collected snippets of immediate importance...


Showing posts with label vivek chibber. Show all posts
Showing posts with label vivek chibber. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 29, 2011

reviving the developmental state? myth of national bourgeoisie, vivek chibber

(227): three Marxist expectations for national bourgeoisie, which have been called into question
  1. expand capitalist relations
  2. abolish pre-capitalist relations (anti-feudal, etc.)
  3. natural interest in opposing imperialism
(228): assumption that national bourgeoisie is natural force for development needs to be challenged

(230): n. bourgeoisie has been an obstacle to State capacity, which is what was needed for successful development

(237): actual power of State in State-led development was weak

(238) twin problems
  1. fiscal drain--slack taken up by public sector, subsidies to inefficient private sector, etc.
  2. external account drain--import of capital goods, failure of export-promotion programs (due to resistance from firms)
(241): key point--late-late development was very different form late development, in the role that the State would have to play (more than subsidization/protection, due to comparative severity of backwardness). this is one reason Marxists had trouble understanding.

(242): second reason: Theory of the State issue, as well--instrumentalists understood State entirely in service of capitalist class. but if you allow some independence, it becomes easier to understand the conflict between capitalists and the State. [hmm]

(244): remember, ISI was a massive transfer of resources to capitalists.

(244): co-option and repression lf labour--too often labour was complicit (you mean labour bureaucracy)

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1. small number of producers not sufficient to generate competition [same question as last week, which was well-answered: (1) don't want to waste resources; (2) mkt not big enough]

2. th. of the State point. really?

Friday, March 25, 2011

vivek chibber, locked in place (2003) chapter 1: introduction

(4): india's failure as a relative failure

(6-7): e. asian example teaches us that this is not so much about state intervention, but about the quality of state intervention. specifically, in two dimensions:
  1. state's cohesiveness as a strategic actor
  2. state's ability to extract performance from private firms
(9): critical--the question of the installation of this apparatus has been answered by referencing goings-on within the state. in contrast, bringing attentiont to the conflicts between the state and societal actors. two nested claims, here:
  1. divergence in outcomes depended on the orientation of the business class -- state managers' agenda was frustrated by a well-organized offensive launched by domestic capitalists
  2. the mechanism that caused a different reaction in India and Korea was the former's adoption of ISI, and the latter's adoption of ELI. they generated different political incentive structures.
chapter 2

(13) state intervention in the latter half of the twentieth century has been more extensive and invasive than earlier 'late development.' the hallmark is the appearance of 'development planning'.

(16-17): these demands on the state (state capacity) require institutional structures that can do two things:
  1. coordinate amongst firms--guarantee inputs and coordinated investment projects
  2. compel/discipline capital
(19-23): this, in turn, requires three things
  1. rational bureaucracy
  2. nodal agencies
  3. embededness
(29-44): four theses
  1. state building in India imperiled by capitalist offensive; not the case in Korea
  2. ISI vs. ELI
  3. Korea was able to switch to ELI because of unique historical conditions; this was not possible in India, ELI would not have helped appease capitalists
  4. full explanation for failure in India would have to incorporate INC demobilization of the labour, which reduced State's autonomy from Capital
(52): coup of 1961, SK -- crucial

(53): not b/c of State power, but b/c of capitalist enthusiasm [this is why point about authoritarianism is misplaced]

(56): Rhee (1948-1961), pursued 'bad' ISI in 50s

(58): crux--critical factor allowing for policy change in SK was emerging alliance between K. and J. capital

(60): EPB as 'nodal agency'

(61): 1964-1965 -- the 'pact' around the export-led strategy

(62-65): control over finance/credit --> State autonomy? [no, Vivek is saying-- this doesn't render state managers indifferent to capitalists' reaction to their policies]

(66): summary page--development of dev. State in SK

(68): b. confidence went down with the coup

(69): 1961-1963 failure in SK

(71): difference between export-led and export-promotion (most countries did latter; SK was unique in pursuing former)

(72): in early 60s, Korean firms not so hot

(72): but firms will still be amenable, where a reasonable chance of success in markets, exists

(73-74): Japanese help was crucial, in SK--and it began before '64-'65

(77): FDI important or not? not a lot of the investment, but central to success in key sectors

(78): in short--the Japanese relationship [seems to suggest that Japanese supplied the credit; what does this mean in terms of importance of State monopoly of credit?]

