138): "... between August 27 and 30 more than 240 [ad-hoc committees] were formed in various parts of Russia, often by urban and rural soviets..."
(139): "...it would be difficult to find, in recent history, a more powerful, effective display of largely spontaneous and unified mass political action..." [the largely spontaneous needs interrogation, but ok]
(142): Union of Railway Workers
(144): Kronstadt mobilizes!
(144):
key--"
The overwhelming superiority of the left over the pro-Kornilov forces was quickly evident. Steps taken by the moderate socialists and Bolsheviks to insure that factory workers would not be deceived by rightist agitators achieved their aim..."
(148): glorious--"... at times, echelons of the Savage Division were encircled by local workers and peasants who berated them for betraying the revolution. The troops had not been told the real reason for their movement northward, and, as it turned out, most had little sympathy for Kornilov's objectives..."
(149): "Actually, there were almost no skirmishes betwen Kornilov's forces and those on the government's side uring the entire affair..."
(150): Gen Krymov's suicide
Chapter 9, The Question of a New Government(152):
key, re: Kerensky--"One might have expected that at this point, having suffered so badly at the hands of the right and having witnessed the enormous power of the left, the prime minister would have taken pains to retain the support of the latter. Yet, obsessed more than ever by fear of the extreme left and still intent on somehow strengthening the war effort, Kerensky now behaved almost as if the Kornilov affair had not happened..."
(152): "...the exigencies of the struggle against Kornilov had pulled the moderate socialists leftward into conflict with the government and toward closer alliance with the extreme left..."
(154): "...at the bottom the demands of the masses at this time differed little from what they had been two months earlier..." ["All Power to the Soviets!"]
(156): another excellent communique -- "'We insist on the... abolition of capital punishment, to be effective after the execution of Kornilov... Soldiers' pay should be increased to twenty rubles... The necessary funds should be obtained by confiscating excess profits from plant and factory owners...'"
(158):
important--"It is worth noting that even workers in industrial plants that heretofore had been Menshevik and SR strongholds, as well as soldiers in some of the more politically restrained regiments of the garrison--for example, those which initially had remained neutral and subsequently had taken the lead in helping to suppress the July uprising--now turned against the government... The political resolutions passed at this time were inspired by no single party or organization... These statements varied greatly in regard to specifics...
However, common to virtually all were concern that Kornilov and his supporters be dealt with harshly so as to avoid further attacks by the 'counterrevolution,' aversion for the immediate creation of some kind of exclusively socialist government which would bring an end to the war..."
(159): meeting of All-Russian Executive Committees on August 31 to consider gov't question--closest, till October, that Mensheviks and SRs came to breaking with gov't
(162): August 31 (later that night), Petrograd Soviet adopts Kamenev's statement (details of the statement pp 159-160)--"...reflected a gradual... leftward shift in the deputies' orientation.
It is worth recalling in this connection that on March 2 a Bolshevik resolution opposing assumption of power by the Provisional Government received a mere 19 votes in the Petrograd Soviet, while a resolution sponsored jointly by the Mensheviks and SRs pledging qualified support for the government attracted 400 votes... "
(164): but All-Russian Executive Committee does not go this far, calls for support to Kerensky, September 2. "It would have obviously have been very difficult for the moderate socialists to have acted otherwise. Support for the course proposed by the Bolsheviks would have required the Mensheviks and SRs to repudiate their policies of the preceding six months and abandon their ideal of creating a democratic government representing all classes..."
(165): "...For the time being, the rightist movement was, of course, shattered... Kadet politics virtually ground to a halt ["to some extent unfairly" suspected of being in league with Kornilov]"
(165-166): Mensheviks and SRs in crisis (left SRs emerging as an independent force)
(167):
key, in sum--"Among the competitors for power in 1917, then, it is clear that the winners in the Kornilov affair were the Bolsheviks. The defeat of Kornilov testified to the great potential power of the left and demonstrated once again the enormous atrraction of the Bolshevik program. Yet it seems questionable to argue, as some do, that Kornilov's defeat made Lenin's victory inevitable.
The mass mood was not specifically Bolshevik in the sense of reflecting a desire for a Bolshevik government... So that whether the party would somehow find the strength of will, organizational discipline, and sensitivity to the complexities of the fluid and possibly explosive situation requisite for it to take power was, at this point, still very much an open question."
