Against the claims of nationalist historians that the Soviets guaranteed the autonomy of the People’s Committees in the North, Kim shows clearly that the occupiers saw them as more of a safety valve and a means through which they could exercise their control more effectively.19 Once an overarching administrative bureau was formed to coordinate the People’s Committees in November 1945, the Soviets made sure that it followed orders from the Soviet civil administration or army headquarters, and all its proclamations had to be approved by them.
(...) But as Kim Ha-yong points out, there was never a workers’ revolution in North Korea, and in the late 1940s Kim Il-sung himself did not talk much about socialism, but rather the ‘people’s democratic revolution’, a theory that Lankov describes as ‘specially designed for Soviet-controlled territories’.25 The basic idea of ‘people’s democracy’ was that the countries liberated by the Soviets after the Second World War would move gradually to socialism via ‘people’s democratic’ reforms, without the need for a revolution like that experienced by Russia in 1917. But according to Kim Ha-yong, ‘People’s democracy was not the path of non-revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism, but nothing more than the establishment from above of capitalism (a national economy)’...
(...) One of the main elements of the people’s democracy reforms was
the North’s land reform, much praised on the South Korean left. The reform took place in the space of only 20 days during spring 1946, and consisted of land confiscation without compensation and free land distribution to the former tenant farmers... Supplying the cities with food required huge state intervention in agriculture, and the peasants were forced to give the government around 25 percent of their yield as a tax in kind that appeared little different to the portion of their crop they had given up to the landlords under the old sharecropping system or the exactions of rice by the Japanese colonial administration.
(...) The nationalisation of industry and the commencement of a series of one-year plans in the late 1940s are one of the main developments that have led historians and commentators, whether hostile or friendly to the regime, to call North Korea socialist from this time on. In opposition to this view, Kim Ha-yong puts North Korea’s state ownership of industry into the context of the worldwide trend towards state capitalism...
(...) [state capitalism] First, there was the complete separation of North Korean workers from ownership or control over the means of production... The second aspect was the relentless drive for capital accumulation under the newly nationalised and planned economy of North Korea in the late 1940s. What this meant was a massive concentration of production into producing further means of production rather than consumer goods.

before stalinism, samuel farber (1990)

introduction

(2): arguing that subsequent revolutions cannot be called 'independent' revolutionary experiments, insofar as they consciously look to the experience of the Russian Revolution. fine, as motivating a study on the RR, but not that insightful when we consider the entirely different conditions that confronted those revolutions (e.g., China)

(3): enormous, key claim--leaders in these other countries (Chia, Cuba, Vietnam) consciously pursued anti-democratic arrangements, which they regarded as normatively superior to democratic arrangements (and not, because of a lesser evilism forced on them by cirmustance). this doesn't go very far, and needs substantiation, but is interesting nonetheless.

(4): yes--"the key question then becomes if, and to what degree and for how long, objective obstacles and crises confronting a successful revolutionary movement can justifiably be claimed as reasons to abridge democratic freedoms."

(4-5): insists that we speak about both economic and political democracy--for while the former is important, certainly, it is almost meaningless unless the larger plan (or 'market) is arranged at a national, bureaucratic level inaccessible to workers and citizens. fair point.

(5): "...the popular classes need political freedoms..."[of course, this is--normatively--question-begging, as he knows all too well; it is the task he has set himself]

(6): Bettleheim, accusing Mao of voluntarism, accuses the Bolsheviks (and Mensheviks) of determinism for the notion that socialism could not be built in Russia.

(7): key, crux of this text: "...while i would agree with Smith that, in broad terms, we cannot have a socialism of liberty while material scarcity prevails, he begs the question of whether something less than a democratic and libertarian socialism, yet better than Lenin and Stalin's Russia, might have been a viable alternative for the Soviet people..."

(9): insisting that political choices and competing ideologies, within and without, did matter "to the particular variety of non-socialist oder that was eventually established"

(9): key, "to say that the Soviet Russia of the early twenties was not likely to have witnessed a full-fledged revolutionary democratic socialism is not to say that whatever decisions the revolutionary leadershipmade were indifferent or of no consequence..."

(10): revisionists pushing back in several places--(a) myth of bolshevik party as monolith; (b) october revolution was not a coup; (c) bureaucratic apparatus was born months after the seizure of power.

(10): aimed at Stephen Cohen--yet, "what could have been a reasonable skepticism about he possibilities for authentic democratic institutions... has been transformed by some revisionists into an almost uncritical defense of Lenin's NEP and Bukharin's subsequent political line..."

(11): good, revolutionary revisionism, in his opinion, is victor serge and ante ciliga.

(12): democracy as opposed to revolution? not a chance, arguing Farber--unlike the "deep-lying Western sentiment that sees democracy as counterposed not only to the necessary use of violence but even to quick and decisive action as well..." [cites Kautsky, the proletariat cannot make war]

(14): four historical stages

1. from February 1917, to November 1917 (or October)
2. from November 1917, to beginning of Civil War in Summer of 1918
3. Civil War and War Communism, from Summer 1918 to end of 1920
4. from strike waves, Kronstadt and NEP (February-March 1921), to the interregnum after Lenin's death in 1924.
   

(14): thesis, more-or-less: "the great objective difficulties confronted by the revolutionary government during the period of the Civil War will be shown to have combined and interacted wit the political priorities of the policies of War Communism" [this 'split', where one is a matter of choice and the other compulsion, seems flawed already--but the substance is obviously in the details]. "this interaction resulted in the transformation of what up to that point had been some democratically flawed predispositions... into a systematic political doctrine of a clear and marked anti-democratic character."

PART ONE: SOVIET DEMOCRACY UNDER ATTACK

Chapter One, The Rise and Decline of Democratic Soviets

(19): origins in October 1905, with 226 deputies from 96 factories/workshops and 5 trade unions--a true "worker's parliament"

(19): in May there may have been 400 soviets, in August 600--not long, then, before "dual power" emerged.

(20): by October 1917, there were 900 workers', peasants', soldiers' soviets in existence.

(20-21): the problem, though, as Rabinowitch noted, was not the dynamism of the soviets, which continued with the Left SRs in serious, trenchant opposition through the early part of 1918, but the ascendancy of the Sovnarkom.

(21-22): more-or-less sensible position the Bolsheviks had, on party-soviet relations; in the early part of the post-revolutionary era, there was not really much of an attempt to dominate the soviets.

(22): "The Bolshsevik's soviet electoral hegemony began to significantly erode in the country as a whole by the Spring of 1918..." Bolsheviks won about 48.5% of the vote, in June 1918 elections for the Petrograd Soviet. [though we haven't yet discussed why...] "Petrograd was the home of working-class Bolshevism, and for this party to elect somewhat less than half of the soviet delegates was indeed a very serious setback."

(22-23): decline in Kronstdat, as well, in April 1918 elections there.

(23): on country-wide scale, "representation in 100 county soviets declined from 66 pecent in mid-March 1918 to 44.8 percenti n the period from April to August 1918" [dating civil war to end-May, and war communism to June]

(23-24): discussion of who made up the remainder--conclusion seems to be that in urban areas, the Mensheviks were recovering, while in general (and in rural areas, specifically) it was Left SRs and especially non-party delegates.

(24): key--"in light of the central concerns of this study, it is particularly important to note that... Bolshevik armed force usually overthrew the results of these provincial soviets..."

(24): causes of this shift, of course, include Civil War, food crisis, unpopularity of Brest-Litovsk treaty, etc.

(25): key--"These types of pronouncements laid the basis for what soon (i.e., in 1919) became Lenin's fully explicit revision of the concept of the dictatorship of the whole proletariat by changing it into the dictatorship of the most advanced workers, i.e. the party. In sum, the Bolsheviks were beginning to lose the hegemony they had acquired in the working class ever since the struggle against Kornilov in the late Summer of 1917."

(26): absolutely--even if the opposition had no alternative program (as Rosenberg argues they didn't)"...given that the Bolsheviks had earlier proclaimed the superiority of the soviet system because of the rank-and-file's ability to recall its representatives, weren't then the workers entitled to remove the Bolsheviks from the government and find out if the opposition could do any better?"

(27): by the Summer of 1918, you have one-party rule in the Soviets--the Mensheviks and SRs were excluded in June (on CEC orders), and the Left SRs in July, after the assassination. [even though, "for a year and a half after this, opposition parties--including Mensheviks and Right SRs--were occasionally reinstated... but following a decree of 28 November 1919, a tiny number of appointed rather than elected non-Communist delegates were permitted to attend the Seventh Soviet Congress in December 1919... with no vote]

(27): key facts--Fourth Congress of Soviets in March 1918 was 65% Bolshevik, 22% Left SR, 11% Other, 27% non-Party; Seventh Congress in December 1919 was 97% Communist.

(27): The Eighth Congress of Soviets, in December 1920, was the last to accept opposition party delegates, without voting rights. At local level, you continued to have the odd opposition delegate, but only until 1921.

(27): in sum you have a dynamic where soviet democracy was degenerated as the opposition, it seems, became more and more popular (for a variety of reasons). this can give rise to a bevy of conclusions--but they all ought to be historically grounded.

(28): key--"it was not during the Civil War, but during the period from 1921 to 1922, as a political accompaniment to the economic 'retreat' of the NEP, that the one-party state was completely and fully established..."

(29): the end of the road--"in August 1922, the 12th All-Russian Congress of the Communist Party passed a resolution...which opened the way for the consolidation and systematization of the one-party state... it required that the Bolsheviks put an end to Menshevik and SR activities in trade unions, cooperatives, secondary schools, etc."

(29-30): increasing centralization and bureaucratization of the Soviets, too--(1) the soviet congresses... only met annually after November of 1918, after meeting every three months before that. (2) the CEC did not meet at all, in 1919! (after meeting every few days in the first half of 1918). there were attempts to revive it, meeting a few times in 1920 and 1921. (3) increasing power was going to the Party apparatus, particularly after the 8th Party Congress in 1922-23 (this was disenfranchising the Sovnarkom, too). party secretaries were replacing soviet officials as key holders of power at local level. [question of how this regeneration of the party happened, particularly given the serious weakness of party work in the aftermath of the revolution]

(30): "by 1921 the party had come to exercise administrative as well as political authority in the new society..."

(30): centralization of the Party apparatus, particularly after 1919 (loss of autonomy for local committees, at the expense of the Politburo and the Orgburo)

(30): 9th Party Congress, April 1920

(31-34): structural weaknesses of the Russian soviets

1. party-soviet relations--in February parties were not that important, but their role increased in importance as the revolution advanced; this obviously threatened the autonomy of the soviets. (parties, moreover, acquired rights within soviets, to appoint officers, what have you--with this, 'internal discipline' threatened soviet democracy)
2. disparities in representation; conflicts among multiple organs of representation; persons often attended who had no ties to the soviet.
   
3. great weakness of the soviets amongst the peasantry, which was about 80% of the country in 1917. no more than 11% of rural districts had soviets in October 1917, it's estimated (though at higher geographic levels (county and province) soviets had been organized quite widely). As a result of all this, though, "peasants were often represetned... by outside intellectuals who did not fully understand [them]"

(35): "as a minimum, this leadership did not see these institutional democratic gains as indispensable characters of a workers' and peasants' state..." [hmm, this falls short as a retort, I think--much more interesting will be the section on potential alternatives, i suspect]

(35): Bolshevik rejection of the Soviets in November 1905--this is a bit tendentious, to read this into 1917 and after, given the infinite declarations of precisely the opposite sentiment. though Lenin is not to blame here, he says.

(36): until general strikes in October 1905, even the Mensheviks didn't have many links to the workers--they, like Bolsheviks, had concentrated on the radicalization of the intelligentsia.

(36-38): key, in sum-- in this discussion, Farber is acknowledging that Lenin was a critic of sectarianism when there were Bolsheviks who disregarded the Petrograd Soviet of 1905--but he's simultaneously arguing that, precisely because of his position on the primacy of the Party over non-party organizations in the tasks of the revolution, his support for Soviet democracy was only ever provisional and tactical. this, in other words, is an ideological predisposition to anti-democracy. this places Farber in the odd position, though, of completely disregarding State and Revolution as relevant to the theoretical formation of Lenin (or, at least, to Lenin in power). one thinks he recognizes this is a weak argument, for this reason. [our task is to think through whether this was really ever of anything more than rhetorical importance--does it explain anything substantive? ]

(39): Rosa Luxemburg on 'winning a majority'--not from 'majority' to revolutionary tactics, but from revolutionary tactics to a 'majority'. brilliant--and one can imagine 6 Spartacists in a room, chanting this in unison.

(39): Farber agrees, then, that you can have a revolutionary situation, where the act of revolution contravenes the will of the majority. But, very fairly, he is arguing that this is precisely why democratic institutions are so critically important--because they can compensate, as well as offering an institutional structure for post-revolutionary society.

(39): importance of the smychka, if a revolutionary Marxist perspective was to survive a peasant-majority society. moreover, the international context was seen as key--"the survival of the worker-peasant revolution in Russia was seen as dependent on its ability to act as a triggering or precipitating mechanism for a more general European workers' revolution that would then help Russia out of its backwardness." [this would be the place to ask if this was a realistic expectation, re: escaping backwardness, not just re: general revolution]

(40): his question (and THE pointed question, in a sense): "however, there is a far more serious problem that neither Luxemburg nor the bolsheviks discussed or theorized about: namely, what should revolutionaries do if they succeed in taking and retaining power, but their wager or projection fails insofar as maintaining popular support and a democratic society are concerned?"

(40): agrees that pre-October Bolshevik strategy was defensible, from a democratic-revolutionary point of view (seizing power, etc.) "Yet, while I believe Bolshevik strategy and tactics in this period were on the whole correct, it is also important to note that there were, within the Bolshevik Party, significantly different degrees of concern... with the serious problems involved in taking and/or holding on to power without majority support" [and Lenin was among those less concerned, he's arguing].

(41): looking at this through Lenin on the Soviets, in the July Days (and the Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party, July/August 1917), opposed by Voldarskii and Kharitinov [but couldn't the whole incident also be read as a reluctance to take power, precisely because of the lack of majority support? Farber is implying that Lenin was pushing for an immediate taking of power, not through soviets but through shop committees--this is not what I recall. though Farber's analysis of Stalin's resolution at the Congress seems right; look at the Rabinowitch, again]

(43): all of this, of course, was made immaterial by the August putsch attempt

(43-44): "War Communism" and Red Terror as "Stalinist Leninism" (Robert Tucker) -- not just exigencies, "the governmental euphoria with War Communism also implicitly revealed the political and ideological priorities of mainstream Bolshevism."

(44-46): main features of War Communism (Summer 1918 to March/April 1921)

1. seizures of surplus grain (surplus defined very freely) [this had been carried out already by the PG, don't forget] this includes the structural invitation to the poor peasantry to press the kulak--farber is arguing that this stemmed from a misreading of the rural situation, with a distinctive poor stratum not beig that evident [marc ferro on village solidarity; the person on the State committee as much an alien as the kulak. but what about Lenin's intensive study of agriculture? surely we can't charge the Bolsheviks with a lack of interest, or awareness of this problem. farber is additionally arguing, interestingly, that there were Bolsheviks who argued that 'poor peasant' wasn't an intelligible political category]
2. widespread nationalization of industry
3. attempt to abolish money and trade [or celebrate their abolition?]

