lecture 13, "the origins of WWI"
john merriman

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showing a map of "the new imperialism"--from the mid 1880s to 1914. (in particular, the "scramble for Africa")

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so, just to put this in context--the diplomatic origins of WWI

the traditional image is not a bad one: entangling alliances that create a house of cards, ready to collapse.

how does it happen? (for France, this is also the story of a shift from England seen as France's greatest rival, to Germany)

much of the diplomatic history of this period revolves around the rivalry of France and Germany--one can debate the extent to which revenge played a role (most people in the 1890s would have likely said France were more likely to go to war with Britain).

the other major issue upon which WWI hinged on was the hatred between Russia and Austria-Hungary--Russia sees itself as the protector of the Slavic peoples, and that Austria-Hungary is a polyglot Empire (about 15 national communities--a perpetual destabilizing factor in their national politics). particularly when Russia is fanning the flames of pan-Slavism and Slavic nationalisms within the A-H Empire (which had become the dual empire in 1867).

by 1900, Russia is fanning the flames of pan-Slavic fervor in the mountainous territories of Bosnia-Herzogivina, which includes Serbs, Muslims, and Catholic Croats.

now, the alliance system of the late 19th century hinges on German and French antagonism, and the competing interests of A-H and Russia in the Balkans, and Germany's fear of being attacked from both East and West by Russia and France. you have two potential free agents, Italy (which goes to highest bidder in 1915), and Great Britain (it wasn't a given that it would ally with France and Russia, remember--Britain and Russia and Britain and France had been fighting each other for ages).

so, how does it happen that it in 1914 that France finds it with these bizarre bedfellows? (remember, if you're a republican/socialist, how do you explain an alliance with the Tsar, represser of the peoples and encourager of vicious pogroms against the Jews).

later on, i will make the case that, most of the people who looked at such things expected a war in their lifetimes. they're had not been a major conflagration since Waterloo, basically. you have wars, but basically this period is referred to as the Pax Britannica. but most people thought there would be a war in their lifetime--and many people wanted one.

but nobody wanted one that would carry away four empires, a million lives, and last for four years, and unleash the demons of the 20th century.

in 1879, Bismarck forges the cornerstone alliance, between Germany and Austria-Hungary, against Russia's activity in the Balkans. and this is one of the continuities of the entire period.

and this explains why, in July 1914, the Germans give the famous blank cheque to Austria-Hungary--you can do whatever you want to Serbia, and we will back you all the way (even if it involves going to war with "these guys"). (they all know that it will take Russians two weeks to mobilize--furthermore they had lost badly to Japan in 1905, remember).

this is the first chip, the first block.

a year later, 1n 1880, Italy allies itself with these two, but there are all sorts of conditions, and it's more of a free agent.

the last thing that Bismarck wants (remember he's out of it by 1894) was to see Germany attacked from both sides. they don't want France, in other words, to ally with Russia.

so how does that happen?

well, it has to do with a fear of Germany (aside from some scattered cultural tries; some Russian elite spoke French). other facts: tied together by economic investment (French investors are frequently investing outside of France, remember, and they have invested heavily in Russia--particularly in railroads). these economic ties help solidify the arrangements of Great Powers. think of the irony of the Russian Tsar being received France in 1892, when they sign a military treaty! there is a formal alliance in 1894--and everybody knows the rough outlines of this. this ends what Bismarck had intended, which was the diplomatic isolation of France.

how does Britain get into this?

because Germany becomes a much bigger economic rival than anyone else--the German economy grows rapidly (nipping at British heels in terms of steel production, they're producing huge battleships, and that sort of thing). they go way ahead, in chemistry. so, with this economic rivalry (expressed in Africa, as well), goes the naval rivalry, that heats up after the turn of the century. industrialists, of course, love to build big ships. Britain's control of the seas has persisted for centuries, don't forget.

so the last thing the British think they can do, is lose control of the seas.

for a long time, Britain has not seen the need for an alliance, but now looking towards the French in the face of this economic and naval tension. again, in the 1890s, people in Bourdeaux/London, etc. had expected to go to war with Britain/France (people were writing future war novels at this time, don't forget--and one of the more ridiculous ones was a novel in England that predicted a war with France, after the French arrive in Dover, digging a tunnel under the English channel!).

events in 1905--the first Moroccan crisis, followed by, in 1911, the second Moroccan crisis--demonstrate German saber-rattling in Morocco. and this convinces the British that maybe allying with the French isn't such a dumb idea after all. they begin to have informal military talks, that develop into a military understanding viz-a-viz Germany (French on Mediterranean, England on North Sea).

so this explains how these two unlikely allies came together. moreover, the birth-rate--the French realize, that if it's more than just a short encounter, their birth-rate is so miniscule that they'd better have allies. and military planners know this stuff. that means that it's all that more important, if they're contemplating that war, to rely on allies.

