erik olin wright, classes (NLR, 2009)

[the task:] "I will focus on three clusters of causal processes relevant to class analysis, each associated with a different strand of sociological theory. The first identifies classes with the attributes and material life conditions of individuals. The second focuses on the ways in which social positions afford some people control over economic resources while excluding others—defining classes relative to processes of ‘opportunity hoarding’. The third approach conceives of classes as being structured by mechanisms of domination and exploitation, in which economic positions accord some people power over the lives and activities of others. The first is the approach taken in stratification research, the second is the Weberian perspective, and the third is associated with the Marxist tradition."

(...) [the first paradigm--an "individual-attributes" approach] "‘Class’, then, identifies those economically important attributes that shape people’s opportunities and choices in a market economy, and thus their material conditions. Class should neither be identified simply with people’s individual attributes nor with their material conditions of life; rather, it is a way of talking about the interconnections between these two."

(...) here, "the central concern of sociologists has been to understand how people acquire the characteristics that place them in one class or another."

(...) [the second paradigm--"opportunity-hoarding"] "The second approach, in which classes are defined by access to and exclusion from certain economic opportunities, focuses on ‘opportunity hoarding’—a concept closely associated with the work of Max Weber."

(...) key [Marxist conception, through Weber]--"Accreditation and licensing are particularly important mechanisms for opportunity hoarding, but many other institutional devices have been used in various times and places to protect the privileges and advantages of specific groups: colour bars excluded racial minorities from many jobs in the United States, especially (but not only) in the South until the 1960s; marriage bars and gender exclusions restricted access to certain jobs for women until well into the 20th century in most developed capitalist countries; religion, cultural criteria, manners, accent—all of these have constituted mechanisms of exclusion. Perhaps the most important exclusionary mechanism is private-property rights in the means of production. Private-property rights are the pivotal form of closure that determines access to the ‘job’ of employer. If workers were to attempt to take over a factory and run it themselves, they would be challenging their exclusion from control over the means of production; the capacity of owners to acquire profits, meanwhile, depends upon their defence of this exclusion. The core class division between capitalists and workers—common to both Weberian and Marxian traditions of sociology—can therefore be understood, from a Weberian perspective, as reflecting a specific form of opportunity hoarding enforced by the legal rules of property rights."

(...) "Sociologists who adopt the opportunity-hoarding approach to class generally identify three broad categories in American society: capitalists, defined by private-property rights in the ownership of means of production; the middle class, defined by mechanisms of exclusion over the acquisition of education and skills; and the working class, defined by their exclusion from both higher educational credentials and capital."

(...) important [Weber vs. bourgeois social science]--"The critical difference between opportunity-hoarding mechanisms of class and individual-attribute mechanisms is this: in the former, the economic advantages gained from being in a privileged class position are causally connected to the disadvantages of those excluded from such positions. In the individual-attributes approach, such advantages and disadvantages are simply the outcomes of individual conditions: the rich are rich because they have favourable attributes, the poor poor because they lack them; there is no systematic causal connection between these facts. Eliminating poverty by improving the relevant attributes of the poor—their education, cultural level, human capital—would in no way harm the affluent. In the case of opportunity hoarding, the rich are rich in part because the poor are poor, and the things the rich do to maintain their wealth contribute to the disadvantages faced by poor people. Here, moves to eliminate poverty by removing the mechanisms of exclusion would potentially undermine the advantages of the affluent."

(...) [the third paradigm] "...the landowners not only gain from controlling access to the land (opportunity hoarding), they dominate the farm workers and exploit their labour. This is a stronger form of relational interdependency than in the case of simple exclusion, for here there is an ongoing relationship between not only the conditions but also the activities of the advantaged and disadvantaged. Exploitation and domination are forms of structured inequality which require the continual active cooperation between exploiters and exploited, dominators and dominated." [but it is surely important to ask what kind of an account of exploitation we have here? attached to the LTV, or not?]

(...) important, from least to most relational--"We could, then, summarize the contrast between the role of social relations in each of the three approaches to class analysis as follows. In the stratification approach, neither the economic conditions in which people live nor their activities are understood as directly reflecting social relations; it is the least relational of the three. The Weberian approach sees people’s economic conditions as being formed through relations of exclusion, but does not specify class as embodying relations among activities. The Marxist tradition is relational in both senses, drawing attention to the structuring effect of exploitation and domination on both economic conditions and activities."

(...) "Within this approach, the central class division in capitalist society is between those who own and control the means of production—capitalists—and those hired to use those means of production—workers. Capitalists, within this framework, exploit and dominate workers. Other positions within the class structure draw their specific character from their relationship to this basic division."

(...) [looking forward...] "These three processes operate in all capitalist societies. The differences in class structures between countries are produced by the varying interactions of these mechanisms. The theoretical task is to think through the different ways they are linked and combined; the empirical task is to develop ways of studying each mechanism and the interconnections between them."

(...) [sure, but isn't it worth calling this synthesis Marxist? who's his audience? i mean, as soon as you have an account of the context in which individual attributes are being assigned, you're no longer working with the categories of bourgeois class analysis] One possible nested micro-macro model is illustrated schematically in Figure 4. In this model the power relations and legal rules that give people effective control over economic resources—means of production, finance, human capital—generate structures of social closure and opportunity hoarding connected to social positions. Opportunity hoarding then produces three streams of causal effects: firstly, it shapes the micro-level processes through which individuals acquire class-relevant attributes; secondly, it shapes the structure of locations within market relations—occupations and jobs—and the associated distributional conflicts; and thirdly, it shapes the structure of relations within production, especially relations of domination and exploitation, and the associated conflicts in that sphere. The first of these causal streams in turn directs the flow of people into class locations within the market and production. Jointly the class attributes of individuals and their class locations affect their levels of individual economic well-being.

(...) [an obvious question-begger, not to be resolved here; but clear where erik olin wright stands...] "Such arguments are unconvincing. Marxism is a powerful tradition in social science because it provides far-reaching explanations for a range of important phenomena, not because it has some special method that sets it apart from all other theoretical currents. Of course, it is always possible that future efforts to formulate Marxism as a distinctive, comprehensive paradigm may succeed. But for the present, it seems more helpful to see Marxism as a research programme defined by attention to a specific set of problems, mechanisms and provisional explanatory theories."

(...) [ha--pragmatist realism! bit of a weak ending...] "It might seem from this assessment that, in the end, we should all simply declare ourselves Weberians. This was one of the accusations levelled against my work and that of other Marxists thirty years ago by the British sociologist Frank Parkin when he wrote: ‘inside every neo-Marxist there seems to be a Weberian struggling to get out’ I do not think this follows from the kind of pragmatist realism I am advocating here. Marxism remains a distinctive tradition in social science because of the specific set of problems it addresses, its normative foundations, and the distinctive inventory of concepts and mechanisms it has developed."

(1) worth thinking a bit more about this argument about the creation of a middle-class through expansion of massive education in the US -- is education more-or-less what the middle class rises and falls with, then?

(2) also useful to think about how this would translate to an analysis of the 'global proletariat', a la harman and others, no?

max weber, types of legitimate domination

part one: the basis of legitimacy (212-217)

(212): the premise, in effect: "every genuine form of domination implies a minimum of voluntary compliance, that is, an interest... in obedience."