(79-80): wrt Japanese capital, state support was critical (1) ensuring partnerships; (2) guaranteeing credit, etc. [but why not just allow State control over Japanese? why allow State control over themselves? isn't there a prisoner's dilemma, here? you might even want State to control others, but why your own firm? but maybe 'chaebols' obviate this]

(82): key--ELI causally prior to dev. state

(83): w/o this ELI analysis, you have a 'bootstraps' model

(86): three theses, re: India
  1. release of Bombay Plan not motivated by desire to launch developmental State. instead, response to Quit India agitation of '42-'43, which industrialists perceived as threat. trying to preempt socialist planning, calling for capitalist planning
  2. capitalists were quite opposed to idea of giving State any measure of power to control investment ('39 coordination fell apart', reception of BPlan, etc.). after 1945 very clear.
  3. opposition to State power over private capital was generated by structural factors--partly due to flight of British capital, but mainly result of State ISI strategy
(92): Q. India went out of INC's hands

(110): by demobilizing labour, Congress was eroding its capacity to impose discipline

(113): Gandhi--singular capacity to mobilize the masses (especially rural) earned the respect of the Left; staunch defense of property earned the trust of the Right

(125): imp--question, here, of what allowed them to split the labour movement so easily. is it as simple as saying that they had political hegemony?

(128): argument re: business offensive in India
  1. state managers needed to both (a) win support of capitalists; (b) impose discipline on capitalists.
  2. but (b) was not tolerable to capitalists, and (a) made it very rational for them to resist (b) (they liked ISI largesse, which made it easy for them to make profits without ramping up productivity)
  3. capitalist class was handicapped because self-regulation was discredited; and also 'planning' of the largesse kind was favored
  4. as a result, industrial planning policy was passed--but severely compromised by State's concern to appease capitalists. PC basically became an advisory body
(142): political lobbying and investment strike, when things didn't seem to be going their way

(144): Nehru was concerned, but couldn't do anything: (1) departure of Left and (2) ascension of V.B. Patel left him powerless

(146): PC was neutered, as a result

(148): the State as 'doting nanny'

(163): importance of 'the nodal agency' -- need to discipline political elites, as well

(169, 172): structure of Korean business important in facilitating corporatist arrangements? made embeddedness/discipline easier? but then should have been easier in India, Vivek notes

(175): regulation in Korea vs. self-regulation in India

(182): in sum, planners weren't given institutional power

(195): why didn't reform occur?
  1. not because of ideological biases--ideological argument can't explain why planners didn't pursue 'better' State intervention.
  2. not because they were corrupt--in Japan and SK, corruption was compatible with effective State intervention
(196): Crisis of 1957 triggered re-think--onset of foreign-exchange crisis, exports would have to be increased.

(200-206): but trying to turn firms towards export markets, following Korea's example, in 1958-1959--floundered for three basic reasons.
  1. preference for the domestic market--firms are comfortable making easy profits insulated from competition. why change? [so why change in SK, after 50s? because of historic opportunity given to them by Japanese]
  2. but MNC's in India didn't play the Japanese role--corporations in India exported very little, unlike the Japanese, who had set up to export
  3. b/c of this, only State export promotion schemes were left--and these didn't work, for reasons already detailed. structure of policy apparatus wasn't coherent, and firms remained committed to domestic market.
(207): imp--the fact that reform was understood as 'less State intervention' rather than 'better State intervention' was a function of the 'balance of forces' [Vivek adds that this was generated by the planning process itself, though I'm unclear what this means, exactly? why did the failure of the planning process produce a more powerful capitalist class? isn't it the case that we had this already--absent a labour upsurge or like increase in State autonomy, this was the destined trajectory]

(209): imp-- bureaucracy reaction to crisis is to ignore plan directives even more, allow foreign capital partnerships to aid import of machinery (this just favored luxury consumption, etc.)

(210): PC was incapacitated by its lack of clout--but it also was implicated in debacle, which made it a prime target for attack

(214): PC duly marginalized under Shastri and Gandhi--power shifted to the ministries

(212, 214): 1964 Nehru dies. 1964-1966 Lal Bahadur Shastri. 1966-1984, w/ exception of 1977-1979, Indira Gandhi. over this period, PC loses all its power.

(217): push towards 'ministerial autonomy' [how do you think of this, structurally? what is the place of the story of 'purely political' conflict?]

(218): US aid for liberalization

(227): planning possible when domestic capital resists, if you have the power, which you can have if (a) bourgeoisie is too weak; (b) labour is strong as counterweight; (c) exceptional circumstances [what would this look like? we're certainly not talking about benign State-capital cooperation anymore]

(228): Taiwan example of (a) [but Pakistan? something else has to be going on]

(228): Postwar France an example of (b)

(229): postwar Japan an example of (c)

(233-236): lots of countries tried ELI in 60s and 70s, but failed. this, largely, was b/c of pre-existing ISI and b/c lack of 'cohesive' State [but former the case in Korea, too, and it doesn't matter; and latter, if important, needs explanation--in acct explained by ELI, no? Vivek focusing, then, rightly, on the inability to reduce 'entry costs'--Korea had this b/c of Japan, but others didn't, obviously]. other possibility was their 'socialization by the State', but this is precluded because of the balance of class forces--of course, there you need a solid State structure.