Chapter 10, "All Power to the Soviets!"(170): "[Because of Kornilov affair and as it was unfolding], Lenin now endorsed the possibility of returning to the 'peaceful' pre-July tactical program urged all along by party moderates..."
(171): Lenin on transferring power to the soviets--"'The slogan 'Power to the Soviets' is very often incorrectly interpreted to mean a 'cabinet of the parties of the Soviet majority'...
[Not so.] 'Power to the Soviets' means radically reshaping the entire old state apparatus, that bureaucratic apparatus which hampers everything democratic. It means removing this appartus and substituting for it a new popular one... It means allowing the majority of the people initative and independence, not only in the election of deputies, but also in state administration...'"
(172): alas -- Lenin in 'The Russian Revolution and Civil War' ..."'Only the immediate transfer of all power to the soviets would make civil war in Russia impossible...'"
(172): "It is indicative of the spirit of freewheeling debate within the Bolshevik organization in 1917 that even Lenin's new moderation was not accepted without opposition."
(174-175): proposal for proportional representation in the Petrograd Soviet; September 25 a new presidium eas elected, with four Bolsheviks and Trotsky as chair (out of 7)
(177): Democratic State Conference, September 14
(178): "It is worth noting that while Kamenev was speaking out for the creation of a broad, democratic coalition government... and against an exclusively soviet regime, Trotsky urged the transfer of full power to the soviets. This important distinction bespoke fundamentally different views on the development of the Russian revolution which were soon to erupt into one of the bitterest and most important internal controversies in the history of Bolshevism... In the context of the present discussion, however, the crucial point is that both... viewed positively... the prospects for peaceful development of the revolution."
(178-179): September 12-14, Lenin abandons moderation (worried about capitulation of Petrograd, seeing radical agitation around him in Finland)
(180):
key--"...a successful insurrection had to be timed to occur when the activity of the advanced ranks was at its height, while, on the other hand, vacillations within the enemy camp were at their strongest... He contrasted the existing situation with conditions prevailing in July, observing that at that time the Bolsheviks had still lacked the support of the proletariat; now, as a result of the persecution of the Bolsheviks and the Kornilov experience, the party had majorities in the soviets in both Moscow and Petrograd. In July there had been no countrywide revolutionary upsurge, but such an upsurge had followed the Kornilov revolt. Finally, earlier there had not been serious wavering among the Bolsheviks' enemies, while now there was a significant degree of vacillation."
(181): the initial response of other Bolsheviks -- "'We were all aghast,' Bukharin was to recall... Most of those present were apparently concerned above all that they [the letters] be quietly destroyed [Stalin proposed circulation, though!]"
(182): at this moment, Lenin resolves to return to Petrograd (travels September 17, or so)
(183): unsatisfactory resolution to the Democratic State Conference -- agreed to coalition without the Kadets (left didn't want coalition; coalitionists wanted the Kadets). the next day at at-hoc meeting, though, the "propertied elements" are brought back on to the table.
(185): "Thus the long-anticipated Democratic State Conference ended in what amounted to an evasion: a few as-yet-unnamed representatives were to be made responsible for somehow devising an acceptable solution to the cabinet crisis which more than a thousand delegates to the conference from all over Russia had been unable to resolve."
(186): September 22-24 negotiations between ad-hoc group from DSC and Kerensky, Kadet Central Committee, industrialists, etc. Tsereteli et. al. selling out. Kerensky names Kadet-heavy coalition cabinet on September 25.
(187): September 21 meeting of Bolsheviks--"what was perhaps most striking about this meeting was that even now... Lenin's recommendation that the urban masses be called to arms was given absolutely no consideration..."
(188): Trotsky and Stalin on one side in discussions about participation in the 'Preparliament' -- Rykov, Kamenev, Nogin, and Riazanov opposed.
(190): nonetheless: "This basic orientation toward the creation of a new government at the Congress of Soviets [due to be held October 20] was to shape the Bolsheviks' activity throughout the latter part of September"
Chapter 11, Lenin's Campaign for An Insurrection(192): Lenin still censored -- publishing of his earlier, moderate pieces continues
(193-194): tenders his resignation from the Central Committee! "There is no evidence that this resignation was ever formally considered by the Central Committee and, as we shall see, Lenin was soon to participate in the deliberations of that body as if it had never been submitted..."
