neil smith, the new urban frontier

preface (xiii-xx)

(xiii): the "urban wilderness" [and transformation into "frontier" in the 1960s -- xiv]

(xiv): "antiurbanism has been a central theme in US culture..."

(xiv): the 'frontier' idiom invovles, also, the fact that the present populations are seen as natural elements of the physical surroundings -- a "city not yet socially inhabited"

(xv): "it was a short path from a failed liberalism to the revanchist city of the 1990s"

(xvi): important, gentrification and uneven capitalist development--"economic expansion today no longer takes place purely via absolute geographical expansion but rather involves internal differentiation of already developed spaces. at the urban scale, this is the importance of gentrification vis-a-vis suburbanization. The production of space in general and gentrification in particular are examples of this kind of uneven development endemic to capitalist societies. Much like a real frontier, the gentrification frontier is advanced not so much through the actions of intrepid pioneers as through the actions of collective owners of capital."

(xvii): four parts

1. "sets the stage for the... conflicts raised by gentrification." (involving the "central argument that in the 1990s, continuing gentrification contributes to what i call the 'revanchist city.'")
   
2. "interconnection between shifts in the social economy and the myriad detail of local instances of gentrification" (role of the state; catch-22 for working-class)
3. turning frontier motif on its head.
   
4. 'revanchist urbanism' as an attack on populations accused of stealing the city from the white working-classes

(xviii-xix): "while i accept that... radically different experiences of gentrification obtain in different... contexts, i would also hold that among these differences a braid of common threads ripples through..."

introduction--chapter 1 (3-29)

(3): 'class war, class war, die yuppie scum'

(6-7): important--"largely abandoned to the working class amid postwar suburban expansion, relinquished to the poor and unemployed as reservations for racial and ethnic minorities, the terrain of the inner city is suddenly valuable again, perversely profitable. this new urbanism embodies a widespread and drastic repolarization of the city along political, economic, cultural and geographical lines since the 1970s, and is integral with larger global shifts... simultaneously a response and contributor to a series of wider global transformations: global economic expansion in the 1980s; the restructuring of national and urban economies in advanced capitalist countries toward services, recreation and consumption; and the emergence of a global hierarchy of world, national, and regional cities. These shifts have propelled gentrification from a comparatively marginal preoccupation in a certain niche of the real estate industry to the cutting edge of urban change."

(10): from cement benches to wrought-iron benches "to prevent homeless people from sleeping."

(10): tomkins square as jane jacobs' neighborhood park

(11): [in 1873] 'There was in any case a strong ideological objection to the concept of relief itself and a belief that the rigors of unemployment were a necessary and salutary discipline for the working classes.' [in protest being shut down, newspaper's evoking the spectre of the paris commune]

(12): Triangle fire of 1911, which killed 146 women proletarians on the l. east side; Palmer raids of 1919

(12): suburbs burgeoning in the 1920s [how is this to be related to post-war suburbanization?]

(12): "myth is constituted by the loss of the geographical quality of things, as well."

(17-18): the use of the frontier myth to exculpate the metropolis; to "justify monstrous incivility in the heart of the city" (18)--"the frontier was conveyed in the city as a safety valve for the urban class warfare brewing in such events as the 1863 NY draft riot, the 1877 railway strike... urban social conflict was not so much denied as externalized." (17)

(18): naming of 'east village'

(18-19): complicity of art in gentrification

(20-21): 1929 regional plan (coming after 1924 federal decision to severely curtail european immigratoin), which envisaged the reconstruction of 'high-class residences' in the area. but then came the depression, and the area was abandoned to its devices. "Not until a further half-centtury of disinvestment, dilapidation and decline did the 1929 vision begin to be implemented."

(21): pop. numbers

(22): property value story (including the nutty story of the Christodora)

(23): important, role of property re-developers and real estate (comparison to molotch's account, useful?)--"the perverse rationality of real estate capitalism means that buildling owners and developers garner a double reward for milking properties and destroying buildings. first, they pocket the money that should have gone to repairs and upkeep; second, having effectively destroyed the building and established a rent gap, they have produced for themselves the conditions and opportunity for a whole new round of capital reinvestment. having produced a scarcity of capital in the name of profit they now flood the neighborhood for the same purpose, portraying themselves all along as civic-minded heroes..."

(23): profit rate re-vitalized, as city life is de-vitalized

(24): the State (local gov't) is hard at work in this process, too--the "more prosaic tasks: reclaiming the land and quelling the natives. in its housing policy, drug crackdowns, and especially in its parks strategy..."

