collected snippets of immediate importance...


Showing posts with label capitalist globalization. Show all posts
Showing posts with label capitalist globalization. Show all posts

Wednesday, December 2, 2009

Far from the working class internationally contracting, it has continued to grow. And the distinctions between this enlarged working class and other oppressed groups, far from becoming marginal, are as central as when Lenin and Trotsky polemicised against the Narodniks.
(...) Filmer concluded that the overall number of employed people worldwide was about 880 million, compared with around 1,000 million people working mainly for their own account on the land (overwhelmingly peasants), and 480 million working for their own account in industry and services. The figure for 'employed people' includes some non-workers' groups as well as workers. There is a section of the bourgeoisie in receipt of enormous corporate salaries, and below that the new middle class who get paid more value than they create in return for helping to control the mass of workers. These groups probably amount to 10 percent of the population.14 That reduces the size of the employed world working class to around 700 million, with about a third in 'industry'and the rest in 'services'.
(...) But the total size of the working class is considerably greater than this. The class also includes those who are dependent on income that comes from the waged labour of relatives or savings and pensions resulting from past wage labour--that is, non-employed spouses, children and retired elderly people. If these categories are added in, the worldwide total figure for the working class comes to between 1.5 and 2 billion. Anyone who believes we have said 'farewell' to this class is not living in the real world.
(...) Add these 'semi-workers' or 'peasant workers' to the numbers of people completely dependent on wage labour, and you get a figure which must be somewhere between 40 and 50 percent of the world's population. In other words around the core of 1.5 to 2 million proletarians there are a similar number of semi-proletarians.
(...) Industrial employment has fallen sharply in a number of countries over the last three decades--in Britain and Belgium by a third, and in France by more than a quarter. But these do not represent a deindustrialisation of the whole of the advanced industrial world, but rather a restructuring of industry within it. The number of industrial jobs in the advanced industrial countries as a whole was 112 million in 1998--25 million more than in 1951 and only 7.4 million less than in 1971. There is a great danger of looking at the world through British or French glasses, and not seeing what is really happening on a global scale. So Toni Negri's Italy may not be in the same league as the US or Japan, but the industrial workers have certainly not disappeared. There were 6.5 million four years ago, down only one sixth since 1971.
(...) But that is not all. The usual distinction between 'industry' and 'services' obscures more than it reveals. The category 'services' includes things which are of no intrinsic importance to the capitalist production (for instance, the hordes of servants who provide individual capitalist parasites with their leisure). But it has always included things which are absolutely central to it (like the transportation of goods and the provision of computer software). What is more, some of the shift from 'industry' to the 'service sector' amounts to no more than a change in the name given to essentially similar jobs.
(...) But even Rowthorn's figures considerably underestimate the size of the working class--that class whose labour is essential for the accumulation of capital. Many of Rowthorn's 'free standing services' are essential to such accumulation in the modern world. Two in particular are absolutely indispensable for capitalist accumulation today--health provision and the education service.
(...)There is a widespread myth that the 'service' workforce consists of well paid people with control over their own working situation who never need to get their hands dirty. So Guardian columnist (and former SDP member) Polly Toynbee writes: 'We have seen the most rapid change in social class in recorded history: the 1977 mass working class, with two thirds of people in manual jobs, shrunk to one third, while the rest migrated upwards into a 70 percent home-owning, white collar middle class'.37 So Hardt and Negri claim:

    The jobs for the most part are highly mobile involving flexible skills. More important, they are characterised in general by the central role played by knowledge, information, affect, and communication. In this sense many call the post-industrial economy an informational economy... Through the process of post-modernisation all production tends toward the production of services, toward becoming informationalised.38

In fact, however, any proper breakdown of the figures for 'service' employment provides a very different picture to this. Some of the most important 'services industries' employ overwhelmingly 'manual workers' of the 'traditional' sort.
(...) Altogether there are a minimum of 42 million 'service sector workers' in manual or routine white collar occupations in the US. These, it should be added, are the occupations that have been expanding most rapidly recently with the 'creation' of a mass of low wage jobs. On top of them, many workers in other occupational categories would have been doing work which was little different--for instance, many of the 3.2 million 'sales representatives' and the 4.3 million 'technicians and related support' workers. So would many of the 'health assessment and treating occupations' (83 percent female, unlike the 'health diagnostic' category above them which is 75 percent male), and many of the 5.3 million school teachers (75 percent female). Together these groups constitute well over half the 'service sector'. Add to them the 33 million workers in traditional manual industries, and you have some three quarters of the US population made up of workers. If the 'working class' has 'disappeared from view' for people like Hardt and Negri, it is because they have been looking in the wrong direction.
(...) A central theme of all those who see the working class as disappearing is that the jobs that remain are so precarious that little remains of the permanent working class organisations and communities that used to exist. The argument has been a continual feature of 'post-Marxist' arguments for the last 15 years both from 'Third Way' social democrats and those on the 'autonomist' left.
(...) But this does not mean that in reality capital has been able to destroy workers' resistance to such flexibility, or even that it itself can keep accumulating without continually reproducing relatively permanent labour forces within particular workplaces. One recent study for Britain shows:

    Many of the commonly held assumptions about today's world of work need to be seriously questioned. A wide gulf exists between the over-familiar rhetoric and hyperbole we hear daily about our flexible and dynamic labour market and the realities of workplace life. The evidence simply does not sustain the view that we are witnessing the emergence of a 'new' kind of employment relations, seen in the 'end of the career' and the 'death of the permanent job for life'.48

People often do not see the limits to what capital can achieve in terms of 'flexible labour markets' because they lump together quite different forms of employment: part time employment, temporary employment, employment on short term contracts, and self employment on behalf of firms. But part time employment can also be permanent employment--as it usually is among women in Britain. Similarly, those working on short term contracts can find them renewed month after month, or year after year. They lack long term rights and are the first to go when crises hit, but they do not move into and out of jobs all the time in between. Finally, those in genuinely temporary employment may be indispensable to production and be provided on a long term but intermittent basis by agencies which are themselves large firms and dependent on maintaining a permanent pool of labour to supply to other firms.
(...) Across Western Europe as a whole, 'one out of five jobs has been precarious during the last five years'--but that still leaves four out of five jobs as 'permanent'.
(...) The figures do, however, show that 'average job tenure has remained relatively stable since 1975'. The idea that the working class has been 'flexible-ised' out of existence is completely mistaken. Most people continue to work in the same place, and to be subject to exploitation by the same employers for quite long periods of time. By the same token, they have the time and opportunity to connect up with the people around them to fight back against that exploitation.
(...)

The claim that the 'permanent' worker is a thing of the past is often connected with the claim that employers can move production--and jobs--at a moment's notice.

So Hardt and Negri write:

    The informatisation of production and the increasing importance of immaterial production have tended to free capital from the constraints of territory, and capital can withdraw from negotiation with a given local population by moving its site to another point in the global network... Entire labouring populations, which had enjoyed a certain stability and contractual power, have thus found themselves in increasingly precarious employment situations.57

