marxism/resistance mp3's, part II
middle east through a marxist mirror, gilbert achcar (2003): very interesting talk, though makes arguments that can only be fully developed in the book of the same name. the underlying thread is that Marxism is going to be tested when applied to a region like the middle east (yet, of course, gilbert is also suggesting that it's important to make that "extra" effort--i would argue that, in truth, marxism always needs to be re-applied, rather than mechanically imputed). the issues he raises: (1) combined and uneven development--trotsky's methodology is critical, as you see the co-existence of the very modern with the very backward (and, indeed, the very point is that you can't make sense of the assemblage of structures without this framework to orient your analysis). but, and this is a point that is undoubtedly better developed in the book, the actually existing conditions in the middle east are very different from tsarist russia. whereas in the latter trotsky read the urgency of permanent revolution into the conjuncture of a weak bourgeoisie and urban petty bourgeoisie counterposed to a concentrated (if small) working-class, in the middle east, achcar's argument is that the urban petty bourgeoisie is much, much stronger (and that the working-class less so). it is the urban petty bourgeoisie that led the national democratic revolution (here he discusses them as an example of bonapartism, which again could not be fully developed in this talk--what he mentions is that, in the form of Nasser, they even went as far as expropriation of the national bourgeoisise--state capitalism), before it collapsed at the end of the 60's. what we are seeing now is what Marx argued--most of the urban petty bourgeoisie will not play a progressive role, but will want to turn back the clock of the history that is crushing them (hence islamic fundamentalism--and this is certainly a major part of the story, as many others have written). (2) achcar also argues that classical marxism needs to re-calibrated if we're to understand rentier states run by individuals or families--the heavy dependence on oil renders them, as those who control the oil rent, autonomous from the prevailing balance of class forces. this, achcar continues, means that the individual psychology of the leaders can play an important role in the policy that the state enacts--in other words, the paramount importance of oil enables erratic behavior (behavior that is not rational from the perspective of bourgeois economic development--i.e., Gaddafi. the state doesn't have to "deliver" to its bourgeoisie). (3) he makes some auxiliary observations about Islam, arguing that it has calcified into something less moldable than Christianity (he makes a strange claim about how christianity was born as a religion of the oppressed, which makes it amenable to theologies of liberation, whereas Islam and Judiasm do not have that character--the trouble is that this seems to neglect the very quick co-option of Christianity (and Islam, of course) as a ruling ideology (i mean that both (a) the imprint of the early years, in other words, would fade; and (b) thus, if christianity can make room for theologies of liberation, so can islam, surely (what about ali shariati?).
emiliano zapata, mike gonzalez (1993): more of an excellent history of the mexican revolution than a summary of zapata's life--gonzalez' narrative centers on the "lost possibility" of the winter of 1914, when zapata and villa found themselves in possession of mexico city for almost two months. after the defeat of general huerta (who had united the forces of reaction to topple madero)--a defeat which owed principally to the stregnth of the peasant armies, gonzalez argues--there was an opening for villa and zapata to cease power; the bourgeoisie was weak, disorganized, and plagued by in-fighting. but--and this is the point that gonzalez stresses--they failed to make common cause with the working-class (and two points are key, which make this "lost possibility" all the more lamentable: (1) the urban working-class existed, and was militant, as evidenced by a strike in 1908 and general activism; (2) the peasantry themselves was comprised of a significant number who worked for a wage, thereby offering a more potent basis for this possible alliance). the bourgeoisie, under the leadership of carranza and others, united to push zapata and villa back to the south and north respectively--they pursued, then, to besiege them for the next few years. these campaigns were a priority for the government, and demonstrated its commitment to a decisively bourgeois economic and political framework--as they encroached upon zapata's domain, they picked off the land he had reclaimed for the peasantry in order to hand it back to the landed elites that had fled the fighting. of course, it goes without saying that whatever was relatviely progressive in the constitution that was eventually consolidated in 1917--owed everything to the activism of zapata and villa.
