Nowhere is this ethos more pronounced than in Chongqing, whose leadership has vowed to develop so-called "red GDP". This is a codeword for economic development that is geared toward the needs of the masses - and not dictated by the greed of privileged classes such as the country's estimated 30 million millionaires.

If we look at the entire country from a distance, during the period between 1978 and 1992 there were two great sectors: a public sector that was still largely based on socialist production relations and a private sector in which family production relations prevailed. Looking a little closer, in urban areas, the public sector was dominant, with a thriving family economy at the margins, while in rural areas, the family economy was dominant, with a growing township and village enterprise sector, which harboured both socialist and small-scale capitalist production relations. This was, indeed, a non-capitalist market economy, although it was changing quickly. Since 1992, much more radical market reforms have changed everything.

ALBANIA

population: 3,619,778 (July 2008 est.)
religion: Muslim 70%, Albanian Orthodox 20%, Roman Catholic 10%
literacy: 98.7%
GDP by sector: agriculture 20.6%; industry 19.9%; services 59.5% (2008 est.)
labor force: 1.09 million (not including 352,000 emigrant workers)
labor force by occupation: agriculture 58%; industry 15%; services 27% (September 2006 est.)

1385-1912: Ottoman rule in the Balkan region can be dated to the Battle of Savra, when they routed Serbian forces in the region, and "the principal Albanian clans swore fealty to the Sultan." Though tribal chiefs retained their property and positions, they had to pay tribute and provide an auxiliary army to the Sultan upon request. Even so, in the 15th century, Albania saw fierce resistance to Ottoman rule. Under the leadership of Skanderberg (who, as the Muslim Iskander, had been a prominent Ottoman commander before converting and turning against the Turks), they fought against the Ottomans throughout the mid and late-1400s. Albania's flag today bears Skanderberg's family crest. The rentrenchment of Ottoman rule saw a mass exodus of Albanians to Italy; a community that would be important in the movement toward Albanian nation-hood. Throughout the five hundred year occupation, the Ottomans relied upon a never-fully-successful structure of governance, patronizing individual lords over others (with land, etc.--much like any other Empire at this time). "As the centuries passed, however, Ottoman rulers lost the capacity to command the loyalty of local pashas, who governed districts on the empire's fringes, which threatened stability in the region. The Ottoman rulers of the nineteenth century struggled to shore up central authority, introducing reforms aimed at harnessing unruly pashas and checking the spread of nationalist ideas"

1912-1914: In 1912, after a major uprising against the Ottoman Empire (there had been many others preceding this one, as well), on the eve of the First Balkan War (1912-1913: Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, and Bulgaria against the Ottomans). Given the anxiety, for Albanians and their foreign patrons, that these powers might come to control Albania, independence was declared against the claims of Serbia, Montenegro and Greece to their territory. After the Second Balkan War in 1913, however, parts of what was considered Albania proper was partitioned between Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece (particularly the Serbs)--as per the wishes of the Great powers, a principality was established in this smaller territory under the sovereignty of a German prince in February 1914. However, by September, a revolt established the authority of a local Muslim warrior, Haji Kamal.

1914-1919: As World War I broke out, however, Albania was quickly invaded by Montenegro, Serbia, Austria-Hungary, Greece, Italy, and France. At the War's end, Serb and Italian forces remained in control of much of the territory--but resistance eventually pushed these forces beyond what are today considered the borders of Albania (with the help of US influence--see below)

1919-1939: Though at the Paris Peace Conference in 1920, Albania was virtually carved up and given to the competing claimants, intervention by Woodrow Wilson saved the fledgling nation-state (though its borders remained unclear, it was admitted to the League of Nations in December 1920). Over the next few years, a struggle for power ensued (via apparently democratic institutions--assemblies, elections), all exacerbated by the fact that the Yugoslavs and the Italians were still both seeking to dominate the country. After defeating the more radical Fan Noli, who had taken power on an anti-feudal platform in June 1924, Ahmed Bay Zogu emerged victorious in December of that same year. He sought dictatorial powers (in 1928, Parliament was dissolved), against the nominally democratic provisions of the constitution. Though patronized by the Yugoslavs, he soon looked instead to Mussolini for support. What followed was harsh and repressive rule, ensured by military men in his pay. Over the latter decade of his rule, though, Zogu slowly fell out with Mussolini.