This vastly exaggerates the movement of capital, and the ease with which firms can move their operations from one place to another... As I have explained elsewhere,58 capital as money (ie finance) can move at the touch of a computer key from one location to another (although determined governments can still impede its movement). But capital as means of production finds it much more difficult to do so. Physical equipment has to be uninstalled and reinstalled, transport has to be arranged for goods produced, a reliable workforce with the requisite skills found, and so on. It is a process that is usually expensive, taking years rather than seconds. What is more, physical production depends upon transporting goods to markets, and therefore closeness to markets is an advantage. The result is that most of the restructuring of industry over the last three decades has usually been within the world's existing industrial regions.
(...) There has, of course, been a shift in certain manufacturing industries to states which were not industrialised 40 years ago--otherwise the phenomenon of the Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) and of certain expanding industries in 'underdeveloped' countries would be inexplicable. But there is little evidence to support the claim that 'advanced countries are abandoning the production of manufactured goods. Many labour-intensive manufacturing activities in the advanced economies, such as clothing or routine assembly, have been put out of business by rising imports from developing countries', but these imports have been financed 'not by the export of services' but 'by the export of other manufactures, especially capital goods and intermediate products such as chemicals'.
(...) Restructuring means that much of this production does not take place in the old industrial centres, such as those in and around Detroit, but in the 'sun belt' states of the west and south. So most US auto workers no longer work directly for the 'Big Three' of Ford, General Motors and Chrysler, but for 'trans-plant manufacturers' like Honda, Toyota, Nissan, Mitsubishi and Daimler Benz, or for new parts manufacturers spun off by GM so as to weaken the union.63 This is a far cry from the picture sometimes presented of all US auto jobs disappearing over the border into Mexico.
(...) But it is not 'fluid' in being able to move effortlessly from one location to another. The general trend for capitalism today is still for production to be concentrated in the advanced countries. Some sorts of production have shifted to a few favoured areas of the Third World--the NICs of east and south east Asia, and eastern China. But capital still finds it more profitable, in general, to locate itself in the regions which had industrialised by the mid 20th century. Workers may usually be better paid there, but a combination of established skills levels and existing investments in plant and infrastructure mean they are also more productive, providing much more surplus value for the system than most of their poorer brothers and sisters in the Third World. This explains why the picture for most of Latin America has been one of very slow average growth or stagnation, and of most of Africa of absolute decline.
(...) Capitalism has created a world working class in the last century and a half. Industry and wage labour exist today in virtually every part of the globe. The industrial working class has a worldwide presence. But the combined and uneven development of the system means it is very unevenly distributed between regions. Rough calculations indicate that 40 percent of the world's 270 million or so industrial workers are in the OECD countries, around 15 percent each in China, Latin America and the former USSR, around 10 percent in the rest of Asia, and around 5 percent in Africa.
(...) Sub-Saharan Africa is the exception rather than the norm for the world system as a whole, or even for its vast, impoverished regions. In Asia and Latin America there has been a growth of wage labour. But it has often been outside what is usually called the 'modern' sector, and has often been accompanied by an equally rapid rise of self employment.
(...) Most of the self employed are by no means privileged. A survey of Ahmedabad shows only one tenth of the male self employed as having a 'separate business place'. A third worked on the streets, as vendors, rickshaw drivers, cart pullers and the like. There are 200,000 rickshaw men in Mumbai, 80,000 in Ahmedabad, and 30,000 in Bangalore, while Calcutta has around 250,000 street hawkers and Calcutta more than 100,000.
(...) In addition to--and often merging into--those in the informal sector, there are everywhere those denied any opportunities for employment by modern capitalism: the unemployed. Their numbers vary considerably from region to region and country to country--depending, in part, on the ease of people making some sort of livelihood in the informal sector.
(...) Capitalist accumulation is causing the rapid growth of cities across wide swathes of the globe, and of occupations involving production for the market. In most regions (although not in most of Africa) there is also a growth of the number involved in wage labour of a relatively productive sort in medium to large workplaces. But even more rapid is the expansion of the vast mass of people precariously trying to make a livelihood through casual labour, selling things in the streets, trying to survive through working on their own account. At one extreme this mass merges into the petty bourgeoisie proper of small employers, at the other into the desperate poverty of those who can hardly get a livelihood at all--48 percent of the urban population of Brazil live below the poverty line, and two out of five of these below the 'indigence' income needed to satisfy food needs but nothing else.
(...) There is one widespread, very simple, and very mistaken, answer. That is to see the workers with permanent jobs as 'privileged', as some sort of 'labour aristocracy'. This is certainly how it can seem to those driven into the informal sector. In the formal sector there are usually considerably higher wage rates and often sickness benefits, paid holidays, and pensions of sorts as well... Employers have not, however, provided such things out of the goodness of their heart. They need a certain stability to their labour force, particularly when it comes to skilled workers who they do not want to be poached by rivals during times of boom. States often want such stability as well, seeing welfare provision for a section of the urban workforce as a way of protecting themselves against sudden explosions of popular discontent.
(...) It often seems counterintuitive to argue that groups of workers who have better conditions than others do not benefit at their expense--whether the argument is used about Western workers and workers in the Third World, or formal sector Third World workers and informal sector workers. But in this case the 'counterintuitive' argument is correct. In many industries, the more stable and experienced a workforce, the more productive it is. Capital is prepared to concede higher wages to certain of the workers in those industries because by doing so it is able to make more profits out of them. Hence the apparent contradiction--some sections of the world's workers are both better paid than others, and more exploited. It is this alone which explains why capitalists, motivated only by the drive for profit, do not usually invest on any great scale in regions like Africa, where wages are lowest.
(...) That, of course, does not prevent capital from continually trying to hold down what it has to pay--and from seizing on new technologies and restructuring production to reduce its labour costs drastically. Hence the pattern in much of the world for the established 'formal' workforce to remain more or less intact, but for there to be some chipping away round the edges and for many new jobs to be in the 'informal' sector.
(...) [mike davis + a rejoinder to hardt/negri, more or less] The great mass of the informal workforce in 'developing' countries today are people who are new to the urban workforce--either from the countryside (as with the more than 100 million peasants seeking employment in China's cities) or women and young people seeking paid labour for the first time. But the pattern of capitalist accumulation over the last couple of decades means that the labour demands of modern, productive industry have not expanded on anything like the scale needed to absorb them into its workforce. Competition on a global scale has caused capitalists to turn to 'capital intensive' forms of production (with what Marx called a rising 'organic composition of capital') which do not require massive numbers of new workers. As a result, the only ways for most new entrants to the labour force to gain a livelihood are through the most meagre forms of self employment or through selling their labour power at such a low price and under such arduous conditions that small capitalists at the margins of the system can profit from exploiting it.
(...) That is not, however, the end of the matter. Capitalism has one important use for those it refuses to allow to make a proper livelihood. It uses them to put increased pressure on those it does exploit in the most productive areas of the economy. Far from the growth of the informal workforce benefiting the workforce in the formal sector, it has been accompanied by an increased exploitation of workers in this sector--and in many cases by a deterioration. [empirical proof follows]
(...) In both India and Latin America something else has been happening--the shifting of certain jobs in big industry from the formal to the informal sector. This allows management to cut some of their wage costs--and to put pressure on the remaining 'formal' sector of the workforce to accept worse conditions.
(...) It is wrong, as people like Paulo Singer do, to write of 'deproletarianisation'.119 Rather, what is happening is a restructuring of the workforce, with the hiving off by big firms of some tasks (usually relatively unskilled and therefore easily performed by a floating workforce) to small firms, labour-only contractors and the supposedly self employed. It should be added that this phenomenon is by no means new in the history of capitalism. Casual employment has often played an important role in certain industries--for instance, in the docks in Britain until the late 1960s. And forms of contract labour are very old--it was common in the textile factories of the industrial revolution. In the mines in both the US and Britain in the 19th century, overseers or foremen ('buttymen') would recruit workers and pay them out of a sum given to them by the mine owners. These casual groups of workers may not always have felt themselves to be part of the working class. They were often detached from the struggles of other sections of that class for years, even decades, at a time. Yet the potential for struggling with those sections was always there, and when it turned into reality the struggle could be very bitter, with an almost insurrectionary tinge.
(...) [citing engels on dock workers] The point is very important. Internationally we are just emerging from more than two decades of defeat and demoralisation for workers right across the world. This bred a fatalism about the possibility of fighting, which was reflected in a mass of studies which depicted the suffering of the poor and the oppressed, showing them always as victims, rarely as fighters. Thus there are tons of materials sponsored by the International Labour Organisation on 'social exclusion'--a theme which suits the bureaucrats who run such bodies. In these studies themes like the 'casualisation' and 'feminisation' of the workforce become stereotyped, academic ways of dismissing possibilities of struggle--even if some of those carrying through the studies try to escape from the paradigm in which they are trapped. The stereotypes then provide trade union officialdom with excuses for avoiding struggle on the grounds that it cannot work. What begins as a mistaken assessment of the possibility of struggle becomes a real obstacle to unleashing such struggle.
(...) [naomi klein on EPZs] Such accounts provide a brilliant exposure of the greed and inhumanity of those who run the multinationals. But like many orthodox academic studies on the informal workforce (especially those sponsored by the International Labour Organisation) they are too pessimistic when it comes to the possibilities of fighting back. First, the multinationals cannot afford simply to mistreat their workers. It is not as easy as the multinationals would like people to think for them to close down their facilities and move elsewhere if the workforce does explode in bitterness. Setting up the links in a global production chain takes a lot of effort by the multinational... When Henry Ford pioneered mass production, assembly line methods in the auto industry, he saw that the most effective form of exploitation lay in stabilising a handpicked workforce under tight managerial control. Thomas O'Brien has told how some of the first US multinationals to operate in Latin America took efforts to stabilise their workforces by providing minimal welfare facilities--providing accommodation in company towns, health clinics, schools, sports facilities, even paid holidays. The aim was to combine maintaining the workers at a minimal level of fitness with extending managerial discipline over workers to the home as well as the workplace...
(...) This element of stability in the workforce is important because it means such workers can fight back, and win. Conditions in many South Korean clothing and footwear plants in the 1960s were exactly as Naomi Klein describes them. George E Ogle has told of 'the sweat, blood and tears of young women who worked in the export industries during the 1960s and 1970s--textiles, garments, electronics, chemicals'
(...) [strategy matters, in other words] So, for instance, an account of the great Bombay textile strikes of 1982-1983 paints a different picture to that in Korea. The strike began as a semi-spontaneous upsurge from below (workers demonstrated outside the residence of Datta Samant, who was to become the strike figurehead, demanding that he 'lead' them) and developed into one of the biggest prolonged strikes in world history, lasting a year, involving hundreds of thousands of workers and dominating the political life of India's commercial and industrial capital. But it never spread from the 'organised' sector of the larger workplaces to the small workplaces and the impoverished self employed weavers--indeed, many strikers began working in the informal sector without anyone regarding them as scabs. This enabled the employers to hold out for a year and defeat the workers, since they were never short of finished cloth.
(...) [too easy? but important regardless] The victories in Korea show the possibility of organising informal and maquiladora workers, of pulling them behind struggles initiated by larger and more secure groups of workers. The defeat in Bombay showed the dangers for the more secure groups of not going out and bringing the informal workers into the struggle. The dangers are not simply a matter of wage cuts, job losses and deteriorating working conditions. Defeat can have a devastating impact on wider society. During the strike there was unity between the different religious and caste groups that make up the mass of Bombay's lower classes. The aftermath of defeat saw the rise to a dominating position in wide areas of the city of the Sriv Sena, a political organisation based upon turning Hindus against Muslms, culminating in murderous riots against the Muslim population in 1992. Unity in struggle had created a sense of solidarity which then exerted a pull on the vast mass of the informal workers, self employed, the unemployed poor and the impoverished sections of the petty bourgeoisie. The defeat led to the sectional attitudes and communal conflicts of the petty bourgeoisie influencing the self employed, the unemployed and wide layers of workers.

[CONCLUSION]
(...) The overall picture is not one of a disintegrating or declining working class. It is one of a working class that on a world scale has grown bigger than ever, even if the rate of growth has slowed down with the successive crises in the world economy and the tendency everywhere to 'capital intensive' forms of production that do not employ massively new numbers of people.
(...) Neither is the picture one in which working class employment is being transferred on a massive scale from the old industrial economies of the 'North' to the previously agrarian economies of the 'South'. The new international division of labour is developing mainly within the 'triad' of North America, Europe and Japan--with a lesser part being played by the NICs of East Asia and eastern China. There is also an expansion of industrial employment within some of the burgeoning cities of the 'South'--but the expansion is uneven, barely touching whole regions, and is not mainly through transfer of jobs from the North.
(...) A twofold change is taking place now. There is the growing importance of the production of certain 'immaterial' commodities which are often classified as part of the service sector, but involve forms of work very similar to those in industry. And there is the growing importance of forms of labour which do not themselves produce commodities, but which serve to maintain and increase the productivity of the direct producers.
(...) The working class is not disappearing. It is not becoming bourgoeisified. It is not turning into a privileged layer. It is not gaining somehow from the impoverishment of wide sections of the Third World, especially Africa. It is growing even while it is restructured globally.
(...) The anti-capitalist movement itself has some of the same characteristics. Its initial base, like that of the first movement of the late 1960s, has been among people not firmly rooted in the productive process--students, school students, young people not yet trapped into permanent jobs, workers who take part in its activities as individuals without any clear sense of class identity, lower professionals. As a descriptive term for such movements, 'multitude' is not completely misplaced. A disparate coalition of forces has come together to provide a new and massively important focus for the struggle against the system after two decades of defeat and demoralisation. But the glorification of disparateness embodied in the term prevents people seeing what needs to be done next to build the movement. It does not recognise that what was so important about Genoa and Barcelona was the beginning of the involvement of organised workers in the protests. It fails to locate the most important deficiency of the movement in Argentina to date--the ability of trade union bureaucracies to build a wall between employed workers on the one hand and the neighbourhood and unemployed workers' movements on the other.
(...) The mistake is to see movements of disparate social groups as 'social subjects' capable of bringing about a transformation of society. They are not. Because their base is not centred in collective organisation rooted in production, they cannot challenge the control over that production which is central to ruling class power. They can create problems for particular governments. But they cannot begin the process of rebuilding society from the bottom up. And in practice, the workers who could begin to do this only play a marginal role in them. Talk about 'rainbow coalitions' or 'multitudes' conceals that relative lack of involvement in the movement of those working long hours at manual or routine white collar jobs--and with extra hours of unpaid labour bringing up children. It underplays the degree to which the movements remain dominated by those whose occupations leave them most time and energy to be active. Fashionable theories about 'post-industrial society' then become an excuse for a narrowness of vision and action that ignores the great majority of the working class.