john rees, the politics and economics of modern imperialism (2007): not unlike david harvey's "the new imperialism," john enumerates a dialectical schema for thinking about imperialism in capitalism. he argues that there are two "threads" to its DNA--two distinct logics: (1) an economic logic--capitalism invariably involves competition amongst different economic units for resources, labor and markets--conflicts which can hardly be limited by geographic boundaries; (2) a political logic--insofar as the modern era is defined by the existence of the nation-state, we contend also with a territorial logic of power, in which administrators are driven by geo-strategic compulsions to exercise control over regions beyond the borders of their own nation-states. while rees contends that these two dynamics have been in operation since the birth of modernity, imperialism has nonetheless developed in the hundreds of years since modernity was born (in other words, victorian imperialism is distinct from today's imperialism--it would be useful to enumerate how, which this talk doesn't do). the modern character of today's imperialism rests on two turning points, the first economic and the second political: (1) 1979, which represents the birth of neoliberal capitalism--the context of course is the petering out of the tremendous growth of the "golden age," in which capitalism both needed and was able to afford the welfare state. to revive profitability, capital sought the famous "three fixes"--neoliberalism, globalization, and financializaiton (he doesn't go into this in much detail, but this argument is there); (2) 1989, which represents the ascent of the neo-conservative vision in the united states--the nutters that advocate imperial expansion. he ends with the critical observation that, while the united states' military might is still unparalleled, its economic power has faded dramatically since the zenith of WWII--where once the dollar's stregnth was unquestionable and america's manufacturing base very impressive, america today is a de-industrializing debtor nation which depends on the oil states and e. asia to hold its dollars (in a sense we are seeing the interdependence and independence of the economic and political in this very fact--capital is fleeing the US, even as the nation-state desperately needs it to stay). the uneasy alliance rumsfeld brokered between the neo-cons and the fiscal republicans led the US into an iraq "invasion-lite" (half the number troops they used in the first gulf war)--but it was, as a result, rees argues, trapped in a unplanned, underfunded invasion of a population deeply hostile to its presence. the iraq invasion, of course, has worsened the fiscal deficit of the US considerably, making its economic position only more insecure (much like vietnam hit the american state in the early 70s). reed concludes by arguing that we are heading towards the definitive end to the american empire--what awaits us, though, we know not.
Showing posts with label egypt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label egypt. Show all posts
Thursday, July 16, 2009
Wednesday, July 15, 2009
marxism/resistance mp3's, part I
robin hood, judy cook (1993): judy cook tries to distinguish between three robin hood narratives: the ruling-class'/hollywood attempt to co-opt robin hood as a disenchanted noble who only wants a better king, the other attempt to portray him as a lawless and aimless bandit, and the third--the one she advocates--which is to put him in the context of the horribly oppressive world in which he matured (roughly by the 1200s you see the first references to robin hood in various literature)--a world in which armed banditry was a terribly attractive form of social entrepreneurship, if you like (freedom from serfdom, etc.). she makes the important, if somewhat stale point, that we couldn't have expected a lenin, insofar as there was no class ready to take over the administration of society (but that's all a bit formulaic, even if also obviously true).
bolivia, andy brown (2008): brown details the revolutionary insurrection from 2003-2005, which came on the back end of two decades of solidly neo-liberal policy ("bolivia as lab-rat for neo-liberalism"). it marked the decisive defeat of national and transnational elite. he asked the question of how to characterize the movement, whether indigenous or national-popular; settled on a developed conception of the former, i think, in the sense that the movement would have been impossible without the contribution of the indigenous campesinos--they were decisive (here some instructive history about how the traditional left in bolivia, in the 50s and 60s, neglected the indigenous movements; this created an opening for their co-option by the military, and thus the downfall of the first revolution). brown is relatively dismissive of what evo morales had accomplished thus far, identifying three key policy areas in which he has not been nearly as radical as the insurrection which took him to power (hydrocarbons--better terms, but not nationalization, land reform--only unused land, which does hurt elite interested in keeping land for speculative purposes, and the constituent assembly--quite insufficient, failing to transcend liberal logic of representation). in sum: the "first revolution of the 21st century," perhaps, but all that energy is, as of now, being only uneasily represented by evo morales in power.
simon bolivar, andy brown (2007): interesting observations about the man's thoroughly liberal commitments (which he "picked up" in Europe). some discussion over how representative he was of the elites' desires around him, which was torn between staying tied to the bourbon monarchy in spain and emulating revolutions on the mainland/to the north. bolivar's liberalism, brown argues, co-existed uneasily with his belief in the paramount importance of a highly centralized state (perhaps this was pragmatic, though), and the danger that he would be caught up in the military, almost bonapartist logic of his own rebellion. nonetheless, he was a believer in racial equality, though the new republics did not emancipate the slaves immediately. all in all, the way in which the contemporary bolivarian republics lay claim to his legacy is, of course, strategic, in the sense that he can only ever represent the bourgeois liberal in his revolutionary role.
