collected snippets of immediate importance...


Showing posts with label labor. Show all posts
Showing posts with label labor. Show all posts

Thursday, April 15, 2010

michael goldfield, "worker insurgency, radical organization, and new deal labor legislation" (1989)

(1258): thesis--'labor militance' and 'radical organization' did have a major influence on the passing of the 1935 NLRA. this opens up questions for (1) the study of US politics and (2) the study of the modern State.

(1258): noting that, prior to the 1930s, unions were de facto illegal.

(1259): skocpol's explanation for the NLRA, in four parts
  1. state as potentially autonomous
  2. new deal period as a time in which the state was quite autonomous from social influence
  3. against six contending explanations: not (1) multi-interest reform coalition; (2) roosevelt; (3) liberal corporate elites; (4) capital-intensive industries; (5) working-class disruption, a la Piven/Cloward; (6) working-class strength, i.e., in order to control workers.
  4. key is understanding the 'autonomous' milieu in which robert wagner operated; particularly autonomous at this time, in fact, due to widespread state incapacity.
(1262): key--goldfield wants to distinguish between four kinds of influence that capitalists can have over the State.
  1. providing impetus for a bill to pass
  2. dominating the content of a bill
  3. the policy-outcome of a bill is what was wanted
  4. the ability to block legislation, to force compromises, and otherwise control the decision-making agenda.
(1262-1263): key argument is that skocpol says that the state is autonomous because no one has a strong form of influence3--but goldfield's argument is that this misses influence1, influence2, and weak forms of influence3

(1263): similarly, capitalist opposition is not simply influence4, but can be a 'whole family of activities'

(1264-1265): four understandings of labor influence
  1. becoming a rival 'power elite'. this has "virtually never happened," and is not the argument. many who attempt to attack the notion that the w-class had something to do with the new deal, though, attack this straw man.
  2. the Sweden model (negotiations with elites on behalf of w-class). but this is not applicable to workers' insurgency, he's noting
  3. piven/cloward disruption model--too much emphasis on spontaneity, misunderstands the degree to which protest was organized.
concessions granted by the government in order to stem working class militance and organized radicalism. insurgency can change capital's preferences [this is what he wants to argue.]

(1265-1268): there are three arguments against labor influence. goldfield does a very good job, here, of showing them to be untenable.
  1. legislation preceded upsurge--well, NLRB actually settled very few cases until 1937, coming at the very end of the '34-'38 upsurge. the dam was broken without the help of the NLRB.
  2. labor was too weak
  3. causality, in fact, goes the other way--in fact, NLRA could actually be called responsible for inhibiting the further growth if we follow Skocpol's logic, re: the '38 downturn. but she's wrong, and this would be mistaken.
(1268-1268): the counter-model, in five parts
  1. labor legislation was a result of interaction between labor movement, radical organizations (CP), liberal reformers, government officials.
  2. the impetus for the passage was a direct result of the broad labor upsurge, conflicts within labor movement, and growing influence of radicalism
  3. the ties of reformers to the AFL leaders are central--they actually had narrow room for maneuver, contra skocpol
  4. the legislation itself was not so radical, nor was it so unambiguously pro-labor
  5. the key is understanding two aspects of labor's development: (1) the unemployed movement, farmer-labor party, etc. -- added breadth and broad-based support to labor upsurge; (2) tremendous conflict within the labor movement, with a conservative AFL and more
(1270-1276): the model depends on three linkages
  1. connection between labor upsurge and social movements (unemployed and CP, farmers' movements, etc.)
  2. political conflict within the labor movement, with power shifting left (strikes as 'grim reaper' for the AFL)
  3. these phenomena had an impact on the reform process (it truly alarmed elites--reform was a more compelling option than repression, becase they actually thought revolution was on the cards. this is what the AFL was telling them, too. reformers were terrified.)
(1278): acknowledging that conjunctural factors are important, too. doesn't mean to discount those. [maybe a way to bring in the ferguson]

Thursday, February 18, 2010

harry braverman, labor and monopoly capital

Introduction

(10): intermediate classes discussed in the Second International--but abortive

(11): labor movement's critique of capitalism as a mode of production became a critique of capitalism as a mode of distribution

(16): insistence that machine/technology is embedded in social relations

(19): the growth of the forces of production within a mode of production (i.e., the growth of potential forces of production--for the next mode of production, within antiquated forms--industrial capitalism "gives us" electric power, internal combustion engine, atomic power)

(20): technology does not produce social relations, but is produced by social relations represented by capitalism.

(23): Khruschev ridiculing Chinese industrialization as 'eating soup with an awl'

(26): new/old working class confusion -- everything, in some sense, is 'new' as an occupation, in other words, because the labor process has--always--been in flux

(27): this book is about the working class as a class in itself, not a class for itself

(29-30): three expressions of class consciousness
  1. absolute expression -- pervasive durable attitude
  2. long-term relative expression -- slowly changing traditions, organization
  3. short-term relative expression -- dynamic complex of moods and sentiments
PART ONE

Chapter 2


(51): labor-power critically important--won't necessarily look like this to the master of laborers. but for the individuals who allocate their own labor, this is of critical importance (and this is where, he's suggesting, the labor theory of value begins)

(52): emphatically not Smithian--three conditions of capitalist production
  1. workers separated from the means of production, can only gain access to them by selling labor-power
  2. workers freed of legal constraints that prevent them from disposing of their labor power
  3. purpose of employment is the expansion of capital
(54): what the capitalist buys is the right to dispose of the worker for an agreed period of time. this is not the purchase of labor (which is an inalienable human function), but of labor-power.

(55-56): the essential distinction between human and animal labor is the infinite malleability of the former; example of the ox (who lacks the many-sided potentiality of the human)

(57): labor process has become the responsibility of the capitalist

(58): capitalist, thus, strives to take control--this presents itself, to us, as the problem of management.

(60-63): from "timid" to "avid" capitalists--they avoid taking control, at first. but eventually, the potential benefits are simply too great (controlling/moulding the labor process--this is, also, a precondition for rapid technological change)

(66): absolute surplus value, and habituation (association of early industry with prisons, workhouses, and orphanages)

Chapter 3

(72): distinction between the social division of labor and the division of labor in detail

(74): the stupidity of Durkheim (thank you!)

(80): Babbage's innovation--dividing the craft cheapens the laborers you are hiring; decreases the value of labor-power

(82): the capitalist mode of production systematically destroys skills where they exist--bringing into existence skills that correspond to its needs. the end of the generalized distribution of knowledge about the production process.

Chapter 4

(90): Taylor is not someone who was seeking the best way to do work in general, but the best way to manage alienated labor (labor power that is bought and sold).

(98): natural soldiering (laziness) and systematic soldiering. Taylor saw himself as up against the latter.

(100): the conclusion Taylor drew was simple--so long as workers control the labor proceess, capital cannot realize the full potential inherent in their labor power.

(107): and this is the pivot on which management turns--the control over the decisions that are made in the course of work no longer belong to the worker.

(113, 119): three principles of scientific management:
  1. dissociation of the labor process from the skills of workers--it should be planned not according to craft or other principles
  2. separation of conception from execution
  3. use of the monopoly over knowledge of the labor process to control each step
(118): Taylor understood the Babbage principle

Chapter 5

(126): separation of hand and brain is the most decisive step, again (socially, of course, their unity still exists; but not individually, in the labor process as experienced by the worker)

(129-130): the influx of laborers from ruined agriculture, the advent of new industries which require some skill training -- all this can obscure a long-term, secular trend toward the incessant lowering of working-class skills.

(132): craftsman traditional repository of technical knowledge of the production process

Chapter 6

(146-149): the way in which the worker is habituated to the capitalist mode of production is not through manipulation or cajolery, but through socioeconomic forces--the capitalist mode of production destroys all other forms of organization of labor, and thus eliminates all alternatives for the working population.

PART TWO

Chapter 7

(156): science, like labor, has been turned into capitalist property [question, here, of the role of the State?]

(166): the distinctiveness of the scientific-technical revolution, the systematic application of science to the labor process (which really takes off in the last quarter of the nineteenth century)

(169): initially, it is the organization of labor that changes. next, it is the instruments of labor that are revolutionized. to the question of how this happens, though, there is no unitary answer (it is open to history, we might say)

(171): and this, then, coincides with a systematic attack on the unity of thought and action in the labor process. this signals its total destruction, in a sense. [there is an important point about technology being both an effect and a cause of the separation of planning and execution, here]

(172): he is arguing, though, that this is an ideal that is only realized within definite limits [the question is what are these limits, and how can they be established]

(179-180): worker is seen as a machine from the perspective of capital, which is the animating principle of this method of labor organization (of this mode of production)

(182): moving, in a sense, towards abstract labor stripped of all its concreteness

(184): two approaches--the engineering approach, which abstracts from social relations, and the social approach, which views technology as situated in social relations.

