alfredo stepan, rethinking military politics

(3-8): political society, civil society, and the State -- too much focus on 'civil society' to the exclusion of political society; we need to make a distinction between 'liberalization' and 'democratization' (latter encompasses former)

(10): stressing military's own institutional interests, vs. Poulantzas' conception of 'relative autonomy' of State

(11): military is demanded where 'hegemony' is absent (following Gramsci and Weber) -- in other words, a 'specific' attnetion to the military is critical [this is a decent start at conceptualizating the Ayub period, no doubt--but not clear if it gets us much farther than we already were.]

(15): "the new professionalism"

(17): '68-'72 most repressive period, under Medici

(19-20, particularly in Brazil p. 25): autonomy of intelligence agency [q. about ISI, here]

(28-29): abertura begins in 1973 -- throughout this period, he's aruging, you see institutional obstacles to the 'opening', where it is argued that 'social conflicts' don't permit democratization

(30-32): three components to military rule (gov't, security, institution), four configurations

(38): use of civil society against military extremists (principally the security apparatus) -- in other words, the suggestion is that this is how we ought to think of aspects of the abertura

(44): analysis of military discourse, citing Foucault? this could get ugly...

(56-57): by 1982, the 'Brumerian' moment had passed (economic crisis, threat of Left had receded, multiclass civil society opposition to the regime) -- so question is what was presenting the military from abandoning power?

(59-60): for reasons listed here (generally, strength of their own position within the state structure), military was comfortable moving towards some sort of 'opening', as long as their institutional interests were seen to (development of arms industry, no retaliation against them)

(60): summary of his own argument re: 1964 (conjunctural factors, despite general weakening of democratic forces)

(61): three causes of presidency going to civil society in 1985 (are these really causes? this is descriptive, no?)

1. gov't candidate drove supporters to opposition
2. broad candidte for opposition
3. military had to allow selection of both candidates, and election to proceed
   

(64): needed a candidate who was moderate enough that the military would accede (noting that this would not have been possible in Argentina or in Chile, where military killed more than one hundred times people, per capita, than in brazil)

(68): wrt to civilian control of military (i.e. once indemocratic period), two dimensions--"articulated military contestation", and "military institutional prerogatives"

(80): situation re: military budget was the 'opposite' in Brazil, from Argentina; in the former, stood to gain from democratization, as a 'pressure group'

(84): interesting--arguing that the emergence of a significant arms-industry decreases the rationale for military dictatorship, precisely because, now, they don't need state power to guarantee arms. they don't need to import weapons from abroad; and now, additionally, they have non-military industrialists who benefit from the arms industry, in general, meaning the possibility exists of making alliances across civil society. this is what he sees in Brazil, viz-a-viz other countries on the cone (giving the example of India, too--"military-industrial complex paradoxically strengthens the chances for democracy")

(87): Brazil learned from Argentine military's incompetence in Malvinas war

(92-96): table detailing eleven military prerogatives

(100): military prerogatives/military contestation table --four possibilities

(122): interesting comparative graph of the transitions

(128): this has been one of stepan's main points--that 'brumerian' moments can turn, easily, into 'praetorian decades' (i.e., outlast the desire of civil society to have military rule, precisely because the military has its own institutional interests)

(136): the need, in essence, of the erosion of military claims to military expertise [all this is quite underwhelming, in all honesty]

(145): bring the military into the political fold, ensuring that conflict unfolds transparently [yawn...]

africa's unnatural disaster:
The World Bank's continued market fundamentalism is difficult to understand, especially in light of the fact that after more than 25 years of imposing these policies in Africa and Latin America, success stories are few and far between. Those countries that do have productive agricultural sectors (almost none of which are in Africa) either rely on huge landholders to be productive (Brazil, Argentina, Chile) or on massive subsidies (India) or both (U.S., EU). The countries that have eliminated their subsidies and privatized their grain boards, including many in Africa, are those that are doing the poorest.
(...) If one is willing to look at the events of the last 30 years without the quasi-religious belief that free markets lead to development and growth, one would undoubtedly find that the opposite is true. In his groundbreaking work Kicking Away the Ladder (2003), Ha Joon Chang documents the development of every industrialized country, showing that protectionist policies were a fundamental part of development strategy in almost every case. The process of development that emerges from this story is not maximizing comparative advantage (for if so, the U.S. would be a sparsely populated country of fur traders and fisher people) but rather shifting comparative advantage to high value goods through calculated market distortions. In the case of the U.K. and the United States, those market distortions originally came in the form of colonialism and slavery. But market distortions continue in the U.S. today in the form of agriculture and steel subsidies, not to mention the tremendous government spending on biotechnology and defense, which largely serves as a subsidy for those sectors.
(...) The report does point out that a few countries (Brazil and Chile are the examples given) have successfully used agriculture to increase growth, but in Brazil and (to a lesser extent) Chile, small farmers are all but extinct, and agriculture is big business. Given the preoccupation with small farmers and poverty alleviation in other parts of the document, the examples are odd.
(...) Since about 1970, the World Bank, other international financial institutions and the private sector have succeeded in completely transforming agriculture from a primarily local affair to a complex industrialized process. Monocropping, over-reliance on chemical pesticides and fertilizers and trans-genetic manipulation have in some cases increased yields; but these practices have not led to a significant reduction in the number of hungry people in the world. The recommendations of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa and the World Bank amount to insanity - recommending more of the same and expecting better results.
(...) In the United States, Europe and elsewhere, many are beginning to understand that industrialized agriculture benefits neither those who produce nor those who consume food. In the current food crisis, more than 25 countries and the European Union have imposed tariffs, subsidies, price controls or other measures to protect consumers from the global free market. So why the double standard when it comes to Africa?
(...) For those interested in solutions, the organic and local movements aren't far off the mark. What producers and consumers in many parts of the world are beginning to understand is that the way that farmers have been growing food for millennia is more or less a good system. While there may be room for technology, (drip irrigation systems, for example) that innovation should not alter the food product nor add layers of cost. Many parts of Africa have an advantage in that they have never really lost their traditional relationships with the land. The problem has been that cheaper food from Europe and the United States is often dumped on African countries, undercutting the possibility for farmers to earn a living from their production. In the case of Africa, all that may be needed is a sensible trade policy to protect those who already grow enough food for all Africans.

papal decline:
The Roman Catholic pope's arrival in Brazil has been marred by controversy over his remarks on abortion and a poor turnout of the faithful, indicating growing discontent with the church.