misagh parsa, states, ideologies, and social revolutions(7, 10, 21): structures are insufficient to explain revolutions -- need to discuss
structures +
process; "structural vulnerabilities by themselves do not inevitably produce social conflict, let alone revolution... there is always more than one potential outcome... any analysis of revolution must also take into account the revolutionary process"
(8):
problem w/ Skocpol:multiple actors and multiple conflicts ('labor radicalism might affect capitalists from taking on the State'); States in developing countries do not necessarily rule in tandem with capitalist classes
(8-9):
problem w/ ideology in explanations -- the burden of proof is actually quite serious, for a claim like this: have to show that actors were both aware of and supportive of a given ideology, and weren't supporting it out of tactical convenience.
- methodological reductionism ('ideology of successful revolutionary challengers, assuming that participants adhered to those ideologies)
- explantions use outcomes of revolution to account for its causes
- ideological debates might be cryptic in revolutionary situations
(11): [1]
Exclusive rule, centralization and repression -- consequences:
- states resort to violence at time of social conflict, reducing support for regime
- may weaken elite/moderate challengers, strengthen radicals [a la Jeff's argument]
- more likely to be externally dependent, which might be detrimental at times of crisis
(12-21): [2]
State intervention and target of social conflicts: regulative (conflicts will occur in civil society -- State is unlikely to be the direct target of collective action)* vs. administrative vs. hyperactive (State more vulnerable to challenge and attack -- also likely to negatively affect a segment of elites, even the majority of elites depending on the extent to which the rule is personalistic)
(19): conflating the 'self-employed' with the capitalist class [bizarre!]*
(21 -24):
[3] Collective action and coalition formation: large-scale insurgencies emerge when political opportunities emerge (b/c state feeling external pressures, schisms within the state, or state reforms). in the absence of state breakdown or military victory, insurgencies are more likely to succeed if they are organized as a cross-class coalition (cross-class coalitions are encouraged, remember, by a high level of state intervention and a low level of open, class conflict). there is something, here, about disruptive collective action, also, suggesting that it can weaken the State's hold over society.
(24-25):
[4] Ideology and social revolution: the challengers that seize power matter, for whether you will have simply political change or social revolution. all things being equal, moderate challengers are typically in a better position to win power (more resources, less repression, allies within gov't) -- but there are limits to their activism. radical challengers lack these advantages, and only a few will succeed -- they are likely to do better the more exclusive the regime was, when moderate paths to the State's overthrow have been exhausted. but radical challengers will benefit from 'toning down' their radical platform.
(26):
in sum -- classes are important, but intensified class conflict can hurt, reducing the likelihood of social revolutions.* students reveal the greatest propensity toward adopting revolutionary ideologies, following intellectuals.
(26):
Iran--Shah constructed exclusive polity, intervened in capital allocation/accumulation and working of market; government policies increased inequality;* political opportunities arose in 1977, as external pressure forced repression to decrease; different groups mobilized and made different claims; forced to mobilize through the mosque; a coalition succeeded in overthrowing the monarchy; but soon after the overthrow, a small minority of the clergy succeeded in repressing coalition partners and establishing a theocratic state.
(27):
Nicaragua--Somoza constructed exclusive state; state intervened in the economy and capital accumulation; policies increased inequality;* after 1972 earthquake, there were mobilizations against the regime, which lasted until 1974; a new round began in 1977, when external pressures led to reduced repression; assasination of Chamorro in January 1978 intensified the conflict; a coalition overthrew the state in 1979, led by the FSLN; FSLN had turned to armed struggle because moderate tactics had been ruled out (but they had credibility,* for this reason)
(27-28):
Philippines -- formal democratic institutions till 1972; Marcos imposes martial law, repressing moderates and creating a centralized executive; expanded State intervention in the economy; country comes into crisis after period of spectacular growth, and experiences rising social and economic inequalities; in 1981, in response to external pressures Marcos lifts Martial law and some repression; political mobilization emerges in 1983 as a result of the assasination of Aquino; for two years opposition can't remove Marcos b/c of lack of broad coalition, as Marcos is able to tempt moderates into running for elections in 1984; from there, a complex set of processes (having to do with elevated levels of class struggle, and the strength of the Communist Party) lead to an elite-brokered transition (elements in the Army are important); this results in a political revolution.
