During this process, the Pakistani Taliban never really merged into the organizationalstructure of the Afghan Taliban under Mullah Omar; instead, they developed a distinct identity. From their perspective, they intelligently created a space for themselves in Pakistan by engaging in military attacks while at other times cutting deals with the Pakistani government to establish their autonomy in the area.1 By default, they were accepted as a legitimate voice in at least two FATA agencies—South Waziristan and North Waziristan.
(...) The name “Tehrik-i-Taliban” had been used prior to the latest December 14 announcement. An organization with a similar name emerged in FATA’s Orakzai Agency in 1998.2 Some reports also mention a similar organization by the name of Tehrik-i-Tulaba (Movement of Students) also operating in Orakzai Agency that even established an active Shari`a court.3 The name and idea, therefore, is not original.
(...) A shura of 40 senior Taliban leaders established the TTP as an umbrella organization. Militant commander Baitullah Mehsud was appointed as its amir, Maulana Hafiz Gul Bahadur of North Waziristan as senior naib amir (deputy) and Maulana Faqir Muhammad of Bajaur Agency as the third in command.6 The shura not only has representation from all of FATA’s seven tribal agencies, but also from the settled North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) districts of Swat, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohistan, uner and Malakand. This reach demonstrates the TTP’s ambitions. Since its establishment, the TTP through its various demarches have announced the following objectives and principles:

1. Enforce Shari`a, unite against NATO forces in Afghanistan and perform “defensive jihad against the Pakistan army.”7
2. React strongly if military operations are not stopped in Swat District and North Waziristan Agency.
3. Demand the abolishment of all military checkpoints in the FATA area.
4. Demand the release of Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) Imam Abdul Aziz.
5. Refuse future peace deals with the government of Pakistan.

(...) TNSM, another banned terrorist outfit, is led by Maulana Fazlullah and had re-emerged in 2006. The group made headlines for taking control of large areas in the Swat Valley of the NWFP. The army, after a large operation in late 2007, recaptured the district, but TNSM militants (numbering in the hundreds) are still operating in parts of the district. The TTP’s demand for halting government military action in Swat appealed to TNSM members and will predictably lead to more collaboration between the two groups in terms of manpower, logistics and intelligence. TNSM leader Fazlullah is known for the mobile FM radio stations that he managed until recently, on which he would broadcast his radical ideology.
(...) Mehsud came to prominence in February 2005 when he signed a deal with the Pakistani government that it termed as his surrender, although he interpreted it as a peace deal in the interests of the tribal regions as well as Pakistan.18 As part of the deal, he had pledged not to provide any assistance to al- Qa`ida and other militants and not to launch operations against government forces. The deal was short lived, and si ce 2006 he has virtually established an independent zone in parts of South Waziristan Agency which is widely believed to be a sanctuary
for al-Qa`ida and the Taliban.
(...) Maulana Hafiz Gul Bahadur—Belonging to North Waziristan Agency, he has been a member of the local Taliban shura since 2005. He was also a member of the threeman signatory team, representing North Waziristan tribes, that signed the wellknown peace deal between the Pakistani government and North Waziristan in September 2006.21 The deal collapsed in July 2007.
(...) Maulana Faqir Muhammad—The relatively well-profiled 39-year-old Faqir Muhammad
belongs to Mohmand tribe and is known as a facilitator for al-Qa`ida.23 He is a resident of Bajaur Agency, but was educated in the Salafist tradition in various madrasas of the NWFP. This brought him closer to the Arabs operating in the area, which also benefited him financially. This perhaps allows him to afford the personal security team that he is known to have. He came into prominence in 2005 when government forces raided his house in search of some “high-value” Al-Qa`ida operatives. He was a target of a U.S. missile attack in 2006, but he escaped unhurt. He also remained close to TNSM’s founder Maulana Sufi Muhammad, who is currently in jail.

Of the NWFP’s 24 districts, the government of Pakistan has declared eight districts as high security zones, which means that Taliban activities are expanding and the chances of terrorist attacks have increased.1 These districts are Peshawar, Mardan, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Nowshera, Abbottabad and Tank. Five of these districts (or their frontier regions) border different FATA agencies (Peshawar: Khyber Agency; Kohat: Orakzai Agency; Bannu: North Waziristan Agency; Dera Ismail Khan: South Waziristan Agency; and Tank: South Waziristan Agency). Clearly, increased disturbances and militancy in FATA is pouring into the neighboring settled districts of the NWFP.
(...) Mangal Bagh, the head of Lashkar-i-Islami, who is essentially a warlord operating in Khyber Agency,22 is introducing his “projects” in Peshawar District apparently without any hindrance.23 He is believed to have sympathizers in the security forces due to his anti-Taliban stance, which at best is a political position because his religious ideals are quite similar to those of the Taliban. For instance, he has asked men to grow beards, wear caps and keep their ankles visible (a very conservative Islamic requirement) to avoid beatings. A large number of people have purchased caps to avoid being killed.
(...) Training and equipping the Frontier Corps is not a substitute for providing adequate resources to the NWFP police.

