At the national level, the FMLN controls the presidency and little else. The right wing still holds sway in still the legislature at the hands of ARENA in coalition with smaller right-wing parties. The vast majority of Supreme Court judges are all ARENA appointees, while key governmental institutions, such as the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the Attorney General's office, are still beholden to the right. It's thus likely that progressive policies will be systematically obstructed at every turn.

elisabeth jean wood, forging democracy from below (2000)

(xiii): "enduring insurgency" as principal reason for the political pacts that led to democracy

(xiv): in el salvador--

1. FMLN was constituted as an insurgent counter-elite by the sustained support of insurgent peasants
2. ongoing urest and reforms reshaped lite interests; meant that elite willing to take a change on electoral competition and its vagaries [precisely because there aren't vagaries, though, is what she shows makes them willing to gamble]

(xiv): in south africa--

1. mobilization brought into existence an insurgent counter-elite
2. a defection from the ruling alliance undermined continued support for apartheid; some elites were moved to press for fundamental political reform.
   

(5): important--the specific argument, then, centers on the fact that elites depended for their economic privileges on state-enforced procedures that were unlikely to be sustainable under democratic rule [but isn't it also the case that it's precisely when they discover that they can sustain their economic privileges despite political reform that they accede? i suppose one can make a point about changing economic interests in el salvador; but to accept the notion that only the 'dull compulsion' of the market is needed is problematic, i think. isn't there always a link to the State? are we talking about a real, qualitiative shift (which is implied throughout), or merely change in degrees of repression?]

(5-6): she sees two puzzles:

1. why did elites give up, after decades of opposition? [her answer is that democracy was "forged from below" by insurgent mobilization. but--key--this is not always what is doing work in her argument. a weaker version is that the transition to democracy would not have taken place without sustained popular mobilization (this, i mean, is not quite saying that it was "forged from below")]
2. why were these so amenable to negotiation? [these two processes (below) forged the structural and political (and economic?) bases of compromise. moreover, these civil wars were different precisely because the contending forces were economically interdependent--ok, but surely this is not limited to south africa and el salvador.]
   

(5-6): two features of this path

1. constitution of an insurgent counter-elite that was elite in the sense that it was a necessary party to reforms (but in SA, elite in the other sense too, no)
2. accumulating costs of the insurgency transformed the core interests of economic elites

(6-7, 8-9): definition of oligarchic societies--societies in which economic elites rely on extra-economic coercion of labor by the state for the realization of incomes superior to those possible under more liberal, market-based arrangements... directly-(1) coercive labor relations such as slavery, (2) coercive restrictions on mobility, (3) coercive practices in the workplace (but this is quite problematic; need to interrogate the three conditions, i'm not sure they make much sense. abandoning RSS' innovation of 'labor-intensity' (see FN, pg. 8), so now it's confused a la Moore. the vocabulary doesn't distinguish a qualitiative shift (a la feudalism/capitalism), but quantitative--does this mean, though, that the US was oligarchic when capitalists call in police to smash strikes?). this is meant to be the foundation of a pact between 'regime elites' and 'economic elites.'

(10): four forms of transition

1. democracy by occupation
2. moderate elements within authoritarianism
3. political mobilization by a cross-class alliance (philippines, nicaragua, czechoslovakia, african countries?)
4. sustained political mobilization from below by working-class actors (wait--does the distinction between 3 and 4 really stand? this would require you to stretch your claims about the ANC and the movement, certainly. but see below, pg. 11 and pg. 12)
   

(11): a danger in overstating contrasts? her argument is that the distinction between 3 and 4 is the coherence of the State apparatus--in 3, elements in the state and the upper stratum can be pulled away. in 4, regime elites are in a tight nexus with economic elites.

(12): argument that ANC/FMLN don't count as cross-class. ok, we need to think about this--especially in light of her later claims about their moderation. [how can we make systematic sense of their "selling out"?]

(14): key distinction, which she doesn't discuss properly: in El Salvador, the insurgency reshaped the 'political economy' of the situation, which in turn shaped elite interests (and this first link is not even that clear--it's migrant remittances in her reconstruction. but consult the later parts--part of this is that the insurgency prevented a counter-coup after 1979); in South Africa, sustained mobilization creates a climate of general uncertainty.

(15): she's clear in saying that only when the "terms of transition" suit elites do they continue. this contains the seeds of rage. where is her rage?

(15): also, geopolitics--rise of neoliberalism meaning that 'postconflict states' less threatening to elites.

(15-16): distinction between other transitions and this one which is driven from below--but this is emphatically not the case in her reconstruction of el salvador (their influence is indirect, at best!)