(24): use of foreclosed properties (in rem)

(26): 'union square park' and 'revitalization'; 'washington square park'

(26): "... the future gentrified city, a city sparkling with the neon of elite consumption anxiously cordoned off from homeless deprivation."

(26-27): mystification and ideology--"gentrification portends a class conquest of the city. the new urban pioneers seek to scrub the city clean of its working-class geography and history... physical effacemetn of original structures effaces social history and geography; if the past is not entirely demolished it is at least reinvented--its class and race contours rubbed smooth--in the refurbishment of a palatable past."

(27): 'Westward Ho!' -- unbelievable...

(28): is there a systematic way think about urban periphery/urban core, and the shifting way in which this maps on to class divides?-- "evicted from the public as well as the private spaces of what is fast becoming a downtown bourgeois playground, minoriites, the unemployed and the poorest of the working class are destined for large-scale displacement. once isolated in central city enclaves, they are increasingly herded to reservations on the urban edge."

(28): important, the local in a global narrative (key difference from molotch, i would insist)--"gentrification and homelessness in the new city are a particular microcosm of a new global order etched first and foremost by the rapacity of capital. not only are broadly similar processes remaking cities around the world, but the world itself impinges dramatically on these localities. the gentrification frontier is also an 'imperial frontier.'... not only does international capital flood the real estate markets that fueld the process, but international migration provides a workforce for many of the... jobs associated with the new urban economy--a workforce that needs a place to stay..."

(29): "the 'primitive' conditions of the core are at once exported to the periphery while those of the periphery are reestablished at the core.'... a new social geography of the city is being born but it would be foolish to expect that it will be a peaceful process..."

introduction--chapter two (30-50)

(32): simple definition of 'gentrification' for friends and family--an "unpredicted reversal of what most twentieth-century urban theories had been predicting as the fate of the central and inner city."

(33): ruth glass and her original, 1964 definition (and its 'critical intent')

(34): "although the emergence of gentrification proper can be traced to the postwar cities of the advanced capitalist world, there are significant precursors..."

(35): Engels, and "haussman[ization]" -- a preliminary, working definition ("It was hardly 'general,' but sporadic, and it was surely restricted to Europe since few cities.... elsewhere had the extent of urban history to provide whole neighborhoods of disinvested stock.")

(35): also, just a note--gentrification doesn't entail a geographic expansion of the city, but a "spatial reconcentration"

(37-8): important--so how unique to post-war world? "the answer lies in both the extent and the systemic nature of central and inner-city rebuilding and rehabilitation beginning in the 1950s. the nineteenth-century experiences in london and paris were unique, resulting from a confluence of a class politics aimed at the threatening working classes and designed to consolidate bourgeois control... this all begins to change in the postwar period, and it is no accident that the world 'gentrification' is coined in the early 1960s... gentrification today is ubiquitous in the central and inner cities of the advanced capitalist world."

(38): AND "not only has gentrification become a widespread experience... but it is also systematically integrated into wider urban and global processes, and this too differentiates it from earlier, more discrete experiences of 'spot rehabilitation.'"

(39): as context/cause, he's identifying the same kind of process that sassen was concerned with--"gentrification became a hallmark of the emerging 'global city'"

(39): important--"...a much larger endeavour: the class remake of the central urban landscape. it would be anachronistic now to exclude redevelpoment from the rubric of gentrification" [see above, too]

(40): important--doesn't, though, spell the end of the 'suburbs': "there is really no sign that the rise of gentrification has diminshed contemporary suburbanization. quite the opposite... [a] parallel decentralization... suburbanization still represents a more powerful force than gentrification in the geographical fashioning of the metropolis..." but the former is critiqued thoroughly in the academy, while the latter goes unnoticed.

(41): in academia, the contours of the debates

(41): consumption-side (for whom a 'new middle class' were the subjects of history)vs. production-side (capital, finance, 'uneven development', 'rent gap')

(43): the postmodern, 'culturalist', consumption-side argument as "foucault run amok."

(44-45): the 'revanchist' city -- involving a "broad, right-wing reaction against both the 'liberalism' of the 1960s and 1970s and the predations of capital." [in an odd relationship to gentrification, which can ebb and flow with crisis/recovery]

part one--chapter three, local arguments (51-74)

(51): important--"it is my contention that the complexity of capital mobility in and out of the built environment lies at the core of the process. for all the interpretive cultural optimism that shrouds it, the new urban frontier is also a resolutely economic creation... it also represents an integral dimension of global restructuring."