(213): normally, domination cannot simply be based on material interest, affectual/ideal solidarity, but requires a "belief in legitimacy."

(213-214): much is obscured by weber's use of the word "freely"

(214): "what is important is the fact that in a given case the particular claim to legitimacy is to a significant degree and according to its type treated as 'valid'"

(215): crux, "three pure types of legitimate domination"

1. rational grounds--belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands
   
2. traditional grounds--resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them
3. charismatic grounds--resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him.

(216): NB--"the idea that the whole of concrete historical reality can be exhausted in the conceptual scheme about to be developed is as far from the author's thoughts as anything could be."

part two: legal authority with a bureaucratic administrative staff (217-226)

(218-223): preliminary delineation of the basic nature of rational authority (enumerating, essentially, the rational, ordered features of bureaucratic organization--importance of 'technical qualification' (221-222))

(223): "the purely bureaucratic type of administrative organization--that is, the monocratic variety of bureaucracy--is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of exercising authority over human beings... [moreover], the needs of mass administration make it today completely indispensable. the choice is only that between bureaucracy and dilettantism in the field of administration."

(224): here, furthermore, predicting that the bureaucracy will have to persist to manage a society like ours.

(224): important--reflections on capitalism and bureaucracy, and the question of their co-evolution: "though by no means alone, the capitalistic system has undeniably played a major role in the development of bureaucracy. indeed, without it capitalistic production could not continue and any rational type of socialism would have simply to take it over and increase its importance... on the one hand, capitalism in its modern stages of development requires the bureaucracy, though both have arisen from different historical sources. conversely, capitalism is the most rational economic basis for bureaucratic administration and enables it to develop in the most rational form, especially because, from a fiscal piont of view, it supplies the necessary money resources."

(225): "socialism would... require a still higher degree of formal bureaucratization than capitalism..." [of course, to a dilettante he sounds prophetic; for us, it is clear that the notion that this nonsense explains 1917 is simply hogwash]

(225): "bureaucratic administration means fundamentally domination through knowledge. this is the feature of it which makes it specifically rational."

(225): in general, the following social consequences (and here, the iron cage is forming)--second is tendency to plutocracy, and third is the dominance of a spirit of formalistic impersonality...

(226): bureaucracy is a process of 'social leveling', and "foreshadows mass democracy" [but, of course, this is all much more ominous than he is letting on here, as he writes elsewhere]

(226): two general characteristics

1. formalism
2. "tendency to substantive rationality" -- tendency to a "utilitarian point of view in the interest of the welfare of those under their authority."
   

part three: traditional authority (226-241)

(226-227): traditional authority -- "in the simplest case... based on personal loyalty which results from common upbringing... obedience is owed not to enacted rules but to the person who occupies a position of authority by tradition or who has been chosen for it by the traditional master."

(227): interesting--"the exercise of power is oriented toward the consideration of how far master and staff can go in view of the subjects' traditional compliance without arousing their resistance. when resistance occurs, it is directed against the master or his servant personally, the accusation being that he failed to observe the traditional limits of his power. opposition is not directed against the system as such--it is a case of 'traditionalist revolution.'" [perhaps thinking of a peasant jacquerie, i suppose; and in this sense it might be interesting to re-cast the argument about the uniqueness of the proletarian revolution in these ideal-typical, Weberian terms. though i'm not sure it would still work.]

(229): "master's discretion" exists in place of rationally established rules and regulations.

(231): gerontocracy and primary patriarchalism

(231): patrimonalism -- "whenever traditional domination develops an administration and a military force which are purely personal instruments of the master."

(232): estate-type domination -- when the administrative staff appropriates administrative powers and economic assets

(238-240): important, capitalism and traditional authority--capitalist trading, capitalist tax farming, capitalist provision of supplies for the state, capitalist plantations may emerge. "All these [latter] forms are indigenous to patrimonial regimes and often reach a very high level of development... [But a higher] type of capitalism is altogether too sensitive to all sorts of irrationalities in the administration of law, administration and taxation, for these upset the basis of calculability."

part four: charismatic authority (241-246)

(241): charismatic authority

(243): "the administrative staff of a charismatic leader does not consist of 'officials'... it is rather chosen in terms of the charismatic qualities of its members..."

(244): important--"Since it is 'extra-ordinary,' charismatic authority is sharply opposed to rational, and particularly bureaucratic, authority, and to traditional authority, whether in its patriarchal, patrimonial, or estate variants, all of which are everyday forms of domination; while the charismatic type is the direct antithesis of this. Bureaucratic authority is specifically rational in the sense of being bound to intellectually analysable rules; while charismatic authority is specifically irrational in the sense of being foreign to all rules... Traditional authority is bound to the precedents handed down... charismatic authority repudiates the past, and is in this sense a specifically revolutionary force."

part v: the routinization of charisma (246-255)

(245): "in traditionalist periods, charisma is the great revolutionary force." [and later?]

(245): important--"in its pure form charismatic authority may be said to exist only in statu nascendi. It cannot remain stable, but becomes either traditionalized or rationalized, or a combination of both."

(249): routinization through succession, but also through the interests of the administrative staff.

(251): moreover, "for charisma to be transformed into an everyday phenomenon, it is necessary that its anti-economic character should be altered. it must be adapted to some form of fiscal organization to provide for the needs of the group..."

(254): "along with the ideology of loyalty, which is certainly by no means unimportant, allegiance to hereditary monarchy in particular is very strongly influenced by the consideration that all inherited and legitimately acquired property would be endangered if people stopped believing in the sanctity of hereditary succession to the throne. it is hence by no means fortuitous that hereditary monarchy is more adequate to the propertied strata than to the proletariat."

part six: feudalism (255-)

(255): two types: fiefs, and benefices.

(257): a tension emerges whenever the grants are "highly developed"--because the overlord's authority, then, "is very dependent on the voluntary obedience and and hence the purely personal loyalty of the members of the administrative staff, who... are themselves in posession of the means of administration."

(259): out of this struggle, in a sense, the seeds of absolutism--"in modern times it everywhere issued in the ruler's victory, and that meant in bureaucratic administration... it was influenced by the rise of the bourgeoisie... it was in addition aided by the competition for power by means of rational... administration among the different states. this led, from fiscal motives, to a crucially important alliance with capitalistic interests..."

(260): "prebendal feudalism"

(262-263): important--"the above discussion makes it quite evident that 'ruling organizations' which belong only to one or another of these pure types are very exceptional... in general, it should be kept clearly in mind that the basis of every authority... is a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige. the composition of this belief is seldom altogether simple..."

(264): importance of administrative staff, for authority: "for the habit of obedience cannot be maintained without organized activity directed to the application and enforcement of the order."

(265): re: discussion of german post-WWI experience, the bureaucracy appears here as a 'tool' to be handled. an empty instrument. [how is this articulated with the state, in the weberian model?]

(266): ah, brief mention of the russian revolution

part seven: the transformation of charisma in a democratic direction (266-271)

(266-267): charismatic authority, in particular it seems, can "be subject to an anti-authoritarian interpretation, for the validity of charismatic authority rests entirely on recognition by the ruled..." in this sense, he's arguing, it can, as it's routinzed, develop into a democratic form of organization on the basis of the principle of election.

