French politicians spoke about their “civilising mission” in Algeria. This was a monstrous lie. In 1834 a French general reported that virtually all the native population could read and write, with schools for boys and girls in each village. A century later only a quarter of the Muslim population could read Arabic. Less than one in ten could read French.
(...) [Setif:] But now the settlers wanted to assert their power. Large numbers of troops were brought in, including Senegalese soldiers, who unfortunately did not make common cause with the local population... Probably at least 15,000 died, though some claim as many as 50,000. Even on the lowest estimate, the Europeans killed 50 Muslims for every European life lost.
Showing posts with label french imperialism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label french imperialism. Show all posts
Tuesday, August 4, 2009
Monday, August 3, 2009
"damming the flood: haiti, aristide, and the politics of containment," peter hallward
take-home: primarily, the book is a thoroughly convincing chronicle of the savage, imperial war waged by haiti's comprador elites (and their foreign backers in the US, France, Canada, and the UN) against the haitian people. much of the narrative centers on the person of jean-bertrand aristide--but as aristide himself insists in the interview first published in the LRB and reproduced in the back of the book, this framing of the destabilization campaign(s)--the marketing of the interventions as "humanitarian" and "popular" and directed surgically against only his person--serve to deflect attention from the real issues at-hand: namely, the indisputable fact that this campaign sought to protect, primarily, the thoroughly corrupt morphology of haitian society. it was an expression of the tragic power wielded by the landed elite and their bourgeois comrades-in-arms, arrayed as it was against the simple popularity and resounding base of lavalas ("the flood").
naturally, for a narrative as unfamiliar to the mainstream as this one, much of what hallward writes is deconstructive--his primary task is to expose the well-worn narratives of the coup-makers, according to which aristide embodies exactly what he and his movement have spent their political lives fighting (illegitimate authority, unjustifiable violence, and so on). here, i suppose, it is appropriate to note the critical reviews of hallward's book, which argue he has been too kind to aristide. but his critic (i speak here of the deibert review), let's be honest, has missed the point: hallward's book is not a "defense" of the aristide regime, insofar as defense requires deification (as deibert seems to believe--hence his logic that the several crimes committed by pro-aristide groups put aristide beyond redemption) . rather, it is an attempt to understand the ways in which this indisputably popular movement (was) collapsed. this is where hallward is triumphant, in my estimation.
his argument, approximately, is that we cannot make sense of the scandalous history told here unless we appreciate these few facts: (a) aristide and lavalas were overhwelmingly popular, as proved by the results of the 1990, 1996, 2000 (2x), and 2006 elections; (b) aristide and lavalas were constrained by the political and economic exigencies of the age (haiti's dependence on foreign aid for its budget, the 1994 compromise with clinton, the "impossibility" of fighting the elite on their own terms (i.e., violently and with weapons); (c) aristide, though linked to the violence in slums (which hallward rightly, against deibert's myopia, insists on contextualizing and politicizing), was far, far, far less repressive/violent than the regimes that preceded or succeeded him, or the "opposition" that "resisted" him; (d) aristide, qua radical theologian of liberation and leader of lavalas, was an uncompromising threat to the privileges of the haitian and international elite.
all of this, it needs repeating, is backed by copious statistics, research, and analysis. it is somewhat ironic that deibert's review targets precisely this element of hallward's book, given that deibert's central rebuttal, weak as it is (in the review, at least; i have not read the book), is backed first and foremost by information gleaned from interviews he himself conducted. in general, deibert's principal charge that a voyeuristic and naive hallward interviewed only aristide partisans is patently false. they inform the narrative of the book, of course, but this only complements the research. after all, hallward's insistence on remaining political is critical, i would say; it is precisely his insistence on understanding aristide as an activist--with the critical sympathy borne of solidarity--that makes this book. deibert, it seems, instead takes refuge under the (surreptitiously political) umbrella of a-politics: at best, "they're all bad, everyone's violent, it's all a mess." at its worst, of course, this conscience is activated inconsistently (or, rather, when the Empire comes calling), thereby never becoming more than a hackneyed cover for reactionary politics.
in other words, hallward's insistence on foregrounding structural violence, the changing contours of this violence owing to the elite and imperial insistence on neo-liberal compromises and state under-funding, the political history of haiti's repressive arms--all this informs the discussion of aristide's relationship to the "chimeres", as it must. without it, one will invariably lose themselves in deibert's journalistic moralizing.
that is the crux, and it is highly invigorating reading. a few points of interest, beyond this, though:
(1) exculpation--as already alluded to, hallward tries to balance, in his book, the rightly political nature of his work (qua defense of aristide against Empire and Reaction) with the equally appropriate (and tactical) character of his disagreements with some of aristide's individual decisions. the fact that these criticisms are generally articulated through his interviews with lavalas' activists adds a commendable layer of authenticity and honesty to his critique (though, against deibert, we have to insist that this is not, nor should it be, necessary). in particular, i think, aristide's 1994 decision to grant bill clinton his post-somalia "foreign policy victory" and return to haiti in a neoliberal straightjacket must be scrutinized--not, again, as a decision made by a power-hungry despot deserves to be decried, but rather as the tortured calculus of a comrade might be criticized. (in some sense, in the difference between these two attitudes, i think, lies everything worth fighting for--as soon as we abandon all attempts at making this distinction, it is over.) at some point in the book hallward mentions, through a FL activist, that it may have been better to prolong the democratic struggle than to return with clinton. this is important--though, again, simultaneously a decision that ought not to be pretentiously made by us, as readers, external to the struggle (again: hallward balances these twin necessities--of critique and of hostility to pretense--very, very well in the book).