(52): consumption-side, cultural theories vs. economic, 'price-of-gas' theories (but both share an emphasis on consumer preference, individualistic -- 'consumer sovereignty')

(54): not so much, he's arguing, a 'back-to-the-suburbs' story, at all

(55): again, "even at the height of 1980s gentrification, suburban expansion proceeded apace. this would seem to cast doubt on the traditional cultural and economic explanations of gentrification as the result of altered consumer choices amid economic constraints."

(56): the follies of the neoclassical rendering of this model, which are legend, of course

(57-58): we need, of course, a deeper theory of why certain areas become profitable, etc. -- neoclassical urban theory out the window! always nice to see this in action.

(58): important--three 'idiosyncrasies' of land as a commodity

1. "private property rights confer on the owner near-monopoly control over land and improvements..."
   
2. "land and improvements are fixed in space but their value is anything but fixed."
   
3. "while land is permanent, the improvements built on it are not but generally have a very long turnover period in physical as well as value terms."
   

(59): key, the 2nd circuit--"particularly when economic growth is hindered elsewhere in the economy, or where profit rates are low, the built environment becomes a target for the switching of much profitable investment."

(59-60): 19th century city, and values taking the classical conical form (high at center, slant towards periphery). thus begins a very imp. historical story: expansion in the post 1893-1897 depression; rise of suburb/periphery, decline/disinvestment in (part of) center through 30s... [see very instructive graph on pg. 60)

(61): towards a theory of gentrification, which will require four terms

1. house value (61) -- comprised of "the amount of socially necessary labor time," integrated with its rate of devalorization through use
   
2. sale price (62) -- value of house plus additoinal rent component
   
3. capitalized ground rent (62) -- claim made by landowner on surplus-value made on site
   
4. potential ground rent (62) -- what could be capitalized under 'highest and best' use

(63-70): the theory of gentrification, at a high level of abstraction

(65): key point in the narrative refers to the so-called 'neighborhood effect,' which is when capitalized ground rent drops below the potential ground rent, making it desirable to just hang on, for the landlord...

(67): till 'abandonment', which comes "not because they are unusable, but because they cannot be used profitably..."

(67): and here, we see the "rent gap" -- "the disparity between the potential ground rent level and the actual ground rent capitalized under the present land use." produced both by devalorization and urban growth in surrounding areas (67-68). in steps the "gentrifier."

(68): noting that the State is often active int his process; financial institutions as well, of course.

(69): three kinds of developers (professional, occupier, landlord)

(70): gentrification as a 'back-to-the-city' movement of capital (not people)

chapter four, global arguments (75-91)

(75): the global--"but in addition to these local dynamics, gentrification represents a significant historical geogrpahical reversal of assumed patterns of urban growth intimately connected to a wider frame of political-economic change."

(75): short-lived exception or long-term reversal? neither, insofar as they're both ungrounded in a larger, master narrative, he's arguing.

(77): "at the urban scale, gentrification represents the leading edge of [uneven development]"

(77): towards a systematic treatment of "uneven development" (in three parts)

1. a general framework of "tendencies toward differentiation and equalization" (77-83) -- (1) on the one hand, expansion, 'space-time' compression--annihilation of space through time; (2) on the other hand, a dynamic which involves the "progressiv divison of labour at various scales, the spatial centralization of capital in some places... (etc., etc.)... "At the urban scale, the main pattern of uneven development lies in the relation between the suburbs and the inner city. the crucial economic force mediating this relation, at the urban scale, is ground rent. it is the equalization and differentiation of ground rent levels between different places in the metropolitan region that most determines the unevenness of development."
   
2. valorization and devalorization of capital in the built environment (83-86) -- capital invested in built environment has a long turnover period, during which a relatively long period of devalorization unfolds ("the devalorization cycle"). roughly, the narrative is quite simple--(1) capital is invested in inner city; (2) barriers to further investment in inner city mean that capital goes to suburbs; (3) devalorization of inner city leads, eventually, to the rent gap; (4) rent gap is taken advantage of, you have new investment opportunities in the center.
3. reinvestment and the rhythm of unevenness (86-88) -- in the urban economy, the rhythms of capital are obviously tied to the larger, national and international contexts. and thus gentrification, as well, via mechanism of second circuit (capital searching for profit rate)
   

(81): "suburbanization" vs. "ribbon development"

(81): more on ground rent as mediating level: "...the ground rent surface translates into a quantitative measure of the actual forces toward differentiation in the urban landscape... of two major sources... the first is functional in the more specific sense, referring to the difference between residential, industrial, recreational... the second force... is differentiation according to class and race"

(82): wage-rates and suburbanization--"dependent less on intraurban population density and more on the nature of the work process."