(19): key--not the "slow penetration" of commercial agriculture (RSS), but sustained insurgency (again, el salvador is not the latter the way she reconstructs it; looks more like the former)

PART ONE

chapter two, conservative modernization to civil war

(26): conservative modernization in El Salvador failed, from 1950s to 1970s (elites did not shift from labor-repressive export agriculture to manufacture--which is less dependent on the coercive apparatus of the State)

(28): land and labor was secured for coffee production by direct coercion, redefinition of property rights

(31): rebellion of Farabundo Marti in 1932--17,000 people slaughtered in retaliation. four legacies:

1. eradication of indigenous culture
2. forestalling of reformist initatives
3. consolidated labor-repressive, coercive economic system
   
4. fifty-year political arrangement that saw the military in direct control of the political system (even though there were municipal and legislative election in the 1960s, and there were presidentail elections--"the Army invariably ruled at the national level", through client parties)

(37): lack of an internal market; logic of export agriculture was obvious.

(43): discussion of reformist coups in '44, '60, '72, '79--until the last one, though, all these efforts came to nought.

(44): in the 1970s, you had stirrings of protest, partly through the Catholic church

(45-46): October 1979 coup; reforms in the early 1980s, including the expropriation of hundreds of elite properties in March 1980.

(51): key argument here is that the insurgency prevented a counter-coup, after the 1979 coup, which made possible the reforms that would otherwise have been annulled. this is the beginnings of something more sophisticated than i was caricaturing earlier, but still indirect.

chapter 3, the structural foundation of a pact

(52-53): two reasons for transition

1. elites no longer depended on repression, because now they relied on market forces--reshaping of their interests (partly fall of export-oriented agriculture; also, though discipline by urban unemployment, she's mentioning...)
   
2. war-induced transformation shifted influence toward fractions of elite that favored compromise.
   

(52-53): transformed in three ways:

1. elites were threatened by Army, CD, and US alliance of reformists
   
2. repression didn't seem to be working, and thus their economic basis was eroding.
   
3. remittances presented new opportunities for gains not tied to coffee
   

(55): dramatic decline of export agriculture, for four reasons (the reason this is not economic determinism, though, is because the insurgency is in the background, throughout--it is not just explained, for example, by the decline in coffee prices)

1. elite uncertainty
2. expropriation in 1980
3. nationalization of finance and export
4. resources transferred elsewhere
   

(62): question--we have to decide if focusing on the unintended effects of insurgency (elites were doing well, elsewhere) is the same as 'forging democracy from below'.

(67): critical--also, the evolution of ARENA; the fact that elites had reliable political representation allowed them to tolerate political reform. it is precisely, in other words, because they weren't afraid of politics. (71--in 1985, a shift away from D'Aubisson)

(73): also, and this is very important in South Africa, as well--neoliberalism means that the postconflict government will be hamstrung, anyway.

(75): ARENA builds a broad political base?

(76): key--"with the eclipse of labor-repressive agriculture as the core interest of economic elites, neither the political nor the economic compromises in the peace agreement... would pose a significant threat..." [so is it indirect? or direct, because the shift is explained by the insurgency? see 77, below]

(77): here, she foregrounds remittances. i think she doesn't quite commit. so confused!

chapter 4, negotiating a democratic transition

(79, 85, 88): in brief--for ARENA, political compromise; for FMLN, almost entire economic compromise, short of redistribution of land; political victory (though in hindsight, wow...). result: ARENA and the elites win! not win-win, hardly compromise.

(105): ARENA builds a strong party ("individual conservatism of campesinos"!). WTF.

PART TWO

chapter five, apartheid, conservative modernization...

(111): same story--conservative modernization could not answer the aspirations of non-whites without compromising the labor-repressive controls on which the elite relied. this paved the way for the emergence of a counter-elite

(113): a "liberal revolution"--political reform, economic status quo [= total sell-out?]

(114): labor-repressive institutions as a response to the problem of labor-supply

(115): "Workers of the World Unite and Fight for a White South Africa", 1921/22!!!

(116): key example--Natives Land Act of 1913, transformation of peasants to farm laborers--clear example of role of extra-economic coercion (different narrative from Masondo's presentation)

(117): context of Apartheid, though, was "rapid urbanization"

(120): in sum, labor-repressive institutions were attempting to "balance" the competing demands for disciplined, urban and rural labor forces.

(122): Apartheid, though, could not wean the economy from its dependence on African labor [this is at the heart of the troubles--and, she will suggest, at the heart of the compromise]

(125-126): ANC's beginnings as a democratic party (founded in 1912). Radicalized in 1948, with Apartheid's implications for the African middle-class. SACP founded in 1921; works with the ANC starting in 1928.