who really ended slavery, robin blackburn and weymann bennet (2007): excellent antidote to the official propagandizing around the 200th anniversary of abolition, which celebrates the role of william wilberforce without ever theorizing the context in which this legislation occurred. primarily, blackburn and bennet emphasize that the oligarchical elite in britain were assailed by the revolutionary specter of (a) slave rebellion and resistance in british colonies in the Caribbean, given the fact that in the 1790s slaves in haiti had successfully launched their rebellion; (b) the general rebellions in europe (french revolution, of course) and the american colonies, where a "social contract" was being pursued that exposed the british oligarchy for the reactionary form of government it was (excessively limited franchise, etc.); (c) the explicit anti-slavery agitation of quakers and even working-classes at home, who had launched one of the first mass campaigns against the slave trade. in sum, their hand was forced--they needed to stave off the specter that was haunting their lands (and then, don't forget, they re-wrote this history and deployed it in the civilizing mission--cue leopold and that rubbish).
a people's history of the british empire, john newsinger (2006): the thesis of the talk was simple--"brutality" was a central part of the civilizing mission, throughout. john insisted on the importance of understanding Empire not on the basis of the pretext it provides for its invasions and occupations, but on the objective basis of actual material causes that explain this intervention, the simple barbarity that has always ensued. there are a few examples of this, that are memorable in the worst way: prisoners in the revolting jamaican colonies in 1865 being used as target practice for the new enfield rifle, the obliteration of canton in the second opium war (the fallujah of that war), britain announcing its imminent withdrawal from its seventy-year occupation in egypt on some sixty occasions, the horrors of the suppression of the mau mau rebellion in kenya where some 130 people were hung from the same tree (this is the 1950s, remember).
robin hood, judy cook (1993): judy cook tries to distinguish between three robin hood narratives: the ruling-class'/hollywood attempt to co-opt robin hood as a disenchanted noble who only wants a better king, the other attempt to portray him as a lawless and aimless bandit, and the third--the one she advocates--which is to put him in the context of the horribly oppressive world in which he matured (roughly by the 1200s you see the first references to robin hood in various literature)--a world in which armed banditry was a terribly attractive form of social entrepreneurship, if you like (freedom from serfdom, etc.). she makes the important, if somewhat stale point, that we couldn't have expected a lenin, insofar as there was no class ready to take over the administration of society (but that's all a bit formulaic, even if also obviously true).
bolivia, andy brown (2008): brown details the revolutionary insurrection from 2003-2005, which came on the back end of two decades of solidly neo-liberal policy ("bolivia as lab-rat for neo-liberalism"). it marked the decisive defeat of national and transnational elite. he asked the question of how to characterize the movement, whether indigenous or national-popular; settled on a developed conception of the former, i think, in the sense that the movement would have been impossible without the contribution of the indigenous campesinos--they were decisive (here some instructive history about how the traditional left in bolivia, in the 50s and 60s, neglected the indigenous movements; this created an opening for their co-option by the military, and thus the downfall of the first revolution). brown is relatively dismissive of what evo morales had accomplished thus far, identifying three key policy areas in which he has not been nearly as radical as the insurrection which took him to power (hydrocarbons--better terms, but not nationalization, land reform--only unused land, which does hurt elite interested in keeping land for speculative purposes, and the constituent assembly--quite insufficient, failing to transcend liberal logic of representation). in sum: the "first revolution of the 21st century," perhaps, but all that energy is, as of now, being only uneasily represented by evo morales in power.
simon bolivar, andy brown (2007): interesting observations about the man's thoroughly liberal commitments (which he "picked up" in Europe). some discussion over how representative he was of the elites' desires around him, which was torn between staying tied to the bourbon monarchy in spain and emulating revolutions on the mainland/to the north. bolivar's liberalism, brown argues, co-existed uneasily with his belief in the paramount importance of a highly centralized state (perhaps this was pragmatic, though), and the danger that he would be caught up in the military, almost bonapartist logic of his own rebellion. nonetheless, he was a believer in racial equality, though the new republics did not emancipate the slaves immediately. all in all, the way in which the contemporary bolivarian republics lay claim to his legacy is, of course, strategic, in the sense that he can only ever represent the bourgeois liberal in his revolutionary role.