(185): we must look at technology as it affects the labor process.

(188): the key element in the development of machinery is not size, speed, etc., but the manner in which its operations are controlled (and thus, of course, what this spells for workers and the labor process)

(190-191): trends in machine development -- from universal to specific to universal functions again?

(193): excellently put--machinery presents us with the possibility of human control over the labor process. but this is nothing but an abstraction, as humans is not explicated in the concrete social setting in which we find ourselves. what it really means is that the mass of humanity is subjected to the labor process, rather than it being set to serve the interests of humanity in general [well expressed, here]

(195): machinery offers management a mechanical means of doing what it might be unable to do through organization or discipline -- take effective control of the labor process.

(199): revolutionary effects of 'numerical control'

(203): price ratio is 12 (old) to 1 (new)

(206): the pursuit of the increased productivity of labor, under capitalism, becomes "generalized social insanity"

(208): in this relentless pursuit of productivity without reference to human need, we have the reductio ad absurdum of capitalist inneficiency.

(212): the crux, again -- machinery enabling control of the labor process, from outside.

(216, 218-219): very interesting tables about levels of control (17!)

(227): dead labor and living labor

(229): it has become fashionable to attribute powers to machine, where we ought to be speaking of social relations

(230): in reality, machines also present us the possibility of eliminating drudgery for all (and a commensurate sharing of the remaining boring tasks) -- this is a classic presentation of forces/social relations contradicton

(237): value of labor power/machine implementation discussion --some interrogation needed, here, of his earlier argument and the preconditions for it.

Wednesday, December 2, 2009

Far from the working class internationally contracting, it has continued to grow. And the distinctions between this enlarged working class and other oppressed groups, far from becoming marginal, are as central as when Lenin and Trotsky polemicised against the Narodniks.
(...) Filmer concluded that the overall number of employed people worldwide was about 880 million, compared with around 1,000 million people working mainly for their own account on the land (overwhelmingly peasants), and 480 million working for their own account in industry and services. The figure for 'employed people' includes some non-workers' groups as well as workers. There is a section of the bourgeoisie in receipt of enormous corporate salaries, and below that the new middle class who get paid more value than they create in return for helping to control the mass of workers. These groups probably amount to 10 percent of the population.14 That reduces the size of the employed world working class to around 700 million, with about a third in 'industry'and the rest in 'services'.
(...) But the total size of the working class is considerably greater than this. The class also includes those who are dependent on income that comes from the waged labour of relatives or savings and pensions resulting from past wage labour--that is, non-employed spouses, children and retired elderly people. If these categories are added in, the worldwide total figure for the working class comes to between 1.5 and 2 billion. Anyone who believes we have said 'farewell' to this class is not living in the real world.
(...) Add these 'semi-workers' or 'peasant workers' to the numbers of people completely dependent on wage labour, and you get a figure which must be somewhere between 40 and 50 percent of the world's population. In other words around the core of 1.5 to 2 million proletarians there are a similar number of semi-proletarians.
(...) Industrial employment has fallen sharply in a number of countries over the last three decades--in Britain and Belgium by a third, and in France by more than a quarter. But these do not represent a deindustrialisation of the whole of the advanced industrial world, but rather a restructuring of industry within it. The number of industrial jobs in the advanced industrial countries as a whole was 112 million in 1998--25 million more than in 1951 and only 7.4 million less than in 1971. There is a great danger of looking at the world through British or French glasses, and not seeing what is really happening on a global scale. So Toni Negri's Italy may not be in the same league as the US or Japan, but the industrial workers have certainly not disappeared. There were 6.5 million four years ago, down only one sixth since 1971.
(...) But that is not all. The usual distinction between 'industry' and 'services' obscures more than it reveals. The category 'services' includes things which are of no intrinsic importance to the capitalist production (for instance, the hordes of servants who provide individual capitalist parasites with their leisure). But it has always included things which are absolutely central to it (like the transportation of goods and the provision of computer software). What is more, some of the shift from 'industry' to the 'service sector' amounts to no more than a change in the name given to essentially similar jobs.
(...) But even Rowthorn's figures considerably underestimate the size of the working class--that class whose labour is essential for the accumulation of capital. Many of Rowthorn's 'free standing services' are essential to such accumulation in the modern world. Two in particular are absolutely indispensable for capitalist accumulation today--health provision and the education service.
(...)There is a widespread myth that the 'service' workforce consists of well paid people with control over their own working situation who never need to get their hands dirty. So Guardian columnist (and former SDP member) Polly Toynbee writes: 'We have seen the most rapid change in social class in recorded history: the 1977 mass working class, with two thirds of people in manual jobs, shrunk to one third, while the rest migrated upwards into a 70 percent home-owning, white collar middle class'.37 So Hardt and Negri claim:

    The jobs for the most part are highly mobile involving flexible skills. More important, they are characterised in general by the central role played by knowledge, information, affect, and communication. In this sense many call the post-industrial economy an informational economy... Through the process of post-modernisation all production tends toward the production of services, toward becoming informationalised.38

In fact, however, any proper breakdown of the figures for 'service' employment provides a very different picture to this. Some of the most important 'services industries' employ overwhelmingly 'manual workers' of the 'traditional' sort.
(...) Altogether there are a minimum of 42 million 'service sector workers' in manual or routine white collar occupations in the US. These, it should be added, are the occupations that have been expanding most rapidly recently with the 'creation' of a mass of low wage jobs. On top of them, many workers in other occupational categories would have been doing work which was little different--for instance, many of the 3.2 million 'sales representatives' and the 4.3 million 'technicians and related support' workers. So would many of the 'health assessment and treating occupations' (83 percent female, unlike the 'health diagnostic' category above them which is 75 percent male), and many of the 5.3 million school teachers (75 percent female). Together these groups constitute well over half the 'service sector'. Add to them the 33 million workers in traditional manual industries, and you have some three quarters of the US population made up of workers. If the 'working class' has 'disappeared from view' for people like Hardt and Negri, it is because they have been looking in the wrong direction.
(...) A central theme of all those who see the working class as disappearing is that the jobs that remain are so precarious that little remains of the permanent working class organisations and communities that used to exist. The argument has been a continual feature of 'post-Marxist' arguments for the last 15 years both from 'Third Way' social democrats and those on the 'autonomist' left.
(...) But this does not mean that in reality capital has been able to destroy workers' resistance to such flexibility, or even that it itself can keep accumulating without continually reproducing relatively permanent labour forces within particular workplaces. One recent study for Britain shows:

    Many of the commonly held assumptions about today's world of work need to be seriously questioned. A wide gulf exists between the over-familiar rhetoric and hyperbole we hear daily about our flexible and dynamic labour market and the realities of workplace life. The evidence simply does not sustain the view that we are witnessing the emergence of a 'new' kind of employment relations, seen in the 'end of the career' and the 'death of the permanent job for life'.48

People often do not see the limits to what capital can achieve in terms of 'flexible labour markets' because they lump together quite different forms of employment: part time employment, temporary employment, employment on short term contracts, and self employment on behalf of firms. But part time employment can also be permanent employment--as it usually is among women in Britain. Similarly, those working on short term contracts can find them renewed month after month, or year after year. They lack long term rights and are the first to go when crises hit, but they do not move into and out of jobs all the time in between. Finally, those in genuinely temporary employment may be indispensable to production and be provided on a long term but intermittent basis by agencies which are themselves large firms and dependent on maintaining a permanent pool of labour to supply to other firms.
(...) Across Western Europe as a whole, 'one out of five jobs has been precarious during the last five years'--but that still leaves four out of five jobs as 'permanent'.
(...) The figures do, however, show that 'average job tenure has remained relatively stable since 1975'. The idea that the working class has been 'flexible-ised' out of existence is completely mistaken. Most people continue to work in the same place, and to be subject to exploitation by the same employers for quite long periods of time. By the same token, they have the time and opportunity to connect up with the people around them to fight back against that exploitation.
(...)

The claim that the 'permanent' worker is a thing of the past is often connected with the claim that employers can move production--and jobs--at a moment's notice.

