Rethinking the French Revolution, George Comninel

(xi-xii): in sum--three guiding principles of Comninel's position on French Rev

1. (a) in contrast with Britain, capitalist class relations did not yet exist in France in town or countryside; (b) the bourgeoisie was not a class opposed to the aristocracy but rather shared with it the essential social relations of property ownership (in land) and state office; (c) consequently, the two were 'partners in exploitation'
2. this partnership was an unequal one -- it was over the 'political' control of the state and spoils of office (army, administration) that a conflict arose that led to the revolution
3. major result of the Revolution was to unify the nation and centralize the state; but it did not transform France into a capitalist country.

(2): Cobban opened the revisionist historiography, refusing to see the French rev as a 'social revolution' (not an objection to analyzing it in terms of social/economic interests)

(6): Lefebvre, on the other hand, saw it as a 'necessary bourgeois social revolution'

(9): an uneasy alliance between Marxists and liberals

(16): three central points of the Marxist perspective

1. the bourgeoisie had been agent of growth in commerce and industry
2. the aristocratic and absolutist structure had been a feudal hindrance to this growth
3. and that the bourgeoisie had led the Revolution in order to overthrow this system, clearing the ground for capitalism

(19): Cobban's three counter-points

1. bourgeois revolutionaries were 'not capitalists'
2. shared in full range of landed income--including portion derived from fedual dues
3. Revolution did not give rise to capitalist production but preserved the essential social characteristics of the Ancien Regime

(20): we have, thus, a 'single elite'

(20-25): int. section on 'conservative liberalism' of the revisionist challenge (for revisionists, what the revolution was about is not the interesting question; they, rather, saw it as their task to prove what it was not about)

(30): by 1850, Marx and Engels had come to the conclusion that the bourgeoisie would not lead a bourgeois revolution, simply because an aristocratic regime held power

(33): Marxism retreated into theoretical 're-mixing' of the history, rather than confronting this wealth of historical evidence head-on (which demonstrated that there was no 'social frontier' separating the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy, etc.)

(50): even Hill, writing about the English Civil War, conceded that the gentry played a large role. for him, the bourgeois revolution is not one which is led by the bourgeoisie (paradoxically, this one was led by the nobility), but one which creates the conditions for capitalism. Brenner takes this further, obviously, noting instead that you get radical and conservative positions within the ruling class leading to Civil War.

(56): Marx's debt to bourgeois materialism ('I did not discover the existence of classes.' [Guizot, Mignet, etc.]) [Comninel's main argument here, of course, is that Marx is giving credit where credit is not due--the 'critique of political economy' actually is a critique of the liberal categories Marx adopted in his early work]

(61): a fundamentally Smithian account of history: 'middle-class industry' as the prgoressive force of civilization, hampered by tradition, etc. Modern, bourgeois progress.

(65): the 'stages' theory is also a legacy of liberal materialism

(68): for liberal materialism, it was the 'mechanistic force of population growth which provided the essential impetus of social development' [you have density-->division of labor, in essence--Durkheim]

(74): key--the 'bourgeois revolution' that Marx imported into his account of history was borrowed from this type of an understanding of the mechanics of history (a liberal class, straining to break free)

(78): against orthodox Marxism -- in which the bourgeois revolution has pride of place (Hobsbawm being its exemplar)

(82): against Structuralist Marxism -- a scientific theory that will be filtered through Marxist categories (but, in essence, Comninel is arguing, these categories that Structuralist Marxism took for granted are flawed). moreover, it is descriptive--can't answer dynamic questions about the MoP, social structure

(106): the question is not whether you had a clash of ideologies in the Rev (you did--'constitutional liberalism' vs 'aristocratic constitutionalism'); the question is whether this reflected a fundamental social clash.

(111-112): 'classlessness' as a common ideology, for all participants in the French Rev (even if in different ways, all clung to some understanding of the 'nation')

(112-113): imp--it proved impossible to defende the Revolution while also attempting to containe the threat of popular sovereignty (explaining its move left) [remember--the argument is not that the 'masses' represented clashing social interest to the bourgeoisie/aristocracy, which is relevant] [one question, here, might be why such a trenchant conflict was fought over political spoils? his point will be the intra-ruling class struggles can be quite profound. do we accept it?]

(117): classes, in liberal history, were not defined in terms of fundamental relations of exploitation--but defined ideologically (active/passive, etc.)

(125): insisting that we remember that HM developed through the critique of capitalism--the critique of political economy

(138): imp--already by 1847, Marx coneived property relatoins as historically specific expressions of the antagonistic relations of production fundamental to each particular epoch.

(139): HM's critique of liberal ideology was to reveal its class content, and the specificity of its concepts

(141-143, 147-148, 150): key-- GI carries liberal ideology within it--division of labor as a motive force, along with increase of production (technical aspects of division of labor predominate, a la Smith; focus is on the social division of labor). two aspects: (1) conflation of liberal conception of class with Marx's own; (2) subordination of history of class society to technical development of division of labor

(151): how can you make sense of the bourgeois revolution, though, without taking into account the fundamental exploitative relationship of the epoch (namely, bourgeoisie/aristocracy with the peasantry)?