Tuesday, November 17, 2009

neil brenner, new state spaces

chapter one, introduction (1-27)

(2): important--"this book is intended to broaden and deepen the geographical imagination of contemporary state theory by investigating the major role of urban regions as key sites of contemporary state institutional and spatial restructuring. rather than treating cities and city-regions as mere subunits of national administrative systems, i suggest that urban policy--broadly defined to encompas all state activities oriented towards the regulation of capitalist urbanization--has become an essential political mechanism through which a profound institutional and geographical transformation of national states has been occurring. my claim is not simply that the institutional infrastructure of urban governance is being re-defined but, more generally, that transformations of urban policy have figured crucially within a fundamental reworking of national statehood since the early 1970s. a geographically attuned and scale-sensitive approach to state theory is required in order to decipher the new state spaces that are being produced under contemporary capitalism."

(2): we are talking about the last three decades, of course, following the decline of "spatial keynesianism." (faced with challenges of urban industrial decline, welfare state retrenchment, european integration, and economic globalization). "as of the early 1980s, national states began to introduce new, post-Keynesian spatial policies intended to reconcentrate productive capacities and specialized, high-performance infrastructural investments into the most globally competitivve city-regions within their territories." -- the need to (a) enhance global competitive advantages and (b) attract mobile capital.

(3): to what extent, though, will we be romanticizing the postwar period, here? "the postwar project of national territorial equalization and sociospatial redistribution has thus been superseded..."

(3): two arguments outlined here:
  1. that city-regions "have become key institutional sites in which a major rescaling of national state power has been unfolding."
  2. that "national state institutions continue to play key roles in formulating, implementing, coordinating, and supervising urban policy initiatives, even as the primacy of the national scale of political-economic life is decentered."
(4): let's try and think about this a bit more, particularly wrt to other ways in which the state has been theorized; surely we're not abandoning schematics that do use the state, singular?--"i believe that the generic concept of the state has become increasingly problematic. the notion of statehood seems to me a more precise basis for describing modern political institutions, because it does not ontologically prejudge..."

(5-7): three trends
  1. global economic integration--"national territorial economies are becoming more permeable to supranational, continental, and global flows of investment."
  2. urban and regional resurgence--"a renewed importance for major fractions of industrial, financial, and service capital..." (citing the global city, industrial districts, learning regions, offshore centers, etc.)
  3. the consolidation of new supranational and cross border-institutions--EU, NAFTA, APEC, ASEAN, MERCOSUR, IMF, World Bank, G8, etc., etc.
(8): three methodological challenges
  1. scale as a proccess, rather than fixed thing
  2. intrinsic relationality of all scales, and their embeddedness within broader hierarchies (this is emphasized again in box 1.2)
  3. postdisciplinary challenge
(12-13): definition of uneven geographic development--"the circumstance that social political, and economic processes under capitalism are not distributed uniformly or homogenously across the earth's surface, but are always organized within distinct sociospatial configurations--such as urban agglomeration regional clusters, rural zones, national territories, supranational economic blocs, and so forth--that are characterized by divergent socioeconomic conditions, developmental capacities, and institutional arrangements..."--outlniing the contradictory interplay of equalization and differentiation...

(14-15): important--we will clearly need an account of the interests that move states, for here, so far, we are seeing the state as a hammer--it can be wielded to alleviate or exacerbate uneven geographic development. turning point was the late-1970s.

(16): KEY--"during the fordist-keynesian period, the problem of uneven geographical development was generally construed as a matter of redressing 'insufficient' or 'imbalanced' industrialization on a national scale. the task of state spatial intervention, under these conditions, was to mold the geography of capital investment into a more balanced, cohesive, and integrated locational pattern throughout the national territory. by contrast, with the rescaling of state space and the proliferation of urban locational policies during the post-1970s period, this project of national territorial equalizaiton has been fundamentally inverted. it is no longer capital that is to be molded into the geogrphay of state space, but state space that is to be molded into the geography of capital." [again, though, this formulation sets us up as keynesians, when we would really like to break the chains]

(16-17): why, with post-keynesian, we can expect crises [well, but what about keynesianism?]

(18): state rescaling as 'ideal-type', or 'real abstraction'? setting the theoretical stage.

(18-21): three levels of abstraction (see box on page 19)
  1. abstract--capital accumulation, class struggle
  2. meso--keynesianism, neoliberalism
  3. concrete--actual policies
(21): in this book, mainly concerned with meso level (but of course, involves other levels, too)

(24): citing jessop as postdisciplinary take on the State

chapter two, the globalization debates (27-

(28-29): globalization as an opportunity to bring space back in to analyses of capitalism--and, obviously, an opportunity to dispose of the 'cartesian' notion of the fixed, nation-state--"to challenge the iron-grip of the nation-state on the social imagination'"

(29): KEY--"thus, one of the central intellectual barriers to a more adequate understanding of contemporary global transformations is that we currently lack appropriately historical and dynamic conceptualizations of social space..."

(30): not 'deterritorialization', but 'reterritorialization'

(30): important, the crux of the contention: we need to transcend the imaginary of the nation-state, and move toward an understanding of the new sociospatial configurations. importantly, "the effort to transcend state-centric modes of analysis does not entail a denial of the national state's continued relevance as a major locus of political-economic regulation."

(30): this chapter sets out its stall to critique the 'global territorialist' approach, and the 'deterritorialization' approach

(31): "the notion of globalization is first and foremost a descriptive category denoting, at the most general level, the spatial extension of social interdependencies on a worldwide scale."

(32): "in other words, all aspects of social space under modern capitalism must be understood as presuppositions, arenas, and outcomes of dynamic processes of continual social contestation and transformation." [bringing the 'social' in, but, like harvey, it seems ever-so-abstract...]

(33): important--insofar as we will be thinking about 'causes' behind global transformation, the dynamics seem to be located in capitalism's inherent tendency to see 'every limit... as a barrier to be overcome'. in other words, we need to think carefully about how this will dovetail with the question of shifting state strategy (if the keynesian and then post-keynesian paradigms were indeed driven, in his argument, by the notion that this was what was (a) best for national ecomonic growth, and/or (b) best for labor). how, in other words, to bring the State into a capital-centric account?

(33): we have a deterritorialization-reterritorialization chronology--first, capital annihilates barriers; then, second, it fixes itself in space as a means to extending its orbit.

(34): these spatial configuration as 'forces of production' (now we are wading into knotty theoretical formulations--though this begins with harvey, of course.)

(35): this particular deterritorialization-reterritorialization is part of the "longue duree dynamic of deterritorialization, reterritorializaiton, and uneven geographic development that has underpinned the production of capitliast spatiality throughout the modern era."

(35-36): six implications of this broad theorization
  1. global restructuring as a conflictual, uneven, dialectical process
  2. global restructuring as both spatial and temporal
  3. global restructuring unfolding upon multiple spatial scales
  4. not involving total obliteration of sociospatial scales (i.e., the state), but their reconfiguration
  5. stems from a diverse range of political-economic causes (reogranization of capital accumulation, consolidation of neoliberalism, financial deregulation, accelerated technological change, new population movements, geopolitical shifts, transformation of global labor force...) [how do we move to a coherent account of what actually happened, as the capital-centric account initially implied? or is this very much a case of overdetermination by all of this?]
  6. states as essential geographical arenas
(37-38): important--here begins the section on the epistemology of state-centrism, which has three most essential spatial assumptions (see box 2.1)
  1. space as static platform, not social (spatial fetishism)
  2. social relations organized within containers (methodological territorialism)
  3. assumption that social relations are organized at a national scale (methodological nationalism)
(41): the intellectual plausibility of this frame, he's arguing, was contingent--it can be traced to "the late nineteenth and early twentieth century historical-geographical context in which the social sciences first emerged, during which the territorial state's role in encaging socioeconomic and politicocultural relations within its boundaries dramatically intensified."

(43): and even then, there was a tendency to see what you expected to see, through it--reify it, rather than see a tendency in operation ("to conflate the historical tendency toward the territorialization of social relations on a national scale--which has undoubtedly intensified during much of the twentieth century--with its full historical realization")

(44): important--the two (mistaken) assumptions of the deterritorialization thesis
  1. that globalization is non-territorial, borderless, supraterritorial.
  2. that globalization entails the contraction of state power, or its erosion.
(45): first mention of 'glocalization' (swyngedouw)

(45): the relativization of scales (jessop)

(47-48): the (nonsense) notion of integration into 'global society'

(48-49): more profound critique of those who see globalization as preconstituted structures, rather than qualitative re-structuring...

(49-52): important, critique of wallerstein as 'state-centric'--"however, considering wallerstein's avowed concern to transcend state-centric models of capitalist modernity, national state territories occupy a surprisingly pivotal theoretical position within his conceptual framework... wallerstein's conceptuion of global space is.. most precisely described as an inter-state division of labor... in this sense, wallerstein's concern to analyze the global scale as a distinctive unit of analysis does not lead to any qualitative modification in the way in which this space is conceptualized... the global and the national scales are viewed as structural analogs of a single spatial form--territoriality... to be sure, wallerstein conceives global space as a complex historical product of capitalist expansion, but he acknowledges its historicity only in a limited sense, in contrast to previous historical systems such as world-empires. for within the cpaitalist historical system, space appears to be frozen into a single geometric crystallization."

(52-53): two general methodological conclusions:
  1. emphasis on the global spatial scale does not necessarily lead to the overcoming of state-centrism
  2. state-centric conceptions of global space mask the national state's own crucial role as a site and agent of global restructuring.
(55): the prospect of 'placelessness' (!)

(56): important--three serious deficiences of deterritorialization approaches
  1. historicity of territoriality is an either/or, presence or absence (?)
  2. telationship btw global space and national territoriality is a zero-sum game
  3. most crucially, "deterritorialization approaches bracket the various forms of spatial fixity, spatial embedding, rescaling, and reterritorialization upon which global flows are premised."
(57): important--"a major agenda of this book is to advance an interpretation of contemporary global restructuring as a rescaling of the nationally organized sociospatial configurations that have long served as the underlying geographical scaffolding for capitalist development."