who really ended slavery, robin blackburn and weymann bennet (2007): excellent antidote to the official propagandizing around the 200th anniversary of abolition, which celebrates the role of william wilberforce without ever theorizing the context in which this legislation occurred. primarily, blackburn and bennet emphasize that the oligarchical elite in britain were assailed by the revolutionary specter of (a) slave rebellion and resistance in british colonies in the Caribbean, given the fact that in the 1790s slaves in haiti had successfully launched their rebellion; (b) the general rebellions in europe (french revolution, of course) and the american colonies, where a "social contract" was being pursued that exposed the british oligarchy for the reactionary form of government it was (excessively limited franchise, etc.); (c) the explicit anti-slavery agitation of quakers and even working-classes at home, who had launched one of the first mass campaigns against the slave trade. in sum, their hand was forced--they needed to stave off the specter that was haunting their lands (and then, don't forget, they re-wrote this history and deployed it in the civilizing mission--cue leopold and that rubbish).
a people's history of the british empire, john newsinger (2006): the thesis of the talk was simple--"brutality" was a central part of the civilizing mission, throughout. john insisted on the importance of understanding Empire not on the basis of the pretext it provides for its invasions and occupations, but on the objective basis of actual material causes that explain this intervention, the simple barbarity that has always ensued. there are a few examples of this, that are memorable in the worst way: prisoners in the revolting jamaican colonies in 1865 being used as target practice for the new enfield rifle, the obliteration of canton in the second opium war (the fallujah of that war), britain announcing its imminent withdrawal from its seventy-year occupation in egypt on some sixty occasions, the horrors of the suppression of the mau mau rebellion in kenya where some 130 people were hung from the same tree (this is the 1950s, remember).
Wednesday, May 2, 2007
rafah crossing:
The Rafah border crossing is one of five ways in and out of Gaza – and a portrait of frustration for many Palestinians trying to get home. It's the only crossing not guarded by Israeli forces. But it has been open just 64 days in the past nine months. Palestinian and Israeli leaders recently began biweekly talks on lower-level issues, including Palestinian arms smuggling into Gaza from Rafah, a town that straddles the border. The US hopes these will lead to discussion of substantive issues like the formation of a Palestinian state.
The Rafah border crossing is one of five ways in and out of Gaza – and a portrait of frustration for many Palestinians trying to get home. It's the only crossing not guarded by Israeli forces. But it has been open just 64 days in the past nine months. Palestinian and Israeli leaders recently began biweekly talks on lower-level issues, including Palestinian arms smuggling into Gaza from Rafah, a town that straddles the border. The US hopes these will lead to discussion of substantive issues like the formation of a Palestinian state.
Saturday, April 28, 2007
deconstructing the shia crescent:
This quadripartite alliance is not confined to Shia actors such as Iran and Hizbullah, but also incorporates the Sunni movement Hamas and a predominantly Sunni Syria, led by a secular Baathist state. Although many proponents of the Shia crescent theory insist, nonetheless, on counting Syria as a Shia state on account of its Alawite regime, such an attempt is an overstretch given the highly disputable classification of Alawism as Shiism among Shia clerical circles. In fact, it was not until 1973 that Alawites were deemed to belong to the Shia sect by Imam Musa As-Sadr, who did so as a political favour to President Hafez Al-Assad. The inclusion of Hamas and Syria in this alliance, means that it cannot be considered Shia or even Islamic in character and composition, but more accurately regional.
(...) The current Sunni-Shia rift is fundamentally a political one that has been fuelled by the ouster of Sunni leader Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the institution of an American-backed, Shia- dominated state. Sunni rage was further ignited by the Iraqi government's highly incendiary execution of Hussein in December last year. While Iran is not feared as a Shia power as such, its support for the Iraqi government and its alleged links with Shia death squads in Iraq has earned it the reproach of many Sunnis and soured Sunni-Shia relations overall. In a similar vein, the crisis in Lebanon between the Siniora government and the Hizbullah-led opposition, has been interpreted by some Sunnis in the region as a flagrant Shia-instigated power struggle which has derailed Hizbullah from its loftier campaign of resistance to Israel.