(2) foreign conniving (USAID, UN, NGOs)--hallward, too, is tireless in his attempt to expose today's civilizing mission ("democracy promotion"). we are obligated, as everyone but the fools these days understands, to reject a priori the Empire and its military tentacles--to remain forever opposed to "hard power." but the theoretically-sophisticated and empirically-rich rebuttal of "soft power", here, is very valuable for reasons sometimes (though not very often, i guess) forgotten. it was, in haiti, this that stands out: (a) the all-too-obvious ways in which the ambitions and agenda of "soft power" are always constituted by "hard power"--it was the agenda and priorities of the US government that USAID and these NGOs towed; (b) the theoretical bankruptcy of "soft power," itself, when counterposed to the overwhelmingly popular force being deemed anti-democratic (here, again, we have the people--in whose name this treachery is being conducted--stripped of their subjectivity in order to be cast as objects fit for intervention and re-education).
as a critique reproduced by hallward emphasized, the bourgeois civil society "trained" and "constituted" by this bevy of NGOs is aristocratic, in form and inspiration. this comprador elite mobilize to tame politics precisely when their world is called into question. they then discover "democracy" and "human rights" and "student movements." "democracy promotion," as hallward argues, therefore represents the calling card of those who can afford to have discovered politics only once they're challenged by the consequences of its genuine flourishing. and the democracy promoters they enlist, of course, are precisely those who live off of politics, without living in it.
(3) reparations--the stunningly bankrupt story behind aristide's failed call for reparations needs to be made more widely known. in 1825, in order to lift the crippling blockade imposed on the newly free colony, haiti paid france 150 million francs (equivalent to france's annual revenue at the time; later the indemnity was reduced, generously, to 90 million ) as punishment for having freed itself. aristide, once it was clear that the international community was intent on suffocating his government by denying him aid, made this the rallying point of the bicentennial celebrations in 2004. haiti calculated that it was owed $21 billion dollars, give or take (at 5% interest). regis debray(!) headed the "commission on reflection" that recommended, to chirac, that they were NOT obligated to pay haiti back. hasta la victoria siempre, regis? (credit where credit is due: paul farmer delivered a brilliant speech to this committee, urging them to fork it out)
(4) populism, popularity, and the Party--hallward's correct insistence on the unremitting popularity of aristide does raise the spectre of populism. but perhaps it's sufficient to defer to his parallel observations about the strength of the people's self-organization, which is perhaps what defines the distinction between genuine and false popularity. after all, as laclau probably suggested in that book i never read, invoking the label of populism is as good (or rather, as bad) as calling the people stupid--and invariably tells us more about the sectarian doing the labeling, than the people. (the next step, of course, is to run off and become a hitchens or horowitz.)
more importantly, i'd argue, aristide raises some critical points about the party and "discipline," in the concluding interview. it is striking, in particular, to note the way in which he insists on the spontaneous, decentralized origins without presenting them as antithetical to the goal of "internal discipline" that he later introduces. it was refreshing to hear this--namely, that someone with years of experience with a genuinely popular politics understands, still, that we need not counterpose self-emancipation to discipline. in this fine balance, i think, lies our salvation.
(5) hope--only a direct quote will do:
for future reference, an abridged timeline (see page 155 for statistics on violence):
take-home: primarily, the book is a thoroughly convincing chronicle of the savage, imperial war waged by haiti's comprador elites (and their foreign backers in the US, France, Canada, and the UN) against the haitian people. much of the narrative centers on the person of jean-bertrand aristide--but as aristide himself insists in the interview first published in the LRB and reproduced in the back of the book, this framing of the destabilization campaign(s)--the marketing of the interventions as "humanitarian" and "popular" and directed surgically against only his person--serve to deflect attention from the real issues at-hand: namely, the indisputable fact that this campaign sought to protect, primarily, the thoroughly corrupt morphology of haitian society. it was an expression of the tragic power wielded by the landed elite and their bourgeois comrades-in-arms, arrayed as it was against the simple popularity and resounding base of lavalas ("the flood").
naturally, for a narrative as unfamiliar to the mainstream as this one, much of what hallward writes is deconstructive--his primary task is to expose the well-worn narratives of the coup-makers, according to which aristide embodies exactly what he and his movement have spent their political lives fighting (illegitimate authority, unjustifiable violence, and so on). here, i suppose, it is appropriate to note the critical reviews of hallward's book, which argue he has been too kind to aristide. but his critic (i speak here of the deibert review), let's be honest, has missed the point: hallward's book is not a "defense" of the aristide regime, insofar as defense requires deification (as deibert seems to believe--hence his logic that the several crimes committed by pro-aristide groups put aristide beyond redemption) . rather, it is an attempt to understand the ways in which this indisputably popular movement (was) collapsed. this is where hallward is triumphant, in my estimation.