(36): Iran,
in sum: Shah had constructed a State that excluded the population, no real social base,* external dependence on US --> rendered regime vulnerable
(44): Nicaragua,
in sum: Somozas built a dynasty excluded the population, based on National Guard, no real social support* --> rendered the regime vulnerable
(53): Philippines,
in sum: Marcos built centralized regime after '72 martial law, abolished democratic institutions, no real social base* and support of US --> rendered the regime vulnerable
(54): regimes varied in the success of their repression -- Iran was the most demobilizing, and Philippines the least
(66): in Iran, gov't policies --> rising economic inequalities*
(85-86):
summary of account is that participation on/exposure to market --> crisis in all three cases*
(89):
summary of argument that declining repression (due to external pressures) --> favorable opportunities for collective action. in this context, further repression may actually make the regime more vulnerable (the Aquino and Chamorro assasinations, he's thinking of)
(94-96):
students as 'relentless revolutionaries', ideological radicals*
(96):
students' role was contradictory -- frequent mobilization important part of challenge; but students' ideological orientation was also polarizing, preventing the formation of a broad coalition.
(99-101, 104): assertion that, for the most part,
students were basically secular in orientation/outlook (repression of 1963 did lead a 'sizable minority' to adopt Islam, but this then waned in the 70s; some rebound after of 1978 (Khomeini becoming popular), but didn't change this basic fact)
(102): student activism predates the clergy, who did get involved until January of 1978
(106-107):
in sum, students in Iran
(108): in Nicaragua, expansion of education + role of US + Sandinistas --> radical students
(110):
two bouts of struggle, in Nicaragua: (1) post-earthquake (1973-1974), and (2) pre-revolution and post-opening (1977-1979)
(112): it was in the second phase that students began to draw close to the FSLN
(115-116):
in sum, students in Nicaragua
(127):
in sum, students in Philippines: like elsewhere, most active social group, at the forefront of collective action; assumed a radical character towards the end of the 'revolutionary' process, as the failure of the moderates became obvious
(127-129):
in sum, students: (1) first social group to mobilize; (2) acted with most frequency (he acknowledges, of course, that this doesn't at all mean that they wield significant power--he's not noting their capacity/threat, but rather their proclivity. here he once again makes the point about how radical students can prevent the formation of the necessary coalitions)
(130): the breakdown of the clergy-State pact results in the politicization of the clergy--and while most stay conservative, a minority break off as radicals
(131-132): only a minority of the
clergy become radical: in Iran, they advocated the formation of an Islamic government; in Nicaragua and the Philippines, they shifted to the left and liberation theology. the explanation of this is the 'weakness of the religious left, the Islamic mohajideen, in Iran [pushes the question back, to an extent]
(132):
upper clergy varied--in Iran on the sidelines, in Nicaragua and especially the Philippines, in support of the regimes
(133, 140): again, in Iran, radical clergy demanding an Islamic government were a minority [this is a good example of why Parsa's right that the 'process' is important; revolutions as highly 'open' times]; moderates were the majority; conservative backers of the Shah were also a minority.
(134): the 'White Revolution' in the late 50s marked the end of the State-clergy pact: 'land reform' (opposed by Khomeini) and 'female franchise' (which he said was Baha'i)
(135, 145):
in sum, in Iran, the clergy was undermined as a source of support by the Shah's policies
(143): Taleghani ('Red Ayatollah'--who demanded popular democracy, workers' councils to run factories, etc.) was actually asked by Khomeini to lead the Tasoua march on December 10, 1978, which became the largest march in Iranian history
(145):
in sum, clergy undermined as a source of support. but the clergy's response to the State was not unanimous. most were moderates, which made the mosque comparatively repression free. ideal places in which to organize. this helped Khomeini and the small minority that supported him.
(146): until 1970, Catholic Church supported Somoza
(146): 'all authority comes from God; He who resists authority resists God'
(153):
in sum, in Nicaragua the Catholic Church was unable to play any significant role in the months leading up to the revolution, because of Somoza's unwillingness to tolerate non-violent solution. Church hierarchy remained largely inactive, despite the fact that a minority were radicalized.
(155): radical clergy vs. Church leadership, in Philippines (Father Conrado Balweg: the gun as 'an instrument for a higher value, the value of justice...')