1939-1944: Mussolini invaded the country in 1939; for the next five years, Albania is under Axis occupation. With him, Mussolini brought 100,000 troops, and 10,000 Italian colonists (the purpose being to integrate the country into Greater Italia). While he initially received some support for his success in expanding the borders of Albania to Yugoslav- and Greek- occupied territories (Kosovo, for example), by mid-1942 the newly-founded Communist Party (led by Enver Hoxha) had begun to mobilize the population to resist. In October 1942 the Party organized a popular front organization, the National Liberation Movement (and the National Liberation Army), to lead the resistance. After Italy's surrender in mid-1943, the Italian establishment in Albania buckled: the Communists took control of most of Albania's south, though an anti-Communist, conservative "resistance" Balli Kombetar held Vlore. By September 1943, though, the Germans had sent paratroopers to take control of Tirana before the resistance was able to--the guerrillas were driven back. Though many Balli Kombetar units collaborated with the Nazi occupiers, the 70,000-strong NLA eventually liberated the country in November 1944 (the only East European country to do so without Soviet assistance; furthermore, Albania was the only country occupied by the Axis powers that ended the war with a higher population of Jews than it started with).

1944-1953: Enver Hoxha, as Secretary General of the Party of Labor (the Communist Party) is the de facto leader of the country after a few years of political turmoil, following the war (most of the interwar elite is forcibly exiled after the end of the Nazi occupation). These changes see a shift in authority in country from the North (the Ghegs) to the South (Tosks). In December December 1945, a new people's assembly is elected; amidst allegations of voter intimidation and terror tactics, 93% of the voters choose the Democratic Front ticket. In January 1946, this assembly convenes and annuls the monarchy. After months of debate, they also adopt a constitution modeled on the Yugoslav and Soviet examples. Hoxha becomes prime minister, defence minister, foreign minister, and the army's commander-in-chief. By early 1946, moderates have allegedly been purged. Economically, by December 1944, the State moves to take control of much of industry, trade, as well as expropriating all German- and Italian- owned property. In August 1945, significant agrarian reforms, which had been stifled in the past, are carried out. By 1946, a system of central planning is in place. Significant spending on education and health also improves social indicators considerably--most notably, illiteracy declines from about 85% to 31% in just five years.

All the while, tensions with Yugsolavia (which is expelled from the Comintern in 1948) begin to build, particularly over the question of Kosovo (which is reincorporated into Yugoslavia in January 1945). Despite the signing of a treaty of friendship and cooperation in 1946, Hoxha and his allies (in particular, Nako Spiru, the head of the planning commission) begin to believe that Yugoslavia is exploiting Albania, economically (by paying too little for raw materials, etc.). In 1947, despite some reciprocal purgues within the respective governments, Yugoslavia attempts to buy off the support of an increasingly skeptical Communist party by extending credits to the Albanian State; Spiru, for his part, proposes a path less dependent on the Yugsolav economy, but is driven to commit suicide for lack of support within the cadre. In 1947, Albania is not even invited to the Cominform meetings; Yugoslavia represents them, instead. Stalin is even reported as saying that Yugoslavia should "swallow" Albania.

However, things change dramatically in 1948. Though the pro-Yugoslav faction had held sway in Albania until this point, the dramatic fall-out between Tito and Stalin led to an about-face in Albanian policy towards Yugoslavia, as well. "The move surely saved Hoxha from a firing squad and as surely doomed Xoxe to one. Three days later, Tirana gave the Yugoslav advisers in Albania 48 hours to leave the country, rescinded all bilateral economic agreements with its neighbor, and launched a virulent anti-Yugoslav propaganda blitz that transformed Stalin into an Albanian national hero, Hoxha into a warrior against foreign aggression, and Tito into an imperialist monster."

Xoxe was soon purged (executed in May 1949, after a secret trial), as Albania moved more squarely into the Soviet orbit (despite not being contiguous, of course). "The subsequent anti-Titoist purges in Albania brought the liquidation of 14 members of the party's 31 person Central Committee and 32 of the 109 People's Assembly deputies. Overall, the party expelled about 25 % of its membership. Yugoslavia responded with a propaganda counterattack, canceled its treaty of friendship with Albania, and in 1950 withdrew its diplomatic mission from Tirana."