Estimates of TTP strength run to over twenty thousand tribesmen, and Mehsud is said to command at least five thousand fighters. He is likely responsible for a rash of suicide bombings throughout Pakistan over the past year. A small contingent of his forces also made headlines when they managed to take hostage over 250 Pakistani soldiers in August 2007. By all appearances, the Pakistani Taliban now represents the greatest threat to security within Pakistan. Significant militant groups other than the TTP include the TNSM in Bajaur Agency, Swat District, and neighboring areas of the NWFP, founded by the pro-Taliban Sufi Mohammad and more recently commanded by his son-in-law, the popular and charismatic “Radio Mullah” Fazlullah. In South Waziristan, a tribal militia under the command of Maulvi Nazir apparently received Pakistani government support in factional fighting against Uzbek militants over the past year. And in Khyber Agency, another radio Mullah, Mangal Bagh Afridi, leads Lashkar-e-Islam (LI), a militant group that has resisted association with the TTP, is active all the way to the outskirts of
Peshawar, and desires Taliban-style government.
(...) Consequently, security and development efforts on the Afghan side of the border take on special urgency. Interdicting the narcotics trade is especially relevant. Without a more effective counternarcotics campaign in Afghanistan, one that stresses shutting down major trafficking rings, militants in Pakistan will continue to enjoy easy access to cash, and, by extension, to foot soldiers, vehicles, and weapons.
(...) In the short run, a temporary work program may also be a useful means to ompete with the Taliban for the many mercenary foot soldiers who only fight for the paycheck. That said, any cash-for-work program that does not lead to stable, sustainable incomes might quickly prove counterproductive by frustrating the mbitions of the men (and their families) it is intended to serve.
(...) The peculiar colonial-era mechanisms for governance in the FATA—its federal administration through the governor and political agents by application of the FCR—must yield to a more representative and transparent political process.

But, so far at least, the tribal militias have been no panacea. Instead, the use of the militias, known as lashkars, has set off a debate over whether such a strategy will contribute to a civil war in the northwest that could engulf all of Pakistan. Yet some tribal leaders say they have little choice but to fight their brothers, cousins and neighbors: The Pakistani military, they say, has threatened to bomb their villages if they do not battle the Taliban.
(...) Feelings of distrust toward the government's strategy are especially high in Bajaur, where, for the past three months, the Pakistani military has pounded suspected insurgent strongholds with artillery fire and air raids. Pakistani military officials say hundreds of fighters have been killed since operations began in August. But they have made little mention of the unknown number of civilians who have also died as a result of the campaign. More than 200,000 people have fled clashes in Bajaur, setting off a humanitarian crisis as the refugees struggle to find food and shelter.

"Some tribal leaders say they have little choice but to fight their brothers, cousins and neighbors," The Washington Post reported on Nov. 11 after touring the carnage in Bajaur. "The Pakistani military, they say, has threatened to bomb their villages if they do not battle the Taliban." The Pakistani military has followed through on these threats on several occasions.
(...) The military has also threatened to destroy homes of the tribes in the Mohmand tribal agency if they fail to expel the Taliban. "We warn the Mohmand tribes to sever ties with Tehreek-e-Taliban’s Abdul Wali group as the government is planning action against the group," the Mohmand Agency administration warned the population in pamphlets, according to a report in Daily Times. "Get all elements of Abdul Wali group out of your homes, otherwise they will be targeted by helicopters and jet bombers."
(...) "But in the long run, Pakistan is alienating the people they are supposed to be protecting. Unless Pakistan is willing to conduct a ruthless, protracted campaign against its own people, like the Russians did in Chechnya, destroying everything and everyone in its path, this will fail," the official said. "And I see no indication Pakistan has the political will to go the way of the Russians in Chechnya."
(...) “The potential for blowback in the tribal areas and beyond is enormous,” said the officer. “We could never have made the Anbar tribes to fight al Qaeda. It was never about guns, money, or power. The Anbar tribes fought for survival. The Pakistani tribes will fight for survival too, but in this case, they likely will see the government as the oppressor.”

The military says more than 1,500 militants have been killed while 73 soldiers have also died in fighting in Bajaur since August, though no independent verification of casualties is available. Unlike past offensives, the military has relied heavily on air power to push back the Islamist guerrillas.

Tribesmen Hazrat Mohammad and Nazir told Daily Times at Torkham border that even their children were unable to sleep due to fighting in the area. Nazir said that security forces could not hit militants, as they were inside their bunkers or on the mountains in the Upper Mohmand Agency and it were the ordinary people who were being caught in the crossfire.