(195): Petersburg Committee vs. Central Committee
(196): this wrangling starts to push the Central Committee left--October 5, only Kamenev opposes a boycott of the first Preparliament session on October 7, but not without further controversy
(197-198): Volodarsky's [and Lashevich's] revolutionary pessimism (seems most wise, in my humble opinion)--"'The correct revolutionary path is to reject compromises but not to force developments.'"
(201): October 7, Trotsky takes the floor at the Preparliament
(202-205): October 10, Central Committee meeting at Sukhanov's flat (a left Menshevik; wife was a Bolshevik!). Lenin is here, calling for insurrection. Kamenev and Zinoviev opposed. (Lenin prevails, 10-2)
(208):
key--"Looking back over the period between the Kornilov affair and the decision of October 10, one can see that, as in April, chief responsibility for this drastic transformation in the outlook of the party's top hierarchy belongs to Lenin... This major personal victory of Lenin's should be borne in mind as we turn to a consideration of political developments in Petrograd and intraparty disputes over tactics between October 10 and the Bolshevik seizure of power.
Few modern historical episodes better illustrate the sometimes decisive role of an individual in historical events."
Chapter 12, Obstacles to An Uprising(212): now, in contrast, Central Committee was more eager/radical than some provincial Executive committees...
(213-214): Left SRs emphasizing importance of taking power in the name of the Congress (and not in the name of one political party)
(217): Nevsky's warning,
too--"Warning that absolutely nothing had been done to prepare the provinces for the overthrow of the Provisional Government and that the Bolsheviks were in fact just starting to gain a foothold in the countryisde, he asserted that peasants in several regions had declared that in the event of an uprising they would withhold bread. He added that the party could not hope to achieve victoy if it ignored the mood of the masses."
(218):
important-- "...It should be borne in mind that at issue here was not whether workers and soldiers were sympathetic to transfer of power to the soviets--that the Bolshevik program was broadly supported by the masses was acknowledged by all--but whether or not they would risk loss of work, immediate shipment to the front... in response..."
(219): Kalinin, October 15--"'The resolution of October 10 is one of the best resolutions the Central Committee has ever passed... But when this uprising will take place is uncertain--perhaps in a year.'"
(220):
key--October 16, Central Committee meets again--one of Lenin's most persuasive addresses.
But still question of whether the masses would rather heed a call put out by the Soviet, rather than the party. Final outcome: "implicit in the comments of several speakers... was the assumption that conditions were not yet ripe for a party-organized insurrection, and that the October 10 resolution was an affirmation of intent to overthrow the government at the first suitable opportunity, rather than a policy directive for immediate implementation... while Trotsky did not attend the meeting, he clearly shared this outlook...
the position taken by Trotsky and others of like mind seems to have been based on a realistic appraisal of available evidence regarding the prevailing mood and correlation of forces in Petrograd, the provinces, and the front."
(222): Kamenev resignation; Kamenev/Zinoviev public joint-statement and Lenin furious
Chapter 13, The Garrison Crisis and The Military Revolutionary Committee
(225): Trotsky and Stalin united on pursuing insurrection through the Soviets (more ambitious than the simple postponers; less ambitious then the Leninist program of taking power as party)
(225):
important--Kerensky gov't gives pretext and spark, moving Petrograd garrison to the front (worry, again, that the PG was surrendering Petrograd to spite the revolution; soldiers are enraged, of course, call for transfer of power).
(226): "There is no direct evidence that the Provisional Government ever seriously entertained the idea of surrendering Petrograd... What does seem to be true is that, as in late August, the embattled Kerensky perceived the apparent German threat as an excellent excuse to rid the capital once and for all of the more unruly elements in the garrison."
(229-230): tensions, nonetheless, between front troops and rear troops, which concerned Bolsheviks
(232):
important--at the Petrograd Soviet, October 9, formation of the Military Revolutionary Committee, on the basis of a Menshevik-SR proposal, interestingly enough. purpose was to prevent gov't attempts to ship soldiers out of Petrograd (though it famously becomes the organ for PG's overthrow)
(236): "Over and over Lenin reiterated the absolute necessity of overthrowing the Provisional Government before the Congress of Soviets so that 'the congress, irrespective of its composition, would be confronted with a situation in which the seizure of power by the workers is an actual fact.'"