So Hardt and Negri write:

    The informatisation of production and the increasing importance of immaterial production have tended to free capital from the constraints of territory, and capital can withdraw from negotiation with a given local population by moving its site to another point in the global network... Entire labouring populations, which had enjoyed a certain stability and contractual power, have thus found themselves in increasingly precarious employment situations.57

This vastly exaggerates the movement of capital, and the ease with which firms can move their operations from one place to another... As I have explained elsewhere,58 capital as money (ie finance) can move at the touch of a computer key from one location to another (although determined governments can still impede its movement). But capital as means of production finds it much more difficult to do so. Physical equipment has to be uninstalled and reinstalled, transport has to be arranged for goods produced, a reliable workforce with the requisite skills found, and so on. It is a process that is usually expensive, taking years rather than seconds. What is more, physical production depends upon transporting goods to markets, and therefore closeness to markets is an advantage. The result is that most of the restructuring of industry over the last three decades has usually been within the world's existing industrial regions.
(...) There has, of course, been a shift in certain manufacturing industries to states which were not industrialised 40 years ago--otherwise the phenomenon of the Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) and of certain expanding industries in 'underdeveloped' countries would be inexplicable. But there is little evidence to support the claim that 'advanced countries are abandoning the production of manufactured goods. Many labour-intensive manufacturing activities in the advanced economies, such as clothing or routine assembly, have been put out of business by rising imports from developing countries', but these imports have been financed 'not by the export of services' but 'by the export of other manufactures, especially capital goods and intermediate products such as chemicals'.
(...) Restructuring means that much of this production does not take place in the old industrial centres, such as those in and around Detroit, but in the 'sun belt' states of the west and south. So most US auto workers no longer work directly for the 'Big Three' of Ford, General Motors and Chrysler, but for 'trans-plant manufacturers' like Honda, Toyota, Nissan, Mitsubishi and Daimler Benz, or for new parts manufacturers spun off by GM so as to weaken the union.63 This is a far cry from the picture sometimes presented of all US auto jobs disappearing over the border into Mexico.
(...) But it is not 'fluid' in being able to move effortlessly from one location to another. The general trend for capitalism today is still for production to be concentrated in the advanced countries. Some sorts of production have shifted to a few favoured areas of the Third World--the NICs of east and south east Asia, and eastern China. But capital still finds it more profitable, in general, to locate itself in the regions which had industrialised by the mid 20th century. Workers may usually be better paid there, but a combination of established skills levels and existing investments in plant and infrastructure mean they are also more productive, providing much more surplus value for the system than most of their poorer brothers and sisters in the Third World. This explains why the picture for most of Latin America has been one of very slow average growth or stagnation, and of most of Africa of absolute decline.
(...) Capitalism has created a world working class in the last century and a half. Industry and wage labour exist today in virtually every part of the globe. The industrial working class has a worldwide presence. But the combined and uneven development of the system means it is very unevenly distributed between regions. Rough calculations indicate that 40 percent of the world's 270 million or so industrial workers are in the OECD countries, around 15 percent each in China, Latin America and the former USSR, around 10 percent in the rest of Asia, and around 5 percent in Africa.
(...) Sub-Saharan Africa is the exception rather than the norm for the world system as a whole, or even for its vast, impoverished regions. In Asia and Latin America there has been a growth of wage labour. But it has often been outside what is usually called the 'modern' sector, and has often been accompanied by an equally rapid rise of self employment.
(...) Most of the self employed are by no means privileged. A survey of Ahmedabad shows only one tenth of the male self employed as having a 'separate business place'. A third worked on the streets, as vendors, rickshaw drivers, cart pullers and the like. There are 200,000 rickshaw men in Mumbai, 80,000 in Ahmedabad, and 30,000 in Bangalore, while Calcutta has around 250,000 street hawkers and Calcutta more than 100,000.
(...) In addition to--and often merging into--those in the informal sector, there are everywhere those denied any opportunities for employment by modern capitalism: the unemployed. Their numbers vary considerably from region to region and country to country--depending, in part, on the ease of people making some sort of livelihood in the informal sector.
(...) Capitalist accumulation is causing the rapid growth of cities across wide swathes of the globe, and of occupations involving production for the market. In most regions (although not in most of Africa) there is also a growth of the number involved in wage labour of a relatively productive sort in medium to large workplaces. But even more rapid is the expansion of the vast mass of people precariously trying to make a livelihood through casual labour, selling things in the streets, trying to survive through working on their own account. At one extreme this mass merges into the petty bourgeoisie proper of small employers, at the other into the desperate poverty of those who can hardly get a livelihood at all--48 percent of the urban population of Brazil live below the poverty line, and two out of five of these below the 'indigence' income needed to satisfy food needs but nothing else.
(...) There is one widespread, very simple, and very mistaken, answer. That is to see the workers with permanent jobs as 'privileged', as some sort of 'labour aristocracy'. This is certainly how it can seem to those driven into the informal sector. In the formal sector there are usually considerably higher wage rates and often sickness benefits, paid holidays, and pensions of sorts as well... Employers have not, however, provided such things out of the goodness of their heart. They need a certain stability to their labour force, particularly when it comes to skilled workers who they do not want to be poached by rivals during times of boom. States often want such stability as well, seeing welfare provision for a section of the urban workforce as a way of protecting themselves against sudden explosions of popular discontent.
(...) It often seems counterintuitive to argue that groups of workers who have better conditions than others do not benefit at their expense--whether the argument is used about Western workers and workers in the Third World, or formal sector Third World workers and informal sector workers. But in this case the 'counterintuitive' argument is correct. In many industries, the more stable and experienced a workforce, the more productive it is. Capital is prepared to concede higher wages to certain of the workers in those industries because by doing so it is able to make more profits out of them. Hence the apparent contradiction--some sections of the world's workers are both better paid than others, and more exploited. It is this alone which explains why capitalists, motivated only by the drive for profit, do not usually invest on any great scale in regions like Africa, where wages are lowest.
(...) That, of course, does not prevent capital from continually trying to hold down what it has to pay--and from seizing on new technologies and restructuring production to reduce its labour costs drastically. Hence the pattern in much of the world for the established 'formal' workforce to remain more or less intact, but for there to be some chipping away round the edges and for many new jobs to be in the 'informal' sector.
(...) [mike davis + a rejoinder to hardt/negri, more or less] The great mass of the informal workforce in 'developing' countries today are people who are new to the urban workforce--either from the countryside (as with the more than 100 million peasants seeking employment in China's cities) or women and young people seeking paid labour for the first time. But the pattern of capitalist accumulation over the last couple of decades means that the labour demands of modern, productive industry have not expanded on anything like the scale needed to absorb them into its workforce. Competition on a global scale has caused capitalists to turn to 'capital intensive' forms of production (with what Marx called a rising 'organic composition of capital') which do not require massive numbers of new workers. As a result, the only ways for most new entrants to the labour force to gain a livelihood are through the most meagre forms of self employment or through selling their labour power at such a low price and under such arduous conditions that small capitalists at the margins of the system can profit from exploiting it.
(...) That is not, however, the end of the matter. Capitalism has one important use for those it refuses to allow to make a proper livelihood. It uses them to put increased pressure on those it does exploit in the most productive areas of the economy. Far from the growth of the informal workforce benefiting the workforce in the formal sector, it has been accompanied by an increased exploitation of workers in this sector--and in many cases by a deterioration. [empirical proof follows]
(...) In both India and Latin America something else has been happening--the shifting of certain jobs in big industry from the formal to the informal sector. This allows management to cut some of their wage costs--and to put pressure on the remaining 'formal' sector of the workforce to accept worse conditions.
(...) It is wrong, as people like Paulo Singer do, to write of 'deproletarianisation'.119 Rather, what is happening is a restructuring of the workforce, with the hiving off by big firms of some tasks (usually relatively unskilled and therefore easily performed by a floating workforce) to small firms, labour-only contractors and the supposedly self employed. It should be added that this phenomenon is by no means new in the history of capitalism. Casual employment has often played an important role in certain industries--for instance, in the docks in Britain until the late 1960s. And forms of contract labour are very old--it was common in the textile factories of the industrial revolution. In the mines in both the US and Britain in the 19th century, overseers or foremen ('buttymen') would recruit workers and pay them out of a sum given to them by the mine owners. These casual groups of workers may not always have felt themselves to be part of the working class. They were often detached from the struggles of other sections of that class for years, even decades, at a time. Yet the potential for struggling with those sections was always there, and when it turned into reality the struggle could be very bitter, with an almost insurrectionary tinge.
(...) [citing engels on dock workers] The point is very important. Internationally we are just emerging from more than two decades of defeat and demoralisation for workers right across the world. This bred a fatalism about the possibility of fighting, which was reflected in a mass of studies which depicted the suffering of the poor and the oppressed, showing them always as victims, rarely as fighters. Thus there are tons of materials sponsored by the International Labour Organisation on 'social exclusion'--a theme which suits the bureaucrats who run such bodies. In these studies themes like the 'casualisation' and 'feminisation' of the workforce become stereotyped, academic ways of dismissing possibilities of struggle--even if some of those carrying through the studies try to escape from the paradigm in which they are trapped. The stereotypes then provide trade union officialdom with excuses for avoiding struggle on the grounds that it cannot work. What begins as a mistaken assessment of the possibility of struggle becomes a real obstacle to unleashing such struggle.
(...) [naomi klein on EPZs] Such accounts provide a brilliant exposure of the greed and inhumanity of those who run the multinationals. But like many orthodox academic studies on the informal workforce (especially those sponsored by the International Labour Organisation) they are too pessimistic when it comes to the possibilities of fighting back. First, the multinationals cannot afford simply to mistreat their workers. It is not as easy as the multinationals would like people to think for them to close down their facilities and move elsewhere if the workforce does explode in bitterness. Setting up the links in a global production chain takes a lot of effort by the multinational... When Henry Ford pioneered mass production, assembly line methods in the auto industry, he saw that the most effective form of exploitation lay in stabilising a handpicked workforce under tight managerial control. Thomas O'Brien has told how some of the first US multinationals to operate in Latin America took efforts to stabilise their workforces by providing minimal welfare facilities--providing accommodation in company towns, health clinics, schools, sports facilities, even paid holidays. The aim was to combine maintaining the workers at a minimal level of fitness with extending managerial discipline over workers to the home as well as the workplace...
(...) This element of stability in the workforce is important because it means such workers can fight back, and win. Conditions in many South Korean clothing and footwear plants in the 1960s were exactly as Naomi Klein describes them. George E Ogle has told of 'the sweat, blood and tears of young women who worked in the export industries during the 1960s and 1970s--textiles, garments, electronics, chemicals'
(...) [strategy matters, in other words] So, for instance, an account of the great Bombay textile strikes of 1982-1983 paints a different picture to that in Korea. The strike began as a semi-spontaneous upsurge from below (workers demonstrated outside the residence of Datta Samant, who was to become the strike figurehead, demanding that he 'lead' them) and developed into one of the biggest prolonged strikes in world history, lasting a year, involving hundreds of thousands of workers and dominating the political life of India's commercial and industrial capital. But it never spread from the 'organised' sector of the larger workplaces to the small workplaces and the impoverished self employed weavers--indeed, many strikers began working in the informal sector without anyone regarding them as scabs. This enabled the employers to hold out for a year and defeat the workers, since they were never short of finished cloth.
(...) [too easy? but important regardless] The victories in Korea show the possibility of organising informal and maquiladora workers, of pulling them behind struggles initiated by larger and more secure groups of workers. The defeat in Bombay showed the dangers for the more secure groups of not going out and bringing the informal workers into the struggle. The dangers are not simply a matter of wage cuts, job losses and deteriorating working conditions. Defeat can have a devastating impact on wider society. During the strike there was unity between the different religious and caste groups that make up the mass of Bombay's lower classes. The aftermath of defeat saw the rise to a dominating position in wide areas of the city of the Sriv Sena, a political organisation based upon turning Hindus against Muslms, culminating in murderous riots against the Muslim population in 1992. Unity in struggle had created a sense of solidarity which then exerted a pull on the vast mass of the informal workers, self employed, the unemployed poor and the impoverished sections of the petty bourgeoisie. The defeat led to the sectional attitudes and communal conflicts of the petty bourgeoisie influencing the self employed, the unemployed and wide layers of workers.