his argument, approximately, is that we cannot make sense of the scandalous history told here unless we appreciate these few facts: (a) aristide and lavalas were overhwelmingly popular, as proved by the results of the 1990, 1996, 2000 (2x), and 2006 elections; (b) aristide and lavalas were constrained by the political and economic exigencies of the age (haiti's dependence on foreign aid for its budget, the 1994 compromise with clinton, the "impossibility" of fighting the elite on their own terms (i.e., violently and with weapons); (c) aristide, though linked to the violence in slums (which hallward rightly, against deibert's myopia, insists on contextualizing and politicizing), was far, far, far less repressive/violent than the regimes that preceded or succeeded him, or the "opposition" that "resisted" him; (d) aristide, qua radical theologian of liberation and leader of lavalas, was an uncompromising threat to the privileges of the haitian and international elite.
all of this, it needs repeating, is backed by copious statistics, research, and analysis. it is somewhat ironic that deibert's review targets precisely this element of hallward's book, given that deibert's central rebuttal, weak as it is (in the review, at least; i have not read the book), is backed first and foremost by information gleaned from interviews he himself conducted. in general, deibert's principal charge that a voyeuristic and naive hallward interviewed only aristide partisans is patently false. they inform the narrative of the book, of course, but this only complements the research. after all, hallward's insistence on remaining political is critical, i would say; it is precisely his insistence on understanding aristide as an activist--with the critical sympathy borne of solidarity--that makes this book. deibert, it seems, instead takes refuge under the (surreptitiously political) umbrella of a-politics: at best, "they're all bad, everyone's violent, it's all a mess." at its worst, of course, this conscience is activated inconsistently (or, rather, when the Empire comes calling), thereby never becoming more than a hackneyed cover for reactionary politics.
in other words, hallward's insistence on foregrounding structural violence, the changing contours of this violence owing to the elite and imperial insistence on neo-liberal compromises and state under-funding, the political history of haiti's repressive arms--all this informs the discussion of aristide's relationship to the "chimeres", as it must. without it, one will invariably lose themselves in deibert's journalistic moralizing.
that is the crux, and it is highly invigorating reading. a few points of interest, beyond this, though:
(1) exculpation--as already alluded to, hallward tries to balance, in his book, the rightly political nature of his work (qua defense of aristide against Empire and Reaction) with the equally appropriate (and tactical) character of his disagreements with some of aristide's individual decisions. the fact that these criticisms are generally articulated through his interviews with lavalas' activists adds a commendable layer of authenticity and honesty to his critique (though, against deibert, we have to insist that this is not, nor should it be, necessary). in particular, i think, aristide's 1994 decision to grant bill clinton his post-somalia "foreign policy victory" and return to haiti in a neoliberal straightjacket must be scrutinized--not, again, as a decision made by a power-hungry despot deserves to be decried, but rather as the tortured calculus of a comrade might be criticized. (in some sense, in the difference between these two attitudes, i think, lies everything worth fighting for--as soon as we abandon all attempts at making this distinction, it is over.) at some point in the book hallward mentions, through a FL activist, that it may have been better to prolong the democratic struggle than to return with clinton. this is important--though, again, simultaneously a decision that ought not to be pretentiously made by us, as readers, external to the struggle (again: hallward balances these twin necessities--of critique and of hostility to pretense--very, very well in the book).
(2) foreign conniving (USAID, UN, NGOs)--hallward, too, is tireless in his attempt to expose today's civilizing mission ("democracy promotion"). we are obligated, as everyone but the fools these days understands, to reject a priori the Empire and its military tentacles--to remain forever opposed to "hard power." but the theoretically-sophisticated and empirically-rich rebuttal of "soft power", here, is very valuable for reasons sometimes (though not very often, i guess) forgotten. it was, in haiti, this that stands out: (a) the all-too-obvious ways in which the ambitions and agenda of "soft power" are always constituted by "hard power"--it was the agenda and priorities of the US government that USAID and these NGOs towed; (b) the theoretical bankruptcy of "soft power," itself, when counterposed to the overwhelmingly popular force being deemed anti-democratic (here, again, we have the people--in whose name this treachery is being conducted--stripped of their subjectivity in order to be cast as objects fit for intervention and re-education).
as a critique reproduced by hallward emphasized, the bourgeois civil society "trained" and "constituted" by this bevy of NGOs is aristocratic, in form and inspiration. this comprador elite mobilize to tame politics precisely when their world is called into question. they then discover "democracy" and "human rights" and "student movements." "democracy promotion," as hallward argues, therefore represents the calling card of those who can afford to have discovered politics only once they're challenged by the consequences of its genuine flourishing. and the democracy promoters they enlist, of course, are precisely those who live off of politics, without living in it.