(239): underdevelopment precluded ELI for most countries

(240): a postwar France, in India?






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[1] is there an ISI that could anchor development, given suitable State discipline?

[2] authoritarianism important for overcoming resistance of political elites?

[3] question of m-term/l-term rationality, re: accepting discipline? not so much, I think -- they need coordination of investment, etc. so they accept it, on s-term grounds. but worth asking

[4] technological assistance vs. discipline?

[5] Indian capitalists' position as the 'default'

Thursday, April 30, 2009

introduction to marxism and politics, with vivek chibber
lecture 1 -- class

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why is class important? synonymous with "marxism," of course--but made so by the degeneracy of "left" culture (used to be the way any self-respecting marxist thought about capitalism, vivek is arguing)

part of the reason class has been so singularly associated with "marxism" has to do with the history of the Stalinization of the workers' movement.

vivek is stressing, though, that Marxists don't have a monopoly on the concept of class. nothing here is specific to Marx, himself--almost any 19th and 20th century socialist would recognize its importance.

nonetheless, why do we give class this importance? we still have to justify this.

it has to do with the issues that the Left is animated around--all those things which afflict vast numbers of people (poverty, disease, inequality, etc.)--all these things are maintained by people in power.

what the Left found, was when it tried to organize for better wages, etc., it found that it met with resistance. social justice is not going to be something that the well-endowed will agree to.

so, (a) the Left had to understand why the powerful resist / (b) what is the source of their power?

this is what leads, ultimately, to the recognition of class. the view on the marxist left has been that the central arbiter of power is class. and the reason that this is the case is because wielding power requires resources; and class is the chief distributor of resources in a capitalist society (indeed, in any society).

resources include: money, time, space, etc. -- again, the unequal distribution of resources translated into an unequal distribution of power, which facilitates the perpetuation of the status quo.

it's surprising, vivek is saying, how few people can justify the importance of class--it should never be a doctrinal commitment. we need to justify our attentiveness to class.

---

we come, then, to the question of how class appears and reproduces itself--and how does it bring about these inequalities.

surplus

class is not just any old social relation. class is associated with inequalities. what vivek wants to argue, though, is that not all inequalities are class inequalities. only certain kinds give you class relations of inequality.

inequalities that come about through exploitation.

most of human history has lacked "social surplus," don't forget. for exploitation to occur, surplus is a precondition.

imagine an agrarian society--everybody owns a small plot of land, big enough to grow enough food for the family unit. if they live in a village, then there's some common land, as well. after each agrarian cycle, there may be enough surplus to be stored in case of disaster. but basically they consume what they produce.

in a society like that, we can say that there's nothing left after people's needs are met. and thus: a group exercising structural and systematic power will not emerge.

maybe a priesthood will emerge--these priests won't work, will appropriate some of the surplus in the name of the ancestors, etc.

the difficulty, however, will be this, of course--where will the crops/produce come from in order to enshrine these classes. the only way in which such a group can emerge, is if the producers make enough to satisfy their own needs and the desires of an extractive class.

here, historically, in the emergence of this parasitic class, we see the birth of armies, retainers, etc. you will invariably meet a lot of resistance when you ask people to give things up.

therefore, this is also a question of technology--the state of the productive sources has to allow such a situation.

for classes to exist, there must be a social surplus. this is what the surplus does.

already we know two things:
(1) classes that are in power, do so by extracting a surplus produced by others
(2) they maintain that power via other institutions, armies and the State.

---

let us think, a bit, about how class worked during feudalism, in order to understand better the emergence of capitalism.

imagine a society in which there is a bit left over in the form of a surplus. a group of people arise to lay claim to that surplus. the feudal lords, who live of the labor of their peasants. the question, here, is how this happens.

a lord says to the peasants--"it's a bad, rough, mean world. all these other lords will come around with their retainers and seize your produce. i will protect you, at a price."

the basis, then, for taking some of the crop is a direct threat to the peasant. feudalism was simply "organized violence--knights as the guys that busted kneecaps." distinct from what your landlord will do if you don't pay rents to, today--violence was much more direct, overt. the threat of bodily harm underlay this system, always and constantly.

what are the ways in which lords actually obtain this surplus?

serfdom: how did serfs produce the surplus? the month is divided into days you work on your own land (which the lord is indirectly laying claim to), and days that you work on the lord's. it looks like a "rental" payment, but "rent" is more obviously a fiction in feudalism. (obviously, productivity has to be high enough in order to produce his necessities in the three or four days that he's working on his own land). there is absolutely no hiding the fact that the lord is getting fat off of the labor of the peasant. how can it be justified? (god made it this way? not coincidental that the ruling ideology was religious--it is very helpful that the church, itself, was a gigantic feudal lord. the priests, the pope, none of them did any labor, don't forget.)