(...) Having said all this, the scope and intensity of sectarian tensions should not be exaggerated. Even in Lebanon, where the Sunni-Shia divide is only second to Iraq in its rancour, two-thirds of Sunnis do not support Sunni attacks against Shias in Iraq, while almost three-quarters of them do not view the Shia crescent as a reality, according to the findings of a Beirut Centre for Research and Information (BCRI) poll. In the region as a whole, Sunnis do not appear to be anywhere near as concerned as their leaders about Iran's rise as a regional powerhouse and its attendant sectarian implications.
(...) In this connection, Iran's right to nuclear power is supported by 61 per cent of Arabs, according to the results of the Telhami-Zogby poll, although half of all respondents in the survey suspect that Iran's nuclear programme is intended for weapons manufacture. For the majority of "moderate" Sunni Arabs then, a nuclear- armed Iran is a desirable counterweight to US and Israeli military dominance in the region.
(...) Support for Iran also owes itself in large part to its longstanding sponsorship of popular Islamist resistance movements in the region -- Hizbullah and Hamas. Although Arab regimes castigated Hizbullah for its abduction of Israeli soldiers in July 2006, with Saudi Arabia condemning Hizbullah's actions as "irresponsible adventurism", popular Arab support for the movement reached its zenith in last summer's war, given the scale of the Israeli offensive and the resistance's ability to defeat the militarily superior Israeli army. As a consequence, the stature of Hizbullah's secretary-general, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, was elevated to heroic proportions in much of the Sunni Arab world, earning him the title of the "new Gamal Abdel Nasser" for his showdown with Israel. In the Telhami-Zogby poll, Nasrallah was ranked the most popular leader by Arab respondents, while in a BCRI survey commissioned by Kuwait's Al-Qabas newspaper in December, Nasrallah emerged as Sunni Kuwait's preferred leader, with 40 per cent of Kuwaitis expressing their preference for him over other Sunni leaders.
(...) What facilitates the appeal of Shia Islamic actors like Iran and Hizbullah to an Arab Sunni audience is their embrace of the core principles of a once predominately Sunni Arabist movement. Arabist slogans such as resistance to occupation, the liberation of Palestine and the struggle against imperialism for regional independence, resonate well with the Sunni Arab street. While Hizbullah's Arab nationality somewhat mitigates its Shia identity, the notion of a Shia-Persian power becoming the standard bearer of Sunni Arab causes, appears more paradoxical. But judging from the level of Sunni Arab support for Hizbullah and Iran, it appears as though the perceived restoration of Arab pride and dignity that these two strategic players have bought about overrides national and sectarian considerations.
(...) In effect, the much promoted "Shia crescent" theory appears to be far less of a political reality, or widespread social concern, than a card played by "moderate" Arab regimes to whip up fears among their Sunni publics within the context of a wider, US-orchestrated campaign to enlist the support of Sunni Arab regimes in demonising and isolating Iran.
(...) . Arab alarmism is therefore not directed at the export of religious or cultural Shiism but, more significantly, at political Shiism as defined by its anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist, pro-resistance identity. That the US supports Saudi efforts to play a more active role in resolving regional disputes, in a last ditch attempt to eclipse Iran's regional soft power, is indicative of the recognition by both parties of the extent of Iran's influence and appeal among Sunni Arabs. And it is precisely because Iran does not act like a Shia power, with distinctly Shia objectives, that makes it such a formidable challenge to the US and its Arab allies.
(...) On one side of the divide lie Arab regimes, such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as well as recently elected governments, all of which have earned their "moderate" epithets by dint of their alliances with the US and their moderation vis-à-vis Israel. Whether authoritarian or democratically elected, these governments are fully buttressed by the US, and are therefore widely accused of ceding their nation's sovereignty and lacking popular legitimacy. [VS.] On the other side of the divide sits the strategic front represented by Iran, Syria, Hizbullah and Hamas, formed in response to the US- Israeli axis and thus essentially a reactive alliance. As a defensive front, whose central objective is to actively resist US and Israeli political intervention, security/intelligence infiltration, and military occupation with a combination of cultural, political and military means, the most suitable designation for this coalition of forces is the "resistance and mumanaa front".