(152): Sweezy-Dobb debate--capitalism as developing external to feudalism, versus as an 'internal dynamic' in class history (here Comninel mentions there is a great deal to be said for an intervening period between feudalism and capitalism)

(156-158): critical--distinction between social division of labor, and technical division of labor, in capitalism (excellent line from Poverty of Philosophy)

georges lefebvre, the coming of the french revolution

(vii-ix): translator defense of revolution's necessity

(xiv-xv): imp--different interests of the classes arrayed in the revolution [though here a recognition that there are facts "awkward to a purely materialist theory of class conflict," there's no attempt to rethink the basic categories of 'bourgeoisie' in the way that Comninel demands]

(xvi): the bourgeoisie had to offer something to everbyody--so they seized on the philosophy of natural rights (the philosophy of the 18th century)

(1-2): key--a new class growing within the aritsocratic order -- it was a revolution to restore the harmony between fact and law [as Marx argued--it is in this sense that Lefebvre's is the classic account]

(3): people were not the original force, but events moved steadily in the direction of the popular revolution

(7): clergy owned a tenth of the land

(8): but wasn't much of a class--"the aristocracy meant the nobility"

(9-10): nobility owned about half of the land, from which they collected dues [here he's acknowledging, again, the fact that the bourgeoisie could also own land and collect dues]

(12): nobility of the sword (wedded most to tradition) vs. nobility of the robe (of recent bourgeois extraction, wealthy because offices had high mkt value)

(16): imp--18th century was not just the time of the bourgeois revolution, but it was also the "last offensive of the aristocracy"

(20): Montesqieu's "Spirit of Laws" as the handbook of the aristocracy--arguing for 'bodies' in opposition to the monarchy; a 'liberty' of the aristocracy

(22): debt servicing in 1788 amounted to 50% of government expenditures (couldn't repudiate it because of the Parliaments and the Paris bourgeoisie--who would have forsaken further assistance)

(23): key--"under the Old Regime, the richer a man was, the less he paid. Technically the crisis was easy to meet: all that was necessary was to make everybody pay."

(25): "the character of the King and Queen must be included." [!?]

(27): aristocracy wanted to use the deficit to assert themselves, viz-a-viz the King

(29-30): battle on--around 1787-1788, between the King and the Aristocracy

(33): calling for the Estates-General, but in a way that favors the aristocracy ("a common front against royal power")

(34-37): key--at this stage, the aristocracy was imagining a France without the power of the absolutist monarchy. their model would have been England post-1688 [this is the c-factual Lefebvre raises--"had the aristocracy had their way"]; they had no intention of surrendering their privileges.

(41): key--[in direct contrast to Comninel's conception of them as exploiters,] Lefebvre suggesting that it was only because the bourgeoisie was intermixed with the rest of the population that they could assume leadership of the revolution.

(42-44): levels of the bourgeois class: (1) finance (pg. 42 -- tax farmers, rentiers); (2) merchants (pg. 43--industry, which was subordinate, is grouped here); (3) liberal professions; (4) skilled workers/crafstmen/sans-culottes, who were hostile to capitalism

(46): in short--extreme diversity of positions reflected in the diversity of life; most bourgeoisie were not very well off, and were intimately connected to common people [well, then, in what sense a coherent class, at all? upper bourgeois simply seems to mean non-nobles living off taxes/rent, and lower bourgeois simply seems to mean not proletarian--but what connects the two?]

(47): its imprudence in attacking the aristocracy was driven by a desire to eliminate legal, hereditary privilege

(48-50): int--doing them an injustice by suggesting they were motivated by their own interests alone. have to account for their 'historic mission', their idealism. [hmm]

(52): pivot point--in September 1788, the Parliament of Paris (aristocracy) rules that the Estates-General should be convened as in 1614--the bourgeoisie rebels, and redirects its ire on the aristocracy.

(53-54): the Committee of Thirty

(55): moderation of the 'patriot party', which had no objections to the idea of 'three orders' -- just wanted the 'doubling of the Third' (same number of reps as the nobility)

(58): December 12, 1788 -- a manifesto of the aristocracy, worried about the suppression of feudal rights, etc. [again--useful to think how we might re-interpret this, in light of the Comninel]

(61): November 1788-February 1789 -- the bourgeoisie was becoming 'more radical', in face of intransigence the 'doubling'. moving to question of voting by order or by head, and possibly even getting rid of the privileged orders

(65): Lawyers dominated the election process for the 3rd Estate

(68): representatives of the Third Estate identified the cause of their class with the cause of their nation.

(69-70): Sieyes was both the godfather and a gravedigger (before a pamphleteer and leading light; after the Fall of the Bastille, the popular revolution terrified him)

(72-75): imp--clear that all three orders were unanimously against absolute royal power--however, there were widely different positions on the question of privileges and civic equality, of course [a potential counterfactual, here -- suggesting that an official plan of reforms, akin to the Charter of 1814, could have saved the monarchy. 'but the court remained inert.]

(82-83): May 4, 1789 the Estates-General convenes; June 17, Third Estate takes the name of 'National Assembly'. King/Necker find themselves on the back foot.

(84-85): On June 20 they take the Tennis Court Oath (some reservations)

(87-89): imp--a of June 23rd shows the King willing to become a Constitutional Monarch, which itself shows that everything has moved forward. Decree is moot, because as July approaches the National Constituent Assembly is declared.

