the banality of greed
This week’s evidence of the continuing corruption of Halliburton and its subsidiaries profiteering from contracts costing American taxpayers an unbelievable $22 billion stems from a report by the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction. The report, only one of many about Halliburton’s recently severed subsidiary KBR, focuses on work done in Baghdad’s super-secure Green Zone. While parent company Halliburton insults U.S. taxpayers by relocating its headquarters to the tax shelter of Dubai, subsidiary KBR has been spun off to focus more directly on the American military contracts that form the core of its operations.
(...) It is claimed by American officials that KBR’s accountability issues are being addressed. In one instance cited, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad—a spiraling enterprise well on its way to becoming a nation-within-a-nation akin to the Vatican in Italy—announced that, as a means of avoiding food theft, its personnel would no longer be allowed to bring large bags into the eating halls. Such sacrifice for the mission of securing Iraqi freedom.

well, at least these troops spread democracy:
A federal judge said Friday that the U.S. Army's military academy at West Point can refuse to let outsiders on campus for an anti-war demonstration during Vice President Cheney's commencement speech.
(...) The commander, Brian Crawford, said in a written statement that protests had never been allowed on the grounds and could be "inconsistent with the military mission and can detract from the good order, discipline, security, morale or loyalty of the soldiers." The would-be protesters argued that Cheney is likely to speak in support of the war in Iraq and they should be allowed to express an opposing view.

meddling in iraq:
During that first war, Secretary of State James Baker told the Iraqi foreign minister that "we will return you to the pre-industrial age." Baker's words were prophetic. The American-led coalition delivered 88,000 tons of bombs, equivalent, Lando notes, to seven Hiroshima-sized atomic bombs. The bombing unquestionably set out to destroy the civilian infrastructure, leveling oil refineries, electrical plants and transportation networks. And all this, Lando emphasizes, resulted in further civilian suffering. Seventeen of twenty electrical generating plants were seriously bombed, and eleven totally destroyed.
(...) After one plant near Basra had been demolished early on, American bombers returned another dozen times. "We're not going to tolerate Saddam Hussein," one Air Force planner said, and the bombing sent a message: "Fix that [Saddam], and we'll fix your electricity." Three-fourths of Iraq's population lived in cities, dependent on electricity for their factories, homes, water treatment plants and sewage treatment facilities. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney vigorously defended the "perfectly legitimate" bombing action. "If I had to do it over again, I would do exactly the same thing," he said. Clearly, Cheney means what he says.
(...) Sanctions devastated the country's medical system, once one of the best in the region. Sanctions insured that malnutrition would morph into virtual death sentences, as Lando notes. Babies died in incubators because of power failures; others were crippled with cerebral palsy because of insufficient oxygen supplies. As early as May 1991, a visiting Harvard medical team concluded that Iraq had a public health catastrophe.
(...) Meanwhile, Bush's strategy of playing for a coup miserably failed. Conditions dramatically deteriorated. Streetcorners became barter bazaars, with people selling their possessions for food and medicine. Crime, prostitution, smuggling and kickbacks flourished. People merely wanted survival; political paralysis, not a coup, was the result. And Americans knew it. Lando quotes the ubiquitous "senior US official" who privately admitted that any popular uprising "is the least likely alternative."
(...) Iraqis hoped for a better day with the new President, Bill Clinton. Alas! Clinton's background and his political calculus determined that he had to establish his macho credentials and his credibility with the right. He authorized a Tomahawk missile attack against Baghdad, supposedly in retaliation for Saddam's alleged plot to assassinate former President Bush. (The Kuwaiti-provided evidence, many believe, is quite tenuous.) In any event, Clinton's attack went off track and killed eight civilians, including a gifted artist. His UN Ambassador, Madeleine Albright, carefully monitored the ever-tightening sanctions. In late 1994 the New York Times reported on children in filthy hospitals, dying with diarrhea and pneumonia, people desperately seeking food, and Iraq's inability to sell its oil--the country faced "famine and economic collapse." Without doubt, the sanctions consolidated Saddam's power. UN Administrator Denis Halliday wrote that the people blamed the United States and the UN for their travails, not Saddam Hussein. Halliday resigned, refusing to administer a program that he called "genocide."
(...) Iraq sold $64.2 billion of oil and received $34.5 billion worth of humanitarian goods. Iraq gained something, but the old habit of clandestine support for Iraq's regime continued as oil companies provided kickbacks of at least $1.8 billion to the Iraqi dictator. At the moment, Chevron is negotiating a "settlement" that would cost it $25-30 million in fines--and, of course, admit to no wrongdoing. What a bargain.
(...) And then Tony Blair, in March 2003, with outrageous chutzpah cited the dramatic increase in infant mortality as a justification for the new invasion of Iraq. Sanctions apparently no longer existed in his mind; the children had "died because of the nature of the regime under which they are living. Now, that is why we're acting." George Orwell would not have said it better.
(...) He blamed the sorry plight of Iraqis on Saddam's search for WMDs. "The world has tried economic sanctions," he said, "and watched Iraq use billions of dollars in illegal oil revenues to fund more weapons purchases, rather than providing for the needs of the Iraqi people." Did he mean sanctions were a failure? When in March 2003, the Bush Administration launched its inevitable invasion, American forces confronted an empty shell of defenses and a dispirited, devastated and despairing populace. The invasion was a cakewalk. But our not-so wise policy-makers wanted more, and Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz promised our troops garlands of flowers as Iraqis would welcome their liberators. Some welcome. The American and British sanctions' policy had done its work quite well--painfully, devastatingly well. Remember: Much of this was pursued by the Clinton Administration, anxious to show that its statesmanship credentials could match any Bush. So the last word properly belongs to Secretary Albright. Although she belatedly disavowed her comments after the Iraq disaster was obvious to all except George W. Bush, nevertheless, she said of sanctions and bombings: "It was worth it."