1953-1970: After Stalin's death in 1953, however, this unsteady skein of alliances shifts. As Nikita Kruschev moves to reconcile Moscow with Belgrade, Hoxha grows increasingly worried, defending Stalin's legacy and denouncing the rhetoric of "peaceful coexistence" and "many different socialisms." Various events in this vein set the stage for rapproachment with China--in the aftermath of the making public of the Sino-Soviet split in June 1960, Albania sides with the Chinese. In November of that same year, at a Moscow conference, Hoxha denounces the Soviet Union (and, in particular, their failure to deliver grain to Albania). Hoxha's third Five-Year plan of 1961-1965 allocated 54% of all investment to industry, directly in opposition to Kruschev's plans to make Albania into an agarian satellite of the Soviet Union. However, because of the withdrawal of much of Soviet aid (and the insufficiency of Chinese replacements), Hoxha was forced to launch an austerity program in 1962. Despite the replacement of Krushchev (with Breshnev), relations between Tirana and Moscow continued to worsen--after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, Albania withdrew from the Soviet alliance.

On the social and economic front, the pattern was similar: aggressive interventions in property regimes had destroyed old kinship patterns; women were encouraged to work, to compensate for labor shortages. In 1967, a campaign was launched to make Albania athiest; religious institutions were seized and converted into gyms, warehouses, and workshops.

1970-1983: Albania's relations with China begin to deterioriate, as the latter begins to emerge from its international isolation. Tirana, for its part, also broadens its contacts with the non-Communist world, opening trade negotiations with France, Italy, and the recently independent African and Asian states. Especially after Nixon's visit to the PRC in 1972 (completely ignored by State media in Tirana), Hoxha tried hard to diversify Albania's economic and political ties. By 1978, after Mao's death, China ended its assistance programs to Albania.

At this stage, Hoxha's health was failing, as well. A second Stalinist constitution in 1976 was an attempt to institutionalize his vision for Albania, in the hope that it would outlive his death: The document "guaranteed" Albanians freedom of speech, the press, organization, association, and assembly but subordinated these rights to the individual's duties to society as a whole. The constitution enshrined in law the idea of autarky and prohibited the government from seeking financial aid or credits or from forming joint companies with partners from capitalist or revisionist communist countries. The constitution's preamble also boasted that the foundations of religious belief in Albania had been abolished."

1983-1985: By 1983, Ramiz Alia had replaced Hoxha, who had moved into semi-retirement. The succession was bloody; Hoxha had overlooked his long-standing comrade-in-arms Mehmet Shehu, who was instead purged, along with his family and relatives (Shehu allegedly committed suicide in December 1981, but Hoxha may have had him killed). "When Hoxha died on April 11, 1985, he left Albania a legacy of repression, technological backwardness, isolation, and fear of the outside world. Alia succeeded to the presidency and became legal secretary of the APL two days later."

1985-1997: Despite Alia's own intentions, it was clear from happenings in Eastern Europe and elsewhere that change was on its way. In 1991, owing to pressure from workers and students, the country held its first pluralist elections in March. Though the Communists won, a general strike two months later collapsed the government. In new elections in March 1992, after an interim government had been in power for almost a year, the Democratic Party defeated the Communists.

1997-2005: Albania's transition to a liberal democratic order was marred by the collapse of several pyramid schemes in January 1997 (in which around 70% of the country's population had invested!). The schemes, which were actually fronts for money laundering and arms dealing, were no longer able to pay out, once the majority of Albanians became involved. As a result, the country descended into "anarchy": by March 1997, the month in which President Sali Berisha declared a State of Emergency, the protests had turned more violent, especially in the South of the country. From late-March to August, an Italian-led mission of 7,000 UN peacekeepers were called to intervene. In elections in June and July, the Socialist Party replaced the Democrats, with Rexhep Meidani as President and Fatos Nano as Prime Minister (though he was replaced by Pandeli Majko in 1998, who was, in turn, replaced by Ilir Meta in November 1999) . A new constitution was approved, despite an opposition boycott, by popular referendum in 1998. In October 2000, the Democratic Party lost elections at the local level, as well. Parliamentary elections in 2001 were also won by the Socialists.