(46): 'War Communism' was neither 'pragmatic', nor conscious and deliberate, but somewhere in between [this is the theme of the entire book, really] -- nationalization of factories, for example, was more-or-less spontaneous; and the end of money and trade, too. "Yet it is no less true that soon after War Communism was established it ceased to be a mere 'situational' response to Civil War imperatives, and also came to represent a political and ideological urge among the majority of Bolsheviks to establish what they considered to be communist (in my view, state socialist) institutions..." [in other words, this reveals something about their ideological predispositions, if nothing else]

(47-48): "Yet War Communism, unlike the later New Economic Policy, had a special attraction for Bolsheviks..."

(49): what's more, despite the fact that he agrees objective necessity plays its part, Farber is here leaning towards suggesting that 'War Communism', in fact, exacerbated the situation confronting the Bolsheviks (it required extra administrative effort, a market could have helped give peasants' incentive to sow).

(49): opposition to 'War Communism'--Larin in 1918, Trotsky in 1920! Lenin, Farber's suggesting, was steadfast in support until the 'Green' peasant revolts in Tambov and the Ukraine, and Kronstadt.

(50): Lenin's position on the peasantry--on the one hand, revolutionary in their struggles with landlord; on the other hand, "inevitably becoming reactionary once they obtained their land." [Russian left-wing populism, on the other hand, was much more inclined to see the peasantry as revolutionary]

(50): "No wonder, then, that the Bolshevik Party hardly existed in the Russian countryside before the October revolution..." [and after the revolution, to a large extent]

(50): At Sixth Party Congress in 1917, no peasant delegates! (In January 1917, only about 7.6 percent of members were from rural areas). Even in 1920, the majority of rural districts had no party organizers.

(51): amongst delegates/activists, rural questions very low on the agenda

(51): when the Bolsheviks did finally recruit from rural areas, as a ruling party, careerism/opportunism were obviously rampant problems.

(51): reasons for prioritizing the industrial working class:

1. corollary of classical Marxist projection
2. peasantry's individualism bias, vs. collective organization of workers
3. predisposition for international solidarity; presumably chauvinism amongst the peasantry
4. strategic concentration of the proletariat assured it command over capitals
   

(52-53): key--Farber has no problem with this, as a theoretical and political stance, insofar as it is an instrumental endorsement of the role of the urban proletariat--but, this "turned out to be remarkably slippery and ambiguous concept, just like the equally slippery and ambiguous notion of the lack of equality between the 'advanced' party members and the more 'backward' elements in the working class... Leadership could subtly and not so subtly be transformed into dictation... This was never truer than under War Communism."

(53): important, re: War Communism: "...it was striking that a major and original contributor to the Marxist tradition had a difficult time reconciling himself to the unavoidable reality that allowing the existence of petty trade was... not a matter of voluntaristic choice... Instead, petty trade was a reflection of material reality, i.e. a very backward development of the still non-collective, petty commodity means of production..." [this is Farber's critique of Lars Lih's article on War Communism/NEP]

(54): in other words, again it's not just objective circumstance--"...I would insist on the inadequacy of Leninist and Bolshevik policies on the peasantry..."[not disputing that Russia was on a path to the proletarianization of the peasantry; but that this had certainly not 'come of age' in 1917]

(55): key conclusion: NEP, or something like it, may have been the only immediate policy option--NEP "may have been the only possible type of policy even if there had been a peaceful transfer of power to the Bolshevik-led soviets, no civil war, and a successful revolution in Germany..."

(55-58): key, Bolsheviks and the Constituent Assembly--"The Bolshevik rationale for the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly would have been justified from a democratic-revolutionary point of view only if we assume that their arguments in defense of the soviet system... represented a genuine and long-term commitment to that alternative form of democratic government..."

(57-60): interesting discussion of the weakness of Rosa Luxemburg's position on the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution

(60): Farber is willing to tolerate a contingent defense of disenfranchisement; but, agreed, that the principle of equal citizenship ought not to be incompatible with a post-revolutionary regime.

(61): key, on revolutionary 'gambling'--"...What is politically not acceptable from a revolutionary democratic point of view is the kind of gambling that involves highly voluntaristic social and economic policies. Given the economic backwardness of Russian society, such policies could not possibly have been carried out without the systematic mass coercion and oppression of at least a major party of the exploited and oppressed classes (e.g., the peasantry). Again, the notion that democratic working-class rule could survive in such a situation is surely utopian." [this is fair enough, though it is unclear that this explains (or objects to) all of what we want to understand in the Bolshevik case, as far as deviations from the democratic-revolutionary line are concerned--

Chapter 2, Workers' Control and Trade Union Independence

(62): executive summary: like soviets (which were political institutions for deepening of democracy), the deepening of economic democracy was "supported by the Bolshevik Party in the period between February and October of 1917... was reversed only a few months after October."

(62-63): 'factory committees' as a defensive tradition of resistance in Russia, particularly in the post-February day [like, but not identical to soviets, which had jurisdiction over a geographic area, and were composed of reps from work centers, military garrisons, etc.--and more oriented to political questions]

(63): Red Guards emerged out of the 'factory committees' -- were only put in the service of the soviets and the trade unions, later

(63): key, though Bolsheviks started agitating for workers' control in May 1917, "... the party of Lenin did not have a clear and unified view, let alone a theory, of the role of workers' control before and/or after the socialist revolution..."

(63-64): except between July and August, when he turned towards them for tactical reasons, Lenin was always more concerned with the soviets than with the 'factory committees.'

(64): key--"However, in its daily grassroots agitation, the Bolshevik Party rank-and-file propagated the slogan of workers' control and encouraged the factory committees' encroachment on management prerogatives... In the last analysis [though], workers' control by the factory committees was, for Lenin and mainstream Bolshevism, a crucial part of the struggle to overthrow capitalism. Nevertheless, the committees had not been much thought about as important working-class institutions in their own right..." [this is critical, but in need of inspection--in other words, he is arguing that the defense of worker control was always tactical, and never intrinsic]

(64-65): a few days after taking power, a generally formulated Decree on Workers' Control--most factory committees (which existed in most large factories) had some element of control in management (nearly 80 percent, in factories over 200). but the devil is in the specific implementation of this decree, of course; in this sense, all alternatives are still made possible, under this decree, from worst to best. [at some stage we will have to ask the obvious question, and fit it into this narrative--even if there were oppositionists who would say yes, do we think that worker control is ever practicable in a war-ravaged, backward economy?]

(65): two different sets of instructions promulgated:

1. Petrograd Central Council of Factory Committees, 7 December 1917--very radical, recommending active intervention of workers. "thoroughgoing workers' management."
   
2. emanating from the Supreme Council of National Economy (VSNKh)--highly centralized system of control "in which local factory committees would be subordinated to the control-distribution commission of the trade union of htat particular branch... these in turn would be subrodinated to regional councils... and ultimately to the VSNKh. Even more important was the stipulation that management functions remain in the hand of the employer..."
   

(66): October Revolution, certainly, gave impetus to demands for worker control--their fulfillment, it seems, is altogether another question.

(66): key claim--"Towards the end of 1917, Lenin decided to centralize in reaction to the increasing radicalism of workers' control and the worsening of the economic crisis. To this end, he also began to turn away from the factory committees and towards the trade unions [which were more moderate, and more closely linked to the parties]..." [in other words, it is--again--here, both subjective/political considerations, and economic/outside exigencies. though a Leninist would clearly connect these two impulses--perhaps justifiably?]

(66): Larin, in November 1917: "'the trade unions represent the interests of the class as a whole whereas the Factory Committees only represent particular interests.'"

(67): the 81 nationalizations in December 1917 involved the creation of a board, which had former management and also factory committees represented--yet management was the prerogative of this board, and not the prerogative of the workers at the given factory.

(67): "Nonetheless... at the very least until March 1918, the center's attempt to control the nature and pace of nationalization, or more generally the economic life of the country, was not fully carried out in practice." [so worker control, as many would obviously argue, as a source of instability? see below, pg. 68]

(67): important, tracking the degeneration, though not as dramatic as I would have thought--on 28 June 1918, War Communism Decree on Nationalization appointed boards, one-third would be elected representatives, two-thirds would be appointed by the Sovnarkom. Farber is arguing, also, that the concept of management was being watered down, though, to inspection.

(68): key, acknowledgment that exigencies played their part--"the real problem of localism was not due to Anarcho-Syndicalist ideological and political influence but was instead a response to objective economic conditions... it was to bexpected that workers in each factory would tend to 'look out for themselves.'... this justified, if not centralization properly speaking, at least a consolidation of leadership functions." BUT--and this is Farber's key point, and where the Bolsheviks fall flat: there can be many forms of centralization, or coordination (a National Congress of Factory Committees, for example (which was proposed, but overruled on three separate occasions), rather than the Sovnarkom. Bolsheviks made a political turn towards a kind of centralization (the trade unions, and the boards) that favored their interests, rather than the cause of worker democracy. [is this a utopian position? i find it hard to maintain that it is. perhaps one might suggest that it would have been impossible to administer a system of national, working-class worker control. but would they have been worse off, had they tried?]

(69): by March 1918, Lenin is advocating 'one-man management', to replace the boards that had been established in late 1917. [though this was not, at all, implemented immediately--see the War Communism Nationalization Decree, for example. It was only by the end of 1920, really, that most factories (2,183 out of 2,843) were run without collective management; this was cemented by 1922]

(69): 9th Congress of the Party, March-April 1920, "confirmed the establishment of one-man management."

(69): increasing unpopularity of factory committees, insofar as factory committee activists were bound to the policies of an increasing unpopular party (and as a result, an increasing lack of internal democracy--reported as early as the early part of 1918, in some factories in Petrograd)

(71): this is the crux of his claim re: worker control--and, in fact, the morphology of his general position: "It may very well be that if objective conditions are highly unfavorable, as they were in the years subsequent to 1918, even the most democratic and proletarian political leadership would have been unable to maintain the achievements of workers' control... and union independence... Yet a national leadership strongly oriented towards rank-and-file control would not have permanently committed itself to the elimination of democracy. At the same time, it would probably have been more modulated and sensitive to the degree of despotism... of the various specific measures introduced." [it could still be the case, though, that democratic opposition to Bolshevik policy was utopian and not justified, even if this were true. farber's point, though, is to draw attention to the fact that the Bolsheviks made a virtue of this necessity, rather than always regard these setbacks as obstacles on the road to revolution, which tells us about their political formation--"prior to 1917, the concern with workers' power at the point of production was by and large alien to the social democratic tradition in Russia..."]

(71): Bogdanov and the Left Bolsheviks, in 1908-1909, were sympathetic to syndaclism.

(72): Farber suggesting that there was a total lack of thinking about the way in which institutions would be managed to meet revolutionary-democratic standards, prior to the Revolution. Perhaps, he's suggesting, because of Marxism's aversion to utopianism. Would more robust blueprint building have saved the revolution, though? Perhaps not, but it could not have hurt.

(7273): in sum, re:worker control, it was a failure of the political tradition from which the Bolsheviks came (not, as others might argue, cynical manipulation of the 'factory committees' to suit personal interests). "For Lenin the central problem and concern continued to be the revolutionary transformation of the central state; what happened at the point of production was derivative."

(73): Lenin on the Post Office and bureaucrats being paid 'workmen's wages' -- but not a challenge to the bureaucratic organization of work, except in this aspect, Farber's arguing. organizational efficiency and centralization hand-in-hand, in other words.

(74): in sum, "the period of War Communism turned out to be uniquely different from the first several months after the revolution and from the post-Civil War NEP. During War Communism, the government placed its main emphasis on the establishment of centralized state ownership and control of the economy with an ever-decreasing element of soviet and shopfloor worker control and ever-increasing element of labor compulsion." And then, precisely because it made a virtue out of this necessity (and didn't defend these as necessities, but as steps toward socialism), it revealed the hollowness of its political vision--in other words, all this was not simply of rhetorical importance. This seems the key kind of argument this book is making, re: the Bolsheviks.

(74-75): what you did have in post-Revolutionary Russia (and this was as far as Lenin got, too) was individuals of proletarian backgrounds in high positions. but that is scarcely socialism--else Stalin might well be called history's greatest socialist.

(75): voluntary Saturday labor becoming compulsory Saturday labor by early 1921.

(76-77): Left Bolsheviks: alive to workers' control and management in a way that Lenin never was. Osinsky's argument that nationalization did not, at all, equal socialism; opposed to Tayloirsm; labor productivity did not mean labor intensity; an alternative national economic authority, involving workers, which repudiated syndicalism but protected the proletariat from bureaucratization. All this was criticized as 'petty-bourgeois wavering.' [Farber's larger point, again, is that even if these proposals wouldn't have worked at the time they were proposed--"the lack of mainstream Bolshevik consideration of and/or support for Osinsky's type of orientation could not but have negatively affected the possibilities for workers' democracy in subsequent years, as the economy gradually improved."

(77-80): Right Bolsheviks: opponents of workers' control (, but a position centered on "the general question of whether or not Russia was economically ripe for socialism." In other words, Lozovsky (and Riazanov) equated socialism with worker control, but think that it was on the agenda of the day--anticipating, instead, a lengthy transitional period of "state capitalism/socialism." At the same time, these were trade union leaders--and thus defended traditional civil liberties, against State and Party interference. [Farber is pointing to the tragic limitations of this and the Left position, but not making this explicit just yet]

(80): unions had played a less important role in the pre-October revolutionary process; Bolsheviks had never been as strongly represented in them, as in 'factory committees'

(80-82): key, debates on Trade Unions, at the Second Trade Union Congress in 1919, and even the First Congress in 1917, which were prefigurative, and more consequential than the famous debate at the 10th Congress of the Communist Party in 1921--in other words, politics, independent of objective exigencies, were revealed in this discussion. Already, at the first congress, Zinoviev (like Tomsky) was asking 'from whom do you need independence: your own government?' Certainly, Farber's point is defensible--trade union independence is not incompatible with support for the gov't. Menshevik case was made, though less convincing; Right Bolshevik case was made, which was very convincing (point about coercion coming to replace spontaneous, consensual solidarity).

(82-83): The Second Trade Union Congress cemented this--Lozovsky, who had been expelled by early 1918, continued to argue for the importance of independence; Tomsky declares, though, that no strikes could take place in Soviet Russia [though they are not outlawed]. "The two congresses did not fully clarify this issue [a State, however, popular, that has not eliminated hierarchical division of labor, needs to give workers the ability to defend themselves, from it]

(83-84): a 'syndicalist slip', at the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party in March 1919

(84-85): growth of the Communist Party, and its subsumption of the trade unions by means of the enforcement of party discipline within the organs, themselves--"...we are really speaking about the end of any significant policy debates within the trade union or in whichever organization the ruling party's fractionali discipline is being invoked..."