(239):
important--"...Western historians have tended to view the organ [the Military Revolutionary Committee] as merely a front organization closely clontrolled by the Bolshevik Central Committee or the Military Organization. Yet such an assessment is inaccurate..."
(241): Military Revolutionary Committee moves to break with the authority of the PG over the Petrograd Garrison. The beginning of the insurrection!
(242-243): Trotsky and oratory
(245-246): ibid, taking of Peter and Paul Fortress
(246-247): "...there was every hope that if the party waited for the government to atack... it would be able to count on the support of the Left SRs, the soldiers at the front and rear, a united Bolshevik Party, and a broad front of mass organizations... Hence, despite its successes... the Military Revolutionary Committee did not cross the Rubicon between moves that could be justified as defensive and steps which would appear to have usurped the prerogatives of the congress..."
(248): Kerensky and the Cabinet move against the Military Revolutionary Committee, October 23-24
Chapter 14, On The Eve(251): concerns at Central Committee meeting about alienating postal/railway workers, and the Left SRs. [didn't discuss insurrection, this time--no Lenin]
(254): "...it became evident that the vast majority of troops were responding to directives from the extreme left, not to those from the regular military command..."
(256): Kerensky at Preparliament--one last 'hysterical wail of a bankrupt politician', well-received--but nonetheless, does not get carte blanche for crackdown on the left
(257):
brilliant--"Martov, who took the floor next on behalf of the Menshevik-Internaitionalists, was similarly critical of the existing government. As he appeared on the rostrum, someone on the right cried out, 'Here is the minister of foreign affairs in the future cabinet'--to which Martov, peering in the direction of his critic, at once retorted, 'I'm nearsighted and cannot tell if this is said by the minister of foreign affairs in Kornilov's cabinet'"
(258-260):
critical--Menshevik/SR position--resolution to crisis can only be political, whereas the Kadets fantasize of a military victory over the Bolsheviks--it is this that is narrowly accepted at the conclusion of the meeting. "...however, word of the Prepariliament's action drove the prime minister into a blind rage." [this is a
key moment; the PG could not, fundamentally, make the requisite reforms]
(265): Lenin on the evening of the 24th--perplexed that the Central Committee has not yet moved. Flees for Smolny in disguise.
(266-267):
key claim--"Accounts of the October revolution by writers in the Soviet Union, seeking to maximize Lenin's role int he Bolshevik seizure of power at the expense of rotsky's, convey the impression that under the latter's influence, the party exaggerated Kerensky's strength and underestimated that of the left, and passively awaited a vote of the Congress of Soviets... The interpretation is, of course, seriously distorted; as we have seen, the policies of the Military Revolutionary Committee between October 21 and 24 were directed toward effectively subverting the Provisional Government in advance of the Congress... Yet there is a measure of truth in the Soviet view that prior to Lenin's appearance at Smolny late on the night of October 24-25, a majority of the Military Revolutoinary Committee, not to speak of the Central Committee, was still uneasy about the possibility of going too far too fast... As we have seen, the Military Revolutionary Committee's initial efforts in the wake of the government's offensive against the left were aimed at alerting left forces..., not calling th emasses into the streets... almost all of the Military Revoluionary Committee's subsequent military operations on October 24 can be interpreted as reactions to offensive moves by the government..."
(268):
yes--"...Lenin, in contrast to almost everyone else, attached decisive importance to overthrowing the Provisional Government in advance of the congress..."
(269): and it begins (2:00AM)
(272): Trotsky coins the 'Council of People's Commissars'
Chapter 15, The Bolsheviks Come To Power(276): Kerensky flees Petrograd in a car borrowed from the American embassy, in search for loyal troops at the front!
(278-279): Trotsky and Lenin announce the revolution ('We shall win the confidence of the peasantry by one decree, which will abolish landlord estates' -- if only)
(285): as if to confirm all that has passed, Kerensky's cabinet meets for a last time, appointing a Kadet to the position of 'Dictator'.
(289): a blank is fired at the Winter Palace!
(290): the Duma dying for the gov't!?
(291-292):
important--the Second Congress of Soviets opens (300 of the 670 delegates are Bolsheviks; some 505 of the 670 are committed to transfer of power to the soviets)
(293): Mensheviks and SRs denounce the 'mad venture' of the Bolsheviks -- retorts of 'Who do you represent?'