(3) reparations--the stunningly bankrupt story behind aristide's failed call for reparations needs to be made more widely known. in 1825, in order to lift the crippling blockade imposed on the newly free colony, haiti paid france 150 million francs (equivalent to france's annual revenue at the time; later the indemnity was reduced, generously, to 90 million ) as punishment for having freed itself. aristide, once it was clear that the international community was intent on suffocating his government by denying him aid, made this the rallying point of the bicentennial celebrations in 2004. haiti calculated that it was owed $21 billion dollars, give or take (at 5% interest). regis debray(!) headed the "commission on reflection" that recommended, to chirac, that they were NOT obligated to pay haiti back. hasta la victoria siempre, regis? (credit where credit is due: paul farmer delivered a brilliant speech to this committee, urging them to fork it out)
(4) populism, popularity, and the Party--hallward's correct insistence on the unremitting popularity of aristide does raise the spectre of populism. but perhaps it's sufficient to defer to his parallel observations about the strength of the people's self-organization, which is perhaps what defines the distinction between genuine and false popularity. after all, as laclau probably suggested in that book i never read, invoking the label of populism is as good (or rather, as bad) as calling the people stupid--and invariably tells us more about the sectarian doing the labeling, than the people. (the next step, of course, is to run off and become a hitchens or horowitz.)
more importantly, i'd argue, aristide raises some critical points about the party and "discipline," in the concluding interview. it is striking, in particular, to note the way in which he insists on the spontaneous, decentralized origins without presenting them as antithetical to the goal of "internal discipline" that he later introduces. it was refreshing to hear this--namely, that someone with years of experience with a genuinely popular politics understands, still, that we need not counterpose self-emancipation to discipline. in this fine balance, i think, lies our salvation.
(5) hope--only a direct quote will do:
[ARISTIDE:] No, I'm not discouraged. You teach philosophy, so let me couch my answer in philosophical terms. You know that we can think the category of being either in terms of potential or act, en puissance or en acte. This is a familiar Aristotelian distinction: being can be potential or actual. So long as it remains potential, you cannot touch it or confirm it. But it is, nonetheless, it exists. The collective consciousness of the Haitian people, their mobilization for democracy, these things may not have been fully actualized but they exist, they are real. This is what sustains me. I am sustained by this collective potential, the power of this collective potential being. This power has not yet been actualized, it has not yet been enacted in the building of enough schools, of more hospitals, more opportunities, but these things will come. The power is real and it is what animates the way forward.
for future reference, an abridged timeline (see page 155 for statistics on violence):
1915-1934: US invasion and occupation of Haiti; moulding of the army to serve imperial and elite interests.
1957-1971: Papa Doc / 1971-1986: Baby Doc (--> together, an estimated 50,000 Haitians were killed by the Duvaliers.)
1986-1990: Baby Doc deposed, Haiti ruled by the ruthless General Henry Namphy and then Prosper Avril. Elections postponed, but finally happen in 1990. (an estimated 700 to 1,000 were killed dead under Namphy/Avril).
December 1990-September 1991: Aristide elected with 67% of the vote. Rules till coup.
September 1991-September/October 1994: Brutal rule of Cedras and soon the infamous FRAPH (4,000 killed under Cedras).
October 1994-February 1996: Aristide finishes term. In December 1995, Rene Preval is elected with 88% of the vote (with Aristide's blessing).
February 1996-May/November 2000: Preval in power; Aristide, meanwhile, has formed Fanmi Lavalas, which wins landslide victories in the legislative/local elections in May (disputed, but Hallward exposes this propaganda) and then the presidential elections in November (92%).
February 2001-February 2004: Aristide rules in the face of mounting opposition from elite opposition groups (G184 and Convergence Democratique) and an "insurgency" of ex-army officers (begins in February 2004 in Gonaives). Destablization hurts, but doesn't do the trick. In sweep the US and French usurpers. (at most, Hallward says, human rights organizatons have pinned 30 political killings on the PNH and/or pro-Lavalas groups; he writes in great detail, also, about the individual massacres they have (mis)reported. as always, the devil is in the context).
March 2004-February 2006: Gerard Latortue appointed prime minister (in absurd move demonstrating the "democracy" being promoted, US ambassador stands in for the non-existent legislative branch and approves his appointment.) Thoroughly brutal rule, complemented by roving, vengeful paramilitaries (in the form of police and ex-army) and an unforgiving, corrupted occupation by the UN. (at least 3,000 killed under Latortue and the UN mission)
February 2006-: The people will not be vanquished. Preval wins an overwhelming majority, reduced to 51% by widespread, acknowledged voter fraud. But Aristide still in exile.
Monday, March 30, 2009
lecture 12, "french imperialism"
charles keith (john merriman's course)
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topic of lecture: French imperialism from 1871-1914
citing a novel from an army officer who speaks about his expedition to Sudan as compensation/consolation for the anger at Alsace-Lorraine's annexation.
during the period we're discussing, the French empire exploded: at the outset, had been little more than outposts in Algeria, military presence in parts of North Africa, Southeast Asia, few "small spits of land" in the Pacific and the Carribean--exploded to include large swathes of North Africa, West Africa, most of mainland Southeast Asia, parts of the Middle East, and territories in the Pacific/Carribean.
by the end of WWI, the French Empire exercised sovereignty over 100 million inhabitants--twice as many people as lived in metropolitan France at that time, roughly.
the passage captures the two central themes at this juncture in French imperial history
(1) serving in the army to recapture prestige lost in the disastrous war with Prussia. officer sees the site of revenge overseas--French nationalism, in this sense, became increasingly inseparable from the idea of a strong, healthy French empire. the fusion of a more modern, French nationalism was new to French history at this period.