(126): Mandela on the SACP

(127): the Freedom Charter, 1955

(126-127): account of the struggle in the 1940s and 1950s

(129): Sharpevillie 1960

(130): ANC exhausts non-violent civil disobedience in the anti-pass campaign around Sharpeville, founds Umkonto we Sizwe

(132): key--labor militance constitutes ANC as a counter-elite (graph on pg. 133--extraordinary peaking in the 1980s).

(135): Soweto 1976 (State responds with repression and reform)

(137): COSATU formed in 1985

(138): Union mobilization peaks in 1987 with 11% on strike (in UK in 1926, 14-15% were on strike; 10% participated in largest general strike after WWII in the US)

(139): COSATU moves toward ANC; adopts Freedom Charter in July 1987.

(140): in conclusion, two effects of sustained mobilization

1. ANC constituted as counter-elite (he writes about the lack of a black moderate leadership--though can't we think of 1990-1994 period, like this?)
2. business organizations were worried enough--they depended on labor--to push for reform.

(141-142): three reasons why the ANC emerges

1. Mandela
2. PAC was in shambles; ANC had resources
3. the appeal of a non-racial platform; universalism was a more powerful weapon than African nationalism

Chapter 6, Economic Elite Interests

(144): unlike El Salvador, where there was sectoral change during civil war--here elites were concerned about the effects on the investment climate.

(149): increasing capital intensity as a response to labor mobilization--this, she's arguing, has the effect of disincentivizing Apartheid. makes sense.

(153, 155): worry about capital outflows, disinvestment, starting in the early-mid 1970s

(159-161): dismissing the liberal argument, which has three requirements that she thinks don't hold. [she's not saying that some of this doesn't happen--the stuff about the profit rate and shortages of skilled labor--but her argument is that it happens too early to explain the time of transition]

1. shortage of skilled labor should have arisen earlier
2. shortage should have a negative impact on the profit rate
3. repairing this ought to have required democracy
   

chapter 7, from recalcitrance to compromise

(170): Business supports National Party in 1983 Referendum

(172): win-win!, from perspective of business. if business thinks its win-win, shouldn't you submit this to serious scrutiny!?

(179): splits within the National Party, into Conservative Party (particularly white labor?)

(182-183): three issues were on the table

1. political policy
2. economic policy
3. truth and reconciliation (and punishment!)

(185): extraordinary figures--between 1984 and 1989 5,500 died; between 1990 and 1993, 13,500 died. ("the tap" and mass action, during negotiations)

(186): Joe Slovo and the 'sunset clause'

(189190): critical--the ANC and economic concessions. sad, sad. (there doesn't seem to be space to see the 'politics-as-usual' in all of this)

(193): like in El Salvador--political victory, economic defeat means that the elites go home happy.

CONCLUSION

Chapter 8, The Insurgent Path

(198): the particular importance of economic interdependence in explaining all of this, as compared to other civil conflicts.

(199-201): important-- differences between El Salvador and South Africa

1. FMLN highly effective military capacity, leadership; ANC was militarily ineffective, and had less direct control of the social movement
2. in El Salvador, sectoral transformation of elite interests, owing to remittances; in South Africa, insurgency transformed elite economic interests not because of this, but because it undermined commitment to labor-repressive institutions (economic instability/political instability argument)

(200): spread of neoliberal ideology comforted elites.

(201): elites compromised only when they knew that they would do better, or at least no worse, in peacetime. scandalous!

(201): again, the trade-offs. politics for economics. boo.

(202): Poland--not the same 'threat' to the elites, she's arguing. they were looking forward to the transition. i think this is all dubious, but need a better sense of the history.

(203): Guatemala--three important differences:

1. weaker insurgency
2. civil war did not transform elite interests
3. fragile transition, because of lack of a hegemonic right-wing political party

(204): again, structural importance of economic interedpendence (israel is obvious thought, here)

(205): there is, though, the spectre of economic interdpendence becoming a normative claim. what happened to 'nothing to lose but chains'? the ANC didn't really need the white elite. they were forced to compromise, with them (working-class has everyday dependence; not politically, at moments of possible revolution). it's the other way (from perspective of capitalists) that dependence is obvious.

