zaidi, issues in pakistan's economy (2005)

(x): both the Ayub and Zia eras, high-growth though they were, confronted their internal contradictions in the popular movements that brought them down

(x): 'middle-class consolidation' [again, though, this is so nebulous as to be unhelpful]

(xi): important--two comprehensive IMF programs of 1988 and 1993-4 were agreed by caretaker gov'ts -- and had to be ratified by Bhutto's incoming gov't [Pakistan didn't need the first, he's noting]. Pakistan goes to the IMF because it is incapable of pushing through those structural reforms that the economy needs (due, explicitly, to its lack of autonomy from its own elites)

(2-3): Pakistan no longer an agricultural country

(4): Pakistan stopped being a feudal country after the Green Revolution of the 1960s, he's arguing--power has shifted from a so-called feudal class towards the urban and rural middle-classes [here, presumably, he means capitalists--"middle-classes" is just a catch-all]

(5): the windfall gains made by the mercantile class in the aftermath of the Korean war laid the groundwork for industrialization--but here, anyway, the State sector was very prominent

(5):important--Ayub's decade of development brought impressive growth in manufacturing, etc.; but no growth in real wages (this, he's saying, was entirely expected--"inherent, inbuilt, inevitable."). Reminding us, also, that this was not, at all, a 'liberal' period. Bureaucracy gave birth to the capitalist [this is not an example of autonomy, but the opposite, in effect]

(6): important--calling for re-evaluation of the Bhutto years--"the bad luck years" (economic loss of E. Pakistan, OPEC price increases and deterioration of balance of payments, worldwide recession, domestic cotton crop failures, nationalized sector did better than most believe)

(6): Zia's period was most liberal yet, brought on by remittances and aid in particular. private sector emerged in the stable post-Bhutto era.

(7): important--post-1988 period was an "era of structural adjustment" more than it was the rebirth of democracy. a blind adherence to Washington; "almost every decision of any consequence was predetermined by Washington" (main focus of fiscal deficit--expansion of indirect taxes, cuts to development expenditure, reduction in tariff rates, increasing in price of utilities, privatization, devaluation of the currency). All has resulted in a serious economic crisis.

(7): increased prices, devalued currency and higher taxes resulted in higher inflation [why would the IMF have wanted higher inflation?]

(8): Musharraf gov't on board with IMF agreements, as well (2001 agreement, for example)--but 9/11 gave him more fiscal space

(31): green revolution as elite-farmer strategy (for Burki, this is the middle-classes, who benefit; for Alavi, it was the large landowners). for both, GR does mean the entrenchment of capitalism in rural areas. [we can infer from this what we will]

(32): important--the 'structure of technology' and 'distribution of credit' reflected the influence of large landowners over public policy [i.e., State hardly autonomous in this regard]

(32): PPP prayed on the contradictions that the GR wrought in rural areas [analagous case to be made for the rural areas]

(33-34): important--Central Council of the Muslim League in 1947 consisted, in the main, of very large landowners (50% of those from Punjab; 60% of those from Sindh). Or, in 1953, won 90% of the seats in the provincial election in Sindh [important to think through this, for the nature of the State--this is a Milibandian style problem, where feudals staff the State apparatus of an aspiring capitalist State. Speaks also to the weakness of the elite's political roots, that they had to depend on landlords].

(34): All this ensured that land reforms were off the agenda during the early part of Pakistani history.

(34-35): question of the nature of Ayub's land reforms -- only Burki seems to think that it made inroads on power of the landed elite [remember Ayub had to lean on the ML for political support]. Damning verdict by Khan.

(36): and Bhutto's reforms weren't very different, of course, though the rhetoric was more radical (no compensation, for example)

(36): Zaidi ends by arguing that the daily work of capitalism may do some of the work of land reforms (small landholdings are emerging, etc.)

(51): tenancy and sharecropping have fallen drastically, both in the number of farms and in the area farmed.

(75): indirect taxes constitute 85% of the total revenues of the federal gov't

(73-75): the issue of the agricultural tax is clearly a testing ground for questions of fractions of capital, etc.