(2) the passage comes from a novel, a part of popular culture--during the late 19th century, Empire became something that more and more French people experienced directly, either through popular culture, serving in the army or colonial administrations, or settling lands for the motherland.
take-away from the lecture: Empire, during the Third Republic, became central to French nationalism--it was in the national curriculum, in the national newspapers, and in political discussion. in many ways, it became a "common experience." Empire was a central part of making people French, in sum.
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Empire, of course, had a long past in French history.
during the 17th and 18th centuries, French had a colonial history in the Caribbean and in North America, though many of these possessions were lost around the time of the French revolution. one of the revolution's powerful legacies, in fact, was a conviction to carry the revolution across French borders--to bring the rights of man to the monarchies of the continent. Napoleon of course, continued this--who carried the reach of the Empire across Europe, all the way to Russia.
at the turn of the 19th century, in fact, Napoleon even tried to colonize Egypt--an event which spoke to his messianic belief in science/progress and French civilization. an absence of any real knowledge, of course, about the non-Western world (and a predisposition to the idea of non-Western inferiority). This potent combination, the mission civilizatrice, was to drive French empire until the end.
at the birth of the Third Republic, however, the various tumult in French history prior meant that the Empire was pretty small. it was, correspondingly, fairly marginal in national imaginary. in the years before the French defeat to Prussia, the main urge to expand often came from soldiers/sailors and/or missionaries. even the bulk of Algerian expansion after 1830 was largely the work of Generals, who defied the national government in Paris. at this stage, in a way, the French empire was a giant system of relief for the French military (something to "occupy" them).
BUT: after the loss to Prussia, an acute sense of national inferiority prevailed. Critics attacked the Republic as a cesspool of corruption, etc. Emasculated militarily, slumping economically, shrinking demographically--at this juncture, many people obviously turned to colonial expansion. Jules Very was perhaps the most prominent advocate of this belief.
in his words, "colonial policy was the daugher of industrial policy... export is an essential factor in public prosperity" -- colonies were essential to a strong national economy. France needed exclusive access to new markets and raw materials. furthermore, closely tried to these objectives were political-strategic ones--a policy of abstention was "the road to decadence". Expansion in Africa and Asia was necessary to make France great in the panoply of nations, according to Very.
he also believed in the civilizing mission: "superior races have a right, but also a duty" to bring civilization to other nations. it was the colonial empire that would save France, and elevate their subjects.
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So: colonial objectives were brought into national politics, big-time, especially after Very and the Republicans came to power in 1879.
first attempt to expand was in Vietnam, where the endeavored to take over what is now its Northern half (then called Tonkin--had failed on several occasions before). on the pretext of protecting catholics and prosecuting pirates; the campaign was unpopular and failed. general's head ended up on a pike-staff.
nevertheless, this prefigured Empire's future prominence--colonial expansion accelerated from this point on, as France rushed to compete with Britain and Germany.
debates over colonial policy would become a standard part of French political discourse in the 1890s. every government after Jules Very presided over a steadily expanding colonial Empire.
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this new prominence was, in many ways, due to the influence of a growing colonial lobby in French society--this lobby was very influential in spreading the idea of Empire as national redemption. it was a diverse group of individuals, who put forth the idea for expansion in many different ways (it was not particularly organized)--included men like informal group of explorers/geographers, shipbuilders, railway magnates, factory owners (path to material wealth), missionairies (converts in the heathen races--declining religiosity in the homeland, don't forget), writers and journalists.
so they weren't united by the same interests--but it is precisely their diversity that shows how compelling Empire had become, for France.
the assumption had become, indeed, that Empire served France, as a whole. Empire as a solution to domestic, national problems ("colonies as a laboratory for modernity"). before the Third Republic, the social value of colonies was little more than a way to get rid of people that the State considered undesirable (French penal colony in New Colony, where over 4,000 of the communards had been sent). but toward the end of the 19th century, this began to change--a potential home for landless peasants, unemployed workers, etc, even.
French engineers, and social planners, came to see colonies as a vast work-site--building from scratch, in a sense. Colonies:France, as what Far West:America (says a colonial administrator in Morocco). a "training ground", for many of these bureaucrats.
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in popular culture: schoolchildren began reading about colonies in textbooks (Ministry of Education directive: "it must not be forgotten that France is a world power... Let us not have any scruples about...giving them as rich an image of their country... the mother country and her distant daughters"). the urban middle-classes visiting the Museum of Natural History began to see objects collected in the colonies. and in the massive expositions (in 1900, colonies given their own staging grounds--entire buildings were transported from the Empire).
the Empire was more than a periodic spectacle--crept into the most mundane forms of everyday life. in newspapers, day-in day-out--articles focused on military encounters, of course (vs. a "savage enemy"). captured in novels, as well.
the French encountered an Empire in cafes, dance halls, etc. even goods that people bought evoked the Empire (the yellow "banana" box). even in Church--the last third of the 19th century was a time of intense missionary activity, and people heard financial pleas from these missionaries.