(82): interesting, back to the urban question; 'labor-market' definition of the spatial scale: "the urban scale as a distinct spatial scale is defined in practice in terms of the reproduction of labor power and the journey to work. the entire urban area is relatively accessible for most commuters..."

(83): summary passage, re: 'land value valley' ("this pattern suggests the operation of both an equalization process and a differentiation process. on the one hand, the development of the suburbs has significantly reduced the general differential between central and suburban ground rent levels for any given location in the suburbs. but on the other hand, a 'land value valley' has emerged in the inner city surrounding the central area..."

(84): "suburbanizaton as complementary to inner-city decline in a wider pattern of uneven development at the urban scale..."

(85): social centralization of capital can become a 'spatial centralization' of capital -- both as the natural outcome of competition

(85): at a particular period in time, "it is not that suburbanization was the only alternative per se. it is just that the redevelopment of the established city was not an economical option. the center was still functional..."

(85-86): in time, though, the "rent gap" emerges

(87): "urban renewal" as an outlet for capital

(87): key, the master narrative, concisely put--"in the US, suburbanization was a concrete social response to the depressions of the 1890s and 1930s, in the sense that suburban development opened up a whole series of investment possibilities which could help to revive the profit rate. with FHA mortgage subsidies, the construction of highways, and so on, the state subsidized suburbanization quite deliberately as part of a larger solution to crisis... albeit a reversal in geographic terms, the gentrification... of the inner city represents a clear continuation... like suburbanization, the redevelopment and rehabilitation of the central cities functions as a substantial engine of profit."

(88): mention of the countryside, whose "urbanization," smith is suggesting, will be necessary in perpetuity.

(88): there is, surely, a question to be asked about how the accumulation cycle beginning with gentrification will complete itself (in other words, sassen's concerns--the city cannot forsake those that it expels to the periphery, precisely because they reproduce it. so what happens when you build hyatt regency upon hyatt regency? what demand are you satisfying? demand extrinsic to the city, mostly?)

(89): astonishing! according to the annual housing survey, 2 million people are displaced every year (86% displaced by private-market activity).

chapter five, social arguments (92-116)

(92-95): the "new middle class" ("i will take as axiomatic the broad proposition that class is defined according to people's social relations to the means of production.")

(95): Poulantzas, "neither own the means of production nor perform productive labor but who are political and ideological participants in the domination of the working class"; Erik Olin Wright, "a 'contradictory class position', pulled hither and tither...

(96-98): important--looking at the puzzle of the yuppies in more detail, noting that it simply cannot be true that it's pegged to changing occupational structure as a rule, given the increasing maldistribution of incomes (i.e., no upwardly mobile strata is really evident--rather, an apparent shrinking of the middle class). the three possibilities, at this early stage.

(98): gentrification and the breakdown of the patriarchal household

(101): first, question of how elite or mass this movement of women-as-gentrifiers is, really; second, question of what extent women play a specific role as women.

(104): the marginal gentrifier

(105-106): gay gentrification

(106): "the point of the argument, then, is that gentrification is an inherently class-rooted process, but it is also a lot more..."

(106): erik olin wright and 'contradictory class positions', once more--"classes are always in the process of constitution... during periods of dimished class struggle, class boundaries become more difficult to identify..."

(108-109): against the consumption-based theories, again: "the conundrum of gentrification does not turn on explaining where middle-class demand comes from. rather it turns on explaining the essentially geographical question why central and inner areas of the city, which for decades could not satisfy the demands of the middle class, now appear to do so handsomely."

(110): "social restructuring is a vital piece of the gentrification puzzle, but it makes sense only in the context of the emergence of a rent gap and a wider political and economic restructuring..."

(112): important, regulation school account--because of crisis and challenge in late nineteenth century, capitalism moves from an extensive to an intensive regime of accumulation [though he suggests that this is setting the system in international context, it really seems the opposite; for to understand early 1900s capitalism, internationally, surely it's necessary to talk primarily of imperialism? e.g., lenin, cartels and global export of capital]. this is especially important, considering what he goes on to say: "the transition to an intensive regime of accumulation is also marked by the geographical transition from the absolute expansion of global capitalism to its internal expansion and differentiation, and the emergence of the classical pattern of uneven development."