(85): extraordinary--at the Fourth All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions (in May 1921), Riazanov presented an amendment, which provided for 'normal methods of proletarian democracy... where the choice of leaders should be left to the trade unionists themselves.' This was supported by Tomsky--his credentials as a member of the Central Committee were duly withdrawn by Lenin, Stalin, and Bukharin. Riazanov was barred from future trade union work.

(85): suppression of the Congress of the Metalworkers' Union (also May 1921), which elected a Workers Opposition leadership-- Central Committee overruled this entirely, and didn't even let a dissident resign in protest!

(86-87): key, the debates over the trade unions that emerged at the 10th Congress in March 1921 had already been presaged by what happened, before--"In light of all that I have just described, the position taken by Lenin during the sharp debates on the unions at the March 1921 Tenth Congress appears to be far less consequential.. At this Congress, tRotsky and Bukharin argued for the complete statification of trade uions, whil the Workers' Opposition... supported the practical implementation of Point V of the 1919 Party Program, i.e., trade union administration of the entire economy." Lenin, of course, disagreed with the Workers' Opposition and Trotsky/Bukharin--but the "degree of autonomy" that he supported (b/c Russia was not yet a workers' state), Farber is arguing, is quite "meaningless"--"Lenin's resolution at the 1921 Congress made it clear that the thrust of his policies was not the strengthening of the defensive character of the unions... while the unions could not be said to have lost all of their previous power, it was clear that they were increasingly becoming 'transmission belts' for the party rather than defensive institutions and/or powerful economic and social policy makers" [two dynamics, documented earlier, seem particularly important in rendering this resolution impotent: the banning of opposition parties from the unions and the fraction discipline being imposed by the Communist party]

(87): contradiction between defensive trade unions and trade unions doing the work of the State, Farber argues, was never seen as temporary by the Bolsheviks, insofar as their independent politics were attributed to the 'surivials of capitalism' within the socialist system and were expected to last 'several decades'

(87): All this was cemented at the 11th Congress of the Communist Party (March-April 1922). Party dominance of trade union central committees; party members could be coopted rather than elected, etc., etc.

(88): some distasteful NEP provisions, for example (reduction in unemployment insurance, lengthening of the workday in dangerous jobs, etc.) could not then be imposed, because of the impotence of the trade unions.

(88): "In spite of all these developments, it still took some time before the independent initiatives of the working class were completely crushed, under Stalin's regime." [and here Farber gives strke statistics from the early 1920s to 1927, despite an official no-strike policy in the unions]

(88): conclusion--"The role that trade unions and factory committees should play in the post-revolutionary transition toward socialism has been inadequately theorized in the socialist and Marxist traditions..."

Chapter 3, Freedom of the Press

(90): importance of the Press, because of relatively high rates of literacy, particularly in urban centers (in 1918, 79% for males and 44% for women in country as a whole; 89% for males and 65% for females in Petrograd)

(90): before the revolution, of course, democratic (even if somewhat eclectic, involving some statification, with the goal of eliminating power of money over press--see 91-92) views on press freedom--"Unquestionably, this was closely connected to Lenin's vigorous support for democratic demands as a keystone of the struggle against Tsarism." Farber is suggesting that there could have been other ways to conceive of this; but this was, certainly, not substantively anti-democratic, even though it had problems.

(92): key--the transition to a closed Stalinist press, Farber is arguing, can be divided into three periods:

1. (92-99) from October 1917 to the beginning of the Civil War in mid 1918: "a mixed press regime prevailed at this time. the press was still relatively open, but the government acted in a confused and arbitrary manner, while at the same time being comparatively mild in its repressive activities--unlike the situation after 1921..." [Sovnarkom announcement of a provisional/temporary/qualified ban on "hostile newspapers"--matter, though, had to be referred to the CEC because of opposition, where, on November 4th, it was Lenin/Trotsky vs. Left SRs/Riazanov/Larin. Lenin draws an analogy to the closing of the Tsarist press, which Farber says is completely untenable; Trotsky also makes some indefensible points about 'program-maximum' vs. 'program-minimum'. Though Farber doesn't think the opposition presented a long-term socialist alternative to the domination of money, they had a short-term solution to an urgent problem, he's arguing. The Bolshevik resolution which was approved, though it provided for other parties, didn't have much purchase, in practice--predisposed to abuses. Really, though, the point is that in this phase--there was inconsistent repression, sometimes even not carried out by local soviets (Mensheviks and Kadets had a newspaper until the Summer of 1918, he notes)]
   
2. (99) "The Civil War that began in mid-1918 considerably accelerated the process of the disappearance of press freedom. Almost all of the opposition press was shut down, especially after the Left SR uprising of 6 July 1918... Yet the government was still somewhat tentative about this new press policy, and was later occasionally willing to permit opposition newspapers to reopen for publication. This was particularly true for groups and parties that coincided with the government in opposing the White counterrevolutionaries.." [Menshevik paper was re-opened on 22 January 1919; then closed on 26 February, etc., etc. ]
   
3. (99-104): "it was only after the end of the Civil War that Lenin and the Bolsheviks firmly adopted policies that moved them a considerable distance towards what later became the Stalinist totalitarian model..." [famous letter to Miasnikov in August 1921 shows evolution of Lenin's views--in 1917 he had proposed a popular freedom of the press; here, his letter to Miasnikov is entirely undemocratic, and not anything that could be defended as 'conjunctural', Farber is saying--same goes for Trotsky in his rejoinder to Kautsky]
   

(102): key--"in reality, the main issue in 1921 was not, as Lenin would have had us believe..., what the international bourgeoisie might or might not have done... As we shall see later, the main issue was that of a divided Communist Party that had just agreed to ban factions... Moreover, this party was desperately trying to hold on to power without a social base outside of its own bureaucracy..."

(103): key--the irony, he's noting, is that in the NEP period, the press was opened up to advertisements, etc. -- but still, nothing could be published that politically opposed the Communist Party. "this proves my earlier contention that the issue was not who published, but what was being published..." ["the party could not tolerate an open political life..."]

(104): a greater degree of openness in "book publishing" (Kadets could publish their party program in January 1918); though the purging of 'popular libraries' had been taking place, under the aegis of Lenin's wife, Krupskyaya

(106): total effect was a 'two-track cultural policy' , which liberated the intelligentsia, to an extent (NEP as a culturally 'fruitful epoch'), but entailed restrictions, still, on the masses (not unlike Gorbachev, Farber is saying--allow some innovation amongst the intelligentsia, but prevent mass popular unrest).

(106-111): in sum--we need a conception of press freedom that is not liberal capitalist (state not ok, but has no answer to capitalist control of media, can't understand takeover of media, and conditions of civil war), not authoritarian/Stalinist in inspiration (cannot have State monopoly on behalf of workers--quoting Trotsky to say, "in reality classes are heterogenous; they are torn by inner antagonisms.") "...socialist points of view would have to prevail on their own merits..."

(112): "In any case..., these limitations on press and media freedoms should be decided by courts directly responsible to the people who democratically elected them..."

Chapter 4, Repression

(113): key--"I would argue... that the unavoidably blood reality of revolutions dow not at all diminish the need for rational policies on the part of the politically conscious revolutionaries. If anything, it only increases their responsibility for attempting, insofar as feasible, to direct the revolutionary rage against rationally and selectively chosen targets..." [one must ask, as he goes on to say--is violence being deployed defensively, or in lieu of political/ideological struggle? right on; though one still needs a conceptual apparatus to defend the revolution against the 'Black Book' types]

(114): like freedom of the press, the initial post-revolutionary period was marked by a "state of arbitrary, inconsistent, and yet comparatively mild repressive activities." but omens, and predispositions, were there--Lenin on capital punishment, on Jacobin terror--"mainstream Bolshevism seems to have taken an almost perverse pride in an equally extreme moral relativism..."

(115): important--Marx and Engels on revolutionary terror, two senses: a 'positive' sense, in which it's a necessary feature of all truly revolutionary upheavals; a 'negative' sense, in which terror is used as a means of 'self-preservation' [here, terror becomes absurd, as Engels said]

(116): key, and the Red Terror, starting in August 1918--not, Farber is arguing, "instrumental or limited in scope" [in the sense of organized for the survival of the revolution], as some have argued. It was "also an instrument to impose what had become, in the course of the Civil War, the government's dogmatic and willfull (in the Robespierran sense) endorsement of the policies of War communism. In particular, these policies were being forced on a peasantry among whom the Bolshevik Party had no historical roots or support..." [it is, another words, a feature of the admired Bolsheviks of late 1917 becoming the hated Communists of late 1918, in the eyes of the peasantry. not just a result of armed political conflict with the Whites, but also a result of failed social and economic policies pursued intentionally against the masses.]

(117): about 50,000 people were put to death by the gov't, in the course of the Civil War [not including insurgents, or people who were killed by mobs, etc.]

(117): it was, of course, also carried out by the Whites.

(118): several disturbing features of the Red Terror:

1. Cheka had no external controls (troika oversight became formal)--it was an administrative agency with de facto judicial powers. this lack of oversight made it highly prone to corruption [particularly the case in the Ukraine, he's noting]. "virtually all the formal trials held on the basis of a Cheka investigation took place without the presence of either the defendant or the prosecutor." [January 1920--Cheka rushed to beat the deadline after the Bolsheviks banned the death penalty]. None of this, Farber agrees with Serge, could be justified by the conditions behind the front lines, in Russia, where normal trials could easily have taken place.
   
2. (120) broadening of punishments; use of 'collective punishments' to punish members of an association, group, etc. in mid-1919, there were some 13,000 hostages; Kamenev at the Sixth Congress in November 1918 had already called for the release of all non-essential hostages [a Latsis' logic, though his incredible statement was repudiated in Pravda; and Steinberg's objection, in late 1917 and early 1918]. This policy, Farber's noting, turned out to be quite disastrous in Bolshevik clashes with the 'Green ' peasant rebellions (often as a result of War Communist policy)--in Tambov from 1920-21, for example (see pg 122-123, where a horrifying decree authorizing the shooting of eldest breadwinners is promulgated)
   

(124): key--Repression against opposition parties was a different story altogether--it was "somewhat tentative during this period... In fact, the opposition political parties actually fared worse under the more limited, but in some crucial respects more systematic, repression of the years after the Civil War when the New Economic Policy was put into effect..."

(124-125): Mensheviks--majority line behind the Reds, against the Whites; in fact, reinstated to soviets in November 1918, after they recognized the 'October Revolution' as historically necessary; harassed by the Cheka, definitely, but were able to have meetings, have an office, etc. "The situation changed substantially at the end of the Civil War in 1921, when the Mensheviks still had significant, and probably growing, influence in the working class. Zinoviev is reported to have estimated that at that time as many as 90 percent of the union rank-and-file were opposed to the regime..." [about 3,000 members were arrested and banished, etc., etc.]

(125-126): Right SRs--many tended to be sympathetic to opposition parties in the Civil War; yet not much internal discipline (those not affiliated with counterrevolution were reinstated to the soviets in February 1919, briefly, after which they again split into many factions). [I'm quite interested in the logic behind these re-instatements--though Farber would clearly argue that they cannot figure into our overall assessment, being temporary blips during the Civil War]

(126): Left SRs--"in my estimation, the Left SRS and the Anarchists were... the only truly revolutionary forces in Russia besides the Bolsheviks..." Again, July 1918 is the key date, though Farber has a more Bolshevik-friendly narrative than Rabinowitch. War Communism put these two parties at logger-heads; however, a group of Left SRs were permitted a periodical in 1920, for a brief time.

(126-127): Anarchists--Bill Shatov sided with Bolsheviks, but most broke in the aftermath of the revolution. Some struggled against the regime--a bomb attack in September 1919, for example. "The last open and public Anarchist demonstration took place when Kropotkin died on February 8 1921" [some 20,000 strong, demanding release of prisoners]. "With the end of the Civil War and the beginning of the New Economic Policy, the suppression of the Anarchists became thorough and complete..."

(128): and this is perhaps his key point, against the traditional socialist narrative--"it is also questionable whether repressive activities were necessarily practical..."

(128-129): important--instead of those who are not with us, are against us--why not those who are not against us, are with us? "Such a policy would have been especially welcome at the time of growing isolation and loss of support for the Bolsheviks, even before the Civil War broke out in mid-1918." [in fact, the implication is that heavy-handedness and inhumanities contributed to the insurgencies--"the extent of the Bolshevik terror was one of the factors that made their victory in the Civil War more difficult."]

(129): there was revolutionary opposition to the Cheka, Farber is noting--the attitude that it was objectively explainable, or necessary, was not "universally shared at the time..." [begins with Steinberg as Commissar of Justice, of course, but includes also widespread opposition to the Cheka within soviets and the party]

(130): struggle of power between soviets and the Cheka, beginning in 1918--to whom did power belong? (80% of local soviets in October 1918 said that the latter should be subordinated to the former)

(131): opposition from individual leaders within the Bolshevik Party--Olminsky (who was on the editorial staff of Pravda from 1918 to 1920; with Bukharin as leader, interestingly, much was published that was opposed to the practice of the Cheka)

(132): the opposition from Revolutionary Tribunals, to the Cheka (established on 17 May 1918, as the proper judicial bodies to try counterrevolutionaries)--very hesitant to deploy the death penalty (only in 2% of all cases). But these were hollowed out as 1919 became 1920, and "the Cheka had clearly come out ahead..."

(133): key--"On the whole, Lenin's position in the political spectrum inside the Bolshevik Party tended to be much closer to the Cheka than to its detractors and opponents..." Though he occasionally opposed excesses in individual instances AND acknowledged mistakes, the opposite was also true (remember his letter to Zinoviev, after Volodarsky's assasination). BUT "most important of all, Lenin did nothing substantive, from an institutional point of view, to significantly reverse the unlimited powers of the Cheka..."

(135): "Worst of all, the evidence indicates that terror remained for Lenin an instrument of political and social policy even after the end of the Civil War..."

(136): like Solzhenitsyn, tracing Stalin's labor camps to Lenin and Red Terror? Absolutely not. Civil War camps (closed in 1922) were distinct from the Northern Camps of Special Designation (SLON) which were opened in 1921 and 1922. In the former, prisoners were paid 70-75% of normal wages, they were in contact with the outside world, etc. The latter on the other hand, were very different--"Brutality was known in these camps," but political activity was still permitted for Leftists. Moreover, these were never put in place to assist the Russian economy. These were certainly part of the heritage of the Stalinist gulag, but not in any kind of immediate sense--it was via the Cheka..

(137): key, the concept of revolutionary 'excess' [in some sense, this is the crux]--"...The power of the working class and peasantry was only a shadow of its former reality by the time the Red Terror and War Communism came to an end in early 1921..." Part of this, Farber is implying, had something to do with the nature and character of the 'excesses'. In acknowledging this, we have to oppose Trotsky's understanding of 'revolutionary' excess. Fair. The fact that there is a such thing as unavoidable excesses (certainly, there are), does not capture what we are really concerned with--we are concerned with "excesses that occur as the result of conscious policy choices by the revolutionary leaders... Neither can we meaningfully talk about 'unavoidable excesses' if the policies of revolutionary leaders are such that they cannot possibly be carried out successfully without excesses. This was the case, for example, with... War Communism..."