(76): rural elite has a disproportionate political influence, it is being argued [they are not feudal, but constitute an important fraction of the ruling class in Pakistan]

(77): Musharraf's gov't has said repeatedly that it was unwilling to embark on land reforms

(98): important--Ayub's regime pushed through limited 'liberalization' in 1959, which acted as a spurt to further growth, it is argued. this was made possible only because of an increase in the availability of foreign aid. this was set back in 1965, once foreign aid was curtailed and foreign exchange difficulties were encountered, as a result [question, here, of the importance of foreign aid in explaining gov't policy, then]

(99): b/c of the changed trade policies, none of the growth during the second five-year plan, it is being said here, was ISI.

(105): important--radical PPP manifesto, demanding nationalization of banking, insurance and of basic industries. the gov't pushed through labor and land reforms, devalued the rupee (which wiped away the subsidy to industrialists), increased procurement prices, abandoned EBS [evidence of significant autonomy, though limited]

(107): important--at the height of Bhutto's nationalizations, private sector investment had dropped to 15 per cent of its late 60's level [can be thought of as investment strike, or as simple crowding out?], public sector investment had become 75% of the total. "there is no doubt that the anti-industrialist policies..." were responsible. [partly, at least, an investment strike--revealing the limits to State autonomy, in short--"Bhutto had broken his promises"]

(111): since 1988, total capitulation to the IMF

(111-112): phenomenal growth rate of 6.5% (including real wages growing at 6.2%) from 1980-1988 (but productivity doesn't increase significantly, nor do employment opportunities)

(113-114): key--policy periods under Zia--first concern was to restore business confidence--denationalization of some agro-based industriees, and others, as well as further incentives given to the private sector, ease regulations, etc.

(114): story of the five-year plans

(116): important to note, though, that Zia couldn't demolish the public sector in toto (it employed 50,000 people, many firms were in the red)--handing this back to the private sector would have meant chaos. Zaidi making the additional point that it didn't want to alienate the middle-classes that had benefited from nationalization.

(116): nonetheless, public sector share of investment fell--from 72% in 1978-79 to 18 percent in 1988

(117): 1983-1988 was marked by further deregulation and liberalization--including the removal of the peg to the dollar in 1982

(118): the World Bank was particularly happy--the 'private sector's' share in total fixed investment increased to 42%, and to 83% in the manufacturing sector

(118-119): evaluation of the reasons for the high level of growth--for our purposes, it is important to note that all are agreed on renewed private sector confidence (we can say, quite clearly, that this was functional for capitalists).

(122-123): private investment as a percentage of GDP dropped through the 90s, so one wants to be careful in using this as an index of 'business confidence.' [this has to do, though, with the hiking of the interest rate--so maybe there is something to be said about financial capital? regardless--it would be foolish to read too much into this]

(146): Privatization really began under Nawaz Sharif, in November 1990, on the principle that the gov't should not be involved in the production of industrial goods--Bhutto had made noises, but not much progress was made.

(147): why privatization? partly to raise revenue. partly also to stimulate private investment in the economy [here, then, is a clear example of the limits to the autonomy of a State operating in capitalism--nationalizations induce wariness in the private sector]

(148): corruption in the selling process

(242): IMF/World Bank fuzziness on Pakistan's fiscal deficit

(244, 247): while Ayub was in power, development spending exceeded defence expenditure; with the democratic interregnum, this was decisively reversed! [at the very least, this offers little evidence for 'institutional' arguments--or that institutional argument that suggests the military intervenes in order to give itself a bigger piece of the pie]

(245): debt crisis was particularly acute when Musharraf first took over--this has eased, since, giving the State some fiscal space

(247): the interest rate was allowed to soar in the late 90s (up to 20% under Moeen Qureshi!), which obviously had the effect of exacerbating the debt problem (promoted low growth, etc.)

(247): damning facts about development and defence spending--almost all the increase in interest payments came at the expense of development spending.

(293): inflation is low in the 80s, high in the 90s (this is where IMF/WB see a problem to be solved)

(297-298): inflation has not been connected, empirically, to the money supply in Pakistan's history

(344): again, decline in private gross fixed capital formation in the 90's -- capitalists investing less, despite SAP.