[CONCLUSION]
(...) The overall picture is not one of a disintegrating or declining working class. It is one of a working class that on a world scale has grown bigger than ever, even if the rate of growth has slowed down with the successive crises in the world economy and the tendency everywhere to 'capital intensive' forms of production that do not employ massively new numbers of people.
(...) Neither is the picture one in which working class employment is being transferred on a massive scale from the old industrial economies of the 'North' to the previously agrarian economies of the 'South'. The new international division of labour is developing mainly within the 'triad' of North America, Europe and Japan--with a lesser part being played by the NICs of East Asia and eastern China. There is also an expansion of industrial employment within some of the burgeoning cities of the 'South'--but the expansion is uneven, barely touching whole regions, and is not mainly through transfer of jobs from the North.
(...) A twofold change is taking place now. There is the growing importance of the production of certain 'immaterial' commodities which are often classified as part of the service sector, but involve forms of work very similar to those in industry. And there is the growing importance of forms of labour which do not themselves produce commodities, but which serve to maintain and increase the productivity of the direct producers.
(...) The working class is not disappearing. It is not becoming bourgoeisified. It is not turning into a privileged layer. It is not gaining somehow from the impoverishment of wide sections of the Third World, especially Africa. It is growing even while it is restructured globally.
(...) The anti-capitalist movement itself has some of the same characteristics. Its initial base, like that of the first movement of the late 1960s, has been among people not firmly rooted in the productive process--students, school students, young people not yet trapped into permanent jobs, workers who take part in its activities as individuals without any clear sense of class identity, lower professionals. As a descriptive term for such movements, 'multitude' is not completely misplaced. A disparate coalition of forces has come together to provide a new and massively important focus for the struggle against the system after two decades of defeat and demoralisation. But the glorification of disparateness embodied in the term prevents people seeing what needs to be done next to build the movement. It does not recognise that what was so important about Genoa and Barcelona was the beginning of the involvement of organised workers in the protests. It fails to locate the most important deficiency of the movement in Argentina to date--the ability of trade union bureaucracies to build a wall between employed workers on the one hand and the neighbourhood and unemployed workers' movements on the other.
(...) The mistake is to see movements of disparate social groups as 'social subjects' capable of bringing about a transformation of society. They are not. Because their base is not centred in collective organisation rooted in production, they cannot challenge the control over that production which is central to ruling class power. They can create problems for particular governments. But they cannot begin the process of rebuilding society from the bottom up. And in practice, the workers who could begin to do this only play a marginal role in them. Talk about 'rainbow coalitions' or 'multitudes' conceals that relative lack of involvement in the movement of those working long hours at manual or routine white collar jobs--and with extra hours of unpaid labour bringing up children. It underplays the degree to which the movements remain dominated by those whose occupations leave them most time and energy to be active. Fashionable theories about 'post-industrial society' then become an excuse for a narrowness of vision and action that ignores the great majority of the working class.

Thursday, September 3, 2009

The State Department contracts with a private security firm - ArmorGroup North America, owned by Wackenhut. ArmorGroup employs 450 guards at the Kabul Embassy - two-thirds from Nepal and India, the rest from the U.S. and other English-speaking nations.

Monday, August 10, 2009

Of course this is nonsense. The overwhelming majority of Americans, along with the overwhelming majority of Haitians and Hondurans, would be absolutely delighted if Haitian and Honduran workers producing clothes for the U.S. market would be paid more. Labor costs are a small fraction of the prices that consumers face. Wages are so low because that yields even more profits for those who already have more money than they can ever spend; the low wage floor is being determined by government policy in Washington, Haiti, Honduras, and elsewhere, not by the desires of consumers. No magic formula of economics determines the minimum wage that can be sustained in Haiti and Honduras. At the margin - whether the minimum wage shall be $3 a day or $5 a day in the export sector in Haiti - it is determined politically. If you say that the leverage of the U.S. consumer market should be used to support higher wages for poor workers in poor countries, rather than the opposite, you're likely to be told that this is not allowed. This leverage has been allocated to something else. The power of the U.S. market can only be used for things like forcing developing countries to enforce the patents, trademarks, and copyrights of U.S. pharmaceutical companies, software companies, and Hollywood.

Thursday, April 30, 2009

introduction to marxism and politics, with vivek chibber
lecture 1 -- class

---

why is class important? synonymous with "marxism," of course--but made so by the degeneracy of "left" culture (used to be the way any self-respecting marxist thought about capitalism, vivek is arguing)

part of the reason class has been so singularly associated with "marxism" has to do with the history of the Stalinization of the workers' movement.

vivek is stressing, though, that Marxists don't have a monopoly on the concept of class. nothing here is specific to Marx, himself--almost any 19th and 20th century socialist would recognize its importance.

nonetheless, why do we give class this importance? we still have to justify this.

it has to do with the issues that the Left is animated around--all those things which afflict vast numbers of people (poverty, disease, inequality, etc.)--all these things are maintained by people in power.

what the Left found, was when it tried to organize for better wages, etc., it found that it met with resistance. social justice is not going to be something that the well-endowed will agree to.

so, (a) the Left had to understand why the powerful resist / (b) what is the source of their power?

this is what leads, ultimately, to the recognition of class. the view on the marxist left has been that the central arbiter of power is class. and the reason that this is the case is because wielding power requires resources; and class is the chief distributor of resources in a capitalist society (indeed, in any society).

resources include: money, time, space, etc. -- again, the unequal distribution of resources translated into an unequal distribution of power, which facilitates the perpetuation of the status quo.

it's surprising, vivek is saying, how few people can justify the importance of class--it should never be a doctrinal commitment. we need to justify our attentiveness to class.