(92):imp--things are finely poised, the Assembly expects force to be used to expel them. BUT the force of the people intervened, and the Old Regime "went down beyond recall"

(97): imp--the Army was staffed by people who were suffering on account of high prices, mingling with townspeople, etc. [speaks to some truths about revolutions, I should think]

(98-99): the strength of insurrectionary movements lay with the 'lesser bourgeoisie' (handicraft workers, shopkeepers)

(99): very interesting--it was precisely because of the lack of coherence/organization of the working-class, Lefebvre is suggesting, that the bourgeosie was willing to move so far with the revolution. otherwise you might have had an 1848, is the implication. [this speaks to larger concerns about the 'bourgeois revolution' -- clearly there is some sense in which Comninel's invitation to think through the structure of exploitation has purchase, implicitly, in Lefebvre's account]

(102-105): economic distress (high price of bread, etc.) as an immediate cause of the insurrection

(108): almost one-half of the population (10 million out of 23 million), it's estimated, were in need of relief

(109): the economic crisis was read as an 'aristocratic conspiracy' by the Third Estate, however incorrectly

(114): attack on the Bastille was initially demand for 'arms'

(116): the 'tricolor' was a synthesis (red and blue for Paris, white for the King)

(118): int--a kind of bourgeois 'dual power'; the co-existence of the formal assembly (the common council) with district assemblies (direct democracy)

(120-122): the 'Terror', here, is made sense of through the fears of the 'aristocratic conspiracy'

(125): July 1789, a differential deepening of the Revolution--in some places the local revolution was complete; in some places democratic development was less pronounced; and yet in others the power of the Old Regime remained intact

(126): "France surged spontaneously in a federation of local units."

(127): National Guard was half-hearted in repressing disorder (the National Assembly tried to get people to pay old taxes, etc.-- but it "preached in the desert")

(133): key--Peasantry didn't enter the scene before July 14, despite being 3/4 of the population. Nonetheless, without their adherence the Revolution could hardly have succeeded. They suddenly revolted, and their uprising is one of the most distinctive features.

(132): France vs. England--unlike England, many French peasants were landowners, yet to be reduced to the ranks of the landless en masse (even though there were propertyless peasants, in quite sizeable numbers [confusing]).

(134): the Old Regime was afflicted by a serious 'agrarian crisis', owing to backwardness of cultivation (need for more land, which wasn't available).

(135): property rights remained unquestioned--principle was penalizing enemies of 'the country', not those w/ property [hmm]

(136): key--the peasantry was critical of the bourgeoisie (here he means 'commercial wealth'), but was most aroused to a state of fury by the privileges of the aristocracy [this, obviously, directly refutes Comninel's contention that the two were twin exploiters--unless we are going to make a 'misperception' qulification, which seems fruitless]

(140): key--the 18th century had seen increasing burden on the peasantry, as well as the steady encroachment on the common rights of the peasantry

(142): bourgeois discomfort over peasant agitation over manorial rights (since that was a form of property)

(143): imp--the convocation of th E-G had an enormous impact on the peasantry--one cannot exaggerate the echoes, argues Lefebvre ('the King meant to give them satisfaction')

(144): the idea of an 'aristocratic conspiracy' against a 'good King' [construction of a usable history/present]

(146): the economic crisis had revolutionary consequences, in two ways

1. enflamed the peasants, turning them against the tithe owners and lords
   
2. it generalized a sense of insecurity which was blamed on the aristocracy

(148): the bourgeoisie wasn't spared [hints at the notion of twin exploitation, but not developed]

(157): the aristocrats had hoped to postpone the Declaration--the equality of rights threatened their privileges

(159): events were confirming the principles--"the people were not waiting upon deliberations of the Assembly to realize their desires"

(161): key--strongest hint that bourgeoisie and nobility had common interests [this is the closest we get to a recognition of Comninel's argument that the 'bourgeoisie's' source of wealth was in manors/fiefs, etc.]

(168): imp--only the National Assembly was able to achieve the national unity for the monarchy had long pined.

theda skocpol, states and social revolutions (1979)

chapter 1

(4): definition of social revolutions

1. coincidence of structural change with class upheaval
2. coincidence of political with social transformation

(14): three major principles of analysis need to be stressed, she's suggesting

1. structural perspective (14-18)
2. international and world-historical context (19-24)
3. the potential autonomy of the state (24-33)
   

(14-17): a critique of voluntarism and 'purposive' accounts of revolutions being led by vanguards -- 'revolutionary movements rarely begin with a revolutionary intention' [but then it becomes difficult, if you take this too far, to account for contingency and organization, etc.; surely structuralism can be overemphasized?]

(20): important reminder that the international context is crucial (totality insight) (see 23, structures of world economy, state system; and "world-time")

(22): a State-centered conception of the State ("interdependent with world capitalism"), which demands interrogation.

(27): argument that Marxists and Tilly haven't looked seriously at clashes between dominant elites and State rulers.

(29): in a way, five reasons to care about the State

1. political crises have expressed contradictions in the structures of the Old Regime
2. the protagonists of these conflicts have formed as interest groups around state structures
3. the vanguard parties have been responsible for State-building, without which revolution makes no sense
   
4. social revolutions have changed State structures as much as they have changed class relations
   
5. effects of revolution have been due to the changes in State form, as well

(29): the notion of the potential autonomy of the State [not a new kind of voluntarism? taking the State seriously is a welcome reminder; arguing that it is potential autonomous in a way that Marxists haven't recognized seems to beg all sorts of questions, though]

(32): important--not interested in the breakdown of 'legitimacy', really, as much as the breakdown of the 'capacity to coerce'

(34): Marxists haven't recognized how important the variable of State strength is.

(41): social revolutions as a triple conjuncture

1. incapacitation of central State machineries
2. widespread rebellion by lower-classes, notably peasants
3. attempts by political leaderships to consolidate State power

chapter 2

(48): the fundamental tensions in these three cases were the tensions between producing classes and landed classes, and between landed classes and State (not commercial-industrial classes and anyone else)

(49): [State in feudalism vs. State in capitalism? or is the question simply about State and autonomous sources of revenue.]