(57): important--remember, two types of deterritorialization under discusssion: of capitalism, and of the state.
  1. of capital (57-60): more-or-less asserting that a territorialization moment is unavoidable, still. "we are witnessing, rather, a profoundly uneven rescaling and reterritorialization of the historically entrenched, state-centric geographical infrastructures that underpinned the last century of capitalist industrialization." capital cannot ever enjoy pure placelessness.
  2. of the state (60-64): the state, also, is most definitely not dead. "national states began actively to facilitate the process of geoeconomic integration through a variety of policy strategies..." as panitch writes, "capitalist globalization... takes place in, through, and under the aegis of states."
(63): and why the urban? well, "as we shall see, large-scale urban regions represent crucial geographical, institutional, and political arenas in which the rescaled geographies of statehood under contemporary capitalism are being forged and contested."

(66-67): in sum, four methodological challenges:
  1. historicity of social space--"historically specific character of national state territoriality as a form of sociospatial organization."
  2. polymorphic geographies--"national state territoriality is today being intertwined with... an immense variety of emergent forms (supranational institutions, etc.)"
  3. the new political economy of scale--decentering of the national scale of political-economic life
  4. the remaking of state space--key role of national states in promoting sociospatial transformations.
chapter three, the state spatial process under capitalism (69-113)

(70): "just as a fish is unlikely to discover water, most postwar social scientists viewed national state territories as pregiven natural environments for sociopolitical life." -- the 'territorial trap'

(70): fordist-keynesian period as a period of historically unprecedented attempt at closure [we can interrogate this, since it ought to give us some clue what 'closed' and 'open' denote; not absence of world trade, certainly]

(70): at times, though, there seems to be a simplified periodization (more simplified, in other words, than the harvey narrative)--we have moved from westphalian, to post-westphalian [if we wanted to draw the periodization out, i am worried that it, as abstract narrative, doesn't match the concrete level] -- this is emphatically misleading, though, for he does also went to stress its indeterminacy during the modern period (see 76)

(72): critical--"of particular importance, in this context, is a sustained inquiry into the conditions under which inherited geographies of state space may be transformed from relatively fixed, stabilized settings in which state regulatory operations occur into potentially malleable stakes of sociopolitical contestation. concomitantly, there is an equally urgent need for a more explicit theoretical conceptualization of the determinate social, political, and economic processes through which transformations of state space unfold."

(72): KEY--"i argue that state space is best conceptualized as an arena, medium and outcome of spatially selective political strategies" [how does this work, then, with the argument that it is potentially malleable and open to political contestation? because it is difficult to argue that its rescaling in the neoliberal period was a response to political contestation--it was in the service of capital. so a kind of political influence, but there is no role for understanding it as a tool to be wielded, in this account, correct? in other words, the question is: is it that capital has captured the state, in the neoliberal period? or is it that the state has decided to go with capital?]

(75): citing Ollman on the dialectic, in order to emphasize process over fixity

(76): "while Weber was highly sensitive to the historical specificity of modern state territoriality relative to premodern political geogrphies, he was considerably less interested in its evolution within the modern interstate system."

(77): five functions of the modern state
  1. war-making and military defense
  2. the containment and enhancement of national wealth
  3. the promotion of national identities
  4. institutionalization of democratic forms of legitimation
  5. the provision of social welfare
(77): spatial scales are tied to "regulatory strategies"

(78-80): important, state space:
  1. in the narrow sense--changing configuration of state border, boundaries, frontiers
  2. in the integral sense--changing substantive ways in which institutions are mobilized to regulate social relations (state inverventions into economic process, etc.)
(81): critical--"the crucial point, therefore, is that the question of which scale of regulatory activity is primary within a given configuration of state power is essentially an empirical-historical one, and not a matter that can be settled on an a priori basis."

(84): important--summarizing his understanding of jessop's notion of strategic-relational theory of the state--"most crucially, neither the state's spatial form nor historically specific forms of state spatiality are ever structurally pregiven; rather, they represent arenas and outcomes of spatially selective political strategies. this conceptualization forms a theoretical linchpin [of this book]" [see also 89]

(84): underdetermined nature of the value form

(85): the state form as analagous

(85): KEY--according to jessop, "the separation of the state from the circuit of capital may seriously constrain its ability to function as an agent of capitalist interests." (the state, then, as a site of contestation). "the state form is an undeteremined condensation of continual strategic interactions regarding the nature of state inteverention, political representation, and ideological hegeony within capitalist society. accordingly, 'there can be no inherent substantive unity to the staet...; its always relative unity must be created...' for jessop, the funcitonal unity and organization coherence of the state are never pregiven, but must be viewed as emergent, contingent, contested... it is only through the mobilization and consolidation of state projects... that the image of the state as a unified organizationl entity can be projected into civil society." (SEE FIGURE 3.4, pg. 86)

(87): state as site of strategies, as generator of strategies, and as product of strategies.

(91-93): important:
  1. state spatial form (defined with reference to the principle of territoriality--it is territoriality that underpins the potential autonomy of state institutions from other social forces within civil society)
  2. state spatial projects (oriented toward state's institutional structure--initiatives to differentiate state territoriality into a functionally coordinated, coherent regulatory geography)
  3. and state spatial strategies (oriented towards circuit of capital--influence the geographies of development, reshape geographies of capital accumulation)
(95): two dimensions
  1. a scalar dimension (a hierarchy among a variety of scales)
  2. a territorial dimension (jurisdictional units)
(96): "the relation of state institutions to patterns of uneven spatial development is frequently an object of intense sociopolitical contestation." [but, and i think we would all agree, it is possible to push this to lengths that would be absurd--we are still talking about a state that is in the broad interests of capital, perhaps more in the way althusser specified...]

(104): all of this is becoming frustratingly formal!

chapter four, urban governance and the nationalization of state space ()

(114-115): ok--"state rescaling has emerged as an important political strategy through which diverse governmental coalitions have attempted to manage the disruptive consequences of a deeply rooted socioeconomic crisis." [again, question of response to politics and contestation, or in line with capital's broad interests]

(115): definition of spatial keynesianism--"spatial keynesianism was a multifaceted, multiscalar, and contradictory amalgamation of staet spatial projects and state spatial strategies that were constructed in response to some of the major regulatory dilemmas associated with postwar fordist urban-entrenched patterns of uneven spatial development by spreading urban growth as evenly as possible across the entire surface of each national territory.."

(116): in this chapter, wants to 'get at' the state by looking at the way in which it strove to regulate urban development/urbanization.

(117): key--"I argue that spatial Keynesianism was composed of a variety of spatially selective political strategies through which wester European antional states attempted to manage the distinctive patterns of urbanization and uneven spatial development that crystallized across western Europe during the Fordist-Keynesian period..."

(120): urban development in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, evolution of capitalism from liberal-competitive to state-managed; a new industrial geography of the second industrial revolution

(122): fordist period as the high-water mark of national capitalism

(128): see box, "key axes of regulation under fordist-keynesian capitalism"

(130): here, a point at which to ask the question of the place of labor in pushing the State--"the goal of state action, in this context, was less to enhance the productive force of capitalist sociospatial configurations than to spread the industrialization process as evenly as possible across the entire surface of the national territory."

(133): compensatory mechanisms, myrdal -- targeting of peripheralized spaces (136)

(171): "spatial keynesianism was not dismantled through a single, catastrophic rupture. rather, its constitutive elemnts were eroded due to a confluence of distinct processes of restructuring, leading in turn to path dependent, politically contested regulatory realignments and institutional modifications within each national state apparatus."

chapter five, interlocality competition as a state project

(172-173): "in contrast to the redistributive agenda associated with the Kenesian welfare national state, the competition state attempts to promote economic regeneration by enhancing the global competitive advantages of its territory..."

(176): we have seen--
  1. state spatial projects--establish customized, place-specific regulatory capacities in major cities, city-regions, and industrial districts and more generally, to decentralize key aspects of economic regulation to subnatinoal institutional levels.
  2. state spatial strategies--reconcentration of socioeconomic assets and advanced infrastructural investments within globally competitive city-regions.
chapter six, alternative rescaling strategies

(257-261): SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
  1. ABSTRACT: A. curret round of global restructuring represents an intensification and re-workign of uneven spatial development / B. state influences this through diverse political strategies / C. towards a processual concpetualization of state spatiality, which calcify into distinct sociospatial configurations
  2. MESO-LEVEL: A. post-1980s western europe, which has facilitated transnational corporate accumulation strategies... has produced intense economic dynamism within a select group of powerful, globally interlinked cities... / B. an inverstion of state appraoches to the regulation of uneven development; redistribution abandoned, competetiveness prioritized. / C. patterns of state spatial selectivity have been transformed; new projects and strateiges designed to make major cities competitive. (towards RCSR--rescaled competition state regime)
(261): this configuration, it is argued, is permeated by crisis-tendencies.

(304): from second-cut, to third-cut RCSR?

Thursday, October 22, 2009

saskia sassen, the global city

xix-xxii: the seven hypotheses

(1) - geographic dispersal of economic activities is a key factor feeding the importance of central corporate functions;
(2) - central functions are so complex that large global firms are compelled to outsource them to 'highly specialized service firms.'
(3) - these highly specialized service firms are 'subject to agglomeration economies.' as a result, "global cities are, in this regard, production sites for the leading information industries of our time."
(4) - the more headquarters outsource their most complex functions, "the freer they are to opt for any location" for the work actually done in their headquarters;
(5) - specialized service firms are engaged in providing a 'global service,' which encourages global city-global city partnership;
(6) - a growing number of high level professionals in cities "have the effect of raising the degree of spatial and socioeconomic inequality evident in these cities."
(7) - the dynamics described in hypothesis six lead to "the growing informalization of a range of economic activities..."

(3): cities' four-fold new functions: (1) highly concentrated command points; key locations for finance; (3) sites of production of innovations; (4) markets for the products and innovations of this new services economy.

(5): "the fundamental dynamic posited here is that the more globalized the economy becomes, the higher the agglomeration of central functions in a relatively few sites, that is, in global cities... there is a new logic of concentration."

(5): the "global city" as a site of production of "highly specialized services and financial goods" [note, this does not tell us anything about cities, in general--in that sense the explanandum is not the "urban," but an atypical subset]

(6): wanting to focus on the "practice" of global control--"the work of producing and reproducing the organization and management of a global production system and a global marketplace for finance," a process in which the "global city" has a critical role. [she is less interested, she says, in the 'familiar issues' of the power of larger corporations. but is this simply an excuse to dull the heinousness of what she's describing?]