---

we come, then, to the question of how class appears and reproduces itself--and how does it bring about these inequalities.

surplus

class is not just any old social relation. class is associated with inequalities. what vivek wants to argue, though, is that not all inequalities are class inequalities. only certain kinds give you class relations of inequality.

inequalities that come about through exploitation.

most of human history has lacked "social surplus," don't forget. for exploitation to occur, surplus is a precondition.

imagine an agrarian society--everybody owns a small plot of land, big enough to grow enough food for the family unit. if they live in a village, then there's some common land, as well. after each agrarian cycle, there may be enough surplus to be stored in case of disaster. but basically they consume what they produce.

in a society like that, we can say that there's nothing left after people's needs are met. and thus: a group exercising structural and systematic power will not emerge.

maybe a priesthood will emerge--these priests won't work, will appropriate some of the surplus in the name of the ancestors, etc.

the difficulty, however, will be this, of course--where will the crops/produce come from in order to enshrine these classes. the only way in which such a group can emerge, is if the producers make enough to satisfy their own needs and the desires of an extractive class.

here, historically, in the emergence of this parasitic class, we see the birth of armies, retainers, etc. you will invariably meet a lot of resistance when you ask people to give things up.

therefore, this is also a question of technology--the state of the productive sources has to allow such a situation.

for classes to exist, there must be a social surplus. this is what the surplus does.

already we know two things:
(1) classes that are in power, do so by extracting a surplus produced by others
(2) they maintain that power via other institutions, armies and the State.

---

let us think, a bit, about how class worked during feudalism, in order to understand better the emergence of capitalism.

imagine a society in which there is a bit left over in the form of a surplus. a group of people arise to lay claim to that surplus. the feudal lords, who live of the labor of their peasants. the question, here, is how this happens.

a lord says to the peasants--"it's a bad, rough, mean world. all these other lords will come around with their retainers and seize your produce. i will protect you, at a price."

the basis, then, for taking some of the crop is a direct threat to the peasant. feudalism was simply "organized violence--knights as the guys that busted kneecaps." distinct from what your landlord will do if you don't pay rents to, today--violence was much more direct, overt. the threat of bodily harm underlay this system, always and constantly.

what are the ways in which lords actually obtain this surplus?

serfdom: how did serfs produce the surplus? the month is divided into days you work on your own land (which the lord is indirectly laying claim to), and days that you work on the lord's. it looks like a "rental" payment, but "rent" is more obviously a fiction in feudalism. (obviously, productivity has to be high enough in order to produce his necessities in the three or four days that he's working on his own land). there is absolutely no hiding the fact that the lord is getting fat off of the labor of the peasant. how can it be justified? (god made it this way? not coincidental that the ruling ideology was religious--it is very helpful that the church, itself, was a gigantic feudal lord. the priests, the pope, none of them did any labor, don't forget.)

----

the question then, arises: how in capitalism does exploitation arise? how is it reproduced? (remember: the key in feudalism is that plots of land were, nominally, in the posession of the peasant; the village unit is intact, as well. a fundamental fact, here, is that peasants don't need their lords; lords enforce their right to appropriate surplus through coercion.)

it seems, in capitalism, that there's nothing unfair going on. the serf is told to work on the lord's land, "or else." in capitalism the oppression is more subtle, hidden. in feudalism, the lord seeks out the peasant; in capitalism, the worker has to continuously seek out the capitalist. there doesn't seem to be the same kind of coercion. moreover, workers are free to quit. and thirdly, when workers come in, they agree on a wage.

nobody is being forced to work for any particular employer. they negotiate over their conditions of work, etc. so what's the problem? where's the exploitation? these are the foundations of the ruling ideology, don't forget. so we must be prepared to define exploitation in spite of this.

so we need to ask: is there a surplus in capitalism? where and how is it appropriated?

how does a factory work? how does the capitalist run his factory?

he sells a product for $100. out of that, wages account for 60$. means of production would be, say, $15. rent and overhead account for $10. his profits, then, are $15.

you might say to yourself--alright, you call call the profit a surplus, but so what? the worker is getting his wages, and the capitalist his. where is the devious plot? the capitalist gave them a job, for god's sake. he used his assets to give workers jobs. and they all go home. why would you call that exploitation?

what do economists say about the labor supply curve? what's the fiction about this relationship that we have to expose?

it's true that workers go looking for the capitalist, in a sense. it's absolutely true that he was not ordered to go to Wal-Mart, etc. BUT: the worker is not free to extricate himself from the production process, in toto. and when they negotiate with the capitalists, their independence is not of equal weight. the worker will last days without the capitalists; the capitalist will last for months. the capitalist has assets, that he can alienate to survive, if forced. workers have nothing to fall back on--they depend on selling their labor-power.

so workers need not work for any particular capitalist, but he still needs to work for Capital.

mainstream counter-argument--(1) capitalist has got the skills, (2) he's in possession of the assets (and that took money).

but let's look at it from a systemic level. a class of people with the assets are putting the workers to work. those assets have not been given to you through free exchange--how can it be simply the fact of ownership that entitles you to those profits? that ownership did not fall from the heavens. (political philosophy in the 20th century has failed to justify the unequal distribution of assets, absent the fiction of free exchange).

and the first defense? what are the skills that the capitalist possesses? most of these skills are acquired, and how? you do so by buying them, from business schools, or whatever. that means that the unequal distribution of skills simply reflects the unequal distribution of wealth.

---

capitalism is unlike feudalism in one very crucial respect--peasants have some control over the means of production (their own land). capitalism is different--the first time in human history where the private possession of the means of production is generalized. (and here, of course, we can tell also the story of "primitive accumulation")

the monopolization of the means of productions means that capitalists no longer need to coerce the workers--and, what's more, capitalists set the terms because of their superior structural position.

---

mainstream notions of class associate the concept with income, absolutely -- if someone is making x thousands of dollars, they are assigned to a specific class.

but here, we have defined class such that it precedes the concept of income. we are relating it to the process of production--your place in the class structure, in this sense, determines your income. and you will not fight poverty without fighting the class structure.

you're not a capitalist because you're rich. you're rich because you're a capitalist. it's not because you're poor that you're working class. it's because you're working-class that you're poor. moreover, there's a causal connection between one's wealth and the other's poverty. (and all this, of course, is maintained, in the final analysis, by force).

---

so, there is exploitation transpiring in capitalism. and this appropriation is rooted in domination and coercion, in the final analysis. (workers have to show up to work--they are not free to not work. the capitalist, moreover, can imposes these conditions because he owns the assets).

we've shown that class exists, then, and that it depends on exploitation.

exploitation is not simply a moral problem, it is a material fact. as long as these classes exist, you will have inequality (and conflict).

---

vivek is here making a further distinction between the not-exploited (permanent unemployed, lumpen elements, etc.) and the exploited (in whom the capitalist class still has a stake, don't forget--it needs Labor, and it can never forget this fact)

---

what differentiates classes, fundamentally, is their relation to the means of production, and the powers that flow from that fact.

Monday, March 30, 2009

lecture 11, "paris and the belle epoque"
john merriman

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the belle epoque was not "good," for most people of France--the image of nostalgia for this period's France is really a creation of post-WWI France.

we have to look, of course, at the reconfiguration of Paris by Baron Haussmann in the 1850s and 1860s (the "Alsatian Attila"). he only went back to Paris three times after he left in scandal at the end of the 1860s.

the great boulevards that became identified with modern Paris can only be understood during this "urban renewal" project--it was the largest, in history (only comparable were the re-building of Tokyo, after the fire; or London (when?)).