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of course, no better way to experience it than go there. though, by the late 1880s and 1890s, there were few Frenchpeople in the colonies (with the exception of Algeria: 300,000 French settlers in 1871)--little more than administrators and garrison--gradually, though, more and more came.
the most drastically affected, of course, were soldiers in the military, as France attempted to expand, and consolidate her Empire (in the face of fierce resistance). long sea journeys, tropical diseases, and miserable pay.
missionairies, too, went overseas more and more.
settlers went to the colonies in order to stay--often committed for life. took to the colonies whatever Capital and possessions they may have had. distance from home, hostility from natives, etc., were all serious obstacles. many were drawn by inducements from people who owned large tracts of land (land-owners also sought Italian and Spanish immigrants, when they couldn't find enough Frenchfolk).
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as Empire grew, life in the colonies became more regularized. administrators/civil service generally took over from soldiers/military, and started to collect taxes, keeping law and order--often having to sanction violence against deviants and those who resisted. increasingly, these people came not from the military, but from civilians who were trained at specific schools in the metropole (Ecole Colonial, for example--founded in 1877).
French government also did its best to draw professionals to the colonies (lawyers, doctors, etc.). Paris offered subsidies.
more and more women came, as well, to these places. in a way, this reflected the taming and the "making domestic" of the colonies--the regularization. women going to seek husbands, etc. many women worked in humanitarian capacities, which is ironic considering what their husbands would be doing.
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by WWI, there would be almost 500,000 French citizens scattered throughout the French empire. what was life like? few people found adventure, of course. disease took a large toll (malaria, yellow fever, etc.). attack/accidents were almost always a concern. medical care was often inadequate. colonial goods were often susceptible to rapidly changing market conditions, meaning that settlers didn't always thrive. social life, in the colonies, was fairly limited--in many places (presumably rural), some citizens might even spend months without seeing other Europeans (!).
most never relinquished their sense of superiority. these attitudes were reinforced by French laws and institutions, and well-established spatial and social segregation.
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to WWI--when "Guns of August" began to roar in 1914, the French empire was at its peak (second only to the British). colonial promoters lauded the benefit of the colonies: (1) prestige, (2) secure site of investment, (3) captive markets, (4) raw materials/cheap labor, (5) reserve army of soldiers. Empire had become a popular part of popular culture. in short, Empire had become a fundamental part of national identity/hubris (as in the rest of Europe).
few French people in 1914 could see few things that might threaten this happy equilibrium. for many people, France had recovered from the loss of Alsace-Lorraine (and Empire was central to this national revival). "The renewal of France," in the words of a colonial official in 1912.
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of course, not all was well in the Emipre. haven't spoken about the effect of French colonialism on those in the colonies. needless to say, French imperialism didn't coincide with the "best of French civilization"
few accepted French expansion without struggle; but few, of course, could match the technology of the French, at the same time.
as French police, legal systems, etc., replaced the overtly military presence of the earlier age--occupation and repression paraded as "integration"/"assimilation"
by 1914, cracks began to appear in the edifice. not everyboy had been swept up by French dreams. a small anti-colonial lobby in the homeland began to appear. for some, expansion seemed a dangerous overextension of French power. others, seeing that promised financial concerns were underwhelming, began to criticize it practically. others yet protested on moral grounds--at a protest in 1906, the famous novelist Anatole France thundered, "whites do not communicate with blacks and yellow men but through arms... the people we call barbarians know us through" our barbarism. Jean Jaures went even further--refuting the mission of the civilizing mission (in this case, in Morocco)--arguing that a civilization existed, in Morocco, that had hope for the future. "And I cannot pardon those who have crushed this hope."
during the 1920s and 1930s, anti-colonialism would become a more potent voice in the metropole. (in 1931, a famous anti-colonial exposition would be organized, in opposition to the colonial expo--nothing similar had happened in 1900).
however: it was not the French themselves who would eventually succeed in crumbling the edifice of Empire. ultimately, it collapsed, first and foremost, because of the many forms of resistance waged by those under their yoke.
in many ways, WWI was a tipping point--the myths sustaining French rule had been very powerful, many in the colonized world had asked themselves whether colonial power was unchallengable and inevitable (and, for some intellectuals, maybe a "good thing"). during the war, about a half a million colonial subjects were conscripted--donning the blue uniform and fighting for France. many others came to the metropole to work. those who came saw religious, economic, political rifts at the home--and they saw a war that gave the lie to French civilization.
for countless people across the world, the Great War showed that France could not and did not correspond to its lofty myths. it dealt a terrible blow to their moral standing; Europeans savagely killing each other, for four years. the contrast between savagery and civilization was now reversed.
after WWI, for growing numbers in France, Emipre seemed to expensive (especially during the depression), immoral, and unwieldy to retain. what had been a source of unification became a source for disunion.
the opposite was true in the colonies. in the 1930s and 1940s, an anti-colonial nationalism was born--in the years after WWI, this would culminate in widespread liberation.
charles keith (john merriman's course)
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topic of lecture: French imperialism from 1871-1914
citing a novel from an army officer who speaks about his expedition to Sudan as compensation/consolation for the anger at Alsace-Lorraine's annexation.
during the period we're discussing, the French empire exploded: at the outset, had been little more than outposts in Algeria, military presence in parts of North Africa, Southeast Asia, few "small spits of land" in the Pacific and the Carribean--exploded to include large swathes of North Africa, West Africa, most of mainland Southeast Asia, parts of the Middle East, and territories in the Pacific/Carribean.
by the end of WWI, the French Empire exercised sovereignty over 100 million inhabitants--twice as many people as lived in metropolitan France at that time, roughly.
the passage captures the two central themes at this juncture in French imperial history
(1) serving in the army to recapture prestige lost in the disastrous war with Prussia. officer sees the site of revenge overseas--French nationalism, in this sense, became increasingly inseparable from the idea of a strong, healthy French empire. the fusion of a more modern, French nationalism was new to French history at this period.