cheney and imperial strategy:
[the imperial arc] Since coming to power in January 2001, the neo- conservatives, especially the ultra-neoconservatives championed by Cheney, were obsessed by a single goal: reordering the world in a way that would establish Washington's global hegemony for the 21st century and ensure that no other power, such as China, could contest America's perch at the pinnacle of the new order. The key to accomplishing this goal, they thought, lay in seizing control over the world's major oil reserves, and Iraq, which sits atop one of the largest oil reserves and which was crippled by a decade of sanctions, was the obvious place to start. Of course, they had the minor problem of having to take a detour through Afghanistan due to that country's immediate connection with 11 September, but they dealt with that as quickly as possible and, as soon as they toppled the Taliban, redirected their guns towards Iraq. Then, following the occupation of Iraq, they shifted their sights to the Iran-Syria-Hizbullah- Palestinian resistance axis, which they felt formed a major impediment to their designs to reshape the Middle East to their liking. Moreover, such was their hubris that they imagined they could cajole, blackmail and twist the arms of the US's European and Arab allies into the service of their policy.
(...) Despite the rapidity of the rise of the Iraqi resistance and the recalcitrance of the resistance on the Lebanese and Palestinian fronts, the Bush administration remained convinced that its plans were proceeding as intended. All these mere glitches meant was that implementation would take a little longer than expected -- a reading of the situation that seemed confirmed by the assassination of Rafik Al-Hariri that set into motion dynamics that would lead to Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and pressure to disarm Hizbullah, the Iranian nuclear crisis that opened an avenue to clamp down on Iran politically and economically, and Sharon's massive offensive against Palestinian resistance factions.
(...) The most likely purpose of Cheney's tour, therefore, is to lay the diplomatic groundwork and secure support for a military strike against Iran. Cheney undoubtedly thinks that there is enough anti-Iranian paranoia in the region to facilitate his task. However, he also knows that the Arabs will also want to see some progress on the Arab-Israeli front, so he certain to perform the types of gestures that we have seen from the Americans before when they were gearing up for a war in this region. Today, in order to show how serious he is about getting the negotiations ball rolling again, he will give some play to the Arab peace initiative. But play is about as far as it will go; firstly, because Cheney is mostly interested in playing for time and, secondly, because an acceptable settlement has never been more out of reach than it is at present. So probably the most we will see will be some preliminary talks while preparations are put into place for a strike against Iran, which could take place much sooner than many imagine and probably no later than October or November. It was not just for show that Cheney climbed aboard an American aircraft carrier in the Gulf and shouted threats at Iran.