(345): Bhutto tried to discontinue a standby loan, but was forced to go back to the IMF for a loan a few months later. Sharif came in and willingly pursued reforms they would like--and then in October 1997 became the first elected gov't to make a new agreement with them. Gen Musharraf has continued the proud tradition.

(365-367): the debt crisis that plagued Pakistan through the 90s was resolved by 2002ish. how? Thanks largely to phenomenal rescheduling of debt in December 2001, as payback to Musharraf for backing the WoT.

(368-369): what is the implication for Th. of the State, that relation with the US has been a key determinant of the ease with which the State gets credit?

(369): remittances rose in the 80s, fell in the 90s, rose dramatically after 9/11 (enormous explosion from the US, in particular)

(491): democratic regimes more likely to receive aid from abroad

(491): arguing that the 'threat' of India is critical for the military's continued survival--this is the reason the peace process doesn't move forward (example, here, of independent interest, qua institution)

(500): policy in the first decade geared toward industrialists--not toward landlords

(502): Bhutto antagonized capital

(502): [again, ludicrous arguments here about the middle-classes backing and then turning on Bhutto]

(503): main reason that Zia had a trouble-free decade was massive remittances from abroad ($20 billion over the decade)

(503): three local body elections, under Zia: 1979, 1983, and 1987

(504): Bhutto, even when she first came to gov't in 1988, had to agree to an IMF package that was signed hours before her accession.

(506): a 'middle-class revolution' [but this is all fly-by observation--not rigorous, at all]

(506): a decline in the importance of the 'national question'?

"the terrorist prince," raja anwar

take-home: an interesting, occasionally thrilling account of the twisted political adventures of murtaza bhutto, situated in an equally informative analysis of the political context of the time (the further fall of the PPP under the leadership of the Bhutto begums, the "communist" regime in Afghanistan, martial law in Pakistan, etc.). one is struck, in particular, by both the internal brutality and general impotency of Al-Zulfikar, quite in contrast to the snippets one occasionally hears.

the general argument is compelling, i think, insofar as it is clear that the failures of the organization reflect both (a) the pathological effects of the terrible toll their father's death took on murtaza and shahnawaz; (b) the failures of terrorism as resistance strategy, which celebrates propaganda of the deed over the hard work of grassroots organizing; (c) a unapologetically feudal sense of entitlement.

there is the question, as always, of whether this critique is too easy. it is, after all, somewhat obvious to declare that the failures of resistance or political work lie in the incomplete democracy of the respective endeavors. yet in this book raja anwar does carefully engage the strategic context (for example, he recommends, with hindsight, a different approach to the confrontationist strategy vis-a-vis zia that, he argues, cost Bhutto his life). in that sense it would be difficult to argue that raja anwar is taking refuge in textbook critiques--his engagement is very much soaked in the political history of the time.

and, after all, in the case of the Bhuttos and the PPP, who could argue against the thesis that their primary failure lay in their inability to be constituted by the authentic aspirations of those they claimed to represent?


--- important quotes/excerpts ---

(12): reasons for Zia's promotion by Bhutto--"no politician could hope either to get into power or to rule effectively without the good will, support, and indeed permissin of the army. Therefore he was looking for an army chief who would remain obedient to him, like Tikka Khan. Another factor was Zia's public persona... For Bhtutto, Zia's superficially weak personality was an asset."

(13): "Bhutto admitted after his removal that Zia's appointment had been his greates mistake."

(15-16): [popular mobilization to bring Bhutto down in 1977?] "The shame of the 1977 elections was that the PPP set out to rig them. The irony is that Bhutto allowed himself to be deprived of what would have been a genuine victory... The PNA had stood no chance of victory, but when it was announced on 8 March that in a national assembly of two hundred seats the PNA had won only 36, and the PPP 155, there was outrage at the scale of the illegalities committed.... The opposition exploited public anger by declaring a boycott of the 10 March elections to the provincial legislatures. Strike calls received tremendous support... Bhutto, having failed to quell the PNA movement through civilian law and order agencies, had increasingly begun to depend on the army for his political survivial. ON 21 April he had martial law proclaimed in Karachi, Lahore, and Hyderabad, but the army was not ready to shoot the people in order to keep a civilian in power..."