(50-51): key dynamic, then--the context of escalating international competition placed pressure on centralized monarchies, who in turn put pressure on their landed elites. in France and China a strong landed class responded by incapacitating the State, in effect. in Russia, the nobility were weaker--however, the State was still unable to carry out the requisite reforms, and it still fell into protracted political crisis.

(51-67): FRANCE

• (54): serious competition putting pressures on royal capacities
• (55): relatively backward agriculture
• (56): a dominant class that was neither 'feudal' nor 'capitalist--surplus appropriation was a melange of rents/dues, but also redistribution accomplished through the State, itself
• (61): revenue problem of the French State
• (64): key--power of the landed elite (she will say their 'political power') prevents the State from moving against them [doesn't this highlight the lack of autonomy of the State, fundamentally?]
• (65): army was reluctant to move against privilege

(67-81): CHINA

• (71): gentry class based upon office-holding and ownership of liquid wealth/surplus land
• (75): key--State was confronted by acute crises (peasant revolts, population pressures) -- but the way in which it repressed these simply stregnthened the hands of the gentry, making centralization/reform/development impossible. And ultimately making the political crisis more acute.
  

(80-81): summary of China/France similarities--useful

(81-99): RUSSIA

• (82): free of feudal shackles--a particularly efficient bureaucracy was possible
• (85): after the defeat in the Crimean War, State successfully implemented reforms (including Emancipation of serfs in 1861, creation of zemstvos, etc.)
• (86-87): important--State moving to expropriate landlords, acquiring its own sources of surplus, which obviously increase its autonomy (passing them out as rewards for State service, instead). becoming less dependent on the landed elite.
  
• (89): important--however, reforms fail to spur the modernization of agriculture [now here redemption payments figure centrally--yet aren't the existence redemption payments a sign that the State doesn't possess the requisite autonomy to eviscerate its landed class?]
• (90): contrast w/ China, where the argument is that the gentry were much more powerful viz-a-viz the State
• (91): Witte's program of crash industrialization in the 1890s (behind tarriff walls, etc. -- laissez-faire didn't work)
  
• (92): industrialization creates grave digger
• (94): key--but, at its root, this didn't solve the problems brought on by international military competition. decisive problem remained the low rate of growth in agriculture.
  
• (95): 1905 vs. 1917 is simply a question of differential state capacity. State can repress in 1905 because troops are back by 1906. this is not the case in 1917.
  

(99): summary passage for France, China, and Russia re: Old Regimes

(100-104): Meiji Restoration in Japan--why?

1. absence of a powerful landed upper class in Tokugawa Japan
   
2. no breakdown in State capacity--this was a revolution from above
3. bureaucratic reforms were pursued (as in Russia), that were successful in ensuring economic take-off (unlike Russia)

(104-109): Prussian Reform Movement--how come, given Prussia had Junkers?

1. a better-organize bureaucracy--upper-classes didn't infiltrate the State apparatus [seems crucial to the explanation]
   
2. upper-classes made a pact, with the State, in effect--they were willing to surrender kingdom-wide authority
3. emancipation in Prussia succeeded in modernizing agriculture, because Prussia had large, commercially-oriented estates (unified management pursued innovative techniques, etc.)

(109-111): chapter summary

chapter 3

(113): peasants as protagonists -- their revolt was a necessary ingredient, but urban workers' revolt was not [dubious--could Russia have been consolidated without an urban workers' challenge?]

(115-117): thesis--Skocpol focusing on three factors

1. the kinds of solidarity of peasant communities
2. degreees of peasant autonomy from day-to-day supervision
3. relaxation of State coercive sanctions against peasantry
   

(118-128): FRANCE

• (123-124): in short--1. creation of collective communities (see also 126), through cahiers; 2. disorganization of upper strata; 3. lack of repressive capacity, of National Assembly; 4. urban forces against 'aristocratic reaction'
• (127): important--the Revolution stregnthened private property and individualism--agrarian revolution of 1789-1793 left peasants more divided (unlike Emancipation of Serfs in Russia)
  

(128-): RUSSIA

• (129-133): 1. emancipation left serfs worse off, bogged down by redemption payments; 2. obschina remained form of land tenure, thus collective institutions were still strong; 3. many were still rentiers, and thus in a very precarious economic situation; 4. the mir was the center of political authority, as emancipation reduced the serfs political dependence on the State.
  
• (133): area was ripe for rebellions, all that was needed was end to coercive controls--which happened in 1917
• (135): Stolypin reforms--noticed communal institutions, but didn't really work
• (137): France vs. Russia [in France they respected private property, etc.; in Russia it was levelling--but this has everything to do with political leadership, it would seem to me. to suggest that this is determined by economic structure seems problematic. it could only be the case if 'collective institutions' didn't exist at all in France, and they existed everywhere in Russia. otherwise something else is doing the work, no? certainly she notes other factors. but surely political leadership must be one--and maybe the most important? would 'levelling' have happened if the Bolsheviks hadn't existed to recognize the seizures?]

(142): in England you had a revolution that didn't displace a landed upper class, that didn't trigger widespread peasant revolts--b/c, she's arguing, of (1) enclosures. capitalist agriculture made it not possible; and (2)no peasant-run village assemblies in England. much weaker collective institutions.

(145-146): in Prussia you didn't have successful peasant rebellions because of the State's capacity to repress peasant rebellions. moreover, E. of the Elbe you had Junkers who didn't give the serfs any breathing room--serfs had fragmented landholdings, and landlords had a monopoly on administrative sovereignty.

(147): CHINA

• (148): in China, collective identity and freedom from landlord control had to be created ('base areas')--they didn't prexist the revolutionary interregnum.
• (149): both collecitve institutions, and freedom from sociopolitical control were absent, in effect.
  