(267): extending democracy to the administrative staff (and this, it seems, means that "they are not 'bureaucratic'") [is this a possible escape route, away from the iron cage? he does go on to imply that these will be wildly more 'inefficient'; but there is a place to raise the normative foundations of the definition of 'efficiency']

part eight: collegiality and the division of powers (271-284)

(271-272): exogenous limitations on the powers of authority (means which are necessary, agencies with their own authority, etc.)--"principle of collegiality"

(277): "collegiality almost inevitably involves obstacles to precise, clear, and above all, rapid decision"

(277): "collegiality is in no sense specifically 'democratic.' where privileged groups have had to protect their privileges agianst those who were excludded from them they have always attempted to prevent the rise of monocratic power..."

(278): 'dictatorship of the proletariat' being read as an individual dictatorship (on behalf of masses) [you can critique marx, but no need to butcher him--this is straw-manning at its worst]

(281): "from an historical point of view it is in terms of collegiality that the concept of an 'administrative agency' first came to be fully developed... only collegial bodies of officials, which were capable of standing together, could gradually expropriate the Occidental monarch, who had become a 'dilettante.'

(281): from monarchy, to bureaucracy, to prime minister, to monocracy (and the victory, then, of the bureaucracy)

(283): "historically, the separation of power in Europe developed out of the old system of estates..."

part nine: parties (284-289)

(286): "structurally, parties may conform to the same types as any other organizations."

(286): "it is of crucial importance for the economic aspect of the distribution of power and for the determination of party policy by what method the party activities are funded."

part ten: direct democracy and representative administration (289-292)

(289): ah, weber is seeing our alternative; what do you think, max?

(290): he believes that "immediate democracy" needs to be small-scale and insufficiently concerned with technical concerns, necessarily -- otherwise the bureaucracy will reassert itself. (see also 291)

(290): the notable, the representative--"presupposes that the individual is able to live for politics without living from politics."

part eleven: representation (292-298)

(292): appropriated representation

(293): estate-type representation

(293): instructed representation

(293): free representation

(294): weber sees the separation between active parties and politically-passive citizens

(296-297): exploring, in general, the harmonious co-evolution of representative government and modern capitalism

(296): "one factor in the development of free representation was the undermining of the economic basis of the older status groups. this made it possible for persons with demagogic gifts to pursue their career regardless of their social position. the source of this undermining process was modern capitalism."

(297): interesting--"two main factors have tended to make monarchs and ministers everywhere favorable to universal suffrage, namely, the necessity for the support of the proletariat in foreign conflict and the hope, which has proved to be unjustified, that, as compared to the bourgeoisie, they would be a conservative influence." [can we just saw, weber is deploying these class-categories--ideal-typically, perhaps--with reckless abandon? i approve! and he neglected to mention agitation for universal suffrage, of course]

(297): important--class character of parliamentary system: "parliaments have tended to function smoothly as long as their composition was drawn predominantly from the classes of wealth and culture... established social status rather than class interests underlay the party structure. the conflicts tended to be only those between different forms of wealth, but with the rise of class parties to power, especially the proletarian parties, the situation of parliaments has changed radically."

(298): the 'soviets' as an interest group [but let's not forget that he basically also admitted the class character of bourgeois democracy, above]

(299): mention of 'works councils' in germany, too

weber, objectivity in social science

(51): the question, put neatly: “in what sense are there in general 'objectively valid truths' in those disciplines concerned with social and cultural phenomena?

(51-52): our science began as a 'technical science' – even though slowly have we come to appreciate this, he's arguing, we have not made the critical distinction between normative and existential knowledge (we were hampered, in this, by a kind of evolutionary determinism—what exists, in effect, could be no other way; the normative question isn't appropriate, in that sense)

(52): “it can never be the task of an empirical science to provide binding norms and ideals from which directives for immediate practical activity can be derived.” NEITHER is it the case, though, that empirical science must forsake norms/ideals. “The problem is rather: what is the meaning and purpose of the scientific criticism of ideals and value-judgments?”

(52-53): proposing, here, an analysis in terms of ends-means, technical criticism. “Science can make him realize that all action and naturally... inaction imply in their consequences the espousal of certain values... The act of choice is his own responsibility.”

(54): science can aid the decision-maker in a quest for logical consistency of principles, too. But again: “As to whether the person expressing these value-judgments should adhere to these ultimate standards is his personal affair; it involves will and conscience, not empirical knowledge.”

(55): “only on the assumption of belief in the validity of values is the attempt to espouse value-judgments meaningful. However, to judge the validity of such values is a matter of faith.”

(56): in other words, a rejoinder to the technocrats and social engineers: “The distinctive character of a problem of social policy is indeed the fact that it cannot be resolved merely on the basis of purely technical considerations which assume already settled ends. Normative standards of value can and must be the objects of dispute in a discussion of a problem of social policy because the problem lies in the domain of general cultural values.”

(56): ah yes, dear max: “And the conflict occurs not merely... between 'class interests' but between general views on life and the universe as well.” [though he goes on to suggest that, yes, class interests play their part]

(57): critical, summary passage: “The fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of knowledge is that it must know that we cannot learn the meaning of the world from the results of its analysis... it must rather be in a position to create this meaning itself. It must recognize that general views of life and the universe can never be the products of increasing empirical knowledge, and that the highest ideals, which move us forcefully, are always formed only in the struggle with other ideals which are just as sacred to others as ours are to us.”

(58): this is critical, and perhaps gives us the first opportunity to push back: “This proposition remains correct, despite, as we shall see, the fact that those highest 'values' underlying the practical interest are and always will be decisively significant in determining the focus of attention of analytical activity in the sphere of the cultural sciences.” [in my translation-cum-extension—the necessary partiality of any position re: the empirical facts-on-the-ground is due to this necessary feature of scientific life; the spectre of the practical lurks, always, affecting the nature of what is understood as “factual,” what is deemed worthy of attention, etc. in this sense, weber's account is obviously informed by an excessive optimism, even as he's, rightly, attacking the technocrats. But is his defense, perhaps, meant as an “aspiration”?]

(59-60): at any time, he's arguing, that “value-judgements” enter the pages of this journal, they must be made explicit; any attack on another's world-view must proceed from the conscious self-presentation of one's own world-view (“it must be a struggle against another's ideas from the standpoint of one's own”).

(60): again, the same question as foregrounded above—here, Weber is striving to distinguish the scientific person from the evaluating/acting one.

(61): again, we get the impression that he understands the critique that we would level, back. And yet he's defending this optimistic vision of the purely scientific man. See, for example: “Hence, the very recognition of the existence of a scientific problem coincides, personally, with the possession of specifically oriented motives and values.”

(62): the journal as 'partial' to the interests of the working class

(63): moving, then, to the problem at the heart of the earlier formulation—how can we speak of “objectivity,” as such?

(64): interesting, a very specific definition of what social science is concerned with: “By a social science problem, we mean a task for a discipline the object of which is to throw light on the ramifications of that fundametnal social-economic phenomenon: the scarcity of means.” [I would only add what is really meant here, is the [relative] scarcity of means]

(64-65): what, exactly, are we to make of this prominence of the “economic” within the essay?