(138-139): key--"an 'objective' analysis cannot ignore that political beliefs... had a dynamic of their own and were not merely a reflex response..." in explaining Stalin, then, objective exigencies are clearly telling; but you don't want to discount the fact that there a gutting of the democratic defenses, which began earlier, removed impediments to the consolidation of his regime. "Subsequent objective developments or timely changes of political course, particularly at the end of the Civil War in 1921, might have turned the tide in at least a somewhat different direction..."

(140-141): 'bad tendency' vs. 'clear and present danger' vs. 'incitement', re: free speech. the second, he's arguing, is appropriate for a violently challenged revolutionary government; the third, for a consolidated phase. the first, never.

(142): in sum, a government has the option of fighting counterrevolutionary elements politically, or militarily/police-wise. the second may very well be justified in times of civil war (when targeted, of course); but the first is, of course, preferable.

(143): enforce political agreement is never more useful than disagreement. an irrational fear of the counterrevolution, of this sort, is better understood as a fear of revolutionary weakness.

Chapter 5, Socialist Legality

(145): change in the class composition of the judiciary--by 1923, 76% of people's judges were workers and peasants.

(145): early Soviet policies on crime, before Stalin, quite enlightened--low limit made 17 years in 1918 (though some retreat from this in later years); guilt deleted from official vocabulary, b/c society was guilty; average length of terms decreased dramatically. "[but], by the Stalinist late twenties,... the number of people in Soviet prisons was significantly higher than even during the worst years of the Tsarist period..."

(146): despite objective exigencies, it is still important to explore the "revolutionaries' most fundamental legal principles..."

(147): certainly, during the Civil War, there was, with the general increase in arbitrariness of authority,we must ask whether that can explain everything. implication is that it cannot, in the case of legal principles.

(147): trial procedure--Cheka and the Revolutionary Tribunals took over from ordinary courts and investigative agencies; "we can clearly detect, particularly in the [closing of individual practices], the state socialist politics of War Communism rather than any situationally justified response to the Civil War emergency..." [as formulated, this is not as convincing as his earlier arguments, to be honest--but let's read on]

(147): restoration of the procuracy in 1921! [centralized political supervision of the courts]. But also restoration of the bar, etc.

(148): key, summary passage--nonetheless, "while at this time the Cheka was reorganized and its name changed to GPU, its arbitrary mode of operation remained fundamentally unchanged... this began to express itself in new areas. By the beginning of 1921, the ruling Communist Party had been left with very little popular support and a very small social base. The party had also acquired a bureaucratic apparatus and had virtually eliminated the participation of other partiess. This was followed shortly after by the banning of factions... All of this established the political basis for Lenin's apparently unproblematic legal assumption in November 1921... that the central party authorities... had the right to force judicial authorities to discontinue proceedings against members of the Communist Party..."

(148): staging of the SR trial, June 1922--"an attempt on the party of the Communist Party leadership to intimidate and squelch the anti-Bolshevik socialist parties that had experienced a certain resurgence after the end of the Civil War..." [littered with violations of due process]

(149): key--"It does not seem that the dire objective necessities posed by the Civl War... were the only or perhaps even the principal reasons for the existence of a large degree of legal arbitrariness during early Bolshevik rule. In fact, the central Bolshevik leadership shared certain notions and preconceptions about legality that greatly influenced if not determined how they responded to the Civil War... Furthermore, after the Civil War was over, the dreadful economic situation and very thin popular base of support for the regime further consolidated the regimes' negative attitude to legal curbs on its unlimited powers... Thus, one cannot but conclude that, even if the revolution had consolidated its power under highly favorable... circumstances, that would not have solved the major problems..."

(149): dictatorship of the proletariat, on Lenin's formulation, as brooking no legal obstacles [but really, can we accept this formulation as a key explanans of what came after 1917?]. at the same time, a commitment to revolutionary legality, particularly in the NEP period. "it seems that his attitude to legality was that of expediency at best and of contempt at worst..."

(151): he's tracing a contradictory Lenin, of sorts, but a mainstream Bolshevism that was, nonetheless, highly committed to a kind of socialist illiberalism, insofar as the individual no longer was thought to need protection from the State--that the adversary process, of prosecution and defense, was outdated. [I am finding this section much less convincing than the rest]

(152): Pashukanis' General Theory of Law and Marxism, anticipating the end of the juridical element, which had its roots in capitalism.

(153): BUT--"the efforts by Pashukanis and his followers to abolish law while worekrs' and peasants' democracy was retrogressing rather than advancing could only have the practical effect of increasing arbitrariness and power disparities..."

(154): at the same time, Pashukanis' thought would become something he would repudiate, in the hands of Krylenko, Stalin's principal jurist in the early 1930's [Pashukanis had determined that Soviet Russia was not yet ready for the elimination of the legal form]

(154): this changed again, with the Pop Front period, and the Constitution of 1936 which moved towards 'legal formalism' and 'democratic appearences'--the quintessentially Stalinist legal system, combining terror and legal formality, emerged. Pashukanis himself, was purged without trial ('denounced as an enemy of the people').

(154): Stuchka vs. Pashukanis, which Farber says reminds him of Rizazanov and Lozovsky's positions in the political and trade union areas.

(156): Lunacharsky's initial objections to the first decree abolishing old courts, in November 1917

(157): the fact that the law is superstructural, and revolution necessary, should not lead socialists to dismiss the law "as if it were consequential..."

(158): legal system (1) exercises the will of the ruling class over subordinate classes, but also (2) adjudicates struggles within the ruling class themselves [so this, he's arguing, has clear implications for the proletariat in power] Moreover, there will be--and this is related--clear conflicts between the State and individual groups, insofar as hierarchy is not at all abolished--to relinquish adjudication in these matters is suicide.

(159): agreed--law can help 'institutionalize' democratic practices, and the social and political conquests of the revolution--not just hamper it. "in sum, this new legal system would sanction theend of the old inequalities while helping to avoid the creation of new ones..." [in other words, against Pashukanis, we would in fact need a new legal system]

(159): yes--civil liberties/inalienable rights are clearly indispensable--here Farber is listing the standard [habeus corpus, prohibition of torture, suppression of the death penalty, public trial by jury of peers]--BUT amending one key feature of bourgeois society, by demanding the "democratic election of all judges, and the right for the mass of the working people to recall elected judges."

(160): only a representative majority can decide when certain civil liberties can be suspended.

(160): "...I would contend that nothing in the history of [really existing socialism] has invalidated the Paris Commune ideal of abolishing the separation of the executive and legislative powers. However, it could also be argued that neither is there anything in the history of these countries that has validated the ideal..."

(161): this doesn't require a bourgeois conception of rights, he's arguing--rather, "rights are social relations, which is reflected in the fact that the full specification of a right requires identification of the right holder as well as the person or agency against whom the right is held..."

(163): the question of rights under communism is immaterial, insofar as we are concerned with the necessity of defending rights under democratic socialism.

(163-164): the question of 'class justice' -- one can reward disadvantaged backgrounds in 'affirmative action', but not discriminate on a 'political basis' (i.e., compensate all civil war veterans; not only those civil war veterans who fight with the State) [example of layoff policies taken by factory committies in Petrograd in late 1917--not sacking workers according to political affiliations; and not 'seniority', but 'material need']

(166): In Russia, discrimination in the penal code according to class background, for example, was not in play, in principle, until 1924--before it was employed as a 'background factor', on the basis of which a crime might be assessed.

PART TWO: POLITICAL ALTERNATIVES

Chapter 6, Revolutionary Alternatives

(169): key--"I would argue that these different types of dissidents demonstrated a much better understanding of the importance of democratic institutions... than did [Lenin]. During the early post-revolutionary period, the Left oppositions emphasized what we would today call institutions of participatory democracy, while the Right raised objections relevant to the more traditional democratic rights and civil liberties..."

(169-170): Lenin's most consistent democratic position, post-revolution, concerned 'worker staffing'--but this is clearly limited in its import. No opposition to bureaucracy beyond this. No opposition to party hierarchy, beyond this. [can we say that this, really, is fair? only way to properly answer would be to systematically read Lenin]

(170): but did these different positions represent a political alternative? [interestingly/provocatively, he notes, "the political possibilities for change at this early time were in some ways greater thnan when Leon Trotsky and others attempted to organize a political opposition to Stalin in the less fluid period of the mid and late twenties..."; important additional note is the instability of political opposition--cf. Bukharin]

(171-172): Right Bolsheviks--Kamenev, Rykov, Riazanov, Lozovsky [Kamenev acknowledging weakness of soviets in December 1920; Lozovsky became a Stalinist, before being purged 'for being a Jew' in 1952; Riazanov, in fact, wanted the ban of factions, in 1921, to go even further and become a ban on temporary coalitions (since the former was targeted at the Left)]

(173-176): Left Bolsheviks--"the majority of the democratic objections... came from the Left rather than the Right.."

1. The 'Military Opposition' and the Democratic Centralists--created in 1919; 'Military Opposition' opposed "the introduction of traditional forms of military discipline'--special living quarters, etc. (opposed by Trotsky); Democratic Centralists had a much broader range of concerns--group around Osinsky emphasized inadequacies of party center, another group criticized rights of soviets going to party committees. Together "placed even greater stress on arguing for reformst that would make the Central Committee of the party more representative and that would restore power to the executive committees of the local soviets..."; Shliapnikov proposal at Ninth Congress (March 1920), calling for three-way separation of powers between party, soviets, trade unions. "In sum, the Democratic Centralists maintained that the worst problem affecting the party was the decline of collective decision making and election of officers... Every possible measure (e.g. holding party conferences every three months) had to be taken to restore that lost balance" [the coherence of this group seems minimal]
   
2. The Workers' Opposition--established in 1920, bigger and more broad than the Democratic Centralists. Far more proleatarian in its leadership (strong amongst Union of Metalworkers). "Demanded freedom of discussion within the party, complete abolition of the system of appointments, to be replaced by election to all posts, and the freeing of the highest soviet and trade union organs from too much interference by the Central Committee..." (concerned, also, with proletarian nature of party; proposed that everyone work as worker/peasant for three/four months a year). Most distinctive proposal was prepared for the Tenth Congress in March 1921--proposed the creation of an All-Russian Congress of Producers, which would take control of the economy. [strong in SE Russia; Ukraine]
   

(175): both of these, he's suggesting, were plagued by "disunity" [Democratic Centralists, though they fought the ban on factions, approved of the motion censuring the Worker Opposition at the same congress for syndicalist deviations] and were never contenders for power (unlike, for example, the Left Communist opposition to Brest-Litovsk.

(176): Neither of these groups opposed the banning of other political parties--that was the work of individuals, like Miasnikov and Riazanov.

(177): important--Maybe there could have been a 'tactical bloc' of democratic opposition, he's suggesting? (see also 181)

(177-178): the ideological obstacle to this alliance was that the Left and the Right were working with different conceptions of democracy--one rooted in civil liberties, one in deep, participatory democracy. [synthesis is of course possible; but here it was not politically on the cards]

(178): interesting--the French Revolution, which was at the back of their minds, underestimated the dangers in the event of the Russian Revolution. the latter was a social revolution of a much more comprehensive sort. moreover, it protected private property and thus bourgeois dictatorship, whereas the proletarian dictatorship could only be political (through the state). moreover, the capacities of the central state were much more pervasive, in 20th century Russia than in 18th century France (and the inherited apparatus in the latter was much weaker) (see also 215)

(181): the relative uselessness of labels of 'Left' and 'Right', when we look at Riazanov/Miasnikov vs. Dzerzhinsky; or think of Trotsky's attitude towards Stalin viz-a-viz Bukharin (though Trotsky did see the need for a 'United Opposition' in 1926-7) [instead, as Trotsky re-assessed in 1932- the Right was actually 'Left', from the perspective of the bureaucracy]

(183): the question of the peasantry--as much a problem in the early phases of the revolution, as it was for Bukharin and Trotsky, later. the early Left was seriously anti-peasant, much more so than Lenin [Osinsky advocate for harsh War Communism; though Miasnikov was different still, opposing NEP but supporting peasant unions; Panyushkin in Summer of 1921, advocating 'All power to the soviets, not to the parties'; the Kronstadt program, which called for worker and peasant soviet democracy]

(184): general pro-peasant sympathies in the Russian working-class

(185): The Left SRs--this party was weak politically and organizationally, but could have played a major role in 'peacefully integrating' the bulk of the peasantry into post-October.

(186): The Anarchists--organizational weakness, and a wide spectrum of groups. All-Russia Conference in Moscow in August 1918 argued for many positive things (opposed one-man management; opposed shift to trade-unions; opposed grain requisitions by state in favor of grain requisitions by peasant-worker committees), but also proposed much that was completely out of touch (abolition of Sovnarkom; immediate and radical revolution against gov't, in middle of Civil War!). Strong on democracy/autonomy, weak on need for organization at central level.

(187): in sum--"any potentially viable revolutionary alternatives to mainstream Bolshevism in this period would have had to be primarily, although not exclusively, centered around tendencies within the Bolshevik Party itself..."

(187): Victor Serge on 'mass of germs'...

Chapter 7, Lenin's NEP as an Alternative

(188): Civil War ends in November 1920 [though still fighitn 'green rebellion' in Tambov; Makhno's peasant revolt in Ukraine]. Working class is half its 1913 size; gov't has limited support amongst what does remain [Zinoviev's estimate is 10%, remember, though Trotsky disagreed]

(188): in early party of 1921, a strike wave accompanied by Menshevik resurgence [first economic demands; and then, later political demands]

(189): In sum, "the 'Green' peasant revolts in the Tambov and the Ukraine, large-scale strikes in Petrograd and Moscow, armed rebellion in Kronstadt--all of these events cumulatively demonstrated the isolation of the regime, despite its major victory against the Whites..."

(189-195): The Kronstadt Rebellion--sympathy with strikers in Petrograd; legnthy Kronstadt manifesto (pg. 190), calling for worker and peasant soviet democracy. Some demands anticipated NEP. "Communists belonging to all tendencies at the Tenth Party Congress joined in the attack on the garrison." No evidence for the claim made by Trotsky and others later (as late as his 1938 piece), that they demanded soviets without Communists (about 1/3 of those elected in pre-rebellion Soviet were Communists; the remainders belonged to no party). Emigre group in Paris and naval officers played no leadership or political role in the rebellion, even if they had given technical advice.