(8): question, also, about the relationship between the city and the nation-state

(10): and finally, the morphology of the new service sector--what about the low-wage jobs that supply this high-wage service sector?

(12): important--here some reflections on why this transition has happened, and how to theorize it. it is not the case that new industries have emerged to replace old ones; at least it is not that simple. what has happened, instead, is a "deep structural process of decline," in which "growth" and "decline" have to be theorized more holistically. simply and specifically, i guess, this is the idea that we are seeing the geographic dispersal of manufacturing, which has engendered the need for the new. [the question, though, is why we need to see the 80's and 90's as "high-flying," rather than periods of stagnation. this motivates a question re: whether the change she is documenting can be attributed to technological shifts, as is somewhat implied, or whether there's something else, more internal to the pure dynamics of capitalism, which has spurred it. i suppose the two theorizations are not mutually exclusive, but there is a sense in which sassen has evacuated the latter paradigm from her analysis.]

(12-13): more on the systemic connection between 'decline' and 'growth'. four working hypotheses:
(1) geographic dispersal of manufacturing, which contributed to the decline of old industrial center [and] [created] a demand for expanded central management...
(2) the growth of the financial industry... benefited from policies and conditions often harmful to other industrial sectors, notably manufacturing (do we mean hiking the interest rates in '79?)
(3) "a transformation in the economic relationships among global cities, the nation states where they are located, and the world economy..."
(4) a "new class alignment" in the global city [a species of "structured coherence," perhaps?]

(19): it might be important to clarify the causal connections between these three observations, because elsewhere it seems to be distinct from what she is proposing here: "a leading argument in this book is that the spatial dispersion of economic activities and the reorganization of the financial industry are two processes that have contributed to new forms of centralization insofar as they have occurred under conditions of continued concentration in ownership or control." [recall panitch and gindin, in other words, who suggest that 'the reorganization of the financial industry' was necessary for Capital to come to terms with 'transnationalization'. also, is the last clause suggesting a positive, normative project--that this process could (and should) have happened under different "conditions [of] ... ownership [and] control."

(20): what we have seen, in effect, is a de-centering of transnational banks (and the TNC's, of course), and the concomitant rise of the "major centers of finance."

(19): interesting, if cryptic sentence: "whether internationalization is essential to the major outcomes, notably the acute pressure, toward agglomeration in leading cities, is difficult to establish and is perhaps a question of theory." [what to make of this? we can have the global city without globalization? unlikely. but this is why her doing the work of theory would be immensely helpful; is she eschewing that task even though she thinks it worthwhile?]

(20): question of the concept of "productive innovation" in finance, insofar as she is anticipating the possibility of "non-productive innovation." what is the distinction? hasn't recent history proven the fallacies of celebrating precisely this same fact of innovation, insofar as it has proved to be 'smoke' and 'mirrors'? or are we speaking of a subset of the kind of innovation that she wants to speak about. [my position seems justified--"innovations" are made explicit on page 21 as "derivatives" and "hedge funds"]

(21): explicitly naming the 'long wave' objection (what is different about this round of 'financialization' from what transpired at the turn of the century?)

chapter two


(23): "capital mobility" is not simply the ability of capital to move across space; the concept must also assimilate the fact of increasing centralization.

(26): mention of 'transnationalization' as a political strategy to break 'fordism', but also a technical consequence of new strategies that were "designed to separate low-wage, routine tasks from highly skilled tasks..."

(28-29): seems too lumpy -- discussing "transnationalization" at the same time as mentioning how many women work from their suburban homes? i understand the affinity, but could this not be said to be symptomatic of some larger failings to systematize data with an appropriately theoretical frame?

(30): sassen's notion of the "redeployment of growth poles," which helps us observe that geographic dispersal has gone hand-in-hand with increasing concentration of capital ["such a parallel decentralization of ownership has not taken place. The large size of firms has made it possible to internalize transaction and circulation costs, thereby reducing the barriers to capital circulation and raising capital's ability to equalize the profit rate." [marxist commitments, clearly...]

(31): perhaps we can start, here, to ask what "productive innovation" in finance might mean? "opening up of regional markets"; "offshore banking" --> all leading to a "renewed concentration in and orientation toward major financial centers, beginning in the early 1980s... not mere geographic retrenchment but was in fact associated with new forms of capital mobility..." "The central activity is now the buying and selling of instruments over and over again, thereby maximizing the circulation of financial capital.."

(32): "increased capital mobility has brought about a homogenization of economic space..." [but, in a way compatible with uneven development, of course.]

(32): important--quite bleak implication for one type of development strategy, here. peripheral labor can now be employed without ever escaping its peripherality. no more "labor aristocracy," which she identifies as a very specific historical phenomenon. technological/communication revolution has enabled high-tech industries to incorporate sweatshop labor. this tendency towards dispersal, she's implying, "neutralizes the politico-economic consequences that Marx associated with the generalized increase in the capital intensity of production..."

(33): labor in this service economy, more mobile/transnational/unequal -- (1) both highly trained personnel, and (2) unskilled service labor

(33-36): useful summary of argument of chapter 2

chapter 10: a new urban regime?


(329): "the most pronounced development is the massive increase in the volume of transactions of the financial industry, by far the most significant international industry."

(330): "most foreign direct investment is now in services."

(331): "the weight of economic activity since the 1980s has shifted from production places, such as Detroit and Manchester, to centers of finance and highly specialized services."

(331): her central amendment to a traditional 'world-systems' narrative--the need for 'control'/'organization' is not inherent in fragmentation ("cannot be taken for granted") but needs to be produced.

(331): "global cities as sites for the production of global control capability."

(332): a list of the kind of firms that comprise this "global control capability"--isn't this a bit underwhelming, if we're honest? -- "advertising, accounting, legal services, business services, certain types of banking, engineering, and architectural services."

(332): hmm--on the one hand she is drawing attention to the enormous importance of finance, as service. but on the other hand, she doesn't want to include the production of financial instruments as a "service." the question, then, is obvious: is the popular narrative that it is these instruments and the games they play that account for the enormity of financial activity? or is it actually true that the services that actually comprise global control capability dominate the world economy? the latter seems very counter-intuitive, especially if you consider the amount of money that was trading on the derivatives market (220 trillion dollars, or something like this...), and all this. having said this, it does seem like she acknowledges this, to an extent; i would only say that what i've read of her argument does not foreground the parasitism of this fact.

(332): the potential for other global cities, besides the trinity -- the possibility of regional and national markets that need a more locally-oriented site of control capability.

(333): and KEY--her larger argument assimilates the understanding that manufacture and the proletariat, in fact, HAVE NOT declined. "I argue it is these transformations that constitute the shift to a service-dominated economy, rather than the mere fact of a shift in employment from manufacturing to services, a process usually centered on the growth of consumer services. On the contrary, I posit that the period of massive growth of consumer services is associated with the expansion of mass production in manufacturing." [but this does raise the question: why do we need to speak about this as "an economic system dominated by such management, servicing, and financial activities? see page 334] see also discussion below

(333): between the global cities, the emergence of a "transterritorial economy" [though not, at all, a self-sufficient economy, remember--it could not exist without manufacturing]

(334): important--an explicit consideration of the place of manufacturing economy. and again, the implications are bleak, insofar as they portend an increasing divergence between the fortunes of the global city and the nation. "Yes, manufacturing matters, but from the perspective of finance and producer services, it does not have to be national... One of the key points developed in this book is that much of the new growth rests on the decline of what were once significant sectors of the national economy, notably key branches of manufacturing that were the leading force in the national economy and promoted the formation and expansion of strong middle class."

(335): MOST IMPORTANT--new, more severe forms of "increased social and economic polarization" associated with this transformation. and this, of course, may one day call into question the foundations of the new growth, too. "At what point do these tensions become unbearable? At what point is the fact of homelessness a cost also for the leading growth sectors? How many times do high-income executives have to step over the bodies of homeless people till this becomes an unacceptable fact or discomfort? At what point does the increasing poverty of large numbers of workers begin to interfere with the performance of the core industries either directly or indirectly? It is perhaps the social involution that this mode of growth brings about in significant sectors of a national economy that may be more devastating to its own growth than the decline of manufacturing at the national level, since there is significant manufacturing growth globally, and in that sense there is grist for the mill of the producer services complex."

(335-336): and then, also, the obvious tension between the "growth of these leading 'industries'" and the decline of the health of the nation-state (in burgeoning budget deficits due to the decline of national economic sectors)

(336): barriers to entry, which is critical for the absurd hacks who want to transform this into a normative project ("And most cities lack the mix of resources which creates organizational complexity in leading cities. We are entering a whole new phase in the development of urban economic cities.")

(337-338): narrative of suburbanization and the rise of the middle-class in the US; in UK, "social provisioning" in the form of a "national public health system" and "public housing"; in Japan, "massive reinvestment to expand the infrastructure for production rather than that for social reproduction."

(339): a move away from production for internal consumer markets, and towards international markets as symptomatic of the larger shift away from the Fordist phase.

(340): IMPORTANT, even if she doesn't answer it, she is asking exactly the right question, here: "This development [away from Fordism] raises a number of questions about the intersection of economics and politics and about the 'natural' tendencies of capitalist economies. Was the social compact of the postwar period the result of the weight of local politics in a phase of economic development that gave local claims unusual powers? And is what we are seeing today--increased economic and social polarization--the 'natural' outcome of the operation of the economic system when political claims carry little weight?"

(340): identifiying an "ideology of globalism," within which "localities are seen as powerless in an era of global economic forces."

(340-341): important--high-income workers vs. management of these service industries--argument, here, is that there is an important distinction to be drawn between the two. the former have no claims over their places of work; they can be fired at the drop of the hat. they are tied to it through "conspicuous consumption," which "serves a strong ideological function of securing the alliance of these workers." [many questions, of course, but perhaps useful to use this as a way into the question of "productive" and "unproductive" labor -- the argument is that "they are ultimately a stratum of extremely hard-working people whose alliance to the system leads them to produce far more profit than they get back in their admittedly very high salaries and bonuses." but how? is their labor not more destructive, than productive, insofar as they're engaged in the re-distribution of surplus value? or are they actually 'facilitating' the creation of 'surplus-value'? or perhaps these two are not mutually exclusive?