(2) the passage comes from a novel, a part of popular culture--during the late 19th century, Empire became something that more and more French people experienced directly, either through popular culture, serving in the army or colonial administrations, or settling lands for the motherland.
take-away from the lecture: Empire, during the Third Republic, became central to French nationalism--it was in the national curriculum, in the national newspapers, and in political discussion. in many ways, it became a "common experience." Empire was a central part of making people French, in sum.
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Empire, of course, had a long past in French history.
during the 17th and 18th centuries, French had a colonial history in the Caribbean and in North America, though many of these possessions were lost around the time of the French revolution. one of the revolution's powerful legacies, in fact, was a conviction to carry the revolution across French borders--to bring the rights of man to the monarchies of the continent. Napoleon of course, continued this--who carried the reach of the Empire across Europe, all the way to Russia.
at the turn of the 19th century, in fact, Napoleon even tried to colonize Egypt--an event which spoke to his messianic belief in science/progress and French civilization. an absence of any real knowledge, of course, about the non-Western world (and a predisposition to the idea of non-Western inferiority). This potent combination, the mission civilizatrice, was to drive French empire until the end.
at the birth of the Third Republic, however, the various tumult in French history prior meant that the Empire was pretty small. it was, correspondingly, fairly marginal in national imaginary. in the years before the French defeat to Prussia, the main urge to expand often came from soldiers/sailors and/or missionaries. even the bulk of Algerian expansion after 1830 was largely the work of Generals, who defied the national government in Paris. at this stage, in a way, the French empire was a giant system of relief for the French military (something to "occupy" them).
BUT: after the loss to Prussia, an acute sense of national inferiority prevailed. Critics attacked the Republic as a cesspool of corruption, etc. Emasculated militarily, slumping economically, shrinking demographically--at this juncture, many people obviously turned to colonial expansion. Jules Very was perhaps the most prominent advocate of this belief.
in his words, "colonial policy was the daugher of industrial policy... export is an essential factor in public prosperity" -- colonies were essential to a strong national economy. France needed exclusive access to new markets and raw materials. furthermore, closely tried to these objectives were political-strategic ones--a policy of abstention was "the road to decadence". Expansion in Africa and Asia was necessary to make France great in the panoply of nations, according to Very.
he also believed in the civilizing mission: "superior races have a right, but also a duty" to bring civilization to other nations. it was the colonial empire that would save France, and elevate their subjects.
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So: colonial objectives were brought into national politics, big-time, especially after Very and the Republicans came to power in 1879.
first attempt to expand was in Vietnam, where the endeavored to take over what is now its Northern half (then called Tonkin--had failed on several occasions before). on the pretext of protecting catholics and prosecuting pirates; the campaign was unpopular and failed. general's head ended up on a pike-staff.
nevertheless, this prefigured Empire's future prominence--colonial expansion accelerated from this point on, as France rushed to compete with Britain and Germany.
debates over colonial policy would become a standard part of French political discourse in the 1890s. every government after Jules Very presided over a steadily expanding colonial Empire.
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this new prominence was, in many ways, due to the influence of a growing colonial lobby in French society--this lobby was very influential in spreading the idea of Empire as national redemption. it was a diverse group of individuals, who put forth the idea for expansion in many different ways (it was not particularly organized)--included men like informal group of explorers/geographers, shipbuilders, railway magnates, factory owners (path to material wealth), missionairies (converts in the heathen races--declining religiosity in the homeland, don't forget), writers and journalists.
so they weren't united by the same interests--but it is precisely their diversity that shows how compelling Empire had become, for France.
the assumption had become, indeed, that Empire served France, as a whole. Empire as a solution to domestic, national problems ("colonies as a laboratory for modernity"). before the Third Republic, the social value of colonies was little more than a way to get rid of people that the State considered undesirable (French penal colony in New Colony, where over 4,000 of the communards had been sent). but toward the end of the 19th century, this began to change--a potential home for landless peasants, unemployed workers, etc, even.
French engineers, and social planners, came to see colonies as a vast work-site--building from scratch, in a sense. Colonies:France, as what Far West:America (says a colonial administrator in Morocco). a "training ground", for many of these bureaucrats.
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in popular culture: schoolchildren began reading about colonies in textbooks (Ministry of Education directive: "it must not be forgotten that France is a world power... Let us not have any scruples about...giving them as rich an image of their country... the mother country and her distant daughters"). the urban middle-classes visiting the Museum of Natural History began to see objects collected in the colonies. and in the massive expositions (in 1900, colonies given their own staging grounds--entire buildings were transported from the Empire).
the Empire was more than a periodic spectacle--crept into the most mundane forms of everyday life. in newspapers, day-in day-out--articles focused on military encounters, of course (vs. a "savage enemy"). captured in novels, as well.
the French encountered an Empire in cafes, dance halls, etc. even goods that people bought evoked the Empire (the yellow "banana" box). even in Church--the last third of the 19th century was a time of intense missionary activity, and people heard financial pleas from these missionaries.