(65-66): important, a Weberian materialism, which will require some unpacking as the essay proceeds, with particular attention paid to this distinction between the “economically conditioned” and the “economically relevant”: “Specifically economic motives... operate wherever the satisfaction of even the most immaterial need or desire is bound up with the application of scarce material means. Their forces has everywhere on that account conditioned and transformed not only the mode in which cultural wants or preferences are satisfied, but their content as well, even in their most subjective aspects. The indirect influence of social relations... extends... into all spheres of culture without exception... They are 'economically conditioned.'... On the other hand, all the activities and situations constituting an historically given cultrue affect the formation of the material wants... They thereby affect the course of 'economic development' and are accordingly 'economically relevant.'”

(66): an immediate distinction, which seems critical, pegged to the question of causality, between “historical knowledge” and those things that are preliminary contributions to “historical knowledge” – the former seems to consist of inquiry into the origins of “economic cultural phenomenon”; the latter into tracing these phenomena across cultural contexts.

(67): “We are only drawing the conclusions of this policy when we state that the scientific investigation of the general cultural significance of the social-economic structure of the human community and its historical forms of organizaiton is the central aim of our journal.” [how shall we interpret “cultural,” here? Does it simply mean “ideological”? Not that? Something more, something less?]

(67-68): he is perfectly aware of the alleged “one-sidedness” of the 'economic' approach to cultural life that is being espoused, here. However: the defense is that this one-sidedness is intentional, and necessary; in a nutshell, he seems to be arguing that doing away with this one-sidedness exposes us to an investigation whose breadth forecloses scientific investigation. In that sense, this is not a “general social science”--and that is precisely what makes it possible [but we have the question of 'causality,' again; it is not clear to me that limitation-as-defense can spare you from the thorny theoretical problems that are at the heart of the question of how to understand culture, regardless of the scope of your investigation; although, differently understood (more accurately, inverted), this is kind of the accommodation that a Marxist materialism must perform, too]

(68): critical, rejection/appropriation of Marx: “Liberated as we are from the antiquated notion that all cultural phenomena can be deduced as a product... of the constellation of 'material' interests, we believe nevertheless that the analysis of social... phenomena with special reference to their economic conditioning and ramifications was a scientific principle of creative fruitfulness... The so-called 'materialistic conception of history'... as a a formula for the causal explanation of historical reality is to be rejected most emphatically. The advancement of the economic interpretation of history is one of the most important aims of our journal..”

(68-70): only “laymen” and “dilettantes” are partial to the materialism outlined in the Communist Manifesto! He sees people searching for “economic” explanations—the abuse of 'in the last instance.' Nevertheless: precisely this, in his mind, explains the fact that social scientists have begun to underestimate its scientific power.

(70-71): after more commentary on this alleged search, in the Marxist tradition, for an “economic” explanation of everything, he writes: “The explanation of everything by economic causes alone is never exhaustive in any sense whatsoever in any sphere of cultural phenomena, not even in the 'economic' sphere itself.” [again, it is interesting to try and respond with the framework of limiting the object of analysis—that some things, indeed, have internal, non-material explanations, but that at a higher level of generality (and scientific meaningfulness), when we expand the bounds of what we want to explain, this is simply not the case. superficially, remember, he seems to be agreeing to a similar kind of materialism via limiting. yet it should be obvious that ours is worlds apart, precisely because it asserts the primacy of an ordered materialism. To me it is unclear that his, in this admission of “one-sidedness,” is anything more than an epistemological mish-mash.]

(72): and thus, all explanations are “one-sided,” in some, very primary, fundamental way: “There is no absolutely 'objective' scientific analysis of culture—or put perhaps more narrowly but certainly not essentially differently for our purposes—of 'social phenomena' independent of special and 'one-sided' viewpoints according to which—expressly or tacitly, consciously or unconsciously—they are selected, analyzed, and organized for expository purposes.”

(73): applying a law to explain concrete reality requires you to decide what, exactly, will constitute the explanandum: “those elements in each event which are left unaccounted for by the selection of their elements subsumable under the 'law' are considered as scientifically unintegrated residues which will be taken care of in the further perfection of the system of 'laws.'”

(73): following from this, he notes the quest for “astronomical knowledge” – “the attitude which declares the ideal which all the sciences... towards which they should strive... is a system of propositions from which reality can be 'deduced.'”

(73-75): important--his critique recalls Hume: “the reality to which the laws apply always remains equally individual, equally undeducible from laws.” and later, on pg 75, arguing against the notion that reality can be broken up into building blocks ('factors') that can then be used to explain things causally, he makes the same kind of point: “The real reason is that the analysis of reality is concerned with the configuration into which those (hypothetical!) 'factors' are arranged to form a cultural phenomenon which is historically significant to us. Furthermore, if we wish to 'explain' this individal configuration 'causally' we must invoke other equally individual configurations on the basis of which we will explain it with the aid of those (hypothetical!) 'laws.'”

(76): important--acknowledging, again, the necessary partiality of our object of study, in the cultural sciences (how, again, are we to relate this to the social sciences? As subset? As distinct? Surely the same principle applies, to everything): “The significance of a configuration of cultural phenomena and the basis of this significance cannot however be derived and rendered intelligible by a system of analytical laws... since the significance of cultural events presupposes a value-orientation towards these events. The concept of culture is a value concept. Empirical reality becomes 'culture' to us because and insofar as we relate it to value ideas. It includes... only those segments of reality which have become significant to us because of this value-relevance... Perception of its meaningfulness to us is the presupposition of its becoming an object of investigation.”

(78): the object of our study is defined by its individuality, in this sense: “We seek knowledge of an historical phenomenon, meaning by historical: significant in its individuality.”

(78): important--arguing that we have to perform this selection of what is significance (i.e., it is not simply a perennial obstacle to 'pure' knowledge; it is a necessary, epistemological tool): “And the decisive element in this is that only through the presupposition that a finite part alone of the infinite variety of phenomena is significant, does the knowledge of an individual phenomenon become logically meaningful. Even with the widest imaginable knowledge of 'laws,' we are helpless in the face of the question: how is the causal explanation of an individual fact possible—since a description of even the smallest slice of reality can never be exhaustive?... A chaos of 'existential judgements'... would be the only result of a serious attempt to analyze reality 'without presuppositions.'... Only certain sides of the infinitely complex concrete phenomenon, namely those to which we attribute a general cultural significance—are therefore worthwhile knowing.” ”

(79): again, we can only capture things as they exist concretely and individually (“imputation”): “It is in brief a question of imputation. Wherever the causal explanation of a 'cultural phenomenon... the knowledge of causal laws is not the end of the investigation but only a means. It facilitates and renders possible the causal imputation to their concrete causes of those components of a phenomenon the individuality of which is culturally significant.”

(79): you do need, of course, what he calls 'nomological' knowledge; in other words, the 'general' and the 'universal' have their place: “whether a single individual component... is... to be assigned causal responsibility for an effect... can in doubtful cases be determined only by estimating the effects which we generally expect from it...”

(80): “in the cultural sciences, the knowledge of the universal or general is never valuable in itself.”

(80): summary passage, outlining why knowledge of cultural phenomena cannot be 'objective': “Firstly, because the knowledge of social laws is not knowledge of social reality but is rather one of the various aids used by out minds for attaining this end; secondly, because knowledge of cultural events is inconceivable except on a basis of the significance which the concrete constellations of reality have for us in certain individual concrete situations.”