(341): let's not overplay the role of these people, as a mass, in the larger population. she acknolwedges that they are "numerically small", but seems to peg the prominence of a "new social aesthetic" to their rise, nonetheless. i suppose we'll have to admit that this culture exists, of course; though it's prominence is open to contestation. they are certainly not involved in an active "war of position." they don't care about winning "hearts and minds." clearly, with sassen, we are still justified in deriding this as the culture of an unaccountable and seceding elite.

(343): all this, again, seems to represent a "new urban regime" [what does this mean, though--theoretically--for questions re: its stability?]

(344): again, engaging the earlier question of the role of finance--how to make sense of this, exactly? ("This is not to say that finance was unimportant then and manufacturing is unimportant today. Nor is it simply that the financial industry has replaced the auto industry as the leading economic force.

epilogue

(346): there are six sets of debates
(1) re: the global city as model (347-355);
(2) re: place and role of finance
(3) producer services;
(4) relations among cities;
(5) inequality in global cities;
(6) are global cities a new spatial order?

(347): concept of "incipient de-nationalization" -- is this helpful? elites willingly surrendering the state to capital?

(348): no such entity as a single global city--"the global city is a function of cross border network of strategic sites... The global city network is the operational scaffolding of that other fuzzy notion, the global economy."

(349): she is not assuming homogenization--rather, her point is "the development and partial importation of a set of specialized functions and the direct and indirect effects this may have on the larger city."

(349): what work does this distinction do, exactly--"It is not simply a matter of global coordination but one of the production of global control capacities."

(349): she is concerned, after all, with a "whole infrastructure of jobs typically not marked as belonging to the corporate sector of the economy."

(350): "The place-ness of the global city is a crucial theoretical and methodological issue in my work. Theoretically it captures Harvey's notion of capital fixity as necessary for hypermobility."

(350): important--she understands herself as making a "distinction between what is encompassed by the global city model and the larger urban entity called New York... What may have not been stated with adequate clarity... is that the effort... was to understand the impact of the global city function on the larger city, to see whether this impact is beneficial for a larg sector of the population or not..." [i think we can push this much, much further than she has--and then, having done that, doesn't it destabilize much of what is 'formally' advertised in this book?]

(351): one answer to why this prism of the global city is useful (again, though, not because it might tell us about cities, but because it tells us something specific about the global economy): "The concept of the global city introduces a far stronger emphasis on strategic components of the global economy, and hence on questions of power... Overall, I would say, the concept of the global city is more attuned to questions of power and inequality."

(354): speaking, explicitly, of "the global city," as it exists today, as a construction of today--"one of the marking features of the organizational architecture of the current phase" of capitalism.

(358): "indeed it let me to start a major new multiyear project on the role of the state in globalization and the impact of the latter in altering the logic explaining whose claims become legitimate"

(358): acknowledging that 1980s and 1990s "increasingly delinked finance from its role as servicing the 'real' economy." and also that financial turn "is not the first time this happens in recent Western history..." "But in my reading there are distinctive features that differentiate the current phase rom earlier phases."

(360): KEY, responds to the questions I posed earlier--"what is specific about the shift to services is not merely the growth in service jobs but, most importantly, the growing service intensity in the organization of advanced economies: firms in all industries, from mining to wholesale buy more accounting, legal, advertising, financial, economic forecasting services, and so on, today than they did twenty years ago... Cities emerge as important production sites for what are key inputs for firms in all industries."

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

neil brenner critique in "review of international political economy" (1,1, 1998)-- reference point of sassen's concept of "systemic discontinuity" is a static nation-space; she has not seen how the reconfiguration of the state, itself, is concomitant to the same processes that have shaped the city. thus her conclusions about the state suffer because they reify an earlier, temporary form, in effect (he is drawing attention, instead, to regional configurations--not unlike taylor).

peter taylor critique in "review of international political economy" (1, 2, 1994)--sassen misses three things: (1) the focus on three cities is inadequate for an understanding of the world urban hierarchy; (2) her theorization of the state is absent, rigid, inadequate--he wants to mention the possibility that different states will take different tactics re: the production of the global city; (3) her theorization of the 1980s runs roughshod over the realization problem; in effect, taylor is drawing attention to the contradiction of neoliberal restructuring (capital will still need to find a market for its goods). this is why he thinks it is the 1980s that are temporary, rather than the social democratic solution of yesteryear.

Thursday, October 1, 2009

the geopolitics of capitalism, david harvey

(313): the logic of the circulation of capital does not explain everything that happens under a capitalist mode of production. but it is the indispensable condition for the existence of the capitalist mode of production, itself.

(313): IMPORTANT--distinction between "infrastructures" being "functional" for the logic of capital, and being "broadly in support of".

(314): class as a loaded term, but one which can be deployed in the simplest sense--the "class relation" that opens up between buyers and sellers of labor power.

(314-315): similarly, "there are… innumerable other sources of tension, conflict, and struggle, not all of which can be directly reduced directly or indirectly to a manifestation of the capital-labor antagonism. But class struggle between capital and labor is so fundamental that it does infect all other aspects of bourgeois life.”

(315): “a central contradiction”—“The system has to expand through the application of living labor whereas the main path of technological change is to supplant living labor…” We can flag, again, the question of what exactly is explaining crisis, in Harvey; because this sounds like the orthodoxy (falling rate of profit), but it leads him directly to enumerate his (derided?) analytic of overaccumulation (twin surpluses of capital and labor as“manifestations” of this crisis). In short, it is not as simply incorrect as I understand it to be.

(316): KEY: “The historical geography of capitalism can best be viewed from the standpoint of the triple imperatives of production, mobilization, and absorption of surpluses of capital and labor power.” (identical to thinking about it through twin imperatives of ‘logic of capital accumulation’ and ‘logic of class struggle’?)

(317): this point is important for his later “accumulation through dispossession argument”—surpluses are, of course, generated from within the production process, but they also require the parasitism of the mode of the production as a whole (obviously recalls Rosa Luxemburg, this).

(318): given conditions of twin surplus (i.e., a crisis), Harvey wants to draw our attention to the effects on accumulation of those “spatial and temporal displacements” which postpone, but fail to permanently resolve crises.

(319): the possibility of “dynamic equilibrium” across time—i.e., investment in areas that take a long time to mature, precisely because they serve to facilitate the speeding up of other parts of the economy. A nice enumeration of the importance of time to his argument (but can pursuit of ‘turnover time’ be subsumed into the ‘pursuit of relative surplus-value’?)

(320): IMPORTANT—very concrete enumeration of the role of “fictitious capital”: “bonds, mortgages, stocks and shares, government debt and the like... What fictitious capital does is to convert a long-drawn-out circulation process… into an annualized rate of return. It does this by facilitating the daily buying and selling of rights and claims to a share in the product of future labor.” In other words, it enables capitalists to make a regular profit off of investments that would otherwise be unattractive (but which are still, from a systemic point of view, critical—both because it helps the absorption problem, but presumably also because it aids in the annihilation of time).

(321): he is saying that, because fictituous capital and credit make it possible for these “long-term” and “short-term” investment options to co-exist, the possibility of a dynamic equilibrium prevails. But does this not neglect the fundamental insight of Marx, in his reflections on Dept. I and Dept. II (which Harvey mentioned, earlier): you could conceive of equilibrium as a ‘theoretical’ possibility, but the fact that it is all being co-ordinated by the pull of profit makes that fanciful.

(322): regardless, he proceeds to focus on the fact that their displacement ultimately fails, simply because it postpones “obligations” into the future: “what happens, in effect, is that present problems are absorbed through contracting future obligations.”

(322-323): there are two forms this crisis can take: (1) the infrastructures help capitalist production, but the excess surpluses produced in the new cycle of reproduction meet with further absorption problems (since all you have done is displace them through time?) (2) the infrastructures proved useless—the relevant investments devalue.

(323): useful contrast between railroad building in the 1800s, and the post-WWII infrastructure boom: in the former, there were periodic bouts of devaluation, which ‘helped’ capitalism restart. In the latter, though, the State postponed the crisis by simply printing more money—this, of course, raised the spectre of inflation (which can, ultimately, only be combated by austerity measures, unless you’re the US of A! he is, of course, writing after the 70s, so when he mentions the difficulty of capitalism finding a way out, which it partly did (though he’s right to anticipate stagnation and devaluation, the latter has not happened at the scale one would have expected—and that’s Bob Brenner’s argument, of course). In sum: we do need to look more carefully at what is (and what was) transpiring). [see also 339]

(324): having considered the temporal fix (debt/fictitious capital formation), we turn to “space,” about which he will conclude: “The end-result… is that crises become more global in scope at the same time that geopolitical conflicts become part and parcel of the processes of crisis formation and resolution.”

(326-327): Lenin's answer to the 'space'-related lacuna in marxism is to add the "State"--but Harvey doesn't believe, rightly, that the questions about space in capitalism can be resolved into the national scale.

(327): important passage, trying to enumerate the specificity of space—“Is it possible to construct a theory of the concrete and the particular in the context of the universal and abstract determinations of Marx’s theory of capitalist accumulation?”

(327-328): critical—we have to be specific about how “space” matters; i.e., we can prioritize “time,” whatever that means, but the real contradiction arises when we see that “spatial organization is necessary” to conquer “space.” It is to see how this unfolds, and its consequences, that we need the methods of a historical-geographical materialism.

(328-329): here, the concept of “structured coherence” enters, includes: forms and technologies of production; technologies, quantities and qualities of consumption, patterns of labor demand; and supply, and physical/social infrastructures—a certain, specific, coherent material-geographical arrangement of the prevailing relations and forces of production, in a given area (an alternative definition is, simply, a labor market/commuter range, it seems). A “regional space.”

(329): FOUR processes that undermine coherence: (1) accumulation/expansion builds pressures on capital to leave, labor to arrive; (2) revolutions in technology; (3) class struggle; (4) revolutions in capitalist forms of organization.

(332-333): “The result can only be a chronic instability to regional and spatial configurations... The inner contradictions of capitalism are expressed through the restless formation and re-formation of geographical landscapes. ”

(333-334): more, then, on the “class alliance” that emerges to protect this “structured coherence.”

(334-335): is there a problem here?—he is trying to problematize the “national question” via his analytic of the “class alliance,” which seems derived from a very specific understanding of developed capitalism. Can we speak of feudal-hari alliance in Sindh in the same way? Maybe.

(337): his analysis of dependency, tested through India-Britain-US. Britain had an interest in tailoring India’s development to the needs of its own industry (but then, it encountered problems precisely because India didn’t work well as a site of surplus absorption). Certainly, there’s a lot missing from the analysis (consciously so, I suspect), but it’s not uninteresting.