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the question then, arises: how in capitalism does exploitation arise? how is it reproduced? (remember: the key in feudalism is that plots of land were, nominally, in the posession of the peasant; the village unit is intact, as well. a fundamental fact, here, is that peasants don't need their lords; lords enforce their right to appropriate surplus through coercion.)

it seems, in capitalism, that there's nothing unfair going on. the serf is told to work on the lord's land, "or else." in capitalism the oppression is more subtle, hidden. in feudalism, the lord seeks out the peasant; in capitalism, the worker has to continuously seek out the capitalist. there doesn't seem to be the same kind of coercion. moreover, workers are free to quit. and thirdly, when workers come in, they agree on a wage.

nobody is being forced to work for any particular employer. they negotiate over their conditions of work, etc. so what's the problem? where's the exploitation? these are the foundations of the ruling ideology, don't forget. so we must be prepared to define exploitation in spite of this.

so we need to ask: is there a surplus in capitalism? where and how is it appropriated?

how does a factory work? how does the capitalist run his factory?

he sells a product for $100. out of that, wages account for 60$. means of production would be, say, $15. rent and overhead account for $10. his profits, then, are $15.

you might say to yourself--alright, you call call the profit a surplus, but so what? the worker is getting his wages, and the capitalist his. where is the devious plot? the capitalist gave them a job, for god's sake. he used his assets to give workers jobs. and they all go home. why would you call that exploitation?

what do economists say about the labor supply curve? what's the fiction about this relationship that we have to expose?

it's true that workers go looking for the capitalist, in a sense. it's absolutely true that he was not ordered to go to Wal-Mart, etc. BUT: the worker is not free to extricate himself from the production process, in toto. and when they negotiate with the capitalists, their independence is not of equal weight. the worker will last days without the capitalists; the capitalist will last for months. the capitalist has assets, that he can alienate to survive, if forced. workers have nothing to fall back on--they depend on selling their labor-power.

so workers need not work for any particular capitalist, but he still needs to work for Capital.

mainstream counter-argument--(1) capitalist has got the skills, (2) he's in possession of the assets (and that took money).

but let's look at it from a systemic level. a class of people with the assets are putting the workers to work. those assets have not been given to you through free exchange--how can it be simply the fact of ownership that entitles you to those profits? that ownership did not fall from the heavens. (political philosophy in the 20th century has failed to justify the unequal distribution of assets, absent the fiction of free exchange).

and the first defense? what are the skills that the capitalist possesses? most of these skills are acquired, and how? you do so by buying them, from business schools, or whatever. that means that the unequal distribution of skills simply reflects the unequal distribution of wealth.

---

capitalism is unlike feudalism in one very crucial respect--peasants have some control over the means of production (their own land). capitalism is different--the first time in human history where the private possession of the means of production is generalized. (and here, of course, we can tell also the story of "primitive accumulation")

the monopolization of the means of productions means that capitalists no longer need to coerce the workers--and, what's more, capitalists set the terms because of their superior structural position.

---

mainstream notions of class associate the concept with income, absolutely -- if someone is making x thousands of dollars, they are assigned to a specific class.

but here, we have defined class such that it precedes the concept of income. we are relating it to the process of production--your place in the class structure, in this sense, determines your income. and you will not fight poverty without fighting the class structure.

you're not a capitalist because you're rich. you're rich because you're a capitalist. it's not because you're poor that you're working class. it's because you're working-class that you're poor. moreover, there's a causal connection between one's wealth and the other's poverty. (and all this, of course, is maintained, in the final analysis, by force).

---

so, there is exploitation transpiring in capitalism. and this appropriation is rooted in domination and coercion, in the final analysis. (workers have to show up to work--they are not free to not work. the capitalist, moreover, can imposes these conditions because he owns the assets).

we've shown that class exists, then, and that it depends on exploitation.

exploitation is not simply a moral problem, it is a material fact. as long as these classes exist, you will have inequality (and conflict).

---

vivek is here making a further distinction between the not-exploited (permanent unemployed, lumpen elements, etc.) and the exploited (in whom the capitalist class still has a stake, don't forget--it needs Labor, and it can never forget this fact)

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what differentiates classes, fundamentally, is their relation to the means of production, and the powers that flow from that fact.