(81): “All knowledge of cultural reality... is knowledge from particular points of view.”

(83): a refutation of a refutation of the materialist understanding of laws as 'superstructrue' (which doesn't, of course, mean that it is a defense of the materialist position).

(84): important—truth is pegged to the 'pursuit': “It obviously does not follow from this that research... can only have results which are 'subjective' in the sense that they are valid for one person and not for others. Only the degree to which they interest different persons varies... IN the method of investigation, the guiding 'point of view' is of great importance for the construction of the conceptual scheme which will be used in the investigation. In the mode of their use, however, the investigator is obviously bound by the norms of our thought just as much here as elsewhere. For scientific truth is precisely what is valid for all who seek the truth.”

(84-85): the assertion of a universal, general will come up with problems because 'everything is in flow'

(85): turning, now, to the question of methodology – what is the status/use of the objects we employ?

(85): against the enlightenment weltanschung, which had its roots in the optimism/technical character of the natural sciences (the non-problematic move from concrete to abstract)

(86): with the theory of evolution, this reached its peak: “it appeared as if there was in general no conceivable meaning of scientific work other than the discovery of the laws of events.”

(87-88): dealing, here, with a more sophisticated theorist, who agrees on the non-identity of laws with reality, but still believes in the pursuit of abstract laws which can model reality. He's arguing that they're caught in a bind, it seems: “In spite of the fundamental methodological distinction between historical knowledge and the knowledge of 'laws' which the creator of the theory drew as the first and only one, he now claims empirical validity, in the sense of the deducibility of reality from 'laws,' for the propositions of abstract theory... This claim fails to observe that in order to be able to reach this result even in the simplest case, the totality of existing historical reality including every one of its causal relationships must be assumed as 'given' and presupposed as known.”

(90): important--introducing the “ideal-type,” by way of the free-market model: “The ideal typical concept will help to develop our skill in imputation in research: it is no 'hypothesis' but it offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses. It is not a description of reality but it aims to give unambiguous means of expression to such a description. It is thus the 'idea' of the historically given modern society, based on an exchange economy, which is developed for us by quite the same logical principles as are used in constructing the idea of the medieval 'city economy' as a 'genetic' concept... It is a utopia. Historical research faces the task of determining in each individual case, the extent to which this ideal-construct approximates to or diverges from reality...” [note my emphasis, which suggest that the ideal-type itself must be recognized as a product of a particular history]

(92): ideal-type, con't: “The construction of abstract ideal-types recommends itself not as an end but as a means. Every conscientious examination of the conceptual elements of historical exposition shows however that the historian as soon as he attempts to go beyond the bare establishement of concrete relationships and to determine the cultural significance of even the simplest individual event in order to 'characterize' it, must use concepts which are precisely and unambiguously definable only in the form of ideal types.”

(93): and more still: “it is even less fitted to serve as a schema under which a real situation or action is to be subsumed as one instance. It has the significance of a purely ideal limiting concept with which the real situation or action is compared and surveyed for the explication of certain of its significant components.”

(94): I suppose this means that it is only in application that the ideal-typical becomes filled out? “...the concepts thereupon become ideal-typical in the sense that they appear in full conceptual integrity either not at all or only in individual instances.”

(94): he is obviously, as he says here, not saying that these things are real, or that they are a 'procrustean bed' into which history can be cast, or that they are real forces which explain the passage of history.

(98): the ideal-typical might become evaluative—as in, it contains what the author thinks christianity 'ought' to contain. This is obviously departing from what Weber wants the theorist to do. “The sphere of empirical science has been left behind and we are constructed with a profession of faith, not an ideal-typical construct.”

(99): are you proceeding, then, from what men themselves think? “In other words, here too the practical idea which should be valid or is believed to be valid and the heuristically intended, theoretically ideal type approach each other very closely and constantly tend to merge with each other.”

(100-101): these passages are important, though I have not fully understood the argument that leads to this assertion (though I understand the assertion): “The goal of ideal-typical concept-construction is always to make clearly explicit not the class or average character but rather the unique individual character of cultural phenomena.”

(101-102): here are the passages where he acknowledges the fixity of the ideal-type as hitherto constructed, and thus proposed an ideal-type of 'developmental' dimensions; in other words, you apply the ideal-type to a historical progression: “This procedure gives rise to no methodological doubts so long as we clearly keep in mind that ideal-typical developmental constructs and history are to be sharply distinguished from each other...”

(102): “The danger of this procedure... lies in the fact that historical knowledge here appears as a servant of theory instead of the opposite role.”

(103): important—assimilating Marx: “we will only point out here that naturally all specifically Marxian 'laws' and developmental constructs—insofar as they are theoretically sound—are ideal types. The eminent, indeed unique, heuristic significance of these ideal types when they are used for the assessment of reality is known to everyone... Similarly, their perniciousness, as soon as they are thought of as empirically valid or as real 'effective forces,' 'tendencies,' etc., is likewise known to those who have used them.”

(104): the idea that we will transcend the era of ideal types one day is wrong, even as it is right to point out the inevitable obsolescence of current ideal-types, weber thinks: “At the very heart of their task lies not only the transiency of all ideal types but also at the same time the inevitability of new ones.”

(106): important—he is writing explicitly against this position, remember—the position that makes ends of theoretical concepts, rather than recognizing it as means: “the latter still hold in many ways, expressly or tacitly, to the opinion that it is the end and the goal of every science to order its data into a system of concepts, the content of which is to be acquired and slowly perfected through the observation of empirical regularities, the construction of hypotheses, and their verification, until finally a 'completed' and hence deductive science emerges.”

(108-110): an illustration of the 'buzzing, confused complexity' through agriculture

(110): summary passage: “The objective validity of all empirical knowledge rests exclusively upon the ordering of the given reality according to categories which are subjective in a specific sense, namely, in that they present the presuppositions of our knowledge and are based on the presupposition of the value of those truths which empirical knowledge alone is able to give us.”

(111): summary passage: “The 'objectivity' of the social sciences depends rather on the fact that the empirical data are always related to those evaluative ideas which alone make them worth knowing and the significance of the empirical data is derived from these evaluative ideas. But these data can never become the foundation for the empirically impossible proof of the validity of the evaluative ideas.”

max weber, the protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism

I--THE PROBLEM

(1-8): DOMINATION AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

(2): KEY--weber here suggests that casting off the fetters of the catholic church not be read as a casting off of 'authority'--but, in fact, the "replacement of the previous form of authority with a different one." in fact, a more strict one--protestants cast off the diktats of pope and priest, only to submit their will to an ethic that was more taxing and more severe.

(3,4): protestants more likely to pursue technical/commercial education, more likely to move from craftwork to skilled work/management (whereas catholics prefer to become master craftsmen)

(4): weber mentions that he would have expected them to, as a minority, have a greater proportion of their leaders in business (since the State is closed to them).

(4): in observing that jews and poles and others have done precisely what catholics are proving unable to do, it seems like this is becoming an argument about protestantism, only implicitly. even though it is early going, yet, this ought to say something about the contingency of the thesis?