(157): in early 80s, clergy is becoming politicized, but still in weak ways ('reconciliation,' etc.)
(159-161):
in sum, role of the clergy in revolutions--segments became politicized, after the breakdown of the clergy-State alliance (greatest in Iran). but there was heterogeneity in their response (mainly along lines of rank, though). in only the Philippines were leading clergy able to impose their will on the outcome; in Iran, it was a small minority that had their way.
(162): vs. Marxists, on workers -- too much class struggle can be a bad thing, by threatening privileged social classes, preventing coalition
(163): large-scale mobilization of workers could only emerge where opportunities were favorable
(164): workers,
in sum:
- in Iran: a low level of organization + targeting of the State --> a coalition with capitalists (here, remember, he means shop-keepers/petit-bourgeois elements)
- in Nicaragua: better organization + targeting of State and Capitalists in '72-74, but State in '77-79 --> a coalition with capitalists, but one that the Sandinistas led ('workers shifted their support to the FSLN, after moderates failed)
- in Philippines: well-organized radical segment, post-Martial law + targeted State and Capitalists ('low level of State intervention') + economic deterioration in mid-1980s --> prevented coalition*
(169): not unlike Fitzpatrick claim re: Russia, noting that high level of State intervention was 'inherently politicizing' when workers went into struggle
(171): although vast majority of workers supported Khomeini, they did not display ideological, but
political support.
(172): Marxists/socialists were in the leadership of the workers' movement
(172-173): workers in Iran,
in sum: needed an opening to organize (workers started mobilizing in August 1978, after reforms); most workers were neither political nor revolutionary at outset, but were politicized (because of the State), even if it was quite late in the game; leadership of movement was in hand of socialists; mobilization was crucial to the outcome, through disruption.
(182-183): workers in Nicaragua, in sum: better organized than Iran; more employed in private sector, targeting capitalists and the State; for a long time workers' activism rendered ineffective by repression; in 1978, quickly focused attacks on the State*
(184): 23% of the labour force unionized, in the mid-1960s to 1970 in the Philippines (a robust labour movement, in short)
(186-187): radicalized in the early 1970s
(192-193):
in sum, workers in Philippines: tradition of collective bargaining in 50s and 60s; institutionalization of industrial conflicts generated a reformist labour movement; radicalized in early 1970s, after (1) moderates didn't gain concessions, (2) repression, and (3) rise of radical allies; favorable opportunities after 1983 brought workers' movement out; militant workers attacked States and capitalists; this threatened the social structure, and helped prevent the formation of a class coalition.
(197):
key amendment -- the defection of the capitalist class is not sufficient to explain revolutions; instead, the capitalist class must take an active role in the conflict, and pursue disruptive tactics; capitalists can be scared away from this by radical threats.*
(198): in protectionist States, division between minority of capitalists, who benefit, and majority, who do not
(198): you can have 'reluctant rebels,' provided that they're not scared off by workers
(199):
in sum -- capitalists in all three countries opposed because of lack of access to the polity/economy*
(201-203): Bazaaris -- not w/ clergy, but with liberal-nationalists
(214): minimal mention of Islamic gov't in statement
(215-216): Bazaaris in Iran,
in sum -- political coalition rather than ideological conversion (not interested in a theocratic State)
(220): private sector wasn't politicized in '74, in Nic, but by '77 and '78 the 'desperate economic situation' and assasination of Chamorro had politicized them [so there's a story of their radicalziation, too]
(224): capitalist support for FSLN was tactical, not ideological--happened only in the final few days [and didn't live long in the memory]
(239):
coalitions are important because:
- isolate the government [aren't they an effect of this?]
- increase the likelihood of factionalism in the armed forces
- essential to initiate disruptive tactics [you need capitalists for the general strike]
- broad coalitions may encourage greater support for armed struggle (thinking of Nicaragua)
(243-247): reason for the failure of secular challengers, in Iran, is repression (for the Feda'iyan, who were anyway quite weak) and political mistakes (for the National Front, who prevented students from organizing after June 1965 uprising, after they themselves had been repressed)
(247):
Khomeini's rise was for political, rather than ideological reasons: (1) he had the advantage of the mosques; (2) he made good, strategic decisions (such as not to publicly advocate for theocratic State in build-up to revolution)
(254-255): the moderates fail, in Nicaragua, bringing the Sandinistas to the fore ['coalition-building'?]