(18-on): Bhutto deposed on 4 July. Meeting in Murree with Zia on 12 July. On 29 July Bhutto released from protective custody, travels through Larkana, Karachi, Multan, Peshawar and Lahore, greeted by enthusiastic crowds. "The people had opted for Bhutto against martial law. Raja Anwar here writes of Bhutto's unwillingness to compromise with the army establishment as a strategic mistake. Bhutto arrested for the murder of Nawab Muhammad Ahmed Khan Kasuri on 3 September 1977.

(21): [JAMAAT-I-ISLAMI] "As soon as the October elections had been put off [Zia's promise of elections in 90 days, in other words], a witch hunt began. This was a shameful period in Pakistan's history. The mere mention of the word constitution, or election, or Bhutto, was enough for a person to be picked up and punished. The brazen manner in which General Zia used the Jamaat-i-Islami (Party of Islam) for his purposes has few examples in recent political history... The Jamaat now declared Zia the great Islamic defender, and lent its blind support to ever sinister martial law enactment and measure of his. Wherever people turend out on the streets to protest against martial law, the baton-swinging 'Danda Force' of the Jamaat would appear on the scene and beat up the demonstrators. If the day ever comes when the Jamaat can bring itself to examine its past conduct honestly, it will struggle to acquit itself of the charge of having acted as martial law's concubine. Scores of appeals to hang Bhutto were made by its members to General Zia."

(22): As for the PPP, it was more a rabble than a party. Bhutto had never encouraged party democracy, or a strong local structure with solid grass-roots links. He once claimed that, 'I am the People's Party and they are all my creatrues', a lesson that his heirs learned only too well. For most of the PPP's young members, a political act consisted of leaping in the air and dancing as their leader made his characteristic fire-breathing speeches. Because of its infantile chemistry..., the party was not equipped to deal with martial law in an organized and effective manner. With no tradition of local initiative, it was only natural that the rank and file would become the victims of Zia's brutal repression."

(24): "Bhutto never accepted until the end that he had been permanently deprived of power by the army. He believed that he would be able to outwit and outmanoeuvre Zia, calling his bluff."

(31): "while I fully supported Begum Bhutto's confrontationist strategy and bold stance towards the martial law regime, in my view her tactical mistake lay in trying to run a protest movement through a nominated central committee or relying mainly on former ministers and members of the defunct assemblies. The total number of such people at local, provincial and federal levels was at no time more than six hundred, hardly any of them willing to undergo the least personal inconvenience for the sake of Bhutto. Since it was a small and well-identified group, the government's intelligence agencies could easily keep watch on the activities of its members."

(35-37): discussion of author's own efforts to launch a campaign that would build up local and popular strength of PPP's anti-zia mobilization--the "Action Committee movement"

(42-43): Murtaza arrives in Kabul, May 1979

(48): "Murtaza was a perfect example of this juvenile adventurism. In 1969, he had a makeshift hut, such as you would find in a slum, constructed in the forecourt of his father's elegant house at 70 Clifton, Karachi. And now, ten years later, housed in a luxurious annexe to a former royal palace, he had hung out a sign saying 'People's Liberation Army' and dreamed of revolution."

(50): "It is ironic that while the political activists have often been able to win for the masses the right to vote freely because of their struggle against dictatorships, they have failed to gain the right to elect the office holders of the political parties they belong to."

(64-66): interesting bit about Afzal Bangash and Ajmal Khattak in Kabul after the MKP broke up into four factions following reforms in China. Raja Anwar critical of the former for looking for an alliance with Murtaza, whereas praising the latter for skillful and tactical pandering to the gallery in Kabul.

(70): meeting between Murtaza and Indira Gandhi (out of power in 1977; Janata Front only lasts two years; back in power by 1980)

(71): Zia on the constitution:

What is a constitution? It is a booklet with twelve or ten pages. I can tear them away and say that tomorrow we shall live under a different system. Today the people will follow wherever I lead. All the politicians including the once-might Mr. Bhutto will follow me with tails wagging.