(5-6): not 'unworldliness' of one vs. 'worldliness' of other -- too meaningless

(7): KEY--the ethic is not connected to the "enlightenment" or "progress," he wants to stress. as such, "if an inner affinity is... found..., we must try... to seek it not in its more or less materialistic... enjoyment of life, but rather in its purely religious features." [in other words, to 'fit' the modern world it has been adapted, in a sense; it is not marked with 'modernity,' at all]

(8-28): THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM

(8-9): this is important and interesting--he is committed, explicitly, to a methodology soaked in history. absolutely anti-positivist, in this sense [a "definition" is not possible, but only a "provisional illustration"]

(11): here we see the first mention of 'instrumental rationality'--"the increase of his wealth... is assumed to be an end in itself." appended to this, then, is also a sense in the ethical correctness of this position, though only in an unapologetically "utilitarian" sense (wherein "the appearence of virtue" is an appropriate substitute for "virtue," because it is all about the result and effect obtained)

(12): but note: this is entirely detached from hedonism or whatever else. it is so "purely thought of as an end in itself."

(12-13): the concept of diligence "in one's calling" makes an appearance, as an "essential element"--weber is even pointing out its familiar but non-obvious nature. important.

(13): important--not so concerned with the re-generation of this kind of an 'ethic', today (as in, it is not even an option if you'd like to compete on a market). this is, primarily it seems, an inquiry into its origins ("it obviously first had to come into being... as an attitude held in common") (see also 18)

(13): first mention of "naive historical materialism."

(14): here, a point to hang a critique on--in MA, the spirit of capitalism preceded "capitalist development." [for one, it's not clear that the spirit of capitalism need only exist in fully-fledged capitalism for historical materialism to be helpful--it seems like it would be might helpful for the yeomanry]

(14): it's not greed that is the explanandum, he's reminding us -- this he sees everywhere. it's something much more specific.

(16): already, we are specifying the object of study, further than the term itself implies (for Weber here is seeing persistent 'precapitalist' modes of behaviour amongst laborers; an alternative, of course, is that these are their own kind of spirits of capitalism)

(18): here the nature of evidence is downright pathetic ("a relative told me" that pietist girls are more conscientious, "as a result of a religious upbringing").

(19): specifying what exactly "traditionalism" means in this narrative--something like werner sombardt's argument, but different. roughly, here, a subsistence economy oriented to "traditional needs."

(19): a provisional definition--"We shall nevertheless provisionally use the expression 'spirit of capitalism' for that attitude which, in the pursuit of a calling, strives systematically for profit for its own sake in the manner exemplified by Benjamin Franklin."

(19-20): a summary passage, of sorts: "We do this [i.e., the above] for the historical reason that this attitude has found its most adequate expression in the capitalist enterprise, and conversely the capitalist enterprise has found in this attitude its most adequate spiritual motivation."

(20): a point to interrogate, here--what does he mean when he says that 'big banks' and businesses, in general, can be run in a 'traditionalist' spirit? it must be historically-specific, since he has earlier discussed the sink or swim character of the economy.

(20): the "peasants" were the craftsman's principal clients?

(21): this is CRUCIAL, to his argument (this history)--he is depicting a capitalist 'form' of organization (the craftshop, and the putter-out), but run in a thoroughly 'traditionalist' spirit (easy working hours, amount of work, the traditional clientele). in other words, here we have capitalism, weber thinks, without the spirit of capitalism. the key change that he wants to to document, then, is not the formal changes that he admits will come later--but before those formal changes, a change in spirit [but isn't the objection obvious?]

(21-22): here one person is the catalyst--it is strange, because the 'spirit of capitalism' is only necessary in the way in which he wants it to be, at one very critical moment' (at a turning point). from there, everything works itself out, without it.

(22): KEY--the thesis: "In such cases (and this is the main point), it was not normally an influx of new money that brought about this revolution--in a number of cases known to me as the entire 'revolutionizing process' was set in motion with a few thousand marks capital borrowed from relatives: it was the new spirit at work--the 'spirit of capitalism.'"

(23): anticipates one of my objections, which is that this new 'spirit' is defined more by what is not (i.e., a loss of respect for the Church, etc.), though he is here only acknowledging its importance.

(24): irrationality of this spirit--"whereby a man exists for his business, not vice versa."

(24): the capitalist entrepreneur "ideal type" (marked, in particular, by asceticism)

(25): Ben Franklin would have been unthinkable, as an ethical ideal, in early years

(26): here, again, noting that Ben Franlkin ideal type emerged in a virtually non-commercial economy (this takes us back to the question of evolution of capitalist 'form')

(26): "To speak of a 'reflection' of the 'material' conditions in the 'superstructure of ideas' would be sheer nonsense here." [but (a) the evidence is shaky; (b) this is not really the proposition of historical materialism (fields and 'propaganda')]

(27): not as simple as seeing development of this 'spirit' as part of the total development of 'rationalist' spirit (this seems to be part of the larger re-reading of the role of the Enlightenment)

(27): this is critical to the argument--we must speak of different forms that rationalism can take ("It is possible to 'rationalize' life from extremely varied ultimate standpoints and in very different dirctions.")

(28-36): LUTHER'S CONCEPTION OF THE CALLING

(29): KEY--"What was definitely new was the estimation of fulfillment of duty within secular callings as being of the absolutely highest level possible for moral activity" (i.e., with the Reformation)

(29-33): exposition of Luther's views within larger theological context starts here. and importantly here it is made clear that Luther, himself, did not deliver a 'rational'/modern reading of the Bible--his was traditionalist. it's only the concept of the 'calling' which gets picked up on, that is potentially anti-traditional. to be clear, though, the calling as deployed by Luther is traditional, insofar as it accepts 'destiny.'

(33): "What we are looking for... cannot be directly derived from Luther's position..."

(33): on to Calvin--the "real enemy" of Catholicism (the "ethical pecularity" of Calvinism)

(35): an important note, which has been made before--we are not looking for an intentional exposition of the spirit of capitalism (indeed, what it became was largely 'unforseen' and even 'unwished for', he says--obviously for Luther but also for Calvin)

(36): another jibe at the materialist doctrine.

(36): here, KEY clarification of the bounds of his investigation: "We have no intention of defending any such foolishly doctrinaire thesis asthat the 'capitalist spirit)... let alone capitalism itslf, could only arise as a result of certain influences of the Reformation. The very fact that certain important forms of capitalist business are considerably older than the Reformation would invalidate such a thesis. We intend, rather, to establish whether and to what extent religious influences have in fact been partially responsible for the qualitative shaping and the quantitative expansion of that 'spirit' across the world, and what concrete aspects of capitalist culture originate from them." ["elective affinities" -- (1) this parsing of the object of analysis is important, but is it sufficient? it gives Weber an all-too-easy theoretical escape point, where his objective, now, is essentially to closely investigate the somewhat 'banal'; (2) there is an important investigation to be conducted into the nature of the capitalist 'form' -- here he speaks about old, 'capitalist' business preceding the spirit of capitalism. but what does this term mean, exactly? he has not yet given us a clear definition]

(46): tsk, tsk -- again, anectodal evidence

(48): not just in dialogue with Marxist materialism (Sombardt claims this ethical aspect is a 'product')

(49): overheard at SDP conferences ('anyone who doesn't toe the line will be kicked out')--"Party discipline is the reflection of factory discipline."