(206): again--"market institutions restrict post-conflict uncertainty"

Epilogue

(210-211): four (negative) legacies of this path

1. unequal distribution of wealth
2. social mobilization it requires
3. raised expectations of mobilized groups
4. a state that reflects past commitments

(211-212): the answer, though, as 'vibrant political competition'!?!? please! a pathological narrowing of the limits of the possible.

immigration numbers:
When we think of immigrants, we generally picture people from poor countries moving to rich ones. But only about a third of the 200 million people who comprise the global migrant populace moves from developing to wealthier nations. Another third moves between developing nations, and the remainder moves from wealthier nations to developing nations.
(...) Of the many forces that drive individual immigration from developing countries, neoliberal capitalist policies are among the most significant. They have disrupted traditional and protected economies in nations like Mexico and Guatemala. “Free-trade” agreements like NAFTA (and the impending DR-CAFTA) have lowered tariffs and abolished the government subsidy and welfare programs that have sustained the campesino classes of these nations for generations. Absorption into the competition of the “world market”—dominated by heavily subsidized American agricultural corporations—has led to the clearing of indigenous peoples from their land at a rate that reproduces the Cherokee “Trail of Tears” weekly. Displacement in rural regions is matched by urban out-migration, as the “Wal-Martization” of the economy accelerates the rate of deindustrialization.
(...) Overall, the undertow of “economic restructuring” pushes about a million workers a year to risk unauthorized migration across reinforced borders.
(...) Ironically, these same policies make national boundaries increasingly irrelevant for migration in the reverse direction. During the last decade, according to U.S. State Department estimates, the number of Americans living in Mexico has soared from 200,000 to 1 million—a quarter of all U.S. expatriates. But we don’t call these people “immigrants.” They are “retirees.” They are the “managers” and “technicians” in the maquiladoras. They are the “commuters”—the working poor of the United States, gentrified out of inflated housing markets like San Diego and seeking refuge in more affordable Tijuana.
(...) José arrived at the pick-up spot this morning, but others have been waiting here for weeks. Some are among the approximately 850,000 Mexicans who, according to the Mexican Interior Ministry, try crossing each year, get caught, and are deported. Most will try again, because about 350,000 Mexicans do successfully make it to their destinations each year. And about 500,000 people from Mexico and farther south do find work in the U.S. each year.
(...) Since 1994, the U.S. enforcement strategy has been two-pronged: criminalize the immigrants and militarize the borders. The U.S. has choked off traditional urban crossing points by building double and triple walls, increased the number of agents, and introduced military technology and personnel into routine activities. This policy has made the journey more dangerous by pushing crossing points into remote, hazardous regions in desert and mountainous terrain, or into the equally dangerous underworld of human smuggling—through ports of entry as container cargo. Funding for border enforcement has increased from $1.3 billion in 1994 to $7.3 billion in 2005, and the yearly death toll during that period has mushroomed from 23 to 473.
(...) In all, more than 4,000 men, women, and children have died in the act of looking for work in the U.S. But the rate of unauthorized crossings has not slowed.
(...) During the past year, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE) has issued 3,667 “administrative violations,” which generally involve the apprehension of undocumented immigrants at work sites—up from 485 in 2002.
(...) Another 24,000 people were picked up separately during Operation “Return to Sender.” Although it was theoretically a plan to arrest those with criminal records, two thirds of those apprehended in this operation had committed no crimes at all but were detained as “collateral arrests.”
(...) At least 25,000 undocumented migrants are imprisoned in more than 200 immigrant detention centers across the country. But there is still an overflow. So detainees en route to deportation hearings are routinely housed in local and state prisons, integrated into the general population there, and subjected to a host of foreseeable problems. Since 1995, about 1.5 million people have been ejected from the U.S. through this process.
(...) Deportations have tragic consequences for families. They separate parents from children, husbands from wives, and same-sex partners from each other. An estimated 5 million children in the United States—at least 3.1 million of them U.S.-born citizens—have parents who are undocumented immigrants.
(...) Deported parents, hoping that they can soon return, commonly leave citizen children with relatives. But current immigration law dictates that if an undocumented person is deported or leaves the country voluntarily, he or she cannot re-enter the United States for 10 years. Worse, anti-immigrant opponents have proposed legislation to deny “birthright citizenship,” so that the children of undocumented migrants born in the U.S. would be denied the right to citizenship that has historically been granted by the Constitution to all people born in the United States.
(...) In 2006, 570 immigrant bills were introduced in 32 states, mostly to implement such restrictions. Local governments have enacted restrictions on renting or providing services to migrants without proof of residency, passed “English-only” ordinances, and empowered local police to check immigration status as part of their normal routine.
(...) Despite the virtually open borders for the migration of American capital and people into Mexico (90 percent of the 2,000 foreign-owned firms in Mexico are U.S.-based), many layers of obstruction prevent Mexicans from obtaining authorization to work in the north. For one, displaced laborers or subsistence farmers like José are categorized as “unskilled,” and the U.S. distributes only about 5,000 visas each year for unskilled workers globally. In 2005, only two of those went to Mexicans.