Soon several such lashkars were formed in the nearby Bajaur tribal area, adjacent to Swat, where tribesmen have suffered at both the hands of the Taliban and through successive military operations. A lashkar of 4,000 armed men raised by the Salarzai tribe launched a campaign against the militants, attacked their strongholds and destroyed their houses and so-called “command centers” in the Bajaur tribal region. Lashkar leaders warned local and foreign militants of dire consequences if they did not leave the area. Malik Munasib Khan, who is leading the uprising against the militants, said that the houses destroyed by the volunteers included one belonging to militant leader Naimatullah, who had occupied several government schools and converted them into madrassas (Dawn [Karachi], September 1). Volunteers of the Salarzai tribe set fire to eight Taliban houses in the Aundai area and killed three militants. Under pressure, the Taliban leadership began directing their supporters to trim their beards and long hair (Taliban hallmarks in the tribal areas) to avoid recognition (Daily Times [Lahore], October 5). The lashkars had some gains in Kurram agency as well, where they captured the Bagzai area, a stronghold of the Taliban, with six militants killed and 26 others injured. The local lashkar then retook control of the Char Dewal and Jalmai villages from the Taliban. After further defeats of the Taliban in various parts of the Kurram agency, the tribal volunteers plugged all access points to prevent further entry of unwanted elements into the agency (Geo TV, September 2).

Colonel Muhammad Nauman Saeed, who has 28 years of service, a greying beard and Sandhurst English, explains that, after weeks of operations, the mixed force of 4,000 troops and paramilitaries known as the Frontier Corps has pushed the militants back to positions that will be cut off when the snows come in a few weeks' time. The weather and a force of American and Afghan national army soldiers across the frontier will mean they are boxed in. Originally there were 5,000 militants and we have killed half of them at least,' the colonel said. His troops have lost 84 killed and 320 injured since the operation began.
(...) n Bajaur, local men formed bands around those with guns and access to cash, elbowing aside traditional tribal leaders. Militant leaders include a former teashop owner, a gunman, a known criminal and a minor cleric. One is from the violence-racked Kunar valley in Afghanistan. 'They are men from economically and socially marginalised elements in tribal society,' said a Peshawar-based expert and former senior bureaucrat, Khalid Aziz. The disparate groups based themselves in the village of its chief and, with money and a little military training from al-Qaeda, soon established a miniature version of a hardline Islamist state, preaching jihad, closing girls' schools and DVD shops, and killing tribal leaders who stood in their way. According to Mohammed Shah, a former chief of security in the region, 'they are a loose federation rather than a unified movement'.
(...) A series of similar military operations over recent years has failed to pacify the tribal areas, often resulting in peace agreements controversial in Washington and Kabul. but lessons had been learnt, Khan said. The current operation would be 'the model' for the future. Last week troops started pushing into Mohmand, the next agency to the south.
(...)

To save Loe Sam, the army has destroyed it. The shops and homes of the 7,000 people who lived here are a heap of gray rubble, blown to bits by the army. Scraps of bedding and broken electric fans lie strewn in the dirt. As Pakistani Army helicopters and artillery fired at militants’ strongholds in the region, about 200,000 people fled to tent camps for the displaced in Pakistan, to relatives’ homes or across the border into Afghanistan.
(...) Arabs, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Afghans form the hard core of its opponents, enlisting young, unemployed local men who join the militants for money and the prestige of sitting armed with a rifle in a double-cabin pickup, the favored Taliban vehicle, General Khan said.
(...) “If the government doesn’t rebuild, we will be thieves, suicide bombers,” he said. “We will be forced to do these things.”
(...) The army says 1,500. But two officers, speaking on condition of anonymity because they were contradicting their superiors, said that the number appeared excessive. One army captain involved in the fighting said 300 seemed closer.
(...) In his wood-paneled office, Col. Nauman Saeed, the officer in charge of day-to-day operations at the headquarters in Khar, said he was mired in a classic guerrilla conflict. In September, he said, Taliban leaders in Bajaur had replenished their forces with 950 more men from Afghanistan. “You keep killing them,” Colonel Saeed said, “but you still have them around.”

"They are between the devil and the deep sea," said Akhunzada Chitran, a tribal representative from the Bajaur area. "On the one side, there is the Taliban, but on the other side, they are being forced by the government to fight the Taliban or flee or the government will bomb them. It's a very difficult choice to make, but we have made up our minds to take on the Taliban."

For the most part, the refugees said they witnessed only airstrikes and heard artillery fire in the distance. None saw any combat involving troops on the ground in Bajur — something the army says has not been a major feature in a fight that has relied heavily on bombs and rockets fired from planes and helicopters. The army also has some 6,000 to 8,000 soldiers and paramilitary troops on the ground.