(50): alluding to need for 'discipline' (this is explicitly different, though, from the sense of the calling as it exists in the entrepreneur. we should in fact inquire more closely into the precise class position of the explanandum--see pg. 51: "it was the rising petite bourgeoisie... who were the 'typical' bearers of capitalist and Calvinist church polity.")

(61): Cromwell and the Irish--justified invasion on basis of English Capital having educated Irish in the habits of work(!)

II--THE IDEA OF THE CALLING IN ASCETIC PROTESTANTISM

(67-69): THE RELIGIOUS FOUNDATIONS OF INNERWORLDLY ASCETICISM

(67): the four historical bearers of "ascetic protestantism": 1. Calvinism; 2. Pietism; 3. Methodism; 4. Bapitst sects

(69): not looking so much for explicit moral imperatives--but, rather, the "pyschological drives" which led people to behave in a certain way (this obviously relates to the discussion of rational/irrational)

(69): 'ideal type' technique as dialectical?

(69-87): CALVINISM

(69-70): the docrine of 'election by grace', whose importance consists in its 'effects' on cultural history. "it was primarily this aspect of Ca;vonism which was felt to be a danger to the state and was attacked by the authorities."

(72): first of two paths to this doctrine consists in knowledge of our total impotence and sinfulness. thus, it is only by god's grace that i could be redeemed, and not through my own action (i am insignificant, again) [Weber is noting that this doctrine faded from Luther, but was amplified in Calvin)

(72): "God was not there for the sake of men, but men were there for the sake of God... only a small proportion of humanity was called to salvation..."

(73): "...his decrees could only be understood or known in any way to the extent that he had seen fit to reveal them to us."

(73): goodness!--"For every creature was separated from God by an unbridgeable gulf and deserved only eternal death except in so far as he, for the greater glory of his majesty, had willed differently." [and it can't be that you can do good deeds and be saved--for that would mean humans had influenced God!]

(73): important--the principal consequence of this doctrine, weber's arguing, was to engender a profound sense of "loneliness" ("no one and nothing could help him.")

(74): this, he adds, was the basis "for the absolutely negative attitude of Puritanism towards all sensual and emotional elements in culture and subjective religiosity" [the asceticism--rejection of "every kind of culture of the senses"]

(74): here, a contrast between the "individualism" this engeders, and the Englightenment's view of men (which was decidedly more optimistic). "The Calvinist's relationship with his God was carried on in profound inner isolation."

(75): important--tracing how we get to the "calling," from this condition of "inner isolation." "The world was desinted to serve the self-glorification of God, and the Christian existed to do his part to increase the praise of God in the world..." more or less, then, because you find yourself in a vocation that God has willed, for you.

(76): "...labor in the service of this social usefulness furthers the divine glory and is willed by God."

(76-77): here arises the question re: 'my' election--how will i know? this, for the ordinary believer, became the question of "overriding importance."

(77): KEY: aside from belieiving in one's state of grace as 'duty', "tireless labor in a calling was urged as the best possible means of attaining this self-assurance."

(78): "The communion of God with the recipients of his grace cnan only take place and be consciously experienced by God's working in them and by their becoming conscious of this..."

(79): and thus, by being sure that his conduct is "based on a strength dwelling within him which is capable of increasing the glory of God... he attains that supreme prize... the certainty of grace." works, even if not sufficient, are still 'indispensable for salvation.'

(79): this means, then, that God will only help those who help themselves; the Calvinist 'creates' the certainty of salvation himself.

(79-80): KEY--elucidating the difference with catholicism: "It further means that what he crates cannot consist, as in Catholicism, in a gradual storing up of meritorious individual achievements; instead, it consists in a form of systematic self-examination which is constantly faced with the question: elect or reprobate?" in other words, it is not 'individual, atypical good works' that are desired by God--but a kind of 'santctification by works' that is being "raised up to the level of a system"

(80-82): the ascetic character of Reformed sects comes in this domination of life by the quest for certainty of salvation (this, he describes as its rationalization)--"the goal of asceticism was... to be able to lead a watchful, aware, alert life."

(82): the key difference between this asceticism and Catholic monastic asceticism consists in the fact that the former leads you into the world (into "secular everyday life"), whereas the latter takes you out of it.

(83): Calvinism contributes, also, a positive motive to this asceticism: the idea that one must "put one's faith to the test." And this, for the larger discussion, will be key, Weber's saying (see 86)

(83): weber is suggesting that this fervent commitment leads Calvinists to view others as God's enemies (yet it is unclear, really, why this follows, uniquely)

(84): importance of Old, and not New, Testament to the formation of these beliefs.

(85-87): KEY--Calvinism takes the "systematization of the ethical conduct of life" to a new level--Christianity permeates the "whole of existence." The key point, then, is that Lutheranism could not do this--it's doctrine of 'faith alone' could not provide the powerful psychological impulse "to be systematic in the conduct of life, and thus to enforce the methodical rationalization of life." Calvin's doctrine of predestination was only one of a number of ways in which this psychological impulse was generated. Now we move to the others.

(87-95): PIETISM

(88):"The movement aims to draw the invisible church of the 'saints' visibly together on earth... to lead a life which is dead to the influences of the world and based on the will of God in every detail, so that the daily outward signs manifest in their conduct may make them sure of their regenerate state."

(88-89): but the key difference between Pietism and Calvinism consists in the former's view of the "emotional side"--it "directs the practice of religion toward the enjoyment of bliss in this world instead of the ascetic struggle to secure a future in the next."

(89): however, this is not practically manifested, he's arguing (i am not following the argument for why, exactly--seems contingent, see 90). rather, "the practical effect of Pietist principles is merely an even stricter ascetic control of morality in the calling than that which is provided by the mere worldly 'respectability' of the normal Reformed Christian..."

(93): nonetheless, the basis of Pietism's asceticism "falls well short of the iron consistency of Calvinism."

(93): a summary passage of Calvinist spirit--useful.

(95-98): METHODISM

(95-96): anglo-american equivalent to continental pietism--a similar emphasis on the 'emotional', on the 'feeling of being certain of grace and God.

(96): "joyful assurance" in place of the "morose" anxiety of the Calvinists

(97): important--at the same time, however, something less than Pietism is going on: "The emotional act of conversion was brought about methodically, but its achievement was not followed by a pious enjoyment of communion with God in the style of the emotional Pietism... instead, the emotion thereby awakened was immediately directd into the path of the rational striving for perfection."

(98): BUT--he concludes by identifying its irrelevance wrt to the establishment of the idea of the calling; methodism will only be important for the "manner of its organization," which is where its particularity lies.

(98-105): THE BAPTIST MOVEMENT

(98): this has a more important place in our argument, since the middle two were sort of secondary, derived phenomena: "A second autonomous bearer of Protestant asceticism alongside Calvinism is the Baptist movement."

(99-100): the church as tightly-knit group--as "sect" -- the 'old' baptist attitude, then, consists in 'shunning' the world. this entails, like the Calvinists, a renunciation of all the pleasures of the world, too.

(101): important--entails, as well, "absolute subordination to the authority of God... the corresponding manner of life is thus a condition of salvation." they reject predestination--and thus, the "specifically methodical character of Baptist morality rests above all on the idea of 'waiitng' upon the working of the spirit..." effected practically, this translates into a "supremely conscientious character."