• (151): in previous rebellions, peasants had to be led by gentry--they didn't have their own communal institutions
• (152): the Chinese gentry were strong, but now they're being portrayed as locally-centered. capable of undermining the State but incapable of providing unified administrative apparatus. [it feels like everything is going on at once--will need to think about this more--is this fair?]
• (153): CCP leadership is critical [again, we can ask why this isn't the case in Russia?]
  

(154-155): summary of Part I

Chapter 4

(168): Revolutionaries as 'state-builders' [very slippery slope]

(170-171): argument that revolutionary ideologies are immaterial to the analysis of the post-Revolution [extremely problematic]

Chapter 6

(207): key--in Russia, the liberals were much, much weaker than in France [is this not a permanent revolution argument?]

(210): liberal incapacity, in short

(211): important--peasant incapacity, too -- couldn't constitute a new national order, by themselves [but this is precisely why revolutionary leadership is important, in all cases. shouldn't we look here for differences between France and Russia, as well, for example? (as mentioned earlier)]

(214): a deceptive presentation of the disbanding of the Constituent Assembly [precisely because she's decided not to think seriously about the principles behind it--the default interpretation for everything is for 'reasons of State']

(221-225): Skocpol's presentation of NEP and the scissors crisis (argument, here, is that Bukharin's proposal was impossible b/c of lack of market legacy; Stalin's proposal was necessary, but was bound to come at massive cost). [whatever else there is to say, have to push back on the attempt to link this to the Old Regime--surely 'habits' don't matter as much as the 'scissors'. if you give them prices, they will produce.]

(224): ridiculous to say that the quasi-psychological 'need' for was driving the alternatives

(226-227): consolidation of State-Party system

(227): upward mobility

(228-229): fate of workers and peasants

1. trade unions neutered by 1928
2. living standards deteriorated markedly in the 1930s
3. collective farmers for peasants, where they were intensely exploited
   
4. high food prices to extract surplus from workers

(230-231): hierarchies and coercion were re-established

(232): in sum--all of this were the imperatives that confronted a State under international pressures that needed heavy-industrialization, but was presiding over a predominantly agrarian society

(233-235): notes that all this brings back bourgeois/proletarian distinction. but her contribution is to stress that this unfolds in a context. [fair enough--but you've set yourself a strawman.]

- - - - - -

(1) her structuralism/voluntarism discussion makes it very difficult to have any serious room for (a) contingency and (b) organization in the argument.

(2) "the potential autonomy of the State." it is unclear what role, exactly, this is playing in her argument. empirically, the analyses of the Old Regime, to my mind, prove precisely the opposite--that in all of these cases, the State is unable to move against its landed class successfully (in France and China it doesn't; in Russia it does but the reforms are ineffectual). theoretically, the question is obvious--insofar as the State requires resources, it can't have total autonomy until it has autonomous ways to extract surplus. the extent to which this is true about the three cases is hard to establish, but this should be recognized. why should the capacity of the State rise and fall with the 'political' power of landlords (i.e., whether the gentry have been integrated into the state apparatus, as in France and China)? why not with their economic power?

(3): her discussion of peasant 'community' seems hurried. isn't it difficult to generalize across nations? see pg. 137 discussion of France and Russia, post-revolution, where she clearly neglects political leadership as one of the factors. why, when in Russia these communal institutions are limited to one part of the country (C. Steppes) does agrarian revolt of a 'leveling' kind take place everywhere? are the other factors not doing more work? [she acknowledges the critical importance of the CCP, remember--though the implication is that this is exceptional]

(4): her treatment of the scissors crisis is poor, insofar as she harkens back to "Old Regime" legacies rather than contemporary factors. we need to foreground the actual dilemma.

(5): strawman treatment of the bourgeois/proletarian distinction (re: political leadership, again), on pp 233-235.

(6): deceptive presentation of the disbanding of the Constituent Assembly, precisely because she's decided to not take revolutionaries' aims seriously. it's fine to say their confronted with competing imperatives; but it's ludicrous to say that everyone can be understood as a State-builder.

lecture 3, "centralized state and republic"
john merriman

-----

two things: (1) centralization of the state, and why paris as center; (2) why the "miracle baby," Chambord, did not become King of France--why did France end up a republic, and how?

-----

the role of Paris is unique in European history--and it still is this way, despite various decentralization proposals. it is the most centralized state in the world, according to professors.
(Spain, Germany all examples that have two or three balancing cities, at the very least. Even England, with industry in the north in Manchester, etc.--the economic centers, etc.)

the role of Paris, in sum, is special, and particular to France.

("Paris in the French Desert"--where else, but in France, would so much of the population be considered provincials, in a deeply condescending way.)

-------

One of the reasons that Paris' role is so great in France has to do with the way that the French state was constructed, the way it was centralized (you only hear people with Parisian accents on the radio, even in other regions, most of the time--always people with Northern accents).

Balzac articulated the way that Parisians view provincials (dominated by role and monotony, like "frogs at the bottom of their puddles"..."they don't think about things that are serious")

One of the key economic indicators of this dominance: Lyon, France's second city--its principal bank moved itself to Paris in the 1860s!

------

How did it get this way?

All states centralized, but why Paris is so uniquely centralized?

In Europe in 1500, you had about 1500 independent, territorial states. State-making, of course, was one of the central processes in early modern European history. Unification of Italy (1850s and 1860s), Germany (1871), of course. States developed their ability to extract resources from the provinces.

In the 16th century, Paris came to be France's capital ("absolutism": in the 17th century, European rulers expand their abilities to extract resources from ordinary people, expand their reach to other provinces).