2005-2009: After 8 years of Socialist Party rule, a pro-Berisha coalition returned to power in elections in 2005 (Berisha is today the Prime Minister). Moves are being made, now, to integrate Albania with greater Europe (NATO and the EU).

the course of naxalism:
The Naxalite movement is mostly active in the tribal areas spreading from Bihar to Andhra Pradesh and Maharastra, and also covering parts of Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. This spread is linked only to the inaccessible hilly terrain of these regions, but a conscious decision by the Naxalites to take up the issues affecting the tribal people, who are among the most exploited in society. India's development process has led to commercialisation of forest resources, reducing the traditional access to forest produce. Alienation of tribal land to non-tribals has been a steady trend despite legal strictures. Mining-based industries and the construction of large dams have caused extensive displacement of the tribals, besides destroying their natural environment. A central Naxalite agenda is for tribal self-determination, asserting the rights of the tribals over local resources.
(...) Overall, therefore, the Naxalite challenge rests upon the issues of agrarian transformation, tribal people's rights, the nationality movement and resisting imperialism and globalisation. All this adds up to what they characterise as the people's democratic revolution to change the very character of the Indian state. Because of the issues they pursue, the Naxalites have a social base which sustains them despite a variety of repressive measures pursued by the state. In fact, over the past decade the movement has spread to new areas such as southern districts of Orissa and West Bengal as well as parts of Uttar Padesh and Rajasthan.
(...) The oft-repeated plea that there is no place for violence in a democracy indicates a desirable norm for seeking peaceful constitutional response to fulfil a people's aspirations. But when the coercive power of the state is used to defend the interest of the rich and the powerful or to eliminate resistance to injustice, the same can sound like a hollow claim. Social violence has grown in India with landlords' armies in Bihar, factional murders in Andhra's Rayalseema, and upper caste atrocities on dalits all over – to mention but a few examples.
(...) Democracy is indeed meant for bringing about peaceful change through people's representatives. But the fact is that existing power centres in society do not allow that to easily happen. Groups fighting for democratic rights have been pointing this out for over three decades now. The state response to the Naxalite movement was to capture and kill activists them by staging 'false encounters'. Human rights groups which go under the acronyms APCLC, PUDR and PUCL, have investigated many such incidents in Andhra, Bihar and elsewhere. They have demanded that rule of law be applied to all such cases, and all persons suspected should be tried according to law rather than be eliminated. When the state itself violates the constitutional obligations with impunity, then the violation of law and civic norms becomes widespread.
(...) During the peace talks and press conferences, the Maoists were confronted with many issues raised by democratic rights groups in the recent years. Could the Maoists be said to be respecting the norms of revolutionary violence when the common people were subjected to killings and torture by them, or when public property was destroyed? How did they explain individual annihilations by their squads, and did this reflect the Maoist norm of 'mass line'?
(...) Human rights activists have also challenged the Maoists, asking whether they practice democracy and civil liberties within their movement, which should after all be the embryo of their 'ideal society'. Factionalism and splits have famously characterised the Naxalite movement, which is why there are over two dozen groups in existence at any given time. And so the natural question, are the comrades guilty of sectarian politics when they should be developing a united front? There was a time the intolerance of divergent opinion within the party was so stark that it led to killings – a tendency that seems to have subsided in recent years. The communist groups seem to resort all too easily to the mechanical understanding of revisionism and dogmatism. The revolutionary tradition of inner-party democracy – the minority accepting the decision of the majority while the majority respects the point of view of the minority – seems a fragile heritage.
(...) The common people whose cause the Naxalites claim to represent confront day-to-day livelihood issues – of making a living out of agriculture and forestry, of finding water for their fields, access to affordable credit, market for their produce, and ways and means to access education and health. Such ground-level issues do not seem to figure prominently in the Maoists' formulation of political strategy. Many of these activities which concretely help the poor are dismissed with terms such as 'reformism', 'welfare work' or even 'ngo action'. The idea that cultural and educational work form an integral part of revolutionary strategy, together with political and military tasks, seems to have been relegated to the background. In the recent years, the Naxalite leadership has indeed tried to respond to these issues, but not entirely satisfactorily.
(...) The issue of revolutionary creativity – the ability to assess the emerging national, local and global environment and adjusting to the evolving while pursuing one's ideological goals – thus remains a challenge for the Naxalite movement in India. It is important not only to learn from the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions, but also from the experience of the Philippines, Nicaragua, Peru, Venezuela and Nepal.
(...) Indeed, the policy makers, be it in Delhi or Hyderabad, are now guided by a unified understanding of global terrorism. They are excitedly formulating a strategy of counter-terrorism US software, Israeli hardware and some Indian brands added. This strategy cannot see the difference between the CPI-Maoist operating in Andhra and Bihar, from the CPN-Maoist currently fighting the autocratic monarchy in Nepal. No doubt, they are revolutionary communists in solidarity with one another, but they are fighting different battles in their own countries. After all, these are Maoists who believed the great helmsman when he said that the people of each country must formulate their own strategy derived from their unique local conditions. Leaders of the Indian state must try and comprehend the nature of the Maoist challenge and address the socio-economic issues at its heart, so that another spiral of intensified violence in India can be avoided and prospects of peace and democracy enhanced.