(103): summary passage: Bapitist and Quaker asceticism manifests itself in capitalist ethics of 'honesty is best policy' a la benjamin franklin. for the Calvinists, we see more he "unleashing of the individual's economic energy in the pursuit of private gain." but these will be systematized more clearly in the next section.

(103): we are interested, here, not in Church discipline--but in "the effects of the subjective appropriation of ascetic religiosity on the conduct of the individual."

(103): we are speaking of a kind of regulation, yes (as was argued at the outset) -- but a regulation that is eminently individual (not State or Church-mediated)

(104): best summary of the argument, thus far--"The consequence for the individual was the drive to keep a methodical check on his state of grace as shown in how he conducted his life and thus to ensure that his life was imbued with asceticism. This ascetic style of life, however... meant a rational shaping of one's whole existence in obedience to God's will... This rationalization of the conduct of life in the world with a view to the beyond is the idea of the calling characteristic of ascetic Protestantism."

(105-122): ASCETICISM AND THE CAPITALIST SPIRIT

(106): Calvin (vs. Baxter), on wealth. But, he's arguing, that Baxter despises wealth only insofar as it is correlated to a kind sloth--"What is really reprehensible is resting on one's posessions... to be sure of his state of grace, man must 'do the works of him who sent him...'"

(107): "every lost hour means one less hour devoted to labor in the service of God's glory."

(107): "Above and beyond this, however, work is the end and purpose of life commanded by God" (entirely different interpretation of the Pauline Principle--as compared to Thomas Aquinas, see 108)

(108): "the calling" as a "command of God to the individual to work to his glory" (as against Lutheranism, which sees it more as a destiny to which one must submit)

(108-109): but here, is this not evidence for the flimsiness of the thesis, in general? for lots of things can be deduced from the 'idea of a calling,' including a deeply anti-capitalist ethic that my station now is, and ought to be, my station forever. is this not symbolic of the kind of reading that is being done, throughout? perhaps the defense, though, would be that the preceding is particularly true of Lutheranism, but not so much in this ascetic Protestantism, where work is not a destiny but a proving-ground. though is that sufficient (see 110, addressed there)? ("The Puritan idea of the calling always emphasizes the methodical character of the asceticisim of the calling, and not, as with Luther, submission to the destiny which God apportions.")

(110): threefold usefulness of a 'calling'--(1) its morality; (2) its usefulness to the community; (3) its profitability

(110): "striving for riches is only dangerous when it is done with the aim of later leading a carefree life of pleasure... to want to be poor, it was often argued, was the same as wanting to be ill."

(111): "and thus, the plain middle-class self-made man enjoys ethical approval in full pressure" (but lots of confusion lies behind this middle-class moniker--are we talking principally of the petit bourgesoisie? or big bourgeoisie as well?)

(111-112): bringing Old Testament norms, back

(112-113): honing in on the argument--"We shall now highlight those particular points in which the Puritan concept of the calling and the insistence on an ascetic conduct of life directly influenced the development of the capitalist style of life."

(113): asceticism, of course, "turns all its force against one thing in particular: the uninhibited enjoyment of life and of the pleasures it has to offer" (Puritans vs. sports on Sunday--'sports' can be tolerated insofar as they "serve the rational purpose of providing sufficient recreation to maintain physical fitness" -- an excellent example of rationalization)

(115): and the spiritual foundation of being a scrooge: "Man was merely the steward of the gifts granted him by God's grace; he, like the wicked servant in the Bible, must give an account of every penny, and it is as the very least dubious whether he should expend any of this money for a purpose which serves not God's glory, but his own pleasure."

(115): summary passage, again: "If we may sum up what has been said so far..." innerworldly Protestant asceticism (1) prohibits enjoyment of posessions, (2) discourages consumption, and (3) liberates the aquisition of wealth from the inhibitions of traditionalist ethics.

(116): opposed, though, to the "striving for wealth for the ultimate purpose of being wealthy." and that is important.

(116-117): KEY--"a religious value was placed on ceaseless, constant, systematic labor in a secular calling as the very highest ascetic path... This was inevitably the most powerful lever imaginable with which to bring about hte spread of that philosophy of life which we have here termed the 'spirit' of capitalism." the restraint on consumption combines with the freedom to pursue profit to produced the creation of capital through the ascetic compulsion to save. [just a note: is a necessary corollary the idea that feelings that are 'spiritual' in nature are also more durable 'psychological drives,' than those that are secular?]

(117): Puritans and the birth of the rational, anti-feudal farmer.

(118): here, he is noting the fact that the wealthier got, the more they were tempted (and prepared) to break with the asceticism of their old ideals--it "...only developed [its] full economic effect after the pinnacle of religious enthusiasm had been left behind..." its principal virtue seems to have been the granting of a clear conscience to the money-maker. "A specifically middle-class ethic of the calling arose."

(119): are we talking about the man's workers, too? this is where I think the explanandum is poorly specified (strategically so).

(119): "he was given the comforting assurance that the unequal distribution of this world's goods was the special work of the providence of God..." interesting--he adds that this, eventually, becomes secularized into the economic doctrine of the "productivity" of low wages (that people will be compelled to work harder if they are poorer)

(119-120): he is answering directly the question about the working-class disciple--that he is content with low-wage work because God has made it so (but this is precisely what i was asking earlier? there is an ambiguity about the ascetic ethic that allows him to explain both the unceasing, instrumental pursuit of wealth and this resignation to low wages. he is having his cake and eating it to). in his defense, i suppose, he adds that this latter phenomenon is not produced by protestantism, but is a feature of the broader ascetic doctrine. though he still maintains that protestantism reinforces this resignation with the idea of the "calling."

(120): IMPORTANT--Weber, and Goethe: here we see the coded lament, I think (as in, he is letting Goethe speak for him). Goethe noted "the basic ascetic motive of hte middle-class style of life," which signaled the 'abandonment of the Faustian universality of humankind..." 'Deed' and 'renunciation' are bound together. "For him this recognition meant a resigned farewell to a period of full and fine humanity, the likes of which we shall not see again in the course of our cultural development..."

(120): "The Puritans wanted to be men of the calling--we, on the other hand, must be."

(121): Weber and Peak Oil!?

(121): important--in a sense, asceticism ended in its opposite: a doctrine which shunned goods (and accepted them only as fruits of God's will; as evidence of God's will, of salvation), has long left us. we now see the dominance of the "outward goods of this world." "Today its spirit ahas fled from this shell... Certainly, victorious capitalism has no further need for this support..."

(121): Weber's clear lament--these people are the pinnacles of cultural development?

(121): and he stops himself, for this historical study was meant to be valueless. interesting relationship to positivism, perhaps--his, at least, is not the standard critique of positivism which foregrounds the necessary subjectivity of the observer, even though his method is certainly anti-positivist.

(122): interesting--what was ostensibly, at the outset, an 'attack' on the materialist doctrine ends up ambivalently (clearly, as he admits, he never purported to replace that reading with a 'spiritual' doctrine). he puts the decision down to future work--it will not be possible, he argues, to begin with the conclusion of the investigation. but here we see the positivist fallacy: "Neither will serve historical truth if they claim to be the conclusion of the investigation rather than merely the preliminary work for it."