remember: when the Tzar orders Russia to mobilize, it is well-known that it will take two weeks. So: the Germans know, then, that they have two weeks to defeat France. they're sure that they can do it, but then they'd better get ready for the Russians on their Eastern frontier. and the only way that they can do that is by violating Belgian and Dutch neutrality (Alsace-Lorraine is not a viable place to launch invasion from). That guarantees, above all else, that the British will go to war--it's bad enought hat they have the French across the Channel. now they have the Germans, as well. you can't have that, so you're going to go to war.

why was that a risk that the Germans were willing to take? because the English do not have a conscript army, but only an expeditionary force. it would take them a month to raise an army that could make any difference, in effect.

these are the competing alliances/considerations that precede 1914, essentially. and this is why the assasination of the Archduke triggers the Great War (prof recounting putting his feet where the 16-yr old gunner had killed Franz Ferdinand). this leads to the blank cheque, and it brings this dreadful war.

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now, like revolutions, wars don't entirely break out according to the hydraulic model--that things get worse and worse and worse and then BOOM, war. but there are moments that raise tensions, and make it possible for the popular press to target potential enemies.

and that's why the incident of Zabern is interesting to discuss, says prof.

the German empire doesn't really trust its Alsatians--residents of the area are not allowed to vote on certain key policy matters (war, treaties, constitutional amendments), for example. Alsace-Lorraine, though, at the same time--is basically German-speaking. 77% of the communes in Alsace-Lorraine are German-speaking, YET, many people consider themselves French. (multiple identities, etc.).

Alsace, is, of course, terribly important, strategically/military.

and what this incident in 1913 does is it confirms the image of German aggressiveness (there are other reasons, too, that Germany does not trust Alsatians--Bismarck is terribly anti-Catholic, don't forget, and this region is overwhelmingly Catholic).

this incident, then: a German officer, speaking to some Alsatian soldiers that were there, refers to them in very scatalogical terms. then, someone else says, "I don't care if you kill these bastards..." And word spreads. tensions build--some German officer slept with a 14 year old Alsatian girl, he's beaten up. the French and German press picks this up and inflames the tensions on both side. they don't go to war, but it confirms the stereotypes that take off during the first years of the war.

so this minor incident, essentially a shouting match, a rape, and a fight, has huge implications. it confirms these military plans. it confirms, for the French, that when the war starts, you'd better get into Alsace-Lorraine and take it back (they're not really going to go into Belgium, are they?).

1914-1944 becomes a new, terrible Thirty Years War. and there were anti-war sentiments, but it was unclear what could be done to stop it.

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in conclusion: it's not just these diplomatic factors and military planning, of course, but really there are deeper, underlying factors. the imperial rivalry helps create this culture of popular imperialism, and popular aggressive nationalism. and the Other, becomes an object of perpetual disdain. jingoism explodes--feeds this expectation that war with come. everyday people dreaming of the next war. social darwinist rivalries, almost. have to pay attention to the popular imaginaire, prof is arguing--public jingoism. only this can help us explain the initial, public, urban enthusiasm for the war (and of course people did not know what it would portend).

human rights as handmaiden to world order:
On Thursday the council’s presidency will pass to Serbia. Serbia is not the only nation in Europe involved in human rights abuses. But it is distinguished by the fact that its failures are uncontroversial. Everyone from Human Rights Watch to President Bush has urged its government to hand over Ratko Mladic – the general responsible for the Srebrenica massacre – to the tribunal in the Hague. To decide that this country is unfit to run the Council of Europe looks uncomplicated and free from political cost. If European countries can’t find the courage to act against Serbia, they can’t find the courage to act against anyone. Human rights become a dead letter.
(...) There is scarcely a government in Europe which does not have something to hide. The UK, Germany, Italy, Macedonia and even Sweden have been assisting the CIA’s programme of “extraordinary rendition”: kidnapping people and delivering them to states which will torture them on America’s behalf(7). Poland and Romania appear to have allowed the US to use secret detention centres on their soil to process them. Austria, Germany and the UK rely on worthless diplomatic assurances to justify handing refugees to governments which torture their prisoners(8). Poland warns that “teachers who reveal their homosexuality will be fired from work”(9). France supports African genocidaires. Spain repatriates unaccompanied children(10). Ukrainian police torture sex workers and force them to confess to crimes they did not commit(11). The United Kingdom bans peaceful protest and continues to occupy the country it illegally invaded. Lift a stone to throw at Serbia anywhere in Europe and you will find something unpleasant cowering there. Better to leave it on the ground. The price of being left alone by other states is the tolerance of mass murder.
(...) If you want to know the value of an institution, you need only imagine what the world would be like if it didn’t exist. If the Council of Europe were dissolved, would anyone suffer, except for the people it employs? The European Court would be missed. But the rest of it? Thanks to the member states’ agreement to ignore each other’s abuses, it is, at the moment, completely useless.