(71): "Men like Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zia-ul-Haq did not rise to power because they were reformers or revolutionaries, or great heroes like de Gaulle and Eisenhower, but because they exploited the Cold War to grab power by toeing the American line"

(73): "The Western-educated Benazir did not take long to learn the golden rule of Pakistan's feudal politics, namely that a leader must not be answerable to his or her party. It was for the leader to issue orders, for the party to unquestioningly obey them. A leader might call for national elections in order to come to power, but elections within the party were out of bounds. Benazir though the safest course was to liquidate the old guard altogether, and in two years [1984-1986], she managed to purge the PPP..."

(78): "It is a tragedy of history that the Indian National Congress which once had in its ranks liberals such as Muhammad Ali Jinnah, non-communal nationalists such as Abu Kalam Azad, revolutionaries such as Subhas Chandra Bose, and brilliant intellectuals of the stature of Jawaharlal Nehru, had become a handmaiden of the naive and brutally ambitious Sanjay Gandhi. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, 'the Frontier Gandhi', was once constrained to comment: 'The party which we had set up by giving it our blood, has been destroyed by this girl [Indira Gandhi]"

(84): "The only success I had before our split was that I did not let him commit any act of violence or terrorism. As he had failed to set up a working-class, revolutionary organization, I tried to convince him to go back to London, where he could set up an office to guide the movement for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. Later, this suggestion provided his evidence to the Afghans that I had tried to persuade him to 'betray the revolution' and return to London."

(106): "[symmetry between Cold War Afghanistan and Pakistan] At the very moment when Karmal was talking so movingly about political prisoners in Pakistan, his own jails were packed with thousands of his countrymen whom he had locked up without any legal trial. While Karmal was bewailing the lot of the poor in Pakistan, General Zia was shedding tears over the privations of the Afghan masses. Both men had set up kangaroo courts to deal with their political opponents. In both countries, the mere mention of human rights amounted to treason. One was smothering the people in the name of socialism, the other in the name of Islam. One was in power by virtue of Soviet tanks, the other, by courtesy of American dollars. In a few years' time both would be disowned by their one-time patrons."

(116): "The hijack had happened at the height of the Cold War [March 1981], and the plane had landed in Kabul, so the world media but two and two together and declared that Al-Zulfikar was trained by the KGB. If Murtaza's dog Wolf was to be included, at the time there were only eight who could be called Al-Zulfikar.

(121): "Al-Zulfikar was neither a political party nor did it have a political, social, or economic programme. It was the manifestation of an emotional response by male members of the Bhutto family to the barbarity of martial law and the hanging of the deposed Prime Minister... There was a temporary increase in its membership after it managed to get some prisoners released from Zia's jails as part of the hijack's negotiated end, but even during those years 1981 to 1982 its total strength never exceeded ninety-six. "

(132): "The punishment awaiting Al-Zulfikar men was swift and merciless. Nothing can make up for the pain, fear, and mental torture they must have undergone. Instead of luxuriating in the safety of his fortress in Kabul, had the leader of ever joined his men on such a journey, he would have known something of the ordeals they endured. I doubt that it occurred to him."

(136): "By 1984, Al-Zulfikar, such as it was, had disintegrated."

(142): "Anjum had fallen a victim to Al-Zulfikar's back-handed logic which argued that the more people Al-Zulfikar blew up or shot, the greater would be the revulsion of the masses against the army. Finally, the masses would march out onto the streets and overthrow the regime. In life, it is the contrary that happens. Terrorism can never be popular because it destroys the very people in whose name it sets out to act."

(148): "The fact that the Bhutto brothers had settled in France in 1984 was not widely known. Not until Shahnawaz died there in 1985 did the world discover where he and his brother had been living. Why did the French government allow leaders of a terrorist organization to live in France?.... It is said that after Bhutto's hanging, the Americans decided to keep their lines open to the Bhutto family, and it was at their request that the French agreed to provide asylum and other facilities to Begum Bhutto and her sons..."

(155): "Afridi [entirely falsely accused, argues the author] was made to sit in a chair which had its back to a wall. He had no idea who was watching him, nor could he have been aware that Tipu and Shahnawaz, both of them toting Kalashnikovs, were hovering close by. Murtaza said in a loud voice: 'If you confess that you are an agent, I will release you and send you to Libya.' The simple Afridi did so. 'In keeping with my promise, I release you,' Murtaza announced. Eyewitnesses to this callous performance have described to me how, as signs of relief appeared on Afridi's face, Tipu and Shahnawaz both opened fire together, and blew his brains out. He died at once. Then his blood-splattered body was photographed and the pictures sent to General Fazle Haq..."