(192): key, the more sophisticated line of criticism is also untenable--Trotskyists have said that Kronstadt in 1921 was not Kronstadt in 1917, because the best socialist elements had gone to the front lines, and peasants had taken their place. "In fact, a smaller proportion of Kronstadt sailors were of peasant social origin than was the case with the Red Army troops supporting the government... recently published data [moreover] suggests that the class composition... had probably remaind unchanged since before the Civil War [b/c of technical needs in navy]." The vast majority of the navy had been recruited before and during the 1917 revolutions. "Indeed, what had changed dramatically in Kronstadt was not the sailors' class origins, but the navy's Communist Party membership... I would suggest that the principal causes of the Kronstadt rebellion are not to be found in some far-fetched sociological analysis of the supposedly changing class composition of the Kronstadt garrison, but at a more immediate level, i.e., the sailors' and civilians' profound political and economic discontent." [with War Communism; with economic crisis; and with specific political events, including the erosion of naval democracy (Trotsky abolished ship committees in January 1919, replaced with commissars])

(194): useful--"Specifically, the overall ideological climate in Kronstadt was very close to the politics of the Socialist Revolutionary Maximalists, a left-wing splitoff from the SR Party, politically located somewhere between the Left SRs and the Anarchists..." [anarcho-populism, involving radical demands but also terrorism]

(194): alternative political trend was well-established--even in January 1918, the Bolsheviks had only won 46% of the vote in the Kronstadt Soviet; elections in April 1918, Bolsheviks won only 29%. (By July, of course, Bolsheviks recovered a majority, because other parties had been banned).

(195-199): NEP as an alternative? In fact, though there were obviously important retreats from War Communism, there were also setbacksfor political freedoms--from "tentative repression" towards "complete and systematic repression of opposition parties and groups..." [though this gives Stephen Cohen a very easy out--NEP w/o repression...] This had, Farber's arguing, to do with Menshevik resurgence, insofar as they could fairly claim that their program had been vindicated. "After 1921, repression increasingly became an alternative to persuasion and the open struggle for mass political hegemony [and thus not justified by objective exigency, even in limited ways, like during the Civil War]"

(197-198): in sum, on NEP--"...Thus, in this period, we can also find a Lenin attempting to develop an economically very moderate perspective, moving toward a de facto socialism in one country, and intensely preoccupied by the growing national chauvinism and bureaucratization of Russian society. The latter concerns increasingly distroted and eventually made the Bolshevik leader quite hostile to Stalin's developing power... Nevertheless, at the same time, Lenin remained no less distant from conceiving or recommending democratic solutions to the problems of bureaucracy... The best thing that can be said about this strategy is that Lenin's government was trying to buy time... There is... something very disturbing about the politics of what has often been an unproblematic supoprt for the NEP frequently coupled with an admiration for Bukharin in his 'right-wing' phase in the 1920s. I would call this the'politics of the possible,' by which I mean the notion that it would have been utopian to expect democratic institutions from below in a countrly like the Soviet Russia of the twenties..." [absolutely agree with this]

(199): Trotsky's 'New Course' Policy of December 1923--should have demanded more 'from below', Farber's arguing.

(199): important--de facto socialism in one country, under Lenin's NEP, vs. de jure/brutal socialism in one country, under Stalin [is this tenable? Farber is arguing, following Claudin, that decisions in the Comintern were already subordinating the defense of the Russian state to international objectives, though not at all, he acknowledges, in the way this would happen under Stalin]

(200): odd claims, here, about Lenin's voluntarism re: building of socialism, and forsaking of international revolution--not sure I understand (January 1923). an incipient Third Worldism, Farber is noting, where Lenin no longer expects international revolution, but looking to India and China in March 1923. [it is not really useful,I would argue, to see in this anything but desperation]

(202): Lenin's various party reform proposals, including expanding the Central Committee to 50 or even 100 people.

(203): dismissing the Maoist objection that Lenin never saw the importance of waging struggle in the cultural realm (a la Cultural Revolution).

(203): Lenin's mistake in Poland (Trotsky, Dzerzhinsky, Radek, Stalin opposed)

(203): questionable overthrow of Menshevik gov't in 1921, in Georgia [why not self-determination of nations, Farber's arguing?--it was not a reactionary gov't]

(204): again, key--Farber is stressing that Lenin understood the bureaucratic obstacles that had developed within the party. But his concrete counter-proposals, he's arguing, are shockingly naive, and center on the question of origin/background, not on structural democracy. Not "true institutional reform".

(206): key--Acknowledging the necessity of 1917, the failure of the gamble on international revolution--"what else could have been done?" No Marxist or Socialist justification for Communists clinging on to power. So an alternative scenario: at the 11th Party Congress in 1922, a New Political Policy ought to have accompanied the NEP (a gamble against degeneration)--legalization of opposition groups pledging loyalty to Soviet government; open soviet elections; press facilities to oppositions; closing of labor camps; secret police under judicial control; amnesty for political prisoners. Certainly, he would had to have gone into negotiations, since other parties would have won elections--but he could go into them demanding certain first principles (sanctity of gains of October revolution, etc.)

(207-208): the mix of economic freedom and political repression actually incapacitated workers against NEP abuses by capitalists and bureaucrats

(208-209): key--this, tragically, was never on the cards, Farber has been arguing throughout, because "by 1921, the political views and practices of Lenin and maintstream Bolshevism had ceased to be significantly affected by democratic considerations and priorities... At least since the Civil War... at the very least, an indifference to democracy as a central element of socialism." [citing Trotsky on Workers' Opposition]. But also acknowledging the democratic character of much of Lenin's earlier political trajectory, including views on press, on national self-determination, etc. "In sum, there are sufficient politically democratic elements in Lenin's writings to have provided the basis ofr a society that would have been, on the whole, democratic and socialist.... This does not mean, of course, that there were no serious flaws... viz-a-viz soviet rule, workers' control, socialist legality, and particularly his failure to see democracy as the institutionalization of a participatory and democratic new way of life for the working class and its class allies..." [periodization--anti-democracy fully crystallized in the period 1921-1923, and robustly democratic views up until at least Spring of 1918]

(212): crux--was not a Marxist, but a worried, self-interested (even if justified by appeal to international revolution) response to the situation confronting them at the time of the Civil War--"reacting, more than anything else, to the fact that the ever-growing popular support that their party had enjoyed in the period of September 1917 to the early part of 1918 had begun to shrink by the Spring of 1918, as shown by the sharp decline of Bolshevik stregnth in the soviet elections held at the time..." It was in this context that predispositions degenerated into outright indifference towards economic and political democracy [in particular, insensitivity to majority opinion, which was the 'decisive flaw'--though he's not willing to read Lenin's post Civil War opinions back into 'What is to be done?']

(213): closer to Jacobinism, than Stalinism--a revolutionary arrogance and discipline.

(215): there are healthy, and unhealthy objections to utopianism--the unwillingness to think through strategy/tactics oriented around revolutionary democracy falls in the latter camp, clearly.

Epilogue

(216-217): ah, reflections on Gorbachev...

(220): "the effort to maintain the monopoly of political power has underlined the limits of Gorbachev's reform program..." [again, drawing a parallel to Lenin's NEP; fundamentally the polar opposite, he's suggesting, of the Trotsky of 1933-1940, who was committed to nationalized property, anti-bureaucratic democracy and revolutionary internationalism]

--

(1) partly, we have a question of assessing the impact of political/ideological predispositions, controlling for the impact of objective exigencies (and the failure of the international revolution), in explaining drifts away from revolutionary-democratic principles. BUT it strikes me that the additional comradely argument, here, is that very often that--under precisely those oppressive objective conditions that confronted the Bolsheviks--the policies pursued were very often not advisable, nor principled. they were not advisable insofar as they worsened the situation that confronted them. they were not principled, in the sense that they betrayed a less-than-robust commitment to the tasks of revolutionary-democratic transformation.

alexander rabinowitch, the bolsheviks in power (2007)

prologue

(1-13): summary of the Revolution: causes and events, useful

(2): implication that the moderate socialists were interested in the survival of the Provisional Government because they believed it "was essential for Russia's military security and survival." No real mention of doctrinal commitment -- and maybe it wasn't that important, thinking back to the first book? anyway...

(2): this is useful--"Top Bolshevik leaders were divided into three groups. On the left were Lenin and Leon Trotsky, among others, for whom the establishment of revolutionary soviet power in Russia was less an end in itself than the trigger for immediate worldwide socialist revolution. In the center was a group of often quite-independent thinking leaders whose views on the development of the Russian revolution tended to flucturat... And on the right was a highly influential group of more moderate national party leaders led by Lev Kamenev and including Grigorii Zinoviev, Vladimir Miliutin, Aleksei Rykov, and Viktor Nogin (all members of the Bolshevik Central Committee), and Anatoli Lunacharskii... In Lenin's absence, this group's outlook, more than any other, shaped the Bolsheviks' public political platform."

(12-13): key--Rabinowitch's reading of the events, and his preliminary account of how the Bolsheviks arrive at authoritarianism. Hinges on the two struggles: one between the Bolsheviks and the liberal-moderate socialists; the second within the Bolsheviks (proponents of an all-socialist government, and the Left and Leninists). There is a sneaking implication that had the former succeeded, we might be elsewhere; but Rabinowitch's own book shows this to be highly unlikely. Would the moderate socialists really have pushed to take power, at any point in October or before? More likely we would have had tactical blunder, after tactical blunder--and the continuation of a thoroughly bankrupt and discredited PG. Maybe, even, a putsch would have eventually succeeded, absent the intransigence of the Left. Having said all this: clearly, there is something, still, in reading the future into these first few months, whether we decide, later, that it's illegitimate. Rabinowitch wants to emphasize the intransigence of the Mensheviks and the SRs over the new gov't, in particular. And thus, on this reading, the question of who was to blame is alive, even if its scope/importance is still limited.

PART ONE: THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

Chapter 1, Forming a Government

(17): executive summary--"Bolshevik moderates... did not end their efforts, or those of other left socialist groups, to form a multiparty, homogeneous socialist government at the Soviet Congress and in its immediate aftermath. During these days, they sought to restore the moevement toward creation of a broad socialist coalition that had been destroyed by the violent overthrow of the Provisional Government engineered by Lenin just before the opening of the Congress of Soviets. When that failed, they strived mightily to ensure that the exclusively Bolshevik cabinet ultimately approved by the congress, the Council of People's Commissars, would be strictly accountable to the multiparty Central Executive Committee."

(18): "...Left SRs declined cabinet posts pending construction of a broadly inclusive socialist coalition...", October 26

(19): key--Lenin outlines a land program to the letter that proposed by the Left SRs; and NOT the Bolshevik program ('As a democratic government we cannot ignore the feelings of the masses even if we don't agree with them.').

(19): Kamenev names a new cabinet -- but this is to be provisional pending the Constituent Assembly.

(20): key--Avilov's "remarkably prophetic argument", arguing against the ability of an all-Bolshevik slate to govern (arguing instead for a Provisional Executive Committee which would form a broad, all-socialist gov't). The resolution did not pass, even though about half of the Bolshevik cabinet supported it, according to Rabinowitch. Trotsky takes the podium to defend the All-Bolshevik character of the new gov't--will not stand with traitors, more-or-less is his argument. [about 150 out of 600 vote for Avilov's proposal; the rest are for Lenin)

(21): wow--The All-Russian Union of Railway Workers takes an anti-Bolshevik stand, threatening to "take control of the entire Russian railway network." But then the officer/mass question is open here, as well, as evidenced by two rank-and-file workers disagreeing...

(21): A new CEC is elected, which includes some 62 Bolsheviks and 29 Left SRs, among other groups. The other groups will be permitted to enter, as well. "The potential entry into the CEC of representatives of peasant soviets was especially significant in terms of broadening the government, because most soviets were still dominated by SRs."

(22): key (note that this is linked to the worldwide revolution)--Rabinowitch arguing that most delegates anticipated a return to the pre-October demands for an all-socialist, multiparty coalition gov't. "Lenin and Trotsky, however, did not share this view. They were now concerned most of all with retaining freedom of action for themselves, so as to maximize the galvanizing effect of violent social upheaval in Russia on revolutionary workers abroad."

(23): October 26/27, shut down of opposition newspapers, which could be charged with 'incitement'. Bolshevik gov't locked in fight with Petrograd City Duma's All-Russian Committee for Salvation of the Homeland and the Revolution.

(23): October 28, large part of the bureaucracy on strike

(24): October 29, armed fighting claims 200 lives in Petrograd--more than those lost in the February or October revolutions. But suppressed.

(25): October 28, a week of streetfighting begins in Moscow, also claims hundreds of lives

(26): October 29, Bolshevik Central Committee (no Lenin, Trotsky) agree to participate in negotiations towards a ceasefire, and in efforts to broaden the government.

(27): key--though the moderates in the Bolshevik party were amenable to compromise, Rabinowitch is making the case that this encouraged the Mensheviks and SRs to take an even harder line--it "encouraged moderate socialists to bleieve that the Bolsheviks were on the brink of defeat..." [evidence is Menshevik Central Committee resolution on October 28, which prohibited negotiation; very hard stance demanding exclusion of Bolsheviks from gov't at the Vikzhel talks, to which the moderate Bolsheviks responded meekly]

(29): the view of the 'Left-moderates', embodied by Martov: "...only the formation of a government uniting the entire democracy, not just the soviets, but excluding representatives of privileged society, offered the hope of heading off a terrible civil war, the destruction of the democracy, and the imposition of a rightist dictatorship..."

(29): "...at the first two Vikzhel pleneary meetings and in the meeting of the 'Special Commission' on 30 October, the Mensheviks and SRs stymied all efforts at compromise by insiting that Bolsheviks be eliminated from the government altogether."

(31): nonetheless, approaching a compromise (excluding Lenin and Trotsky from gov't)

(33-34): key--confrontation between Lenin, Trotsky and the moderates, over the question of compromise. Rabinowitch is suggesting that "Lenin was on safe ground in arguing... that the revolutionary masses would view compromises undermining Soviet power and the gains of October as a betrayal of Bolshevik promises [the task, instead, was to take the gov't toward "All Power to the Soviets"]. On the other hand, the counter-argument seems perfectly tenable, too--"Lunacharski insisted that a homogeneous socialist government rather than an exclusively Bolshevik or even Soviet government was a necessity. In response to Lenin's categorical rejection of compromise, he argued that if the Bolsheviks did not obtain the cooperation of the existing state apparatus they 'would not be able to manage anything.' He acknowledged that the party had the option of 'restorting to terror'..." Nogin from Moscow is making this point, too--the importance of "splitting the opposition" [the danger, here, seems to be--obviously--the seductive nature of the counterfactual. against this, it is critical to reassert that these alternatives were proposing to take the Bolsheviks further away from Soviet power; at the very least, this is how the positions were argued, at the time]

(35): "...Trotsky, as much as Lenin if not more, was then obsessed with instigating immediate decisive socialist revolutions in the more advanced countries of Europe by means of a big revolutionary bang in Russia. Judging by his statements, it is no exaggeration to suggest that most of his thinking about Russian politics was shaped by this overarching concern..."

(36): November 1 meeting of Bolshevik Central Committee rejects Lenin's proposal to pull out of talks--but resolved to pursue the talks with more of an ultimatum in mind, on the basis of certain minimum demands

(37): Volodarskii (26 years old): "He was also skeptical about the likelihood of early socialist revolutions in Europe. 'We must understand that having taken power we will be forced to lower wages, to increase unemployment, to institute terror,' he had warned. 'We do not have the right to reject these methods, but there is no need to rush into them.' [!]