interview with musharaff:
[if democrats come to power?] None at all. It will not change. Every country follows its national interests. [codeword for imperialism] These interests do not change with the change of governments and also there is an environment in Afghanistan, in Palestine and in Iraq, these environments will be understood by whoever comes, whether democrats or republicans, they cannot change their attitudes towards whatever is happening. And as we are concerned with Afghanistan and India, I think all republicans and democrats (who are involved) know what is the reality. Their interests in this region and in Pakistan will remain because we are in the leading role in the coalition to fight terrorism. Whether it (the administration) is republican or democrat nothing is going to change, and they know that.
(...) On Afghanistan, I think things are very clear, I do not think there will be a change in the policy of the United States. On Iraq, yes there are a lot of speculations, there will be a change of policy. But even if you leave aside the history of whether they should have gone there or not, now that they are here, they have caused certain turmoil, how can they just go away? You must solve the problem or there will be a bigger problem that will affect the whole region and the Gulf. So how can you do this? I really do not know, but I would like to see a republican government or a president coming and let us see what decision he takes.[pathetic analysis for a general]
(...) Whoever comes, and a lot of times US Vice-President Dick Cheney came here and the whole world thinks that he comes to pressurise me and Pakistan. What pressure? We don't accept any pressure from anyone.
(...) First of all, I do not get bullied, I do not accept any bullying from anyone. And Pakistan also will not accept any bullying by anyone. We take decisions wherever our national interest is involved. And the example is Iraq. We will not send forces to Iraq (despite the fact we were asked to). Why should we send forces? Nobody bullies us. But yes, there is a lot of talk that Pakistan is not doing enough? I get annoyed at such talk. If Pakistan is not doing enough, I would ask which country is doing enough? It is only Pakistan which is doing something, and I will substantiate that. First of all, Pakistan is not the exporter of terrorism, extremism, Al-Qaeda, or Taliban.
(...) ave the coalition forces or the Afghan government caught anyone? We have suffered 400 casualties. There are 50,000 troops involved in Frontier Tribal Areas. So anyone who says Pakistan is not doing enough, I tell them you don't know what is happening there. And we don't accept such accusations at all. If Pakistan stops doing anything, you will all collapse. So please don't give such wild accusation about Pakistan. We are doing much more than our share but there is a problem which is very big. Instead of refusing, join to see realities, join to strategise to fight this problem.
(...) The Iran situation is dangerous. We, in Pakistan, are against nuclear proliferation. I think the world is so dangerous, we should be talking of reduction of nuclear power, nuclear potential, nuclear weapons rather than making more. At the same time we are for the right of every nation to have nuclear energy. Thirdly, we are against any military action. Because I think that will open another front whereas we should be thinking of closing fronts.