(156): "That he did not think twice about ordering a close companion killed on the basis of hearsay or minor differences, confirms that in Murtaza's book, the dividing line between friendship and enmity was either movable or non-existent. Having opted for the gun, he had convinced himself that therin lay the solution of every major and minor problem, as long as the muzzle was pointed at someone else, and by someone else's hand."

(186): story about Rashid Nagi, poet from Gujranwala, who set himself on fire for Zulfikar only to be sentenced to death by his son: "In February 1979, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had proudly told the Supreme Court of Pakistan that eight of his workers had set themselves on fire for his sake. Could any of them have imagined that only two years later, Bhutto's sons would humiliate one of them on a Kabul street and almost have him killed? Nagi had walked through fire, only to be beaten up and knifed by their henchmen..."

(193): "The new Prime minister of India, Morarji Desai, and the Pakistani dictator had one thing in common: their dislike of Mrs. Gandhi8 and Bhutto. Naturally, this brought them close, which was why the period from 1977 to 1979 brought the warmest ever interlude between the two countries."

(193): author arguing that Zia gives serious support to the Sikhs of East Punjab. but no real documentation of what actually was offered...

(194): as revenge for this, Indian backing for Murtaza to run a liberation movement in Sindh--therefore Al-Zulfikar reborn in January 1986. "Between 1986 and 1993, only Sindhi nationalist youths could join its ranks. Their optimal number can be said to have varied between three hundred and four hundred men. Every single Al-Zulfikar operation in the second phase was undertaken in Sindh."

(198): "Certain parallels between the two political dynasties of Pakistan and India, the Bhuttos and the Gandhis, bear out the judgement that republican democracy in the whole subcontinent is still at war with an older, feudal tradition that requires latter-day kings and queens, princes and princesses, who sometimes pay with their lives for the scale and dominance of their political ambitions..."

(200-201): President Ghulam Ishaq Khan was the sacker of both the Benazir government, in 1990, and the Nawaz Sharif government, in 1993.

(201): "In the elections which followed in 1993, Murtaza, who was stilla broad, decided to run for twenty Sindhi constituencies, confident that the people of Sindh would vote for him rather than Benazir. He was mistaken: the election was a disaster, and he could barely manage to win from Larkana."

(202): incident at Al-Murtaza in 1994, Bhutto's birthday, when brothers' henchmen clash with sisters' policemen.

(202): Murtaza arrested upon arrival in Pakistan--"when Murtaza was finally released from prison in May 1994, the rivalry intensified between him and his sister. In 1995, Murtaza set up his own party, which he named the Pakistan People's Party (Bhutto Shaheed)..."

(203): Both Benazir and Asif did whatever they could do to liquidate Murtaza politically... In May 1996, Murtaza and Benazir met for the first time since his return to Pakistan. The meeting was not a success; the two failed to arrive at a mutually acceptable formula for sharing power..."

(204): "The law and order situation in Karachi was already catastrophic. In 1995 alone, three hundred policemen plus two thousand members of the public had died violent deaths."

(208): "Only time will tell who Murtaza's killers were. One cannot help observing though that his life dictated his death. He had started his political journey with a gun, and on 20 September 1996 it was a gun which brought it to an end."

(209): "When it came into being in 1967, it appealed at once to the deprived masses that constitute the bulk of Pakistani society though they exercise no power. In the PPP they saw the promise of hope and change for the first time... During the five and half years that it stayed in power, it only brought severe disappointment to the people... Massive street demonstrations mounted by the opposition against the PPP's misrule encouraged the army to take over. However Bhutto's trial and execution in April 1979 became a grand act of expiation, and the people forgave him all his excesses..."