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pre-1860 Paris, the first thing you notice, of course, is its small size (prof is showing map). tremendously over-crowded place--and the most densely populated parts of the city were the Isle de Cite, and the Marais (central right-bank districts). their population density was three times what it is today.

in 1851: 1,053,000

in 1861: 1,696,000

in 1872: 1,825,000 (minus the 25,000 slaughtered)

in 1881: 2,269,000

in 1896: 2,500,000

European cities only grow in the first 2/3 of the 19th century through migration (otherwise more people die than are born--disease, infanticide, infant morality, etc.). large-cities replenish themsleves only through immigration. this produces a hyper-density in the central districts of Paris. it's not until the 1880s that you have the huge wave of Breton migration (from Brittany).

so you have an extraordinarily crowded city, the ranks of the poor swollen by immigration.

one of the differences between the 19th century and now is that the people coming into paris, then, the people coming into Paris were people who were poorer than those already there. this is different than middle-class immigration in the immediate aftermath of WWII (not well-explained...)

Haussman himself was born in the Western, prosperous parts of Paris (he was a law student there). in 1852, Napoleon the III orders Haussman to build him great boulevards--it was a time when the gap between the rich and the poor was increasing.

you see, as a consequence of the re-configuration/demolition of the centre and eviction by high rents, the flight of working-class populations from the center to the periphery (the growth, then, of working-class, poor suburbs).

the principle of the planning, itself, is built upon classical principles associated with absolute monarchs--"the imperialism of the straight line." if you think of St. Petersburg, Madrid, Berlin, or Versailles--there were power alleys, down which you marched troops. very different from the cities that had grown organically from the middle ages (Strasbourg, as an example).

the problematique, of course--how do you build this magnificent boulevard from point A to point B? you simply take a ruler, and barge through!

three reasons that Paris is re-built:

(1) more light and air--make it healthier

(2) to liberate Capital, for business--it's not a coincidence that all the major department stores sit on the boulevards.

(3) how do you build a barricade across the boulevards? Haussman says this in his memoirs--"we want to build barricade-proof boulevards"

---------

now, what about the people chased from the central districts?

if you rented (and almost everyone did), and you were kicked out, you were given the equivalent of about a day's wages, and that was it.

---------

freeing the flow of Capital, of course, was a "worthy goal", and it came with a massive exhibition in 1864, and a proliferation of department stores. and what this does, of course, is destroy local craftsmen/businessmen. (there are some dept stores already by the 1820s, and even before that, but it is the 1850s and 1860s that brings to Paris THE Department Store).

it creates jobs for working-class and peasant women (in terrible conditions, of course), and it attracts the rich to consume. in that sense a re-organization of the economy.

----------

Haussman is not a terribly interesting man--he's technocrat. but he was very good at what he did; he frees up the flow of circulation of Capital, etc. and there are visual effects of the reorganization--imperial order is re-inforced, in a sense.

but the effects on the Parisian poor were horrific, again; all of this makes the West-East/Center-Periphery contrasts more important.

----------

to be sure, there were boulevards in European cities, before Haussmann. but they had been built on the peripheries, mainly, on the outskirts (where walls once used to be). Vienna is an example of this. and there is some of this in Paris, too.

Renoire described the Boulevards as soldiers. (prof is showing pictures, at this point)

paintings portraying the anomie of boulevard life--the isolation of modern city-life. one can over-emphasize this theme too much, perhaps, but it's still critical to keep in mind.

----------

you still have traditional work done in Paris--so there is some conversion of old buildings into new industries, and there is some re-organization of work, in a sense (unclear, this point)

but prof is again stressing the marginaliztion of poor and working-class life (and culture). the contrast between what happened to the Western periphery and the Eastern periphery. the Western half of Paris was very different (though one shouldn't over-estimate this).

working-class industrial suburbs became the source of serious support for the communists during the 1920s and 1930s, partly because of how badly they were housed. and they become places feared by the center. the growth of these industrial suburbs is an important feature of large-scale industrialization (many of the "dirty" industries are forced toward the periphery--that's where the factories are, etc.)

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why are European suburbs so different from American suburbs?

in 1992, at the time of the Rodney King riots in LA, prof was writing an edited book on the "Red Suburbs" in Paris (and their identification with radical politics). and people on France kept asking, as they couldn't understand the concept of wealthy suburbs and poor interiors, as prevails in Paris.

in the early 1830s, one of Louis Phillippe's ministers called the industrial periphery the "cord that will one day wring our neck." fear of the periphery, not fear of the center.

in 1831 and 1834, silk workers from Lyon poured down into the city and were kept out of invading the center by Police. prof describing, as contrast, 1968 Detroit, and the riots and fire--one of the suburbs tried to change the street patterns so that the poor of the center couldn't come out to the suburbs.

how did this happen? the pattern is just the opposite--can't be exaggerated, but these spatial tensions do count for something.

Haussmann was part of setting this trend, ultimately--factory owners look for cheap labor on the periphery, prices in the center get higher and higher.

the sense of not belonging to the center, in a sense, offers hope to peripheral activism.

Thursday, March 26, 2009

lecture 6, "workshop and factory"
john merriman


-----

today: large-scale industrialization and workers

two general points: (1) everywhere, the industrial revolution was first and foremost a continuation of previous forms of production (the "break" is overemphasized); traditional ways of producing things (domestic industry, etc.) were critical. the second industrial revolution (circa 1850), with electricty, steel, large-scale units of production, is more like the popular understanding. (2) people who did economic history tended to see britain as a classical case of industrialization, and tended to see france as a "retarded" case--the reason was that if you added up the numbers of factories or steam engines, france lagged behind, of course. (but until the mid-19th century, of course, france is the second largest industrial economy in the world). one of the reasons that economic historians argue that france couldn't become a major industrial leader was because capital formation was more difficult (banking and insurance less developed), and disadvantaged also because of geography (in england, 1819, you had railroads carrying coal to important sites quickly; in france, however, mining sites are far from points of production). prof is arguing, though, that industrialization still proceeds in quite significant way at this time, but not "conventionally" -- i.e., it involves domestic industry, rural industry, "putting-out work" done largely by women. in 1871, in paris, the average industrial workshop in paris had only 7 people working in it (very different from manchester and sheffield). BUT: of course, over the long run, large-scale industrialization does develop more and more (story of 1850s/1860s)--in order to have this kind of investment/transformation, you need a surplus of capital and an increase in food production (agricultural revolution).

until 10 years ago, people still talked about the "long depression" (1873-1890s), characterized by low prices, and particulalry hurts rural people (percentage of people in industry is 27.6% in 1876, 29.2% in 1896), though. so we musn't overstate these transformations? (unclear what point is here)

number of people that are "urban": 1872, 21.1%; in 1901, 40.9%. but prof arguing that this can also overstate, because the level of urbanization is still not comparable to the US, prussian empire before 1871--this is primarily the urbanization of very small places, of market-towns.

so we are dealing with a society in which production is overwhelmingly rural, even if the country is becoming a major kind of industrial-producing country.

-----

urbanization is happening, of course, largely due to the "great departure"--people leaving rural areas for cities. you have huge growth in the industrial north, prof is noting. diseases and crises severly devastate rural industries (prof is not supplying a very coherent narrative, however).

flows of this sort, though, began earlier (in 16th centuries, huge migrations from the south all the way to paris, on foot(!), to work on construction industries in the cities).

"depopulation", again, is one of the most salient processes in rural areas throughout this period (new jobs, industry in urban areas, the story of this time)

-----

where is industry?

62.1% of the people in the "nord" are workers--the purest of the proletarian departments. cities growing into each other near lille (mining and textile industries). in the paris regions, of course--but here more high-quality goods being produced, not the mass-produced rubbish of england (products of quality, not victorian junk). fine clothes still being made, put together by individual men and women at home, that are part of the industrial structure of paris. outside, in the hinterland, the suburbs, you have the "dirty production" (soap, chemicals, etc.). and then, though, you have lyon in the south, which becomes a big industrial center--soap, silk production of france. and you still have merchant capital going into rural areas to look for cheap labor in the form of rural females, of course.

in sum, though not gifted with primary waterways, etc., you still have industrial production of some kind in every part of france.

-----

one of the things that hurts french industry, says prof, is that french capitalists start investing abroad in railroads (in italy, spain, etc.). so you have brits saying that the french will never catch up, because french capital is going abroad, and peasants are hiding their savings under their bed.