Louis XIV (the "sun-god") sends people out in the provinces to do his well--they negotiate with local nobles, etc.--but ultimately, the only thing that matters is that this increases the power of the state (it's at this time that the standing armies of the central, absolute monarchy become enormous).

And along comes the French Revolution, which seeks to rationalize the administration of France. So, before, where you had to pay tolls in many parts of France, different weights/etc., they try to strengthen the center. And because their rivals are the nobles and the Church, they opt to base their administrative center on Departments.

They become strings which reach out from Paris into the different Departments--the three things that any resident of the provinces sees, then, are the ministry of war, the ministry of justice, and the ministry of the interior.

Created in 1790, and they still exist (the only major change came in 1860, when the departments around Paris were consolidated due to the city's expansion). Most are named after rivers.

The point is: in order to defeat its enemies, the revolution centralizes the State.

And next, of course, Napoleon makes state centralization even more important, as he seeks to consolidate his power.

Similarly, the Second Empire (1852-1870), his nephew (Napoleon III), uses centralization as a tool of the state, to consolidate his own power, and to undercut the residual influence of the nobility. If you wanted something, it no longer made sense to go to the local notable--the patronage of the Empire (the Center) is key, as he can provide railroads, schools, etc.

You have economic processes that clarify the power of the Center, in sum. The state can authorize economic processes that make a city (railroads, bridges, factories, etc.). The evolution of banking, as well, which further consolidates power in Paris (the State financial institutions are in Paris, and they can direct investment).

If you look at a map of the railroads, in France--all roads lead to Paris. Trains reinforce the predominance of the capital city. (Turbo-Prof, a name for somebody who lives in Paris, and teaches outside of the city, but is desperate to live in Paris. This is bad, of course, because it destroys local university life.)

The 19th century, then, accentuates all of this. (Prof reading an absurd definition of the "provincial" from the Larousse dictionary). (De Gaulle, as a further example of this, which we will talk about later: "How can you govern a country that has 440 different kinds of cheese?")

It is illegal, in France, to use names that are not officially approved.

What has not changed, in Paris, is the capacity of the center's ministries to influence life in the provinces. (In the 1980s, there were huge demonstrations favoring Catholic Church against the diktats coming down from Paris with regards to content of education).

There is no other country, in the post-communist world, where so many people work for the State. (Prof's aside: it's entirely untrue, of course, that public services don't work).

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All this, of course, becomes a salient question in debates over Europe, and the EU constitution. We will talk about this later, but prof is arguing for a vote against--"I know of no one, except professors in Paris and Lyon, who would have voted for it"

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How did this happen?

In February of 1870, you had a monarchist-dominated Assembly, elected, in which rural regions (Brittany, Normandy, etc.) wanted the restoration of a monarchy. Why does that not happen? Why did it become the Third Republic (1875/1877-1940)?

A story of decisions taken by individual people (old-style history).

There was a miracle baby (part of the Bourbon royal family), Count de Chambord. In 1820, his father was assasinated, by a liberal, who wanted to extinguish this royal line (the Bourbons, who had been restored in 1815-1830).

France goes into great mourning, because the heir to the French throne is dead.

And then, lo and behold, it turns out his widow, was pregnant! And as the country holds its breath, the baby was a boy. A miracle baby! ("Henry V")

Unforunately, he was sort of a "sad sack."

Now, there were the Orleanists, who, under King Louis Phillipe, were in power from 1830-1848, and seen as "progressive", bourgeois-liberal monarchs. Carried an umbrella! He is chased from the throne in 1848--but he had helped modernize the economy, and did not restore the Church to its original power.

Whereas the Orleanists were sharp, then, Chambord was thick as a brick.

When France collapsed after the war with Prussia, it seemed to the monarchists that their ship had come in. It's easy to make fun of Chambord, of course, but there was a strong royalist movement--and it wasn't just people looking backward. He himself said he didn't want to be a king of the old regime, but to combine monarchy with modernity.

You have to imagine him after the Commune--he comes to Paris, had never been to the city. And he goes around as a tourist. He has an entourage, but there is this tradition of popular royalism--of people who wanted the King. There was a close association, of course, between the King and the Church, so there was support in the religious regions (he has made clear that he will restore the church to its rightful place of privilege). And he stands to benefit from the religious revival of the 1870s (after crisis, religious revivals--just like after the French revolution).

But it's hard, if you're 47 years old, and you're a pretender to the throne. He had a royal accident (broke his leg), he was himself a large man. He was a big-time gambler.

Viewed hereditary monarchy as a unique form of "salvation" for France. The key, of course, to his authority, as well, is the nobility, who have been disenfranchised since the revolution (the State had been winning the battle against its nobles). Elections in the 1880s bore out the fact that this was generally popular.

This did not stop nobles from believing that had they run in elections, they would have won, on behalf on the monarchy.

Chambord, though, when disaster came was not ready, in sum. He issued anachronistic manifestos, etc. Even still, for all his limitations, he was a man of faith and loyalty to his principles. In 1789, when the Bourbons were deposed, the family's white flag was replaced by the Tricolore. Chambord refused to compromise on this principle, which was the flag of the revolution that had killed his family members. And he didn't agree, either, to the sucession of the Orleanists after his death (Chambord didn't have any children: "Without my principles, I am a fat man with a big limp"(!)).

And so, Franch, lurched into the Republic of the Moral Order. In 1875, there's an amendment to the constitution that transforms France into a republic (won by won vote). In 1877, a General tries to overthrow the Government--but fails to do so, and by the early 1880s, the Republic is consolidated. And most people wanted it--its social base was the new middle class, and the workers. Some peasants in the south, of course, were still in favor of a monarchy.