(338): Marx’s “theory of overaccumulation-devaluation,” which reveals the “intense destructive power that lurks behind capitalism’s façade…”

(342): from depression to the Marshall Plan: “It was in fact the Second World War that brought full employment and reinvestment, but did so under conditions where vast amounts of capital stood to be physically destroyed, and many idle workers consumed as cannon fodder. And it was precisely the geographical unnevenness of that destruction that opened up new spaces in the postwar period for the absorption of surplus US capital.“

(343): “The bourgeois era has witnessed a growth in destructive force that more than matches the growth of productive force so essential to the survival of capitalism.”

Saturday, March 28, 2009

This survey showed that (contrary to popular perception) the oil price shocks of the 1970s were not the major source of the developing countries' external debt crisis, although they greatly accelerated that crisis. To the extent that petrodollars contributed to the debt crisis, the blame lies not with those dollars as such, but with the policy responses to them (i.e., policies of "recycling" those dollars). This included policy responses of the advanced capitalist countries, of the lending institutions, and of the borrowing governments. The survey further showed that the major bulk of the immense Third World debt has snowballed as a result of factors exogenous to their economies. These factors included excessive interest charges by the commercial banks, capital flight from these countries, rise in the value of the dollar and the loss of their export earnings due to the depressed prices of and demand for their exports. Debtor nations are not responsible for this portion of the debt, i.e., the portion that can reasonably be attributed to factors exogenous to their economies, and it should therefore be repudiated as "illegitimate."
(...) Whereas in the earlier part of this period the major bulk of those receipts consisted of official capital flows from industrial countries and international agencies, in the later part, especially after the late 1960s and early 1970s, commercial bank lending became the dominant source of those receipts. For example, in the 1960-78 period the official development assistance (ODA) to developing countries decreased from 58 percent of their total external financial receipts to 30 percent, while private bank lending rose from about two percent to about 33 percent. Contrary to private bank loans, the official capital flows consisted largely of grants, concessional loans, and other official loans that were based on long-term, low-interest, or project-related financing. This shift away from official to private bank lending played a major role in the development of the present crisis of the Third World debt.
(...) No doubt the oil price shocks of the 1970s greatly accelerated the process of private bank lending and the accumulation of Third World debt. But to view this accelerating (or contributory) effect as the cause for commercial bank lending, hence for the debt problem, is challenging the reality of those developments. Evidence shows that the shift away from official financing to private commercial lending--the major culprit in the debt crisis, in our opinion--took place prior to the oil price shocks. That is, the expansion of bank lending as a result of these oil shocks took place within the general context of the expansion of bank lending. For example, Kristin Hallberg, using the official data of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, shows that "real private bank lending grew 144%" between the years 1970-1973. Citing Charles Kindleberger's private correspondence (a renowned authority on international finance), she further shows that the expansion of commercial lending "coincided with the 'cheap money' push of 1971, when bankers looked to developing countries for riskier investments to maintain their income."
(...) To the extent that the resulting petrodollars from those price hikes contributed to the debt crisis, the blame lies not with those dollars per se, but with the policy responses to them, the so-called "recycling" policies of petrodollars. In fact, with policies concerned with the health of global economy those massive petrodollars could be viewed as a blessing in disguise: the tens of billions of dollars that were generated as a result of the oil price hikes of the 1970s constituted the potential for the largest primitive accumulation of capital to date which could be used for the industrialization and development of developing countries. That potential could be realized through a combination of measures: (a) direct equity investment from "surplus" countries in "deficit" countries--industrialized countries could provide the necessary technology for this strategy and thus make it a truly trilateral cooperation; (b) development grants from "surplus" countries to "deficit" countries, and (c) recycling the surplus not through the commercial banks but through independent international agencies that would grant long-term, low-interest, development-related loans to non-oil developing countries. Instead, the massive amounts of petrodollars (along with Eurodollars and the so-called "cheap money" of the early 1970s) found their way into the coffers of the big commercial banks and the pockets of corrupt "leaders" of the borrowing countries, which triggered their external debt problem.
(...) Several factors prompted the switch away from multilateral, official lending to commercial bank lending. Most significant among these factors was what might be called a weakening of Bretton Woods objectives... [WHY OFFICIAL LENDING, EARLIER?] Under these circumstances, where the Third World seemed at a cross-roads between capitalism and socialism (or something other than capitalism), the United States set out to block the latter road and coax, coerce, or force these countries to move along the former road. [Of course, this does not mean that the U.S. has now abandoned this policy, but that the policy was more urgent at that time.] Thus its financial assistance to the Third World during this period was primarily based on geo-political and long-term economic considerations rather than short-term, cost-benefit calculations. And this is why the financial flows to these countries at that time were largely in the form of grants, concessionary loans, and other forms of "soft" or development-related loans. The fate of Third World economies at this stage was too precarious to be entrusted to commercial banks...
(...) [WHY COMMERCIAL LENDING, LATER?] By the late 1960s and early 1970s, this pattern of Third World financing changed as private banks began to lend to these countries on a commercial basis. A number of factors precipitated this switch: (a) the Cold war atmosphere and the fierce "East-West" rivalry in the Third World had subsided by this time, (b) most of the socio-political upheavals in the former colonies and other less developed countries had also ebbed by the late 1960s, and (c) most of the developing countries had by now adopted a capitalist path of development. Whereas prior to this time private banks were reluctant to lend to developing countries because their economies were considered too volatile and their financial markets too unstructured, and thus unworthy of credit, these banks now began to lend as most of these countries emerged as sovereign nations whose economies and financial markets appeared capable of absorbing substantial debt on a commercial basis. These favorable economic conditions for private bank lending were further reinforced by favorable political and legislative conditions as OECD countries relaxed barriers that previously hampered commercial lending to developing countries. "Bank lending could [now] be expanded fairly rapidly, without the need to go through the legislative and budgetary processes of national governments."
(...) Commercial bank lending was further accelerated by a "natural" or "evolutionary" process of the accumulation of huge sums of finance capital in the coffers of Western big banks during the three decades of economic expansion and stability since WW II. This accumulation of bank capital was a culmination of several developments: the post-war expansionary cycle of the advanced capitalist economies; the Korean and Vietnam wars, which led to the flow of huge sums of dollars and/or Eurodollars into the hands of banks; the U.S. inflationary monetary policy that began under President Johnson, which led to the emergence of the so-called "cheap money" in the early 1970s; and, finally, the petrodollars of the 1970s. Part of the massive finance capital that resulted from these developments was bound to find its way to foreign lending, especially from the United States, where the Glass-Stegal Act prevented commercial banks from underwriting and selling corporate securities at home. (This also explains why commercial banks there have expanded into all kinds of consumer loans, be they mortgages or credit card.)
(...) As these developments led to bank loan officers roaming the Third World pressing their wares, they also created favorable conditions and big appetites for borrowing in the non-oil developing countries. For the inflationary/expansionary cycle and the accompanying "cheap money," mentioned above, positively affected the economies of these countries: On the one hand, it raised the volume and the price of their exports, on the other, it reduced the cost of their borrowing. "Dollars borrowed today could be paid back tomorrow in cheaper dollars, as inflation ate away their value."
(...) This brief overview refutes the claim that the oil price shocks of the 1970s were the major cause for the global debt problem--although it does not deny their contributory or accelerating impact--as it shows that the process of commercial bank lending and the proliferation of Third World debt started before those shocks took place.
(...) Although the oil price shocks contained the potential for an immense international financial imbalance, and hence the debt crisis, this crisis was not inevitable. The policy responses to the oil price hikes contributed more to the crisis than did the price hikes as such. As far as the policies of the OECD countries are concerned, the flip-flop character of those policies was more responsible for the crisis than the policies themselves. Policy responses of these countries to the first oil shock (1973-74) were diametrically opposed to their reactions to the second oil shock (1979-80).
(...) [RESPONSE TO 1973-1974 SHOCK] The first major concern of these countries in the face of the 1973-74 oil shock was to maintain economic expansion "through joint expansionary policies which would maintain growth....This argument reached its peak in the Bonn summit of July 1978 when the summit countries decided to adopt a locomotive theory of growth, with the major OECD countries agreeing to take action to help stimulate demand." The second major concern was that the surplus resulting from the oil price hikes should be recycled toward the "deficit countries" so that their growth, started since the late 1960's, could also be maintained...To be sure, there was some opposition to the involvement of private banks on the grounds that these banks were not trustworthy in the matters of international trade and finance, and that therefore the recycling of the surplus ought to be accomplished through official, multilateral financing. But the views that favored the involvement of commercial banks prevailed. These included the views of most OECD countries and the international organizations under their control, as expressed through the voices of their finance ministers or central bank officials.
(...) Not surprisingly, the decision to expand the role of private banks and Eurocurrency markets led to an immediate and rapid expansion of both the share of commercial bank lending and of the Eurocurrency markets. Eurocurrency markets expanded in the 1973-82 period by almost six times, from $295 billion in 1973 to 1,689 in 1982. And by 1984, "commercial banks' share of the total guaranteed medium-and long-term debt owed by non-oil developing countries to private creditors had risen to 86 percent." [ The remaining 14 percent consisted of the traditional private debt sources such as bonds and supplier's credits.]
(...) As a result of this easy monetary policy and vigorous expansion effort, the expansionary cycle that had started before the 1973-74 oil shock continued unhampered despite the recessionary or hindering effects exerted by the oil price shocks. The expansionary monetary policies (based on the locomotive theory) in the OECD countries, especially in the United States, positively affected the economies of the developing countries, even the non-oil ones. On the one hand, it kept the real interest rate very low, hence their borrowing cost very low, on the other, it raised their export earnings, both in terms of volume and prices. True, their debt was gradually building up, but there was no danger of a default as the steady growth in income, exports, and higher prices of primary goods during this period were reducing the external debt burden on these countries. Indeed, because of low real interest rates and healthy export growth their debt service ratio (the ratio of interest and amortization payments to export earnings) showed only a moderate rise, from 16% in 1973 to 23% in 1980. [CRITICAL: THE FIRST OIL SHOCK DID NOT GIVE RISE TO THE "DEBT CRISIS"] Thus, the 1973-79 period, the period between the two oil shocks, witnessed a healthy annual growth rate in the OECD countries, ranging on the average from 3.6 to 6.1 percent; in the non-oil developing countries, from 5 to 6.1 percent; and in international trade, an annual average growth of 5.5 percent.
(...) [VOLKER'S RESPONSE TO 1979 SHOCK, AND GENERAL INFLATION] As noted earlier, the policy response of the OECD countries to the 1979-80 oil price hikes was diametrically opposed to their response in 1973-74. Instead of maintaining expansionary monetary policy in order to maintain the level of growth, of income and of world trade, these countries now resorted to tight monetary policy to control inflation. The pronounced, or even dramatic, expression of this new policy was Paul Volker's departure from the 1979 Belgrade IMF/IBRD conference before it was officially over in order to prepare the new monetary policy in October. The new policy created a ripple effect in the opposite direction of the previous period: interest rates shot up, growth slowed down and the recessionary cycle (of 1980-82) set in, and the export earnings of deficit countries began to drop. Interest rates were further increased by (a) the larger U.S. budget deficits, and (b) the introduction of so-called floating rates of interest for commercial lending. The effects of the new policy on international interest rates and world economic growth are shown in Table 1. It is obvious from this Table that while this contractionary policy more than doubled the international average interest rate, it reduced the world economic growth to less than a quarter by the end of 1982.
(...) The trade deficit of the developing countries was further aggravated by the shortening of the maturity period of their debt, on the one hand, and the protectionist policies of the OECD countries (prompted by high unemployment rates), on the other. There has been no alleviation of these factors that negatively affect Third World debt: the OECD countries' protectionist policies continues, the U.S. budget and trade deficits continue, and the demand for and price of debtor nations' primary goods also continues to be very low.
(...) The cumulative effect of these factors was a jump in the debt service ratio of these countries from 20% in 1979 to 33% percent in 1982. The absolute amount of their foreign debt rose from $220 billion at the end of 1979 to 326 at the end of 1982 and 343 in 1983. Despite all the talk about solutions to the debt problem, this snowballing process of debt has continued unabated, and it now stands at about $1.3 trillion. [ARTICLE IS WRITTEN IN 1991]