-----

what about the role of women?

obviously crucial in france, as elsewhere in industrial revolutions ("extremely important and persistent").

again, the story is more continuities than dramatic change (women had always worked in industrial production--and they still do!). we've exaggerated the separation of work and home, and thus underestimated the role of women in all of this.

if you look at industrial production of these fine garments and handbags, many of them are made by single women working by themselves on the very top floors (working for merchant capitalists)--just as their predecessors had done two centuries before. to be sure, they gradually moved into factory production.

at the same time, what does not change is the women's management of the household--women's role in the household economy is always extraordinarly important.

furthermore, aspects of women's work that is not industrial does not change: in england, in 1850 and 1880, the largest two female occupations are textile operatives and domestics (many women come to cities and place themselves in domestic service, of course--and you see, at this time, attempts to combat infanticide committed by these single women in cities, so there are organized foundling homes. though, through the 1870s, in these homes, 1/3 of all the babies die!) this is also the road to prostitution, tragically.

women are the "last hired" and the "first fired," always.

you see socialists, at this time, very concerned about women's wages and unions, but don't support the right of women to go to vote (because they're perceived as church-going and loyal to the priest). don't get the right until after WWII.

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in sum: gradually, then, domestic industry implodes into factories on the edge of french cities, big and small--the organization of production, in this sense, is changing. but what women do, doesn't change, they're still doing textile industry work, but in factories. (so, in this sense: the classic picture of industrialization ends up being right, but more gradually and less uniformly than the modernizers might like us to think. the question, of course, remains: is it ok to think in these generalities, when they're being confirmed to be largely correct?)

-----

child labor, too, is of course critical.

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how workers viewed what was happening to them?

three things: (1) and (2) proletarianization is both an objective and subjective concept; (3) how workers viewed their bosses and their factories? 1896-1907 has been called the heroic age of syndicalism/unions/strikes.

in america, "you work hard you'll make it"--obviously that's not the case. similarly, there is social mobility in france, but it was, as always, extremely limited for people born into the working-class. in 1968, one of the big issues that students and professors had was that you could work your ass of and your chances of getting into universities weren't very high (and even if you got through there, you would be unlikely to get a great job). people born into a life of hard work, and you would get those jobs.

the more you read about 1890s, the more you learn about how terrible working-lives were. so there's an objective status of being oppressed.

and the subjective aspect, of course, is "class consciousness" (even as people, of course, have multiple identities). one of the reasons there are so many strikes: has to do with people coming to a sense of being conscious of themselves as a working-class, who view the state and the wealthy as conflicting interests. this really begins in the 1830s, in france (socialism first used in 1834).

it's at this point where artisans begin to see themselves as working-class (even though there's always a tension with the uneducated working-class) -- and they create the strike (even though theyr'e well-dressed, etc.). why? why do artisans start targeting capitalism and the state? (1) because of the french revolution, guild protections are gone--anyone can be any trade you want. the old protections are gone. there's serious competition, artisans are making less and less money. (2) industrialization, mechanized production--undercutting the work of crafstmen, by dumping cheaper goods on the market. some comes with capital and employs these craftsmen to make parts of clothing--integrating them into chains of production, etc. (prof's narrative is weak, alas--not coherent...)

gradually, artisans began to ally themselves with ordinary, unskilled workers.

------

how do workers see this?

the organization was "impressive", the factory's response was "depressing", says prof.

during strikes, what was the image that workers had of their bosses? in 1820s and 1830s, when artisans went on strike, they knew the boss, but were kind of mad at him--"you ought to be the guy you can be". fairly good relations, so he may help them out. a paternalistic relation. in 1850s and 1860s, very different--the vocabulary of the people on strike is transformed. personal characterizations that are much more antagonistic. and in the 1890s and 1900s, it has changed dramatically--something has changed in the way people view their own work ("industrial discipline"). now the boss is often in paris, telling the foremen how to deal with the workers. he has become a symbol of capitalism, backed by the state and its army. he's the symbol of a large-scale, oppressive system. the foreman represents the attempt to impose "industrial discipline"--fine for chattering, fired for doing X, etc., etc. ("the three ages of industrial discipline")

so the attempt to create this kind of perfect workforce helps explain this mobilization and calcification of consciousness/identity.

Tuesday, February 17, 2009

While the capital funding for these construction projects comes from trade and fiscal surplus, the labour needed to work on these projects has to be imported. The construction boom led to an increase in demand for foreign labour -known in the Gulf as "expatriates" - usually recruited from the low-wage countries of South Asia. The domestic citizens of the Gulf, or the "nationals," would simply not work for the same low wages.
(...) By 2008, unofficial estimates put the population of Qatar at 1.25 million, 80 per cent of which were expatriates. By 2008, expatriates were unofficially reported to constitute 90 per cent of the labour force in the UAE.

Saturday, November 15, 2008

notes on capital
chapter 15: machinery and large-scale industry
sections 6-10

(566): nominibus mollire licet mala -- "it is proper to lighten evils with words" (ovid)

(568-569): in this critique of the bourgeois economists, marx alludes to an understanding of machinery as emancipatory, providing that its implementation is not overseen by capitalism. this does, though, leave open many questions about how a socialist society implements machinery. is it gradual? if it's gradual how does it remain competitive? how is it not alienating? etc., etc.

(571): the advent of cotton-spinning "promote[d], as if in a hot house, the growing of cotton in the United States, and with it the African Slave Trade." an example, if one was needed, of the way in which capitalism intensified slavery, rather than simply succeeding it. (in 1790, 697,000 slaves in US; in 1861, four million).

(571-572): a bit about the demands of the wool industry and the consequent conversion of arable land into pasture for sheep, which is critical precisely because, as sayre argued, it demonstrates that little is 'natural' (as in, outside of history). or, better put, nature has to be understood historically; in this case, the relation of man to land (in this case, the de-population of rural areas) cannot be understood outside of technological advance and new systems of production. in other words, man, in england and ireland, did not meet natural limits, but limits imposed upon nature by specific histories of 'progress'.

(574): in essence, section 6 responds to those apologists who see in machinery the means by which more and more employment will be made available to laboreres (as, in short, machinery stimulates general economic growth). marx's response is unequivocal: by and large, this stimulation is negligible. there will be further growth, he admits, but this will be insignificant in relation to the general impact of machinery on labor, as well as itself being prey to the later impact of machinery (as in, if machine implementation in one branch of industry stimulates another, we can still expect it to be a matter of time before machinery pervades the latter). he ends, then, with an interesting summary of recent, contemporary growth of the servant class in industrial britain, which has relevance for third world nations today, of course. for if it truly is the case that machinery requires a "larger and larger part of the working class to be employed unproductively," (can we think of the service sector in these terms?) then it is impossible to understand the plight of the current servant classes of the third world without recourse to 'labor-saving' technology. in other words, marx's attentiveness to this question of the relationship between technology and labor absorption should make us critically aware in the present: is it possible to imagine a way to limit technological advance so as to deal with the far more relatively numerous masses in the homes and kitchens of the indigenous bourgeoisie in the third world? how will this be accomplished, while still being competitive to the extent of being sustainable? are these the right questions?

(577): "finally, we have considered this question entirely apart from the fact that everywhere, except in the metallurgical industries, young persons (under 18), women and children form by far the most preponderant element in the factory personnel"--this is the critical 'other side' of the story of the industrial revolution, and neglected, i think, in accounts of women's liberation that give explanatory power to WWII. what did this mean for women's liberation? specifically, why was it the case that this large-scale employment of women did not result, in england, in a consciousness of liberation in the way that it did in america during WW2? of course there's a lot of history that i have yet to learn about both... (namely, what is the story of the english women's movement and its relation to industrial capitalism? what was the role of women in the US industrial revolution (the mills in massachusetts, for example)?)

(578): once more, a martial metaphor to explain industrial competition.

(579): marx, again, was fully aware of the gutting of india's handicraft cotton production, and its conversion into a site for producing raw material (cotton, wool, hemp, jute, indigo).

(579-580): quite standard development of underdevelopment narrative; in other words, quite clearly a dialectical (not linear) narrative of how capitalism advances.

(582): here, marx draws a link between the global extension of capitalism and the frequency of crisis. in other words, there seems to be a link between the scope of the capitalist market--the space over which it has expanded--and the frequency (and clarity) of the crises that afflict it. this, no doubt, is properly theorized in harvey and others. but we can add that it is probably not so much the fact that space is a source of new contradictions (indeed, harvey suggests that expansion into as-yet virgin areas is often the 'fix'), but rather that it is a vehicle for the consolidation of market relations (which clarifies, in a real sense, the dynamics producing crisis).

(588, fn 67): something made clear throughout this chapter is that the fact that the decreasing rate of surplus value must be compensated by absolute increases in capitalist production (by increases in the mass of surplus value) gives capitalism its relentlessly expansive character. innovation must happen, but alongside expansion. both are, simultaneously, survival strategies for individual and system.