The executive is fairly weak--real stregnth lies in the assembly. This does not mean that the State is not strong, at all. A very controversial decision of this centralized government comes in 1905, for separation of the Church and State.

The State becomes the new vehicle of economic, cultural, political patronage--replaces the nobility, the Church, and the monarchy that most people did not want.

lecture 2, "the paris commune and its legacy"
john merriman

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hung over Europe for 20, 30 years following it -- "in my view," the massacre that followed the commune anticipated the 20th century, where you became guilty for simply who you were (you were guilty if you were left in paris)

it was the largest massacre until the armenian genocide (in europe, only?)

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what was it?

has to be placed in two contexts

(1) in the context of the regime of napoleon the third -- which lasted from 1852-1870 (when he was rounded up by the Prussians). in the late 1860s, there was a revival of republican, socialist, and anarchist organizations -- in 1868, the emperor legalizes public meetings, and you had these in cafes and large warehouses. people were agitating for democratization, etc. -- so, a wave of political mobilzation.

in 1870s, there was a wave of strikes, which had previously been illegal--unions would in fact be illegal until 1881.

(2) the franco-prussian war, napoleon the third gets suckered into a war without any allies at all, against otto von bismarck (the prussian chancellor). it involves the candidacy of a royal family member for the candidacy of france, which would have left the empire surrounded by the prussians. napoleon protests vigorously, and his ambassador abuses bismarck's envoy(!). bismarck reveals to the european world that napoleon had earlier tried to make a deal, intolerable to the british.

so, in sum, they go to war, in the summer of 1870 against prussia, expecting to win. he was, though, "blown out"

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on september 4th, 1870, a crowd storms down town hall, and want to prolong resistance against the prussian army, which is routing the french. napoleon the third is very sick anyway, soon to die, he is captured in the battle of sedan and sent packing to britain.

there are those who want to keep fighting--one of the demands of prussia (german empire will be proclaimed in late january, in versailles) is that there be a huge indemnity that the french will have to pay. and that alsace and loren, the eastern, german-speaking provinces, would be annexed by germany (and these were two of the most prosperous, industrialized provinces of france)

so, in sum, people in paris find themselves surrounded. there is a wall around the city, keeping out the german troops. elsewhere, resistance is sparse--in metz, in october, a general capitulates to bismarck.

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to be sure, there were lots of crowds in paris who were shouting for war, which was surprising, in a sense. but the siege goes on, and on.

paris changes appearences--military dress, uniforms become increasingly visible.

there is the problem of food, how to feed all these people. you have enough for only a month, or so (you are fine in terms of drink, b/c of wine cellars). they use balloons! a symbol of liberty, but presumably this is not exactly sufficient. (there were 65 baloon flights, carrying about 20,000 pounds. pigeons are used to fly messages out, germans bring in falcons to munch the pigeons!)

there were some massacres, in the north-east, but nothing like paris would see in 1914, or 1939-1940.

the national guard from the outskirts took refuge, so a bit like a medieval siege.

you have 2,000,000 people, in total (a smattering of foreigners). the population begins to eat animals--dogs, rats and cats. canine butchers replace horse butchers, animals in the zoo were eaten, etc.

bismark had projected that the siege would end, eventually -- but paris creates a committee of sobriety, and encourages people to eat healthy!? these are the fancy folk.

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it ceased being funny, of course. hunger sets in, even if it was nothing like the siege of leningrad, where 1,000,000 died -- but there were people dying, etc. and venereal disease was rampant, as was drukenness, mental illnessess.

attempts to break out do not work. (there is a contest to see "how we get out"? two suggestions: (1) prostitutes are a resource for paris, they should be used to seduce and poision prussian soldiers. (2) take the orchestras of paris and teach them to play german music--one day they would march out and play this music, with a huge trojan horse behind it!)

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as things are going downhill, people start to say we must fight, but we need to unite to imagine a new world. in january 1871, a red sign is put up (red was illegal between 1849 and 1851, because it was believed to excite people!), saying "make way for the commune."

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france capitulates at the end of january 1871 -- the prussian cavalry trot down the champs d'elysses symbolically clean up the stones, etc., and france is all set to lose the war. france has a provisional government, much of the provinces return a monarchist assembly. the landlords come back to paris, and tell the people to pay back money with interest (pay back the indemnity).

and so people are incredibly angry.

theirs, expecting paris to rise, possbily, sends troops to mon matre(sp.?), because the national guard of paris has still got its guns. these troops go to disarm the national guard, but the guard is alerted--they take two commanders from the troops, and they shoot them.

thiers is now ready to "get these bastards."

and now, paris is surrounded again, but by troops of the provisional government.

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and so the commune begins (march 18, 1871). it will last until the 2nd of may, 1871. (lenin calls this the "festival of the oppressed")

so, for the first time, ordinary parisians find themselves masters of their own lives (the population of the city is swollen with political refugees). as in the french revolution, and 1848, clubs of women begin to form, demanding their rights.

all sorts of impressive social legislation is passed. (secular education system, nurseries for women workers, uniform contracts for female unions, ban night-baking).

this also explains, in part, the viciousness of the massacre of ordinary working women. they were seen as "uppity." many of the important communards are women.

you have the jacobins (republican socialists from the revolutionary tradition), you have the anarchists, you have moderat republicans (who simply desire more liberty vis-a-vis the centralized state), you have moderate socialists.

there are debates, meetings, arguments, etc., as the guns draw nearer.

there were communes in other cities, as well, with a variety of demands. paris keeps waiting for these armies of citizens to come and rescue it.