(256): in 1974, FSLN had 100 members!
(261): members of Chamber of Commerce occupied Church in Leon, after FSLN deaths
(267): New People's Army/ Communist Party Philippines had a 'social base' of one million [so, so much stronger than the FSLN!]
(270):NPA had enormous power in countryside, but couldn't overthrow Marcos by rural insurgency. this is why a coalition was needed*
(270): in line with Jeff's argument, Marcos pre-empted them and brought moderates over to his side, with elections in 1985 (this also then explains something about Nicaragua, in the way Jeff wanted to).*
(275 - 278): in sum, coalitions: in the absence of State breakdown, coalitions are important for the success of 'revolutionary' challengers; broad coalitions in Iran and Nicaragua (explained by low level of class conflict) brought the regimes down; in Philippines, broad coalition could not form.
(277): in Iran, army was integrated with population, which faciliated revolution; in Nicaragua, National Guard was insulated, which meant they fought till the end
(287): vs. Skocpol, upper class defection is not the only reason that revolutions happen; here, external pressures can open up opportunities, which coalitions can take advantage of
(288): Iran, whose revolution is supposed to be explained by a 'culture of martyrdom', lost far fewer people per capita than in Nicaragua's revolution
- - - -
[1] on the one hand, it could be argued that this a recognition problem (in which case ideology, we might further argue, becomes a central determinant of whether this holds true?) on the other hand, Parsa means that this applies somewhat unconditionally -- meaning that it is impossible to make the case, to people, that the State is complicit in their suffering even when it isn't actively involved in the economy. this is either because (a) people won't accept it, no matter how accurate it is [why?]; (b) because it's true, in his opinion [no it's not!]
[2] the strangest part of his argument is the case that these small, discontented capitalists can be captured by the category 'self-employed' (this may include shopkeepers, but also those scraping for survival in the informal sector -- and, in Pakistan's case, peasants!). it is quite strange, needless to say, to stick with figures that suggest that the size of your 'capitalist class' is larger the lower your level of development.
on p. 199, they're one-third of the labour force! this is important also because it suggests, to me, that --even while his 'interventionist State offends most capitalists' line is important--he is mis-specifying the causes behind much-bourgeois activism. he thinks exclusion from the State/economy --> 'capitalist' activism. this is no doubt true, for some big bourgeois types. but when we're talking about a third of the labour force in underdeveloped countries, this is going to be, mainly, a story of pretty impoverished types, i'd expect--in that case, what's doing the work isn't really exclusion from the State (I suspect), but insecurity/poverty/etc.
[3] the suggestion that intensified class conflict reduces the likelihood of social revolution rests on the Nicaragua/Philippines examples. in Nicaragua, a coalition led to social revolution; in the Phillipines, the failure of a coalition to form (due to heightened class conflict) explains the lack of a social revolution.
but Parsa is ignoring the profound limits of what then happened in Nicaragua, as elements of the elite turned on the 'revolutionary coalition,' profoundly limiting the nature of the 'social revolution' (making it a political revolution?) -- and setting the stage for the reversal of the 1990s. this is not to suggest that a social revolution was possible; but it ought to suggest that the counterintuitive conclusion he reaches (a social revolution is more likely when you have less class conflict) is actually not perplexing (because it didn't happen!)
a related concern, here, is with revolutionaries and their audience -- he seems to suggest that the most critical constituency to 'get on board', for revolutionaries, is elites, basically. analytically this might have some insights, though not without the enormous caveats mentioned above. but politically this is ludicrous--at some level isn't it true, also, that the only reason you can force elites to sit at the same table with you is because you have a measure of popular clout that threatens them (in this sense, there might be a middle ground, where elites are intimidated, but not scared enough to run to the arms of the State)
[4] is Parsa's argument about why people become revolutionary like Skocpol on peasants, insofar as 'increasing inequalities' are sufficient to produce revolutionary outcomes. or are these real grievances, which different State policies could have avoided? put differently, is there something specific about people's rage, that can be connected to specific government policies. or are people always ready to rebel? (alternatively, maybe 'crises' are doing most of the work in the argument? in which case the extent to which you can hold the government responsible would be in question)
the case of Iran, for example, it's not at all clear, from his narrative, that it's the fact of State intervention itself that's responsible for greater inequalities (he seems to want to indict State development strategies). in one sense (taxation policy), it seems to be the fact that the State is partial to a particular elite (big capital, rather than small traders) -- the fact that the State is unwilling to move against the wealthy (p. 66), that land reform was weak (p. 67), etc. -- which is surely independent of whether or not the State chooses to intervene. indeed, it's almost as if the State couldn't become 'autonomous enough' from certain elites
so, in short,
one question is what exactly about these States --> rising inequalities/unfairness in economic benefits (can we indict State intervention in the economy?)