(209): "Benazir twice came to power, first from 1988 to 1990 and again from 1993 to 1996. On both occasions, her government failed to complete its term, dismissed on a host of charges by Presidents Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Sardar Farooq Leghari respectively... A party which started out in 1967 with a platform promising the abolition of feudalism, turned into its last outpost..."

zardari speech
(wonderful)

"The PPP has a vision to build a Pakistani nation that is one of the
great capital markets of the world; a revitalized nation that will
generate international investment. We look forward to the complete
electrification of all of our villages, the purification of our
nation's drinking water, the privatization of the public sector, the
expansion of the energy sector, the development of our export
industries, the modernization of our ports and the rebuilding of our
national infrastructure. All of these elements are essential to a new
Pakistan where a democratically elected government, with the mandate
of the people, confronts and marginalizes the forces of dictatorship,
extremism and terrorism wherever they may exist in our nation. In
other words, I see the progressive Pakistan for which my wife lived
and died."

another death in rawalpindi:
Today, military analyst Ayesha Siddeque estimates, the five conglomerates, or "welfare foundations," under military control own about $20 billion of assets and twelve billion hectares of land. This stake in the nation's economic life means the military necessarily has a large and persisting interest in control of the politic

favored nation:
It does not follow, however, that blame for Pakistan’s multifarious woes can be laid squarely on the shoulders of the US. Washington’s influence has played a deletrious contributory role in many respects over the decades, but we are essentially the authors of our own misfortunes - not least in terms of offering the US repeated opportunities to establish - and abuse - its clout.

Pakistan needs scrutiny not charity
In October 2005, upon learning of the devastation that had been caused in Northern Pakistan by a massive earthquake, many of my British friends promptly emailed me with offers of help, ranging from money to filling in my duties at Cambridge while I visited the earthquake stricken region. At the time, I suggested to them that what countries like Pakistan need, even in the face of such calamities, is not charity but scrutiny. Pakistan is a rich country, with abundant natural as well as human resources. What keeps Pakistan from developing is not a lack of resources but the presence of an illegitimate, highly corrupt government, which is sustained not by the people of Pakistan but by powerful developed countries in the vanguard of movements for ‘good governance’, democracy and transparency. 160 million Pakistanis do not need charity from the British public. They need their scrutiny. They need them to deny oppressive governments legitimacy. And they need them to expose the double standards of their own government.

musharraf-bhutto deal:
Rather the status of Bhutto- Musharraf "deal that is no deal" is like the liberated Chinese woman described by Mao Tse- tung: "She doesn't exist. But she is beginning to want to exist".
(...) The deal's terms exist, according to sources. They are that Musharraf would be re- elected Pakistan's president for another five years by the present national and provincial assembles later this year. Bhutto would return to Pakistan, with the corruption cases against her and her family dropped. Free and fair general elections would he held, "uninfluenced" by Pakistan's ubiquitous intelligence agencies. Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) would form the next government, in coalition with Musharraf's Pakistan Muslim League-Q (PML-Q).
(...) For Musharraf, the compulsion is strategic and tactical. Strategically, say sources, he has realised the Pakistan army's historical alliance with the Islamists is untenable in the post 9/11 world, especially given the army's financial and political dependence on Washington. Coaxed by the Americans, he is therefore seeking another political constituency that would widen his legitimacy at home and license his pro-American policies abroad. The PPP is the perfect partner -- it is opposed to the Taliban, supports Musharraf's crackdown on Al-Qaeda and has applauded the peace process with India.
[two fronts of crisis:]
(...) The first is the ferocious political backlash caused by his decision to suspend Pakistan's chief justice, Iftikar Mohamed Chaudhry, on 9 March. The fall-out has not only meant gathering protests in Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi. It has united all shades of the Pakistan opposition around the twin demands of Chaudhry's reinstatement and Musharraf's resignation. "Musharraf has never been weaker than he is today," says analyst Hassan Askari Rizvi.
(...) The second is what Bhutto calls the "creeping Talibanisation" of Pakistan. In the last six months pro-Taliban Islamists have spread their retrograde brand of rule from the tribal areas next to Afghanistan to Peshawar to, in places, Islamabad. The latest taste of their lash was on 28 April, when a suicide bomber exploded next to Pakistan interior minister, Aftab Sherpao, at a public meeting in Charsadda, near Peshawar. Sherpao escaped with perforated eardrums. But 33 others were murdered. It was the eighth suicide attack in Pakistan this year, all aimed at ministers, the army, police and hotels and airports frequented by foreigners -- the very emblems of Musharraf's pro-Western military government.