(588-589): marx comments here on the way in which specific technical innovations undo certain divisions of labor pioneered in the manufacturing/handicraft era. he uses the example of adam smith, and his example of ten men making sewing-needles. the general importance of this passage, i suggest, is that it raises again the question of how machinery imposes objective requirements on the organization of production, which are of a quite different nature from the divisions of labor that preceded them. in other words, it is wrong to see, as feldstein via smith implied, that the progressively more extensive division of labor is the driver of increased productivity--rather, machinery intervenes in a quite decisive way, disrupting what is a very alluring linear story to reveal contradictions (advances with retreats). (see also 590, where marx writes about how the 'new division of labor' requires exclusively 'cheap labor' (i.e., women and children), quite in contrast to the 'old division of labor' in the handicrafts and even manufacture).

(593): "they become rough, foulmouthed boys, before Nature has taught them that they are women"--i suppose this is excusable, given context and intent.

(596): again, an explicit critique of the linear liberal.

(597): here, in the employment of child labor, we remember the contingency of the definition of childhood. in other words, appraising the dialectical relationship of environment (i.e., the factory) to the underlying biology is crucial to understanding the mendacity of 'capitalist anthropology'. (see also 599, where sociobiology can make little sense of parents pushing their children into brutal forms of employment).

(601): marx's argument, derived from the calculus he establishes for deciding on the efficacy of machinery, is that, in any given industry, there comes a point when increasing productivity through cheating labor, employing women/children, etc., is no longer viable (largely because demand has become so extensive). instead, capitalists turn to the machine. one question, in response, is how does this match on to the argument that the machine itself facilitates the entrance of women/children (he later clarifies some complexity, in that young children are removed but "the new machine-minders are exclusively girls and young women"? but i think that is a historical question, which requires one only to look more carefully at the chronology of their entry, rather than a theoretical conundrum. secondly, there seems to be an underlying dynamic of capital accumulation involved; in other words, you need a certain amount of capital to be able to invest in whole-scale transformation of production; a amount of disposable capital that may not be available in immature industries.

(601): again, looking to the past to better understand the present: "the fearful increase in death from starvation during the last ten years in london runs parallel with the extension of machine sewing"

(604): an important passage on the unsteadiness governing the transition from pre-factory forms to the factory system. specifically, marx here is arguing that the uneven implementation of the factory system in various branches of industry, affects dramatically (in a way that makes more inhumane) the non-factory forms of production that are linked to this technical advance. in other words, much like capitalism seizes on pre-capitalist forms and transforms them, here the factory form of production exacerbates the madness of pre-factory forms. in this way, the ascent of the factory system is accompanied by "a totally changed and disorganized" series of non-factory forms of production, which themselves "overdo all the horrors of the factory system." there is a lingering question about how to judge this transition, as marx seems to be arguing that the transitional forms are "worst" (not unlike slavery under capitalism, i suppose).

(604-605): argument here is fairly straightforward, yet important for legislation to check the excesses of contemporary capitalisms in the third world. in essence, marx is suggesting that the factory acts hastened the mechanization of production, insofar as they prohibited manufacture/domestic industry from the quick fixes of "unlimited exploitation of cheap labor-power." to compete, they had to raise productivity by the books. this has interesting consequences, when extrapolated to the case of child labor in the third world; insofar as it is true that more smaller factories/workplaces sustain these practices than larger ones (how true?), one can imagine proper legislation facilitating the concentration of capital in the hands of larger-scale industry (made explicit by marx in a passage on page 607). this dynamic, of course, has its own consequences. (anyway i think all this requires more empirical investigation, before it can be applied to explain today).

(607): a need to discipline the worker--to wean him from his "irregular habits"

(608): this is important, precisely because it prefigures what is done far too infrequently when studying "booms & busts"--namely, looking at crises from the eyes of labor, and assessing their consequences thusly.

(612): the earlier point about bourgeois legality being unable to regulate the internal order of a factory here resurfaces (and this quite aside from questions of autocracy at work). here marx offers an example of the impossibility of regulating the architecture of production: the factory acts could not re-organize the spatial structures of production, lest they "strike at the very roots of the capitalist mode of production," which is really it's freedom to purchase and consume labor-power in whatever way it pleases. put differently, the spatiality of this freedom here becomes important, insofar as it seems "impossible to impose [any] rule on capital" in this regard. in a sense, the contradiction immanent in the dual freedom of labor (the freedom to dispose of him/herself, but also the freeing of him/her from the means of production) here reappears as a contradiction in the legality of productive activity: the bourgeoisie claim the latter in the form of their property rights, yet thereby expose the fallacy of the former, insofar labor is revealed to be thoroughly subordinate to capital's will. "between equal rights, force decides."

(617): there's a dynamism to modern industry, marx is arguing, that is not present in all previous modes of production. whereas those were "essentially conservative," modern industry cannot survive without constantly "transforming not only the technical basis of production but also the functions of the worker and the social combinations of the labour process." this is of course important to the chronological questions of early industrial britain (progressive de-skilling, for example), aside from being wholly true with respect to the madness of contemporary capitalism. again, dialectics, not linearity. BUT, critically, marx here, in one of those rare moments, hints at what socialist harnessing of large-scale industry would achieve. at the bottom, he writes of how capitalism channels the dynamism required by industry (the "fluidity of functions, the mobility of the worker") into a form that does away with "all fixity and security" for the worker. the challenge for socialism, then, is this: how to organize production in large-scale industry such that the mobility is emancipating, rather than exploitative (there is, of course, the ecological challenge, but that's quite separate). all this is made explicit on page 618, where marx writes directly (well, almost) of the "partially developed individual" being replaced by "the totally developed individual, for whom the different social functions [required by large-scale industry] are different modes of activity he takes up in turn."

(619): more of the same attempt to prefigure socialist organization of production--and indeed, a making explicit of the dialectical approach: no necessary connection, in other words, between industry and alienation. in fact, it proves, on this account, a necessary condition for emancipation.

(620): quoting children's employment comission of 1866 (for the sociobiologists): "against no persons do the children of both sexes so much require protection as against their parents."

(621): toward a "higher form of the family:" again, an excellent explication of a concrete issue in which we can both lament the loss of all that is "fixed and frozen" (as is critical) without fearing the future (as is necessary).

(621): "since here the worker exists for the process of production, and not the process of production for the worker."

(621): clarifying chronology: factory acts enable general transition to machine-system, simultaneously heightening (in a real sense) the misery of those branches of industry left unregulated (domestic industry, manufacture, handicrafts).

(625-626): of course, in noting the disjuncture between what's enshrined in the letter of the law and what applies, marx (or engels, in this case) registers the classic contradiction of battles over the integrity of laws. indeed, we need to look no further than the UN declaration of human rights.

(635): a key passage, especially as regards the question of the revolutionary potential of the informal working-class. because here marx is tracing the increasing revolutionary capacities of the industrial working-class to the obliteration of spatially isolated small-scale workshops (those "ancient and transitional forms"). as this concentration of workers replaces the prevailing "partially hidden dominion of capital" with an awareness of what exactly workers ought to hold against this world, it "generalizes the direct struggle." it should be clear, though, that none of these conditions exist in the contemporary third world in any significant capacity. in that sense, fanon's command to concentrate on the peasantry needs to be re-issued, today, in the form of a demand to understand and organize the informal sector (the lumpen sectors). what remains to be studied, of course, are the imperfections of this general narrative; are there any ways in which the modern conjuncture opens up as-yet-unforseen possibilities of revolt? or is it really true that davis' pessimism prevails? why not study this, for god's sake?

(637-638): marx's first systematic presentation of the industrialization of agricultural production is lacking, of course, but is interesting in ways that orthodox reproductions don't account for. for example, there is the emphasis on the spatial distribution of laborers as an explanation for the possibility of resistance--indeed, the way he traces the chronology of agglomeration, it might be argued that even the peasantry, if crowded appropriately, could be revolutionary. (yet, on second thought, there's much more to this issue than simply space--it is, of course, to marxism's credit that it has a more robust explanation for what makes the urban working-class revolutionary (i.e,. the utterly inhuman (and painfully clear) hierarchies of the factory floor, and the invariably collective character of the demands that follow)). yet, even still, there remains room for playing with this aspect of the passage. secondly, even more interestingly, marx here introduces the concept of the 'metabolic rift,' emphasized by bellamy-foster. he hints at its future resolution, but all that he writes otherwise clarifies his interest in ecology, and capitalism's unavoidable irrationality in this respect. all this, it scarcely needs to be said, is a critical rejoinder to soviet developmentalism.