This quadripartite alliance is not confined to Shia actors such as Iran and Hizbullah, but also incorporates the Sunni movement Hamas and a predominantly Sunni Syria, led by a secular Baathist state. Although many proponents of the Shia crescent theory insist, nonetheless, on counting Syria as a Shia state on account of its Alawite regime, such an attempt is an overstretch given the highly disputable classification of Alawism as Shiism among Shia clerical circles. In fact, it was not until 1973 that Alawites were deemed to belong to the Shia sect by Imam Musa As-Sadr, who did so as a political favour to President Hafez Al-Assad. The inclusion of Hamas and Syria in this alliance, means that it cannot be considered Shia or even Islamic in character and composition, but more accurately regional.
(...) The current Sunni-Shia rift is fundamentally a political one that has been fuelled by the ouster of Sunni leader Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the institution of an American-backed, Shia- dominated state. Sunni rage was further ignited by the Iraqi government's highly incendiary execution of Hussein in December last year. While Iran is not feared as a Shia power as such, its support for the Iraqi government and its alleged links with Shia death squads in Iraq has earned it the reproach of many Sunnis and soured Sunni-Shia relations overall. In a similar vein, the crisis in Lebanon between the Siniora government and the Hizbullah-led opposition, has been interpreted by some Sunnis in the region as a flagrant Shia-instigated power struggle which has derailed Hizbullah from its loftier campaign of resistance to Israel.
(...) Having said all this, the scope and intensity of sectarian tensions should not be exaggerated. Even in Lebanon, where the Sunni-Shia divide is only second to Iraq in its rancour, two-thirds of Sunnis do not support Sunni attacks against Shias in Iraq, while almost three-quarters of them do not view the Shia crescent as a reality, according to the findings of a Beirut Centre for Research and Information (BCRI) poll. In the region as a whole, Sunnis do not appear to be anywhere near as concerned as their leaders about Iran's rise as a regional powerhouse and its attendant sectarian implications.
(...) In this connection, Iran's right to nuclear power is supported by 61 per cent of Arabs, according to the results of the Telhami-Zogby poll, although half of all respondents in the survey suspect that Iran's nuclear programme is intended for weapons manufacture. For the majority of "moderate" Sunni Arabs then, a nuclear- armed Iran is a desirable counterweight to US and Israeli military dominance in the region.
(...) Support for Iran also owes itself in large part to its longstanding sponsorship of popular Islamist resistance movements in the region -- Hizbullah and Hamas. Although Arab regimes castigated Hizbullah for its abduction of Israeli soldiers in July 2006, with Saudi Arabia condemning Hizbullah's actions as "irresponsible adventurism", popular Arab support for the movement reached its zenith in last summer's war, given the scale of the Israeli offensive and the resistance's ability to defeat the militarily superior Israeli army. As a consequence, the stature of Hizbullah's secretary-general, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, was elevated to heroic proportions in much of the Sunni Arab world, earning him the title of the "new Gamal Abdel Nasser" for his showdown with Israel. In the Telhami-Zogby poll, Nasrallah was ranked the most popular leader by Arab respondents, while in a BCRI survey commissioned by Kuwait's Al-Qabas newspaper in December, Nasrallah emerged as Sunni Kuwait's preferred leader, with 40 per cent of Kuwaitis expressing their preference for him over other Sunni leaders.
(...) What facilitates the appeal of Shia Islamic actors like Iran and Hizbullah to an Arab Sunni audience is their embrace of the core principles of a once predominately Sunni Arabist movement. Arabist slogans such as resistance to occupation, the liberation of Palestine and the struggle against imperialism for regional independence, resonate well with the Sunni Arab street. While Hizbullah's Arab nationality somewhat mitigates its Shia identity, the notion of a Shia-Persian power becoming the standard bearer of Sunni Arab causes, appears more paradoxical. But judging from the level of Sunni Arab support for Hizbullah and Iran, it appears as though the perceived restoration of Arab pride and dignity that these two strategic players have bought about overrides national and sectarian considerations.
(...) In effect, the much promoted "Shia crescent" theory appears to be far less of a political reality, or widespread social concern, than a card played by "moderate" Arab regimes to whip up fears among their Sunni publics within the context of a wider, US-orchestrated campaign to enlist the support of Sunni Arab regimes in demonising and isolating Iran.