(38-39): November 2 Central Committee meeting rejects agreement with the moderate socialists (details of how this was passed, intervention of Petrograd Committee are here)

(39-40): important--Nonetheless, at a CEC meeting, Kamenev softens this: retains minimum demands of the earlier ultimatum (primacy of the CEC, recognition of the decrees of the Congress of Soviets, rejection of creation of a new parliamentary body), but also allows for broadening of the CEC. "The primary purpose of the proposal Kamenev presented was to continue the negotiations. For the Left SRs, these were forward steps. [Lenin's proposal, in contrast, had aimed to halt them]"

(40): November 3, the Vikzhel talks reconvene--but the agreement of the earlier meetings is now abandoned, as more radical demands are put forth by the Bolsheviks (recognition of the Congress, responsibility of gov't to the CEC)

(41): important--Lenin furious at the Bolshevik moderates for wanting to continue negotiations. "He now asked each individual member of the Central Committee not openly allied with Kamenev to sign a formal statement pledging to bring the dispute with the moderates before top party committees regionally and nationally..." [Trotsky, Sverdlov, Stalin, Uritskii, Dzerzhinskii, Sokolnikov, Bubnov, Adolf Ioffe, and Matvei Muranov signed--not clear that all of them were unsympathetic to compromise, though they agreed on party discipline]. Kamenev, Rykov, Zinoviev, Nogin, and Vladimir Miliutin resigned from Central Committee, hoping to touch off shock waves.

(42): Rabinowitch commentary, key: "By leaving the Central Committee and not responding positively to the idea of convening an emergency national party meeting, moderate Bolsheviks left one of the revolution's most important arenas of battle and helped 'ensure the victory of Lenin's whole line,' no less than did the Mensheviks and SRs in quitting the Second Congress of Soviets."

(42): important--"Unfortunately for the Mensheviks and SRs, the Bolsheviks' initialy revolutionary decrees, and their apparent toughness in dealing with the internal and external counterrevolution, had rejuvenated the revolutionary spirit of Petrograd's lower classes, a fact reflected in the expansion of support for Lenin's position at the local level."

(44): all this wrangling aside, key--"In Bolshevik Central Committee resolutions on the government question during this period, regardless of whether they were proposed by the moderates or Leninists, the CEC's primacy over the Sovnarkom was consistently reaffirmed... In practice [however], limitations on the independent power of the Sovnarkom, and the prerogatives and sensibilities of the CEC, were ignored by the Sovnarkom from the start... Similar arbitrariness characterized the behavior of the MRC, [which had become] the main command post for security in Petrograd and for expansion of Soviet rule nationally"

(45): important, precisely because it opens up into the larger questions of the revolution--Rabinowitch noting that if this temporary arbitrariness could have been justified in the last week of October, by the beginning of November, with immediate threats overcome, the persistence rule by arbitrary decree was clearly problematic.

(46): CEC meeting on November 4th: delicate tussle over Muraviev's endorsement of lynch justice, highlighting the issues [eventually rescinded by CEC a few days later]. and over Lenin's press curbs--which were repealed, at least formally.

(47): Over these struggles, Left SRs withdraw from everything but the CEC.

(47): key, for Rabinowitch's argument: "Nogin made an emotional plea for a compromise on the government issue, following it up with an announcement that was as prohpetic as it was startling. As he put it, the only alternative was a 'purely Bolshevik government maintained by political terror...'" [Rykov, Miliutin, Ivan Teodorovich, and Nogin all resign from the Sovnarkom -- all four were people's Commissars]

(47): another powerful indictment of the hardline, delivered by Lozovskii

(48): "...Nogin's announcement of resignations from the government had the effect of an exploding bomb..."

(48): key, a confidence vote on the Sovnarkom introduced--"With historical perspective, one can see that this was a critical moment in the earliest evolution of the Soviet system. The primary source of the Bolsheviks' popular authority lay in the identification of the party with the Soviets and the defense of the Soviets as the embodiment of the revolution. An open break between the Sovnarkom and the CEC at this point... might have significantly undermined the authority of the former... A roll-call vote ended up 29 to 23, with 3 abstentions. Riazanov and other leading moderate Bolsheviks... do not appear to have voted. This circumstance, coupled with the 'yes' votes of four people's commissars--Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, and Nikolai Krylenko--was decisive." [wow]

(49-50): Lenin has Kamenev replaced with Sverdlov as head of the CEC.

(50): merger with the Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies further stregnthened Lenin's position (it had been centrist/right, but now dominated by Left SRs). Official creation of a joint CEC (including also soldiers and sailors and trade unionists) took place on November 15. [it is not satisfactorily explained, here, why the Left SRs, upset with so much else, would consent.]

(51): "...by the end of November, the Bolsheviks had a majority in the combined CEC"

(51): there was a moment here (before the inclusion of soldiers, sailors, and trade unionists in the combined CEC) where the Left SRs could have exercised authority and taken power, but did not.

(51-52): Maria Spiridonova, a Left SR leader: "'However alien their [Bolshevik] crude behavior is to us, we are maintaining close contact because the masses...follow them.' "

(52): question, again, of relationship of Sovnarkom to the CEC -- a decree is passed demanding closer collaboration. BUT, key: "It was not quite that. As time would show, the understanding depended on good faith on the part of the Bolsheviks and left extensive discretionary power in the hands of the Sovnarkom. Nonetheless, for some time, people's commissars dutifully made reports on their work to the CEC. Also, many major decrees, though by no means all, were transmitted to the CEC for confirmation after adoption by the Sovnarkom.

(53): key, and a place, here, to ask many questions--Rabinowitch is seeing the seeds of the future Russian state emerge in these dynamics; these first few days (in a sense, the effect of his earlier volume is almost slightly nullified). Regardless, the argument is that Lenin's success in these battles with, first, the moderate socialists, and especially second, the Bolshevik moderates and the Left SRs precluded the creation of a multiparty, coalition socialist gov't, and laid the foundations for continued all-Bolshevik rule. I suppose when we ask when democracy (or revolution) in Russia lost, we have to ask about the plausibility and importance of the multiparty coalition -- because other democratic, alternative arrangements did exist (what about all power to the soviets, for example, however impractical). In other words, given the bankruptcy of the socialist factions, there is no reason to make a rosy estimation of the lost opportunity wrt Menshevik/SR elements. Certainly, the pragmatic counterargument (that the Russian Revolution could have avoided a debilitating Civil War, if these early steps had been navigated more carefully) is very tempting; but it is not clear that it stands the test, empirically. Nonetheless, here is a place where counterfactuals truly flourish.

Chapter 2, Rebels into Rulers

(54): executive summary--"The collapse of efforts to broaden the Sovnarkom or even make it accountable to the multiparty CEC... meant that in the wake of the October revoltuion the Bolsheviks bore exclusive responsibility for maintaining order and provicing municipal services, and food and fuel, to Petrograd and the surrounding region... Lenin and Trotsky were not particularly concerned with the practical implications of their acts... The consequence of their stance, however, was that Bolsheviks in the city part organization, the Petrograd Soviet, and Petrograd district soviets were forced to transform themselves from rebels into rulers and to reshape or construct new local government and administrative bodies. These burdens led inexorably to the fundamental transofmraiton of the Petrograd Bolshevik party organization's composition, structure, method of operation, and relationship to its constituencies."

(55): Soviets did not assume gov't functions till late November--"Only then, more than a month after the Bolsheviks assumed formal power, did the executive organis of the Petrograd Soviet begin to play a meaningful role in governing revolutionary Russia's capital city. By virtue of being chair of the newly elected Executive Committee and Presidium, Zinoviev, who had restored himself to Lenin's good graces by abandoning the moderates, became head of the Petrograd Soviet. HE was to hold that post till the end of 1925."

(55): November 16, Petrograd City Duma officially dissolved (though elections were held November 27-28 to elect a new one, and retain expertise of the civil service; all-Bolshevik return, of course)

(56): important--as the Bolsheviks saw it at this time, Soviets were not institutions of administration--"Having devoted their lives to fomenting revolution, at the outset they perceived soviets less as organs of popular self-government than as political institutions whose task of consolidating the revolution was by no means over and which would at most define public policy, not implement it..." [the question was why they didn't simply take over the work of district dumas, which were controlled by Kadets and moderate socialists] "Not until late November and December..., in the face of strikes by civil servants partly directed by district dumas, did district soviets begin dissolving them." [often begun by the local Bolshevik party committee--evidence that the overall organization of the Party was still quite decentralized, he is arguing]

(57): "...District party committee and district soviet resolutions dissolving district dumas provided for their reelection. Prepartions for these elections were often initiated, but none were actually held..."

(57): "...work stoppages by veteran civil servants petered out in early January, not because they were smashed or replaced by freshly trained representatives of the revolutionary masses, as Trotsky advocated, but because ultimately most of them were dependent on wages for survival..."

(58-59): threat of bourgeois counterrevolution on the Don (Alekseev, Kaledin, Denikin and Kornilov regrouping) -- but a threat that was overstated by Lenin, Rabinowitch is arguing, as much of their rank-and-file was not motivated to fight.

(59): key to understanding the disintegration of the democratic life of the party, Rabinowitch is suggesting--'party work has ground to a halt' owing to the other demands on its best organizers; "The record shows that during the first year of Soviet power in Petrograd massive outflows of the most effective party workers, leading to organizational dysfunction, were the rule in all districts." ['we need to take steps to avoid being overwhelmed by 'October Bolsheviks' -- by inexperienced recruits]

(61): MRC disbanded on December 5 (it had been the effective governing authority in Petrograd (not the Soviets and not really the City Duma), up to this point--"from directing military operations and policing into such areas as the procurement, delivery, and distribution of food, fuel, and other basic necessities; transport and travel; labor relations and wages; public health; prison administration; and the allocation of housing.")

(62): to gauge popular opinion on Bolshevik rule, we can look to the Constituent Assembly elections between 12-14 November (and this opens into the question of the provinces, of course)

(64-65): the class question within the women's movement -- interesting pages

(67): discussion of the SR platform, which Rabinowitch is arguing was not very radical, save for the revolutionary agrarian program (permanent expropriation without compensation)

(68): Left SR platform was much more radical, even if it "upheld the sanctity of the Constitutent Assembly as revolutionary Russia's supreme political authority." Called, more or less, for the decrees passed at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets (including accountability of gov't to the Soviets), but also for the undoing of the political damage wrought by the premature seizure of power [of course, it's worth adding that they would have hardly have been in a position to demand this, had the premature seizure of power not taken place]

(68-69): in sum--"With preponderant strength among peasants in the countryside, nationally the SRs received the largest number of votes... In Petrograd... the results of elections to the Constituent Assembly were a strong endorsement of revolutionary Bolshevik policies and Soviet power by lower classes in the Petrograd region... [and among the Baltic Fleet and soldiers on the Northern Front]". Nonetheless, thus begins the tussle over the Constituent Assembly as alternate source of political authority in post-revolutionary Russia.

(71): important--"During these days, the Leninist Bolshevik leadership pursued the general directions developed when the outcome of the elections to the Constituent Assembly became known, namely, organizing recall elections, doing everything possible to undermine the Constituent Assembly at a popular level, and asserting control over arrangements for the assembly."

(73): important--All this being said, both Bolsheviks and Left SRs were in agreement that the Constitutent Assembly's power should be subordinated to the authority of the Soviet. Both parties were pursuing, at this time, a policy of balancing competing imperatives: broadening the revolution, and sustaining Soviet power.

(74-75): November 27/28, a 10,000-100,000 pro-Constituent Assembly march of well-dressed citizens.

(76): Pitirim Sorokin, future founder of Sociology Department at Harvard, main speaker at an SR rally!

(76-77): all this protest/occupation moves the Bolsheviks to outlaw the Kadets, which brings matter to a head for the moderate socialists (and even the Left SRs), as it seems to indicate an unwillingness to let the Constituent Assembly convene.

(78): Trotsky and Terror: 'There is nothing immoral in the proletariat finishing off a class that is collapsing... You [the Left SRs] wax indignant at the naked terror which we are applying against our class enemies. But let me assure you that in one month's time at the most, it will assume more frightful forms, modeled after the terror of the great French revolutionaries. Not the fortress but the guillotine awaits our enemies..."

(78): CEC adopts a suitably Bolshevik resolution on the Constituent Assembly and the Kadets.

(79): executive summary of the chapter, once more. He sees in this chapter the seeds, no doubt, of the "organization's increasing isolation from its social base." The question, for us, is obviously whether this was at all avoidable (were there strategic errors made, in other words?). Insofar as this has to do with the transition from rebels to rulers, it is more-or-less unavoidable--the weakening of Party work is something can be explained from the context, of course. But one senses that Rabinowitch wants to make, against Lenin and Trotsky, a stronger critique.

Chapter 3, The Defeat of the Moderates

(80): Left SRs accept posts in the Sovnarkom, despite their reservations, December 9 1917 (see 84, also)

(82-83): Rabinowitch is offering an alternative explanation for the rise of the VCheka, that has squarely to do with the "Left SR" problem--"It now appears likely that the MRC decided to disband not because it considered its role finished but because its radical Bolshevik leadership was frustrated with the Sovnarkom. It is also clear that the decisive factor dictating the Sovnarkom's approval of the MRC's self-liquidation and the creation of the VCheka was its perceived need for a temporary agency, free from meddling by the Left SRs, to deal decisively with the threatened nationwide strike of civil servants and, even more fundamental, to contend with the danger posed by supporters of the Constituent Assembly to the survival of Soviet power.. For Soviet leaders, it became clear that the presence of Left SRs [and specifically Shteinberg taking the Commissariat for Justice] made combating counterrevolution impossible..."

(87): interesting counterfactuals--considered without context, really, it seems impossible to deny the legitimacy of Shteinberg's position.

(88): Nonetheless, four Left SRs enter the VCheka in early January 1918, after much wrangling.

(89): the question of the moderate Bolsheviks (organized into the Constituent Assembly
'fraction'), yet again--based on the "principle that the Constituent Assembly should be the ultimate arbiter of Russia's political destiny."

(90): key--Lenin's Theses on the Constituent Assembly (December 12) -- Soviets as a higher form of democracy--"any form of government the Constituent Assembly might create would be an intolerable step backward from the republic of soviets..." ; broadest use of recall, therefore, and unequivocal recognition of Soviet power was imperative. Nonetheless, the Party moderates were sidelined, quite slyly but explicitly. Details here.

(93): a surprisingly Left-inspired SR program, probably to attract the support of the soviets

(94): Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets, January 1918

(97): weaknesses of the VCheka--in many workers'/soldiers' minds, much like the Okhrana

(98): assasination attempt on Lenin, January 1918--attributed to the Right SRs

(103): executive summary, leading up to tensions with the Consituent Assembly--"...the Central Committee's stance on the primacy of Soviet power over the Constituent Assembly, coupled with the reluctance of the SRs to try to provide for the Constituent Assembly's security, along with the indifference of the bulk of Russian population to its fate, all but assured its quick demise."