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of course, no better way to experience it than go there. though, by the late 1880s and 1890s, there were few Frenchpeople in the colonies (with the exception of Algeria: 300,000 French settlers in 1871)--little more than administrators and garrison--gradually, though, more and more came.
the most drastically affected, of course, were soldiers in the military, as France attempted to expand, and consolidate her Empire (in the face of fierce resistance). long sea journeys, tropical diseases, and miserable pay.
missionairies, too, went overseas more and more.
settlers went to the colonies in order to stay--often committed for life. took to the colonies whatever Capital and possessions they may have had. distance from home, hostility from natives, etc., were all serious obstacles. many were drawn by inducements from people who owned large tracts of land (land-owners also sought Italian and Spanish immigrants, when they couldn't find enough Frenchfolk).
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as Empire grew, life in the colonies became more regularized. administrators/civil service generally took over from soldiers/military, and started to collect taxes, keeping law and order--often having to sanction violence against deviants and those who resisted. increasingly, these people came not from the military, but from civilians who were trained at specific schools in the metropole (Ecole Colonial, for example--founded in 1877).
French government also did its best to draw professionals to the colonies (lawyers, doctors, etc.). Paris offered subsidies.
more and more women came, as well, to these places. in a way, this reflected the taming and the "making domestic" of the colonies--the regularization. women going to seek husbands, etc. many women worked in humanitarian capacities, which is ironic considering what their husbands would be doing.
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by WWI, there would be almost 500,000 French citizens scattered throughout the French empire. what was life like? few people found adventure, of course. disease took a large toll (malaria, yellow fever, etc.). attack/accidents were almost always a concern. medical care was often inadequate. colonial goods were often susceptible to rapidly changing market conditions, meaning that settlers didn't always thrive. social life, in the colonies, was fairly limited--in many places (presumably rural), some citizens might even spend months without seeing other Europeans (!).
most never relinquished their sense of superiority. these attitudes were reinforced by French laws and institutions, and well-established spatial and social segregation.
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to WWI--when "Guns of August" began to roar in 1914, the French empire was at its peak (second only to the British). colonial promoters lauded the benefit of the colonies: (1) prestige, (2) secure site of investment, (3) captive markets, (4) raw materials/cheap labor, (5) reserve army of soldiers. Empire had become a popular part of popular culture. in short, Empire had become a fundamental part of national identity/hubris (as in the rest of Europe).
few French people in 1914 could see few things that might threaten this happy equilibrium. for many people, France had recovered from the loss of Alsace-Lorraine (and Empire was central to this national revival). "The renewal of France," in the words of a colonial official in 1912.
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of course, not all was well in the Emipre. haven't spoken about the effect of French colonialism on those in the colonies. needless to say, French imperialism didn't coincide with the "best of French civilization"
few accepted French expansion without struggle; but few, of course, could match the technology of the French, at the same time.
as French police, legal systems, etc., replaced the overtly military presence of the earlier age--occupation and repression paraded as "integration"/"assimilation"
by 1914, cracks began to appear in the edifice. not everyboy had been swept up by French dreams. a small anti-colonial lobby in the homeland began to appear. for some, expansion seemed a dangerous overextension of French power. others, seeing that promised financial concerns were underwhelming, began to criticize it practically. others yet protested on moral grounds--at a protest in 1906, the famous novelist Anatole France thundered, "whites do not communicate with blacks and yellow men but through arms... the people we call barbarians know us through" our barbarism. Jean Jaures went even further--refuting the mission of the civilizing mission (in this case, in Morocco)--arguing that a civilization existed, in Morocco, that had hope for the future. "And I cannot pardon those who have crushed this hope."
during the 1920s and 1930s, anti-colonialism would become a more potent voice in the metropole. (in 1931, a famous anti-colonial exposition would be organized, in opposition to the colonial expo--nothing similar had happened in 1900).
however: it was not the French themselves who would eventually succeed in crumbling the edifice of Empire. ultimately, it collapsed, first and foremost, because of the many forms of resistance waged by those under their yoke.
in many ways, WWI was a tipping point--the myths sustaining French rule had been very powerful, many in the colonized world had asked themselves whether colonial power was unchallengable and inevitable (and, for some intellectuals, maybe a "good thing"). during the war, about a half a million colonial subjects were conscripted--donning the blue uniform and fighting for France. many others came to the metropole to work. those who came saw religious, economic, political rifts at the home--and they saw a war that gave the lie to French civilization.
for countless people across the world, the Great War showed that France could not and did not correspond to its lofty myths. it dealt a terrible blow to their moral standing; Europeans savagely killing each other, for four years. the contrast between savagery and civilization was now reversed.
after WWI, for growing numbers in France, Emipre seemed to expensive (especially during the depression), immoral, and unwieldy to retain. what had been a source of unification became a source for disunion.
the opposite was true in the colonies. in the 1930s and 1940s, an anti-colonial nationalism was born--in the years after WWI, this would culminate in widespread liberation.
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