(...) . Arab alarmism is therefore not directed at the export of religious or cultural Shiism but, more significantly, at political Shiism as defined by its anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist, pro-resistance identity. That the US supports Saudi efforts to play a more active role in resolving regional disputes, in a last ditch attempt to eclipse Iran's regional soft power, is indicative of the recognition by both parties of the extent of Iran's influence and appeal among Sunni Arabs. And it is precisely because Iran does not act like a Shia power, with distinctly Shia objectives, that makes it such a formidable challenge to the US and its Arab allies.
(...) On one side of the divide lie Arab regimes, such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as well as recently elected governments, all of which have earned their "moderate" epithets by dint of their alliances with the US and their moderation vis-à-vis Israel. Whether authoritarian or democratically elected, these governments are fully buttressed by the US, and are therefore widely accused of ceding their nation's sovereignty and lacking popular legitimacy. [VS.] On the other side of the divide sits the strategic front represented by Iran, Syria, Hizbullah and Hamas, formed in response to the US- Israeli axis and thus essentially a reactive alliance. As a defensive front, whose central objective is to actively resist US and Israeli political intervention, security/intelligence infiltration, and military occupation with a combination of cultural, political and military means, the most suitable designation for this coalition of forces is the "resistance and mumanaa front".
Sunday, April 15, 2007
on the 'culture of fear' that underlies the war of terror:
The war on terror has disseminated fear everywhere. Fear is a much greater threat to nations than the most lethal weapons. Fear numbs the mind and sparks the weakest, most cowardly and basest instincts. It makes people easy prey to the whims and follies of demagogues and dictators. It was by playing on fear that Bush could mount his invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. Whenever his project bogs down or he comes under fire, Bush instructs his aides to drum up people's fear of another terrorist attack. This was the climate that smoothed the passage of the Patriot Act and the erosion of civil and personal liberties under government surveillance and secret detentions. This act, moreover, set the model for other governments, which never would have dared introduce a law like it before. Now that the greatest democracy on earth has it, it has become the right of every ruler on earth to impose a patriot act of his own; in our case, to make it an eternal constitutional cornerstone and perpetual font of legislation. The perpetuation of fear has turned back the tide of democracy, stymied the march of liberty, and let absolute rulers rule more absolutely.
(...) [and a boom for business?] But the culture of fear has also sparked a great boom in the private security sector. On top of the slew of already pre-existing security firms -- some transnational -- there have emerged hundreds of new ones, all dedicated to providing protection to politicians, film and music stars, influential families, and the rich and famous of every stripe. With all those guards, hidden cameras and metal detectors everywhere, is it any wonder that everyone is feeling increasingly nervous? Security now means big money. In Iraq alone, some 100,000 private security entrepreneurs are raking in billions of dollars protecting US armed forces personnel and those America installed in government there. The phenomenon is widespread and growing -- here in Egypt, too -- and it feeds on the culture of fear, without the continuation of which some very important and wealthy people would lose a lot of money and influence.
The war on terror has disseminated fear everywhere. Fear is a much greater threat to nations than the most lethal weapons. Fear numbs the mind and sparks the weakest, most cowardly and basest instincts. It makes people easy prey to the whims and follies of demagogues and dictators. It was by playing on fear that Bush could mount his invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. Whenever his project bogs down or he comes under fire, Bush instructs his aides to drum up people's fear of another terrorist attack. This was the climate that smoothed the passage of the Patriot Act and the erosion of civil and personal liberties under government surveillance and secret detentions. This act, moreover, set the model for other governments, which never would have dared introduce a law like it before. Now that the greatest democracy on earth has it, it has become the right of every ruler on earth to impose a patriot act of his own; in our case, to make it an eternal constitutional cornerstone and perpetual font of legislation. The perpetuation of fear has turned back the tide of democracy, stymied the march of liberty, and let absolute rulers rule more absolutely.
(...) [and a boom for business?] But the culture of fear has also sparked a great boom in the private security sector. On top of the slew of already pre-existing security firms -- some transnational -- there have emerged hundreds of new ones, all dedicated to providing protection to politicians, film and music stars, influential families, and the rich and famous of every stripe. With all those guards, hidden cameras and metal detectors everywhere, is it any wonder that everyone is feeling increasingly nervous? Security now means big money. In Iraq alone, some 100,000 private security entrepreneurs are raking in billions of dollars protecting US armed forces personnel and those America installed in government there. The phenomenon is widespread and growing -- here in Egypt, too -- and it feeds on the culture of fear, without the continuation of which some very important and wealthy people would lose a lot of money and influence.
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