electoral revolution in nepal:
While focusing on the individual's path to enlightenment, Buddhism did not ignore social reality. The early order of monks and nuns applied itself to charitable work, such as the establishment of hospitals and shelters for the homeless. In an extraordinary break with the social order, Siddhartha Gautama (a.k.a Buddha) rejected the caste system, declared that those of any background could be enlightened, and insisted on delivering his sermons in the local dialects wherever he traveled. He was in that sense a revolutionary. And a world-conqueror: the Buddha directed his followers to spread the word throughout the world, and thus Buddhism gradually spread from the Himalayan foothills to Sri Lanka, to northeastern Iran, to China and Japan, to southeast Asia.

a himalyan surprise:
The communists here had always been at the forefront of democratic struggle. Formed in 1949, the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) went through all the twists and turns of international communist movement. It split. It re-united. Only to split again. It was a unification of CPN (ML) and CPN (Marxist) led to CPN (UML-Unified Marxist Leninist) in 1991 while there was a split in Samyukta Jana Morcha Nepal (SJMN) in late 1993 fathered CPN (Maoists). At the time of split, SJMN was third largest party in the parliament with nine MPs.
(...) Hence UML was voted by the electorate to power in 1994. But the communist government not only failed to deliver the land reforms it had promised, it also disillusioned its cadres. An isolated UML government was easily removed by the monarch in August 1995
(...) As the UML was losing its electoral base in the towns, the Maoists were gaining ground on the countryside. An uprising launched in 1996, had soon assumed the control of almost 70 percent of the countryside.
(...) However, it was Maoists radical ideas on land reform and negation of the caste system that won them support. They began running the districts under their control through people's committees and implemented land reforms, besides setting up "people's courts".
(...) Traditionally, India and Britain supported the Nepalese monarchy, but, of late, the US has increasingly been extending its support too. The Bush administration put the CPN-M on its list of terrorist organisations on October 31, 2003, and also signed a five-year agreement "for co-operation in fighting terrorism and preventing possible terror attacks" with Nepal in 2002.
Washington may have concerns about the impact of instability in Nepal on the Indian subcontinent as a whole. But the major reason for the growing US military ties with Nepal was the country's strategic position. Washington has a series of military arrangements with countries bordering China, stretching from its new bases in the Central Asian republics through South-East Asia to its formal allies in north-east Asia: Japan and South Korea. Therefore, the United States became a major provider of military assistance to Nepal, allocating over $29 million in grants to Nepal to pay for US weapons, services and training from October 2001 to October 2004.

interview with baburam bhattarai

"So, it's not true that we abandoned the bullet to come to the ballot. We used both the bullet and the ballot in this revolution. You couldn't win with only bullets, and you couldn't win with only the ballot. Nepal's revolution has been completed in this unique manner."
(...) "We would like to assure everyone that once the Maoists come (into government) the investment climate will be even more favourable. There shouldn't be any unnecessary misunderstanding about that. The rumours in the press about our intention are wrong, there are reports of capital flight, but this shouldn't happen. And the other aspect is that once there is political stability, the investment climate will be even better. Our other agenda is economic development and for this we want to mobilise domestic resources and capital, and also welcome private foreign direct investment. The only thing we ask is to be allowed to define our national priorities."
(...) "Just watch, the labour-mangement climate will improve in our time in office."