Chapter 4, The Fate of the Constituent Assembly

(106-107): Major clash, January 5 1918, at rally for defense of Constituent Assembly--'brutal' killings by amateur security forces deployed by the Soviet authorities, without corresponding provocation.

(111): at this point, though, still divergent positions within the party on the fate of the assembly; nonetheless, plan was to push a program so radical that the Assembly would be forced to disband.

(112): opens with a fight!

(115): key-- "[Chernov, SR] challenged the Bolsheviks to request an immediate nationwide plebiscite on attitudes toward the Constituent Assembly if they had doubts about its right to express the will of the people... Implicit in what he said was the asummption that... the era of Soviet rule was over and that of new institutions to be created by the Constituent Assembly was about to begin.."

(116): Bukharin responds, emphasizing importance of Soviets

(117): Tsereteli, from the Mensheviks, on the offensive -- 'At the present time you are fighting neither Kerensky nor Tseretel but the expressed will of the entire population.' [!] Calling for the subordination of the soviets, explicitly, to the Constituent Assembly.

(119): Sorokin presentation (on behalf but against express will of Left SRs; as peasant leader, really) also backing away, marginally, from calling for the dissolution of the assembly. Influence of moderates, and desire to distinguish themselves, argues Rabinowitch. Raises the specter of the agrarian question.

(121): "All that can be gleaned from available sources is that Lenin arrived armed for bear and, in the name of the Central Committee, demanded an immediate Bolshevik walkout and dissolution of the Constituent Assembly after the first session."

(122): Bolsheviks withdraw; Left SRs walk out at 4AM, after Assembly doesn't vote on recognition of Soviet power!

(126): A few dissenters in the CEC against dissolution of the Constituent Assembly (Riazanov and Lozovskii)

(127) executive summary--"Most important, however, Sviatitskii was probably on target when he pointed to the Russian people's fundamental indifference to the fate of the Constituent Assembly, allowing Lenin to command that they all simply go home..."

PART TWO: WAR OR PEACE ?

Chapter 5, Fighting Lenin

(131): central importance of Bolshevik demand of immediate peace--both to rank-and-file, and to Bolshevik moderates who were otherwise opposed to Lenin's radical line.

(131): Brest-Litovsk talks begun on 20 November, 1917; negotiations on 9 December, 1917

(132): but 'universal proletarian peace', or stuck with unilateral negotiations with the Central Powers?

(135): disagreements at negotiations over commitment to self-determination of all subject peoples, proposed by Ioffe as condition in his opening proposal

(136): Lenin-sponsored survey shows massive weaknesses and disaffection in Russia's capacity to resist, in event of break-down of talks

(139): even still--"In fact, with virtually no exceptions, everyone, either explicitly or implicitly, rejected compromise with the Central Powers" [this is the Petrograd Soviet]

(141): Lenin's views on peace, key--"my reading of the available evidence leads me to conclude that Lenin came to power convinced of the need for immediate peace if revolutionary Russia was to survive but that this concern did not trouble him much becasue of his absolute confidence in the immediacy of decisive socialist revolutions abroad... However, he began to have doubts... Following his sojourn in Finalnd [December 24-27], he made one of his characteristic 180-degree turns, concluding that htere was no alternative to accepting whatever peace terms the Germans offered. The stage was set for one of the most profound intraparty crisis of Lenin's years..."

(142): Left Communist opposition, advocacy of "revolutionary war"--particularly heated owing to proximity of upheaval in Germany, belief that German soldiers would not fight Russian troops.

(143): and Trotsky's middle position--"simply to declare the war was over, that the army was being demobilized, and that it was going thome to build a socialist Russia."

(143): On 8 January, at ad hoc conference on this issue, the Left Communists won handily (32 for them, 16 for Trotsky, 15 for Lenin).

(144): 11 January, this was brought up at Central Committee meeting--Trotsky's position wins 9 to 7 (Lenin's was considered so weak, not even voted on!)

(149): here, and elsewhere, it is Bukharin's and the Left Communist position that subordinates everything to the objective of international revolution.

(151-152): Trotsky presents his position at Brest; General Max Hoffman calls off the truce. But the Russian delegation, at this point, is still confident that the Great War is over; that the Germans won't carry out an offensive.

(153-154): executive summary

Chapter 6, "The Socialist Fatherland Is in Danger"

(158): "For [Trotsky], the aim of immediate, open, and comprehensive demobilization was to demonstrate to the entire world Soviet Russia's unequivocal determination to end its participation in the war and to put the burdent of protecting the Russian revolution, if that became necessary, squarely on Europe's revolutionary masses..."

(158): "Trotsky's final statement at Brest had flowed naturally from the conundrum [that it was necessary to demand more than simply a return to status quo--in line with peace without annexations, the right of self-determination, etc.]

(160): On February 13 (new calendar), Germans had in fact taken a decision, against Trotsky's expectation, to launch a limited offensive, to 'put the Bolsheviks in their place' (on February 18)

(161): the debate re: a separate peace is re-opened with haste

(162-165): key, for two reasons--Lenin continually demanding immediate capitluation; but in battle with Bukharin, who "suggested that Lenin and those who favored peace at virtually any price were succumbing to panic..." But eventually Lenin (and Trotsky) triumphant, within the party and at the Soviet. Further controversy, though, because this decision was fundamentally made by the Sovnarkom, without consultation with CEC (and by a one-vote margin).

(166): Rank-and-file (as expressed by district soviets) in Petrograd opposed, by and large, to surrender? Most were Left Communists (see 167)

(167): key, different point--at this time, the Petrograd party organization was re-shaped, which "appears in retrospect to have been a major step in the destruction of the relative internal democracy..."

(167): serious dissent within the Central Committee (Bukharin, Uritskii, Lomov, Bubnov)

(168): in sum, despite peace proposal from Lenin/Trotsky, increasing militancy in both the Bolshevik and Left SR camps, including at lower, district levels, it seems. [though not, at all, among soldiers]

(171-172): CEC meeting chaired by "tactically astute" Sverdlov, who recognized possibility that peace issue could bring down the gov't (Left SRs were with the Left Communists) -- prepared instead, essentially, for the imminent defense of Petrograd.

(173): important, new German peace conditions arrive--"Could [Lenin] have been revealed that they were not harsher? ... ON the other hand, the intervening days had revealed the depth and scope of aversion to bowing before German imperialism on the party of many if not most of Lenin's closest comrades-in-arms. Surely there are few better examples of Lenin's legendary tenacity and strength of will than his fierce determination to overcome his opponents at this critical juncture..."

(174): Lenin's threat to resign hangs over the meeting to consider the terms. Vote is 7 to 4, with 4 abstentions, in favor of accepting the terms.

(178): And, after much intense discussion, a tense vote at the CEC meeting in favor of acceptance. 112 to 86, with 22 abstentions.

(178-180): executive summary

Chapter 7, An Obscene Peace

(181-182): With capture of Pskov, an apparent German advance to Petrograd, despite acceptance [though they had actually planned to stop short]. Thus talk of evacuating the capital to Moscow.

(183): key -- "The relationship between the Petrograd proletariat and the Bolsheviks, in February and March 1918, had already cooled compared to what it had been when Kerensky advanced on the capital in late October 1917, and this hampered recruitment efforts. This change was partly a result of popular disenchantment with the economic consequences of the October revolution, above all food shortages and spiraling unemployment. Other factors impeding the recruitment of workers for defense at the end of February and in March 1918 included general demoralization; the large number of party members... already transferred from their jobs to serve with Red Guard detachments supporting consolidation of the revolution around the country...; the startling suddenness of the resumption of German military operation; and the utterly confused military and political situation."

(187): tracking the degeneration--in this atmosphere, VCheka given right to summarily execute 'counterrevolutionaries' and common criminals [Left SRs opposed, importantly]

(188-189): order to shoot people putting up posters saying 'Russia Has Been Sold to the Germans'[!]. District soviets opposed, importantly.

(191-192): worker activists committed to defense of revolution; rank-and-file, much less so.

(192-193): key--and gradually (early to mid-March), a shift in the wishes of district Soviets and trade unions, too, who had been initially opposed to peace: "...a major grassroots shift in favor of ratificationh and against the Left Communists..."

(196-198): important, Seventh All-Russian Bolshevik Party Congress, March 1918 (focus on ratifying the Brest treaty, for Party-wide legitimacy) [Lenin here criticizes the Left Communists, AND Trotsky] "[Bukharin] reminded Lenin that, to the contrary, the Left Communists had consistently held to the principle that the Russian revolution would either be saved by revolutions abroad or would be crusehd by the capitalist powers... To Bukharin, the fundamental difference between the two sides was that the Left Communists believed in the imminence of an international workers' revolution." Debate lasts 12 hours; final vote is 30 in favor, 12 against, 4 abstentions. Riazanov resigns. AND Trotsky resigns, taking umbrage at implication that he is to blame [when majority of Party had backed his line]; but takes it back, for reasons that are unclear/undocumented.

(200-202): the move to Moscow, early March

(203): Kronstadt Soviet still radical beyond belief--"'Did we overthrow Russian tsarism and the bourgeoisie to bow before German stranglers without a fight?'" Represented, also, by increasing gains made by Left SRs in the soviet, at expense of Bolsheviks, in early months of 1918.

(203): Fourth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, March 1918 [814 of the 1172 delegates were Bolsheviks; 238 Left SRs; 114 unaffiliated]

(204-205): important--despite "...overwhelming support for ratification among Bolshevik delegates...", Congress hears arguments against ratification, by Left SRs--focusing on ongoing resistance in areas occupied by Germany, prospect of partisan warfare, and the danger of betraying international revolution. Left SRs (and Left Communists) threaten to leave Sovnarkom if peace is ratified, in order to fight German imperialism on the ground--which they do upon the ending of the Congress.

(208-209): executive summary

PART THREE, SOVIET POWER ON THE BRINK

Chapter 8, A Turbulent Spring

(213): amid crises, "Bolshevik leaders staying in Petrograd were also faced with the emerging opposition of Petrograd workers... In the late spring and early summer of 1918, these problems worsened and new ones emerged [i.e., outbreak of civil war]"

(214): creation of Petrograd Labor Commune (SK PTK), after gov't retreat to Moscow

(216): key--"...This was still a fluid time in the relationship between soviet and party agencies in Petrograd. Local party bodies, striped of many of their most experienced members, were now beginning to consider broader political and economic issues. However, they still shied away from direct involvement in government..." [relationship between 'party work' and 'soviet work'; two different attitudes prevailed within the Party]

(220): chaotic, tense relations between Petrograd, ravaged by crises at this time, and Moscow

(221): SK PTK pursuing line of moderation on counterrevolution and crime (not shooting)

(223): terrible food supply situation in Petrograd

(224): 46% of Petrograd's labor force was unemployed, by April 1918; breakdown of industry

(223-225): key--the EAD had been formed (opposition movement of moderate socialists and unaffiliated factory workers), "stimulated by the widespread view that trade unions, factory committees, and soviets, perhaps especially district soviets, were no longer representative, democratcially run working-class institutions; instead, they had been transformed into arbitrary, bureaucratic, government agencies. There was ample reason for this concern..." [and key seems to be the food supply problem; exacerbated as it was by the separate negotiations with the Ukraine, pursued by the Germans at Brest]

(225): key, tracking the disintegration of distric soviets and local party committees--"As in the case of Bolshevik district committees, links between local soviets and factory workers, critical for leftist success in 1917, were broken. Who had time for meetings and agitation among constituents with the Germans at the gates?"

(228): optimists vs. pessimists in the EAD, around the question of worker support vs. Bolsheviks. "Turning point in their strategic orientation" is mid-May, when all issues come to a head.

(231-232): "The growing disenchantment of Petrograd workers with economic conditions and the evolving structure and operation of Soviet political institutions... naturally worried Bolshevik authorities in Petrograd..." [This is when Zinoviev declares that Soviets had become 'Houses of Lords,' and proposes nonparty worker conferences as remedy--as an institution to legitimize the district soviet's work...]

(234): First City District Workers Conference, May-June 1918

Chapter 9, Continuing Crises

(237): Danger of military advance of Germans, allied with Finland whites--jeopardizing the Baltic Fleet [leading to the 'Ice March' of the Baltic Fleet]

(242): "The determination of Lenin and Trotsky to avoid a renewal of war with Germany in May 1918 was not only a consequence of their enduring assumptions about the hopelessness of sucessfully defending Petrograd..."

(243): dark act by Trotsky, according to Rabinowitch--the execution of Shcastny (commander of Baltic fleet), on trumped-up charges of trying to overthrow the Petrograd Commune, 21/22 June 1918 [and this enraged the Baltic Fleet, with whom he was quite popular]

(244-245): antigovernment revolts, also, at Obhukov--"one of Russia's largest producers of [military goods]", and thus hit hard by demobilization in December 1917.

(246): assasination of Volodarskii, June 20 1918.

(248): June 1918, membership numbers at 13,472 (36,000 in February; 60,000 in October 1917).

(248-249): key--new elections to the Petrograd Soviet, announced on 13 June--goal to purge moderate socialists, to counteract the right of the EAD to represent workers, etc. [Rabinowitch looking at the electoral rules, and saying this was fixed to assist the Bolsheviks in various ways]

(251): and election results in June 1918: "the governing parties receieved a 3 to 1 majority among workers." [badly amongst women]. "One is still left, however, with the nagging question of how many Bolshevik deputies from factories were elected instead of the oppostion because of press restrictions, voter intimidation, vote fraud..." [in sum, a highly suspect victory]

(254): repression of the EAD, and the thwarting of the general strike they had called for July 2. not pretty.

(256-257): a cholera outbreak compounding all issues, in July-September 1918 [4,305 deaths]

(258-259): executive summary

Chapter 10, The Northern Commune and the Bolshevik-Left SR Alliance

(261): purpose of this chapter is to discuss run-up, foundation of soviets in the Northern Oblast, whose "primary historical interest lies in the revealing arguments that broke out... over Left SR participation in the new government and over the government's structure..."

(262): Zinoviev vs. Fishman at the First Northern Oblast Congress (over Brest, primarily)

(263): critical--Left SR challenge: "the main social base of revolutionary government [b/c of decomposition of the proletariat] would have to be Russia's still enormous, healthy, and politically able class of laboring peasants...a diktat of party officials was being substituted for class-based democracy exercised through freely elected, representative soviets" [right on]. Goes on to present a proposal to involve the masses, once again, in gov't, in his words.

(265): responsive in their counterproposals--but "in practice, it quickly fell by the wayside; as in the central government, the Central Executive Committee of the Northern Oblast was subordinate to the SK SO..."

