(3-8): political society, civil society, and the State -- too much focus on 'civil society' to the exclusion of political society; we need to make a distinction between 'liberalization' and 'democratization' (latter encompasses former)
(10): stressing military's own institutional interests, vs. Poulantzas' conception of 'relative autonomy' of State
(11): military is demanded where 'hegemony' is absent (following Gramsci and Weber) -- in other words, a 'specific' attnetion to the military is critical [this is a decent start at conceptualizating the Ayub period, no doubt--but not clear if it gets us much farther than we already were.]
(15): "the new professionalism"
(17): '68-'72 most repressive period, under Medici
(19-20, particularly in Brazil p. 25): autonomy of intelligence agency [q. about ISI, here]
(28-29): abertura begins in 1973 -- throughout this period, he's aruging, you see institutional obstacles to the 'opening', where it is argued that 'social conflicts' don't permit democratization
(30-32): three components to military rule (gov't, security, institution), four configurations
(38): use of civil society against military extremists (principally the security apparatus) -- in other words, the suggestion is that this is how we ought to think of aspects of the abertura
(44): analysis of military discourse, citing Foucault? this could get ugly...
(56-57): by 1982, the 'Brumerian' moment had passed (economic crisis, threat of Left had receded, multiclass civil society opposition to the regime) -- so question is what was presenting the military from abandoning power?
(59-60): for reasons listed here (generally, strength of their own position within the state structure), military was comfortable moving towards some sort of 'opening', as long as their institutional interests were seen to (development of arms industry, no retaliation against them)
(60): summary of his own argument re: 1964 (conjunctural factors, despite general weakening of democratic forces)
(61): three causes of presidency going to civil society in 1985 (are these really causes? this is descriptive, no?)
- gov't candidate drove supporters to opposition
- broad candidte for opposition
- military had to allow selection of both candidates, and election to proceed
(68): wrt to civilian control of military (i.e. once indemocratic period), two dimensions--"articulated military contestation", and "military institutional prerogatives"
(80): situation re: military budget was the 'opposite' in Brazil, from Argentina; in the former, stood to gain from democratization, as a 'pressure group'
(84): interesting--arguing that the emergence of a significant arms-industry decreases the rationale for military dictatorship, precisely because, now, they don't need state power to guarantee arms. they don't need to import weapons from abroad; and now, additionally, they have non-military industrialists who benefit from the arms industry, in general, meaning the possibility exists of making alliances across civil society. this is what he sees in Brazil, viz-a-viz other countries on the cone (giving the example of India, too--"military-industrial complex paradoxically strengthens the chances for democracy")
(87): Brazil learned from Argentine military's incompetence in Malvinas war
(92-96): table detailing eleven military prerogatives
(100): military prerogatives/military contestation table --four possibilities
(122): interesting comparative graph of the transitions
(128): this has been one of stepan's main points--that 'brumerian' moments can turn, easily, into 'praetorian decades' (i.e., outlast the desire of civil society to have military rule, precisely because the military has its own institutional interests)
(136): the need, in essence, of the erosion of military claims to military expertise [all this is quite underwhelming, in all honesty]
(145): bring the military into the political fold, ensuring that conflict unfolds transparently [yawn...]
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