(294):
key--Menshevik/SR walkout with immense historical consequences. "When one recalls that less than twenty-four hours earlier the Menshevik and SR congress fractions, uniting broad segments of both parties, appeared on the verge of at long last breaking with the bourgeois parties and endorsing the creation of a homogeneous socialist government pledged to a program of peace and reform, the profound impact of the events of October 24-25 becomes clear... they played directly into Lenin's hands, abruptly paving the way for the creation of a government which had never been publicly broached before--that is, an exclusively Bolshevik regime."
(295-296): Martov trying to prevent a civil war--could a civil war have been avoided? And Trotsky right back--"No compromise! To the dustbin of history!"
(297): the Left SR position was to stick with it, despite grievances (and concerns over the peasantry)
(300): Provisional Government arrested!
(304): October 26, 5:00AM -- "...The Bolsheviks had come to power in Petrograd, and a new era in the history of Russia and of the world had begun..."
Chapter 16, Epilogue(306): Lenin's land decree, adopted on October 27--"...The land decree, borrowed in its essentials from the popular agrarian program of the Left SRs, abolished private property in land and provided for the transfer of all private and church lands to land committees and soviets of peasants' deputies for distribution to the peasantry
according to need..."
(305): An "at first exclusively Bolshevik administration"
(305-306): And, of course, a Menshevik and SR-led All-Russian Committee for the Salvation of the Country! An insurrection promptly put down. Dustbin of history, I think Trotsky said...
(309): nonetheless, some questions--Bolshevik moderates, Zinoviev and Kamenev of course, arguing for a broad socialist government; possible concessions to Mensheviks and SRs... But this did not survive the defeat of Kraznov on October 30.
(310): again, Zinoviev, Kamenev and other moderates resign from the Central Committee in protest (they re-enter later, after a Bolshevik-Left SR gov't has been formed, which was itself short-lived -- that didn't survive Brest-Litovsk, in March 1918)
(310-311):
key--"...Had it not been for the Provisional Government's commitment to pursue the war to victory, a policy which in 1917 enjoyed no broad support, it surely would have been better able to cope with the myriad problems that inevitably attended the collapse of the old order and, in particular, to satisfy popular demands for immediate fundamental reform..."
(311): key--"That in the space of eight months the Bolsheviks reached a position from which they were able to assume power was due as well to the special effort which the party devoted to winning the support of military troops in the rear and at the front; only the Bolsheviks seem to have perceived the necessarily crucial significance of the armed forces in the struggle for power..."
(311):
key--"
Perhaps even more fundamentally, the phenomenal Bolshevik success can be attributed in no small measure to the nature of the party in 1917. Here I have in mind neither Lenin's bold and determined leadership, the immense historical significance of which cannot be denied, nor the Bolsheviks' proverbial, though vastly exaggerated, organizational unity and discipline. Rather, I would emphasize the party's internally relatively democratic, tolearant, and decentralized structure and method of operation, as well as its essentially open and mass character--in striking contrast to the traditional Leninist model."
(313): importance of not having abandoned the soviets after July, as Lenin had recommended.
(313): another important example in late September, when insurrection would have happened had Lenin had his way; and would have failed...
--
(1) the sense that the masses were steadily moving Left -- must be explained by frantic building of infrastructures of resistance, surely? not simply inherent in worsening conditions. indeed, how could it be? this is important to draw out, if only by implication.
(2) if one ever needs an example of 'recall' of deputies in action, look no further -- this institution is one of the principal reasons Soviets were responsive to mass sentiment, as it shifted leftward over the months
(3) Volodarsky and Mikhail Lashevich -- wah wah! and Nevsky's warning. All things to consider in context of October 10 decision.
(4) the question of the peasantry and the provinces hangs over the entire text. the Left SRs warn of this; Lenin thinks it'll be resolved with the seizure and redistribution of land. what to do? what. to. do?
(5) the State in the RR -- with respect to the PG, this clearly hinges on the question of why it was unable to stop the war (and, also, why it couldn't pursue adequate reform more generally)
(6): "What is to be done?" on this reading, is more or less irrelevant to the Russian Revolution. And rightly so, one thinks!