iran, iraq, us:
The three-month-old US plan to regain control of Baghdad is slow to show results despite the arrival of four more US brigades. Security in the heart of the city may be a little better but the US and the Iraqi government are nowhere near dealing a knockout blow to the Sunn insurgency or the Shia militias.
(...) In an interview in Baghdad he laughed as he pointed that Iran and the US both genuinely support the present Iraqi government of prime minister Nouri al-Maliki. The Iranian stance contrasts with Arab states such as Saudi Arabia where the King refuses to meet Mr Maliki. "Ironically," says Mr Zebari, "the Iranian statement on majority rule in Iraq [at the conference on Iraq at Sharm el-Sheikh ten days ago] agrees entirely with what we and the Americans say."
(...) His words are a recipe for a long conflict. As soon as the US and Britain overthrew Saddam Hussein, the detested enemy of Iran, in 2003 Iranian influence in Iraq and power in the Gulf increased. When the Shia religious parties, sympathetic to the clerical regime in Tehran, won the parliamentary elections in Iraq in 2005 Iranian influence grew again. It has proved impossible for the US to reverse this trend which is of its own making.
(...) But it was noticeable in February that when al-Sadr told his Mehdi Army militia to hold back from attacking the Americans and stockpile their arms he was obeyed. Underestimating the Sadrist movement has been a repeated American and British mistake in Iraq since 2003. Another frequent error has been to believe that the Shia alliance, so powerful because the Shia are 60 per cent of the population, is always on the verge of collapse. Even the Sunni opposition to al Qaida may lead the insurgents to concentrate on shooting Americans rather than blowing up Shia street traders.
(...) Peace, when it finally comes to Iraq, will inevitably be the result of a package deal of which a timetable for a US withdrawal is likely to be a central part. Despite Mr Cheney's claim that the US still seeks victory in Iraq-American failure--going by its original high ambitions--has long been inevitable. Iran and Syria are important players in Iraq that cannot be ignored. The popularly elected Shia-Kurdish government cannot be remade at Americans and British request because it does not go along with their wishes.
(...) President Bush's strategy, announced in January, of confronting Iran and seeking to pacify Baghdad by sending US troop reinforcements is not working.

imperial arrogance:
It was a few weeks before the invasion of Iraq, three years ago. I was interviewing the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, in the ballroom of a big hotel in Cairo...he described to me all the disasters he was certain would follow the invasion. The US and British troops would be bogged down in Iraq for years. There would be civil war between Sunnis and Shias. The real beneficiary would be the government in Iran.

"And what do the Americans say when you tell them this," I asked? "They don't even listen," he said.
... I asked him why he thought the US was determined to invade Iraq.
He said he had put the same question to Vice-President Dick Cheney. Mr Cheney had replied: "Because it's doable."

pakistan and musharraf:
"When the army sued for peace with pro-Taliban tribesmen in the Waziristans in 2005 and 2006, it was not because of a new holistic' strategy for the tribal areas, as sold by (Pervez) Musharraf to Washington," Usher said. "It was because of the army's military and political defeat." In 56 years of independence, Pakistani soldiers had never set foot in the Waziristans, "part of the trade-off for keeping the tribes loyal," Usher said, and when they did the numbers of civilians killed and displaced were in the thousands. Malik Qadir Khan, a tribal leader in North Waziristan explained, "Everyone supported the Taliban when the army came in. It was a people's revolt. Pakistan had broken its promise, and that's a big thing in the tribal areas. You don't break your promise."
(...) Although U.S. Vice-President Dick Cheney's advice to Musharraf has been to "go after them," journalist Rahimullah Yousafzai, an expert on the tribal areas believes, "every use of force is a victory for the militants." Yousafzai said the answer "must involve a strategy that provides education and jobs for thousands of impoverished and unemployed youth, who are ready recruits for the Taliban."
(...) The tensions in the tribal regions will not lessen until Pakistan has a civilian government, historian Ahmed Rashid told Usher. "Only a civilian government can bring reform. You cannot have free elections in the tribal areas when there are no free elections in Pakistan," Rashid said.
(...) Cheney flew into Islamabad to deliver a "tough message" to Musharraf, namely he was upset by peace agreements Musharraf signed with pro-Taliban tribesmen along Pakistan's border areas with Afghanistan, Usher wrote. "Bloodied by Iraq, the Bush Administration has realized that Afghanistan could tip the same way." Since 9/11, Pakistan has received $10-billion in direct U.S. aid and as much again in covert aid, "most of it military," The Nation article says.