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within paris, you have poorer people invading the fancy areas, for the first time as independent citizens.

an artist calls for the tearing down of the statue of napoleon, as a symbol of centralized oppression.

for once they had won.

they had to defend paris, of course. cannons, they have. they build these huge barricades, a tradition that stretched back to the 16th century (of course, you can build barricades across smaller streets, but not really across big boulevards--and that was part of the rebuilding of paris in the 1850s and 1860s).

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who were the communards?

when revolutions are victorious, of course, everyone says "i was there!"

here, you have a body count, of more than 15,000 people. they were the ordinary parisians who couldn't get out, basically -- they were the poor socialists, anarchists, republicans, etc. their defence of paris reflects tensions between urban and conservative, rural france--the army that they were fighting was largely recruited from rural areas.

and so the commune is basically proletarian--people from the working quarters. artisans, craftsmen, domestic servants, etc. and they were trying to imagine a world in which they could rule.

prof argues it reflects the artisinal base of the french economy at that time.

the myth of the commune--for the conservatives, this was the "fury of hell", those who rose up to slay their social betters. for the republicans, this was a defense of the republic against the monarchy, restored (which is partly true, of course).

for marx, lenin--this was armageddon for the ruling class. though not marx's industrial working-class, of course, but a very different kind of working-class (semi-proletarianized, prof is arguing). this of course informs the "breaking of the chains" argument; testing the "dictatorship of the proletariat"

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the most important result, however, in prof's opinion, was the massacre itself.

the troops came in through the western gate--they use the boulevards that had been built by napoleon the third as a way of getting to the working-class areas (those areas that had always risen up). hausmann, of course, was the man who had plowed through working-class neighborhoods, that had once lain where those boulevards now are. he did it to bring more light, to bring more air, to free the flow for capital, and because you can't build barricades across the boulevards.

so the troops come pouring in, across boulevards that had been built in the 1850s and 1860s. and the damage was staggering.

and then the women were put on trial--there was a rumor that women had been burning down fancy houses. and so this rumor was part of the fear of "uppity women." and they squished them like grapes.

they shot them all.

in the end, there was a paris in which everybody had been guilty.

chimney sweepers were executed because they had charcoal on their cheeks; they would rip of your shirts, to see if you had any bruises from recoiling rifles; it wasn't a "neutral" massacre, they went to the radical areas, and that's where they went in and massacred the populations.

"why don't you get over this?" this was the ultimate lesson of the commune, which would hang over europe. it was a sign that the state was strong, and can be vicious. don't let anyone tell you that the victims of terrorism are equal, in number, to the victims of state terrorism. but this was the real lesson--the state was growing in power with napoleon, unification. the state could strike back with unparalleled savagery. and that's what happened at the commune.

minimum 15,000 died, probably closer to 25,000. (when they did the census in 1872, in paris, there were 10,000 less shoemakers than there had been before--an extraordinarily radical trade, don't forget). flames engulfed the bodies, they were gone, lost to history.

amnesty for the communards would come in 1879. but the massacre hung like a shadow over french and european politics, for years and years.

sarkozy taking france back to 1789:
In his victory speech, he vowed to “rehabilitate work, authority, morality, respect, merit”. Whether it was used deliberately or subconsciously, “rehabilitate” is an interesting choice of word, because it carries the implication of bringing back into vogue something that existed in the past. You will seldom find its proponents acknowledging that the neoliberal “reform” process falls squarely in that category, for it is based on the assumption that rapid “growth” and “wealth creation” are contingent on further empowering the owners and controllers of capital while wresting from workers many of the rights that were gained after long and arduous struggles.
(...) Trade unions tend to sell out, or become so bloated and bureaucratized that they lose the respect and allegiance of their members. But those that continue to serve their historic purpose of agitating and bargaining for better conditions face the wrath of the entrepreneurial classes: they are dismissed as relics of the distant past and as hurdles to “progress”. From the capitalist point of view, the ideal solution to the nuisance posed by organized labour is legislation that strips it of its powers.
(...) So much, then, for the legacy of May ‘68. It was, in fact, liquidated long ago. Sarkozy isn’t inheriting a socialist state any more than Royal would have sought to create one, had she won last Sunday’s election. France does, however, retain elements of the welfare state. As Tony Judt commented in The New York Times a couple of weeks ago: “The dysfunctional French social model, we are frequently assured, has failed. In that case there is much to be said for failure. French infants have a better chance of survival than American ones. The French live longer than Americans and they live healthier (at far lower cost). They are better educated and have first-rate public transportation. The gap between rich and poor is narrower than in the US or Britain, and there are fewer poor people.”
(...) European social democracy has been in decline for decades: most of the parties associated with that label have convinced themselves that there is no alternative to neoliberal economics and, furthermore, that deviations from the capitalist path are indefensible on the electoral battlefield. No one exemplifies this trend better than Sarkozy’s friend and admirer Tony Blair. The centre has shifted, making it simpler for conservatism to slide towards extremist variants of the creed. Sarkozy, with his appeals to nationalist pride, is one of the consequences. If the drift continues, it is not inconceivable that the far right in Europe will before long acquire “respectability” of the sort it hasn’t enjoyed since the 1930s.
(...) There is a small possibility, of course, that the reality of power will moderate Sarkozy’s crypto-fascist tendencies. However, given that their new president appears to have little time for notions such as liberté, egalité and fraternité, it’s more likely that the plurality of French citizens will sooner or later find themselves rallying to defend not the legacy of 1968 but the spirit of 1789.