(265-266): key--"The debate... graphically illustrated the ties that bound the Bolsheviks and Left SRs, as well as the profound differences... For the Petrograd Bolsheviks, starved for cadres, the Left SRs were a source of energetic, competent personel... [To Left SRs], the Bolsheviks were still the heroic architects of 'October.' They still had a healthy core--the Left Communists--with whom Left SRs felt an especially strong kinship" [these are good pages to look at in more depth, for Bolshevik-Left SR question; though his treatment of this is marred by a slight utopianism, one suspects, insofar as it seems obvious that the Party in opposition is always more capable of demanding democratic reforms, what have you, than the one in power. But this defense, too, can go too far--that is where one must tread carefully.]

(267): key conjuncture--Lenin's 'Immediate Tasks of Soviet Power', on April 29, 1918 ["unquestioning implementation of government directives, obedience to commissars, utilization of 'bourgeois specialists', re-imposition of one-man managerial authority..., and other 'capitalist' measures such as restoration of wage incentives..."]. This deeply, deeply troubled the Left SRs.

(268): key--Another significant source of Left SR anger at Bolsheviks was Lenin's "use of armed force to solve the ever more urgent problem of urban hunger."

(268): March 1918 ration for workers in Petrograd was 1,082 calories! June 1918 was 714! And it was typically worse than this, Rabinowitch notes.

(269): key conjuncture, beginnings of Town-Country--Thus, Sovnarkom (approved by CEC) decree of 13 May 1918 declares all peasants with "grain surpluses" "enemies of the people." [objections raised by Left SRs]. "Lenin's policy of squeezing the peasntry to feed starving workers, and the resulting creation of a virtual state of war between town and country, was implemented on a large scale in the late spring and summer."

(274): Left SR role in moderating (or, at least postponing) 'Red Terror'

(278-281): more useful examples of significant co-operation and importance of Left SR collaboration with Bolsheviks in the gov't, up until the summer of 1918 at the very least.

(281-282): executive summary: "For Soviet power in the region, the period between mid March and July 1918 was a time of continuing crises. That it survived without resort to terror was due in no small part to effective collaboration between Petrograd Bolsheviks and Left SRs, and their mutual restraint in dealing with each other. However, the collaboration was not to last. The breakdown of the Bolshevik-Left SR bond in Petrograd and in the Northern Commune was soon to be triggered by events and directives from Moscow..."

Chapter 11, The Suicide of the Left SRs

(283): tracking decline in relationship, begun in March with ratification of Brest treaty (and continued through food procurement decision, spetsy in management of workplace and army, and authoritarian domestic policies, etc., etc.)

(283): Rabinowitch noting "sharply increasing support for the Left SRs, especially among peasants in the provinces..."

(283): "Thus, as spring turned to summer, Left SR and Bolshevik national leaders were on a collision course that would have serious implications for Bolshevik-Left SR collaboration in Petrograd..."

(284): key--an "especially adverse impact" on the CEC Peasant Section, which was a Left SR Bastion headed by 'legendary' Spiridonova--and had been key in extending Bolshevik power into the countryside from January to April 1918

(285): after mid-March, though, the Peasant Section had sent agitators to organize resistance to the Germans, in contravention of national leadership's decision, of course. Charges of 'separatism', therefore, were somewhat justified.

(287): Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, 28 June 1918 [demanded by Left SRs in face of growing tensions, Rabinowitch suggests]

(287): by this time, though, internal dissent within the Bolshevik Party had died down; little prospect of a Left Communist-Left SR alliance.

(287-288): key-- Mensheviks and SRs were expelled June 14, probably to tip the numbers more favorably in the Bolsheviks' favor--final delegates numbered 678 for the Bolsheviks, and 269 for the Left SRs. Rabinowitch arguing that "there is, in fact, substantial circumstantial evidence that the huge Bolshevik majority in the congress was fabricated, and that the number of legitimately elected Left SR delegates was roughly equal to that of the Bolsheviks..."

(288-289): deeply unsavory picture of the Bolsheviks emerging in these pages.

(290): nonetheless--and this is the "suicide"--Left SR Central Committee authorized, in July 1918, the assasination the German Ambassador, Count Mirbach, in a hope to re-open the war.

(292-293): "...still convinced that all-out war with Germany would be an unmitigated disaster for the revolutionary cause, Lenin quickly recovered and focused on showing the Germans that the Bolsheviks were quite capable of easily handling the Left SRs. The catch was that it was by no means clear that the organized military forces immediately available to him were a match for those at the disposal of the Left SRs..."

(294): key--Rabinowith arguing, quite fairly, that it was not an uprising against 'Soviet power', as Lenin accused it of being, as much as it was "consistent with the objective of reshaping the policies of the Leninist Sovnarkom..."

(294): "more than four hundred Left SRs, mostly rank-and-file members, were caught and an uncertain number were summarily shot..." [!] [Others were detained and arrested--Spiridonova, for example, held in prison until November 1918]. All Left SRs expelled from responsible positions in gov't (though not membership, it seems); Peasant Section was gutted.

(295): absolutely key, tracking the degeneration--Soviet constitution passed at the Fifth Congress (July 1918). "...The constitution perpetuated the fiction that the elective All-Russian Congress of Soviets was the highest organ of state authority, and that between its convocations, except in dire emergencies, the Sovnarkom was subordinate to the CECE, which was the supreme legislative, administrative, and controlling organ of government; in practice, however, the opposite prevailed. Between the Fifth Congress in July 1918 and the Sixth Congress the following November, the CEC assembled only eight times (as a rule, the Sovnarkom met daily), and, with the Mensheviks, SRs, and Left SRs effectively excluded, its meetings were largely ceremonial..."

(295-296): The first constitution legislated dominance of City over Town, with differential rates of representation (1 deputy for 25,000 electors in city soviets; 1 deputy for 125,000 electors in provincial soviets)

(297): Bolshevik authorities in Petrograd heard about the assasination before Petrograd Left SRs!

(302): interesting--by the time of the Fifth Congress, the Left SRs have a majority in the Kronstadt Soviet--"adopted a resolution [there] expressing aversion to centralized dictatorial government as a violation of the principle 'All Power to the Soviets' and a throwback to bourgeois systems of government." Kronstandt Soviet dissolved, and their newspaper (in operation since March 1917) shut down, on July 9, 1918.

(302-305): nonetheless, Petrograd Left SRs defiant, since obvoiusly the Bolshevik story of an 'attack on Soviet power' they knew to be untrue--most stood by their Central Committee's decision to assasinate Count Mirbach.

(306): key--none of this marks the complete exist of Left SRs from gov't, partly because of the severe shortage of cadres; but it does mark the end of them as a collective force in revolutionary politics, it seems. "The end of the Bolshevik-Left SR alliance marked the decisive turn to one-party government in Soviet Russia. Around the same time, government centralization in Petrograd was advanced by the abrogation of the taxing powers of district soviets..."

(307-309): executive summary

(309): "Despite their skyrocketing stregnth in the countryisde before Mirbach's assassination, the Left SRs never recovered from the battering they received at the hands of the Bolsheviks following their impetuous act." [ah, the counterfactuals!]

PART FOUR: CELEBRATION AMID TERROR

Chapter 12, The Road to 'Red Terror'

(313): key--"The summer of 1918 saw a hardening of policies toward real and potential counterrevolution in Petrograd... These threats grew with astounding speed... The drift to Red Terror in Petrograd and other Russian cities during the late summer of 1918 grew out of the insecurity caused by these ominous developments. Factors often cited for causing the Terror, such as pressure from Lenin, the assassinations of Volodarskii and Uritskii, and the unsuccessful attempt to kill Lenin, played a less significant role..."

(318): mid summer 1918, "...Uritskii still resisted the extremist tide at a time when the Cheka in Moscow was already arbitrarily shooting class enemies and when, for practical purposes, unofficial Red Terror was in full sway there and in other Russian cities..."

(319): By late spring, Western allies (especially Britain and France) had started to support various anti-Bolshevik movements "friendly to the cause of pursuing the war against Germany to victory, at first primarily with large infusions of money." [real intervention beginst August 2]

(320): conscription into Red Army begins at the end of June, 1918 [further compromises Party work]

(323): Lockhart "conceded that the Allied intervention was an indirect cause of the Red Terror. There is a kernel of truth in that, at least insofar as Petrograd is concerned..."

(324): By August, Uritskii was "losing ground to advocates of 'Red Terror' in the SK SO..." [19 August seems to mark the start date, as regards the PCheka; first mass shooting was on the 21 of August--quite chilling, but they all are, aren't they?]

(326): Uritskii assasination, on August 30, 1918

(329): attempted assasination of Lenin on same day, at speech to factory workers.

Chapter 13, The Red Terror in Petrograd

(330): "The fundamental aim of the Red Terror in Petrograd, in the fall of 1918, was to ensure political stability at a time when the city was being stripped of its security forces..."

(333): About 800 were shot in Petrograd in the fall of 1918, in total; and 500 by the Kronstadt Cheka [but probably more, Rabinowitch is noting, since this doesn't include 'lynch justice']

(340): some alarm, at local levels (Trade Union Council), at the "indiscriminate character of the Red Terror" (September 1918). [errors were made, Bolsheviks shot]

(342): Zinoviev on the Red Terror, at the Seventh City Conference

(342): Riazanov objections to blood-stained red banners

(343-344): key--all this, of course, exacerbated the dire straits the Bolsheviks found themselves in--by September 1918, membership stood at around 6,000 (according to Fitzpatrick, remember, a year earlier it had been 60,000).
And 40% of the members had joined after October! "Clearly, then, mobilization of experienced Bolsheviks for positions in the Red Army and food procurement detachments... had drastically altered the proportion of party veterans to newcomers to the detriment of the party organization." [additionally, only 10% were women; a tiny, tiny fraction were educated]

(349): key--in late 1918, 'failed rebellion' of Left SR-led Second Baltic Fleet Detachment [owing, in large part, to 'conscription'--additionally, "many of the mobilized sailors came from rural villages where Left SR influence still predominated"], in a pattern of events that "foreshadowed the Kronstadt revolt of March 1921." Horrific conditions--more than half did not have shoes! Demanding a return to the gov't of the soviets, nullification of Brest, etc.

(355): important--Eleven of the leaders of the rebellion were shot. Goodness. Crew of another battleship "boldly protested what it termed the 'brutal massacre of genuine proletarians who, because of genuine, truly terrible hunger, participated in nothing more than a hunger riot which was later dubbed an anti-Soviet insurrection.'"

(355): executive summary

Chapter 14, Celebrating 'The Greatest Event in the History of the World'

(357): In the fall of 1918, euphoria over the C. European upheavals.

(371): Moscow-Petrograd rivalry, in part over the autonomy of the Northern Commune as an institution of gov't.

(371): Sixth All-Russian Congress called for 6 November, 1918--primarily to discuss changed international situation, after WWI

(376-377): Zinoviev predicting a Socialist Europe within a few years.

(378-382): large turnout to the anniversary celebrations. "By all accounts, it was a mass festival unlike any Petrograd had ever witnessed."

(380-381): Zinoviev keynote speaker; never mind his position, a year ago!

(382): 100,000 workers marching (only 6,000 members or so, remember)!

(386): In a celebration in a surrounding village: "the crowd gatehred around a 'bonfire of the revolution' to witness the burning of efficies of tormentors and servatns of the old regime... To the author of this acount, an unforgettable sight was the gray-bearded men who had learned about the torment of serfs imposed by landowners fom their fathers and grandfathers dancing in childlike merriment around the bonfire..."

(387-388): executive summary--increasing power of Central Bureau (and governmental agencies, more generally) over district Soviets

Chapter 15, Price of Survival

(389-401): executive summary of entire argument

(390): "In retrpospect, their [the Bolshevik moderates] thinking about the longer-term dangers of an exclusively Bolshevik assumption of power in backward Russia appears very wise..."

(390): key--"Neither revolutionary ideology nor an established pattern of dictatorial behavior are of much help to explain fundametnal changes in the character and political role of the Bolshevik party..., although the impact of both cannot be entirely discounted. The fact is that the Petrograd Bolsheviks had to transform themselves from rebels into rulers without benefit of an advance plan... Most significant in shaping the earliest evolution of party and soviet bodies, their relationship to each other, and the Soviet political system generally, were the realiteis the Bolsheviks faced in their often seemingly hopeless struggle for survival."

(391-393): absolutely key, in sum--"Three factors explain the relatively weak leadership role of the Petrograd Bolshevik party organizatoin during the first months of Soviet rule. Initially, the most important of these was the lack of any special concern.. with the institutionalization of an authoritative and exlusive directing role for party organs in government. Most historians of Soviet Russia have assumed [this]... However, the large body of relevant sources... leaves no room for doubt that for some time the need for a highly structured, all-powerful, centralized party dictatorship was by no means apparent to most Petrograd Bolsheviks... A second factor that helps explain the weak leaderhip... was that, between January and April 1918, it was a participant in... the bitter intraparty conflict over ratificatoin of the Brest treaty... The debilitating effects of the controversy on the party... were not eased until late March... at the emergency Fifth Conference... when the Left Communists were defeated... A final factor contributing to the ineffectiveness of the Petrograd Bolshevik organizatoin at this juncture was the colossal attrition of its most reliable and qualified personnel... The close, interactive linkages between the Petrograd party organization and factory workers, soldiers, and sailors that had been key to the development of popular political programs... were shattered."

(396): key--"The Left SRs provided Soviet power with a critically important link to the countryside. Had the Bolshevik-Left SR alliance survived, it seems likely that the Russian civil war would have been significantly less torturous..."

(397): changing relationship between the Petrograd Soviet and district soviets is dated to fall of 1918, when the latter start to surrender their independence and start to fall in line with directives from above.

(398): "The burden of existing evidence indicates that these events can best be understood as the culmination of a gradual process during which the moderating influence of such key individuals as Uritskii, Krestinksii, and Proshian was replaced by pressure for systematic Red Terror, in part 'from below.'"

(401): ends with dismissiveness towards the German Revolution, in the sense that it is never implied--in his account--that it could have gone past the moderate phase. in fact, as he argues, it was self-consciously repudiating Bolshevik extremism (the important questions, though, and counterfactuals, are left unaddressed.)

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(1) surely the most important question to ask is the role of the international justification--is it ever anything but utopian? and what then could have been done [/ought to have been done], best, absent this hope? although remember, the deployment of this justification changes across issues, over time, and with its purveyors (it is the Left Communists' justification for revolutionary war in February 1918, for example; and always, also, the Left SRs justification for much of policy pursued in the first half of 1918)

(2) the Left SR position on dissent and terror often seems decidedly more principled than the Bolsheviks--and doesn't, unlike the Mensheviks/SRs, seem to sacrifice the revolution. surely questions are raised here, then? alternatives, though?

(3) as he comes closer and closer to tracking the degeneration, it's quite clear that the Bolsheviks are less and less to be absolved (particularly in the way in which the composition of the Fourth and Fifth Congress of Soviets was tinkered with). But condemnation has to be historical, and comradely--where, again, are the strategic errors that could have been realistically avoided? On the part of the Bolsheviks, since the Left SR blunder is obvious.

(4) question of the peasantry--would it be possible to argue that the gutting of the Peasant Section, with the demise of the Left SRs, sowed the seeds for much of what would come to pass in the Civil War and after? Or is that simply utopian, and too easy?