(...) Only a small portion of the massive Third World debt has actually been received by (and spent in ) these countries. The rest has accumulated due to factors exogenous to the economies of these countries. These factors include the rise in the international rate of interest, the rise in the value of the dollar, the decline in foreign demand for their exports, the fall of the price of their primary goods, and, perhaps most importantly, the flight of huge sums of capital from these countries.
(...) According to Jacobo Schatan's calculations, about two-thirds of the entire Latin American debt in 1985--roughly $450 billion--could be attributed to these exogenous factors, which he appropriately calls the "illegitimate" part of the debt.
(...) The remaining, "legitimate," part of the debt includes what has actually been borrowed (but not fled back overseas), plus the concomitant interest based on the pre-1976 fixed rate of 6 percent. (As pointed out earlier, after 1976 the lending institutions abandoned the previously-agreed-upon fixed rate in favor of floating rates, which ushered in the double-digit interest rates of the early1980s.)
(...) Peter Nunnenkamp's estimates of the effects of external factors on the Third World debt are equally shocking. According to his calculations, the combined effects of external factors on Third World debt in the 1974-81 period amounted to $570 billion, of which interest rate effects accounted for $133.49 billion, lost revenues due to depressed demand for their exports constituted $104.41 billion, and the terms of trade effect accounted for the remaining $297.45 billion--Nunnenkamp attributes about half of the terms of trade effect, i.e., half of the $297.45 billion, to the effects of oil price hikes.
(...) [CAPITAL FLIGHT] A big chunk of the loan money was sent back out of the debtor countries to be deposited, invested, or used to acquire real estate abroad. This has been done by both government and military officials, as well as by private middlemen and businesspersons who usually gain access to foreign currency (through government channels) in the name of project investment. According to an IMF estimate, some $200 billion may have flown out of debtor counties by the end of 1985. Time Magazine estimated that the amount of capital that flew out of three Latin American countries between 1979 and 1984 was about $63 billion (28 billion from Mexico, 23 billion from Venezuela, and 12 billion from Argentina).
(...) [USE OF LOAN MONEY, IN-COUNTRY] Data from the U.S. Federal Reserve Board show that "more than one-third of the combined debt increment of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela between 1974 and 1982, i.e. about $85 billion, was devoted to purchases of real estate and to banking deposits abroad."
(...) But even excluding the part of the debt that is due to external factors, the remaining part, the part that was actually borrowed and somehow spent domestically, was quite substantial, amounting to tens of billions of dollars. What happened to it? How was it spent? What are its impacts on the economic development of these countries? A major part of this money has been spent on consumption, often wasteful consumption of the military and luxury or unessential type, rather than investment and/or production. Borrowing from abroad is not good or bad per se; it all depends on how it is spent. If it is invested in development projects that will yield a rate of return higher than the rate of interest paid for the borrowed capital, then borrowing can play the positive role of initial capital formation for productive investment, without the problem of repayment. This is a pivotal point in understanding the present crisis of the Third World debt: the borrowed funds were viewed not as capital to be invested productively, but as income to be used for consumption, or for financing the government's operating deficits. To the extent that some of these funds were formally invested in development projects, investment priorities and development policies were often perverse: building huge stadiums and sports complexes, buying synfuel plants to supply depressed oil markets, buying national airlines where citizens travel on the back of animals or ox-driven carts, and so on. Some of these pompous, grandiose, show-case projects--often undertaken in the name of building economic infrastructure, or as symbols of "national pride"--went as far as building whole new cities from scratch, such as Brasilia in Brazil and Abuja in Nigeria. "Nigeria is building itself a capital, Abuja, from scratch. The cost, by some estimates exceeds the nation's total sovereign debt of about $20 billion. Yet Nigeria has trouble making interest payments."
(...) A substantial amount of these countries' resources, borrowed or otherwise, is devoted to subsidizing "national" industries and enterprises, largely in the state sector but also occasionally in the private sector. While this policy is pursued in the name of promoting "national" industries, import-substitution, and economic self-reliance, in practice it falls short of achieving these objectives. Instead, by providing easy credit and windfall finances for inefficient and unprofitable enterprises, it aggravates the pattern of inefficiency and perpetuates the lack of competitiveness. It spoils the mismanaged "national" enterprises and their corrupt and inefficient managers by financial crutches. Import tariffs, credit controls, exchange controls and similar restrictions are also often justified by this misguided (or, perhaps, hypocritical) nationalism.
(...) While the purported goal of these nationalizations is that the state sector will play a pioneering role in bringing about a speedy industrialization program, experience shows that other objectives can be detected behind the nationalization thrust: to couple or supplement the political and military power of the state with economic power, to broaden the social base of the state by vesting the interests of broad social layers in the state (through consumer subsidies as well as through employment in the state sector), to provide the state bureaucracy with the opportunity of accumulating their personal fortunes and becoming capitalists in the shadow of the public sector and state capitalism.

(...) Interest payments are devouring a big chunk of the debtors' national income, leaving very little for growth and development. In Mexico, for example, interest payments consumed 46.23% of the government's entire expenditure in 1986 and 56.20% in 1987.
(...) [IN COMES THE IMF, WITH A PLAN!] Debtor countries facing interest payments and balance of payments problems often turn to the IMF for funds--if not for its own funds, then for its mediation to obtain money from other sources, usually from commercial banks. To obtain favorable response to their request for funds, these countries pay the price of allowing their socio-economic objectives to be shaped to meet the policy objectives of the IMF: reducing the size and the role of the public sector in these economies and shifting productive resources from industries that serve the domestic needs to those that serve the needs for foreign exchange to make interest payments. To achieve these objectives, severe austerity programs are usually put into effect in debtor countries: while government subsidies, real wages, and consumer imports are reduced, income taxes and prices are raised. Other IMF-sponsored measures include dismantling of controls that inhibit the export of foreign exchange, especially the payment abroad of interest and dividends to foreign capital, and devaluation of the currency to raise the cost of imports and reduce the price of exports. Instead of alleviating the developing countries' debt burden and other economic problems, the IMF-initiated policies have more often than not aggravated these problems. Efforts to gear national resources to meet the debt obligations have eroded both the standard of living of the majority of population of debtor nations and the industrialization aspirations and development plans of these nations. While many of the burgeoning industries of the 1960s and early 1970s are stalled because of the curtailment of the import of the necessary technology and inputs, a new emphasis is placed on the traditional export industries whose output is largely raw materials and primary goods. This policy, designed to earn maximum foreign exchange in the shortest possible time, is reviving and reinforcing the old pattern of monoculture and rapidly eating away at the natural resources of the debtor nations. Public-sector cutbacks, far from freeing space for private initiative, as the IMF argues they would, has hampered business investment by forcing governments to cut down on essential infrastructure: roads, schools for training a skilled labor force, investment in public health, and so on. Those cutbacks help generate waves of social and political unrest that encourage yet more capital flight.
(...) [INTERESTING REFLECTIONS ON RESPONSIBILITY] As noted, there are individuals and groups on the left who also disagree with the idea of responsibility and "legitimacy" as measures for debt relief, though for a different reason. Their reason is that the "peripheral" countries have for a long time been exploited by the "core" countries of the world capitalist market , and that therefore the entire debt must be repudiated. Our answer to this reasoning is that although the argument of "core-periphery" exploitation is a powerful argument for total repudiation of Third World debt under radically-changed world circumstances, it is not a good one under the present world circumstances (i.e., under the rules of world capitalist market and of the court of bourgeois justice). Under these circumstances, advocates of debtor nations need to show precisely how the debt was generated and accumulated. That is, they need to analyze the debt, to dissect it and break it down into its component parts and identify exactly the source of proliferation of each of these parts. Only in this way can they show the bourgeois judges the illegitimate parts of the debt even by their own standards (i.e., by the standards of their banking regulations and antitrust laws.

While the "core-periphery" exploitation argument correctly points out the transfer of economic surplus and resources from the "periphery" to the "core" of the world capitalist market, it suffers from a number of theoretical and empirical problems. To begin with, it is a class obfuscationist argument. Second (and for this reason) it also obfuscates the question of responsibility and accountability, and thus easily plays into the hands of demagogic national bourgeoisie who frequently point to foreign/external factors to justify their own blunders and mismanagement of the economies under their control (e.g., in the case of the debt it has provided a protective shield for the corrupt "leaders" of a number of debtor countries who are accomplices in the debt crisis). Third, this argument often fails to explain the industrialization and technological impact of the "core" on the "periphery" that takes place under the whip of capitalist accumulation on a world scale--proponents of this argument, largely associated with the Dependency School, either dismiss any such an impact altogether, or trivialize it as simply the development of underdevelopment.
(...) Schatan estimates that if "prices of raw materials had stayed at their 1980 level, export earnings for the 1976-85 period would have been some $25-30 billion higher than they actually were ; had this been the case, Latin America's borrowing needs would have declined by the same amount."