a second question, also, is whether any of this can explain the nature of the crises they confront. the just-so stories he tells (pp. 79-85) rest on the claim that
increasing integration on the world market with specialization in a few commodities --> being prone to crises. but this is independent, we should be clear, of the fact of the State's involvement in the economy.
[5] seems at first as if the State intervention claim explains, for his schema, whether or not workers will be radical and closed to 'coalition-building' (because they won't attack capitalists).
if it is his argument, this seems insufficient. even in the examples where there is supposed to be heavy State intervention (Iran), a majority of workers are employed in the private sector (is the mechanism for his argument actually ideological, as was suggested earlier?). note also that the 50s and 60s in Philippines (p. 193) are almost the opposite argument--a lack of State intervention produces a reformist trade union movement. though this presumably has something to do with the political climate at the time?
regardless, in his reconstruction of the claims, on p. 193, it's not exactly State intervention that's doing the work -- instead, it's
lack of success of moderates + repression + rise of radicals --> social revolution. is this plausible? (it partly lines up with Jeff's account)
in the Nicaragua example (182-183), two of these three things are also here (repression + lack of success of moderates)? so what needs to be explained is rise of radicals?
on the one hand this might be a State intervention claim? so the
repression of the Somoza regime leads not to radical hegemony, but to a coalition with the capitalists, because workers focus on their primary antagonist, the State. in the Philippines, what's supposed to be different is the lower level of State intervention (because there's severe repression in the Philippines, too, but workers still indict capitalists), and thus the heightened level of explicit class conflict, which scares the moderates away from a coalition
but (a) what seems to be doing much more work is the longstanding strength of radical elements in the labour movement in the Philippines (vs. the much weaker position of the FSLN in Nicaragua, which wasn't supported by the trade unions until later, correct?), which cannot be best explained by conjunctural (repression) or this structural ('State-intervention') factor. this gives them the ability to refuse an alliance with 'capitalists'; (b) if not the above, perhaps
strategy would be a superior way of understanding this? I understand the importance of a structural theory of strategy (to a point); but Parsa's account just doesn't sit right.
[6] worth thinking about, in the context of theories of the State, what it means for a State to 'lack' a social base. on the one hand, this history could be read as a perversion of the theory -- the State must serve society, so how you can you have a State that fails to serve society? more accurately, however, the narratives of these regimes' collapse might better be understood as a confirmation of that same argument: it is precisely the fact that these States failed to serve the social base that explains elite opposition to them, and the instability in which they found themselves (though it's not simply elite opposition, of course, that explains the social revolutions; there would be other mechanisms for elites to discipline the State, more like what happens in the Philippines)
[7] on the claim about
students: it's unclear whether this is best understood as students --> radicals, or whether it should really be 'the historical context' --> radical students. the explanation on pg. 98 makes the latter seem much more plausible (a 'just-so' kind of story about student radicalism)
[8] he's not particularly alive to the passive weapons that the capitalist class wields over the State.
[9] NPA and
coalition -- it's not at all clear that what's at issue is the fact that they weren't in coalition with elites. what's at issue is the fact that they were strong in rural areas and not the city (whether this is for reasons of strategy or not, is irrelevant to this point).
[10] Jeff's argument seems to have more purchase on Philippines vs. Nicaragua, which cuts against what Parsa's trying to do. the critical difference in explaining the lack of revolution is Marcos' 1985 concession. Somoza's intransigence is important to the Nicaraguan outcome. this means, also, that 'coalition' isn't the real issue -- that the FSLN was in coalition, is true, but presumably this was a tactical decision which they didn't, necessarily, need to take. could they have won, without coalition, given Somoza's intransigence?
[11] can you really measure the strength/leadership of a movement through 'newspaper reports'?