(112): "at the urban scale it was a period of dramatic suburbanization in which the state actively sponsored working-class homeownership and decentralization..." [this, obviously, raises the questions about effective demand/crisis in a gentrifying age]

(112): in sum, need to pin down the periodization, here: 1850-1890s -- extensive regime of accumulation / 1890s-1950s -- (because he often talks about 1920s suburbanization--is it adequate to think of this as a transitional phase)? / 1950s - 1970s -- intensive regime of accumulation (suburban solution and welfare state) [and then, how do we layer on the conventional marxist discussions of imperialism and the like--there is a larger question, here, of course, about the merits and demerits (and marxist credentials) of the 'regulation school' approach.]

(113): the Keynesian city, and an environment oriented around "consumption"

(115): important--a distinction that seems crucial to his larger argument -- "consumption-led urbanization" is not the same as "demand-led urbanization" (and Harvey, in fact, conflates the two!) "Consumption led growth implies the importance of the consumption sector of the economy and the production of goods in that sector, whereas 'demand-side urbanization' implies that in the move from the extensive to the intensive regime of accumulation, the dyanmics and demand of accumulation are now subordinated to those of consumption..."

(116): 1973 as key turning point, of course

part two--chapter 6, market, state and ideology (119-139)

(119): dating gentrification's origins to the 1950s/1960s, which means that--again--it doesn't map on exactly to the regulation school narrative; though perhaps it doesn't need to. "postwar economic expansion funneled capital towards the development of the suburbs and only very selectively toward existing urban centres" (here, the first example--Society Hill in philadelphia)

(122): public-private organization + state + private financial institutions = gentrifying vanguard

(123): from 'redlining', to 'greenlining'

(124-125): the state-finance revolving door

(126): "the largest financial institutions financed the state at zero risk to invest in an area..." [finance-state nexus]

(127): aloca, the aluminum multinational, moves into real estate -- "would provide high depreciation allowances in its tax returns as well as turn a high profit rate..."

(128): cataloging the different investors in society hill towers

(130): not lack of investment in society hill in immediate postwar period; rather, active disinvestment ("busy with low-risk, high-profit mortgages in the suburbs...")

(135): re: society hill, "although much gentrification in the US and in Britain has enjoyed public subsidy in one form or another, such strict orchestration of the process this early was rare." (though state, as in amsterdam, can obviously intervene to prevent gentrification, as well -- it is the character, not the simple fact, of intervention that is important)

(136): interesting, vs. britain--"the more active involvement of the US state at an earlier stage of gentrification therefore speaks both to the more instrumental relationship between capital and the state in the US and to the depth of disinvestment... "

(136): periodization--"but two things happened by the early 1970s... in the first place, the well-publicized financial success of projects like Society Hill encouraged other developers to invest in rehabilitating old working-class neighborhoods witht he benefit of less generous state subsidies and without such a blanket absorption of the risk. the rent gap, in other words, was coming to be exploited profitably enough through the private market... second, gentrification... was increasingly bound up with a broader urban restructuring that followed the political upheavals of the 1960s and the global economic depression of the early to mid-1970s..." (see also page 140--"by the late 1970s...")

(137): helps the city's tax base, which explains a lot, a la Molotch/Logan

(138): "'what i want to know,' argued one recent immigrant to the neighborhood, 'is by what authority do these people have roots? if you don't own, you don't have roots. what have they planted, their feet in the ground?'" [!!!]

chapter seven, catch-22 & harlem (140-164)

(140): the specific things it brings (but insofar as we're talking about capital coming back to the city center, aren't there other things it could do? has it done other things elsewhere? and would those be called gentrification?)

(142): history of harlem--late 1800s was developed, but with crash in 1904-1905--> "faced with imminent ruin," largely white landlords took unprecedented step of opening it up to black residents(context for "blockbusting")--> increased migration from south during WWI, Harlem renaissance in 1920s--> little further investment till the 1980s.

(143): "in short, black residents -- middle-class and working-class -- who moved into Harlem int he early years of the century largely saved the financial hides of white landlords, speculators and builders who had overdeveloped. in turn, these residents, their children and their children's children were repaid by a bout of concerted disinvestment from harlem housing that has lasted for nine decades..."

(143-144): harlem as a "supreme test" for the gentrification process (both close to one of the highest-rent districts in the world, and subject to decades of disinvestment)

(155): particular importance of the state in Harlem, given that 60 percent of units are state-owned or assisted.

(158-159): gentrification in harlem began in early 1980s, but paused in early 90s (due to stockmarket crash in 1987, it's implied)

(160): interconnection of race and class, in harlem

(163): cultural voyeurism as a lubricant for gentrification -- interesting

(163): the catch-22 (but resolution is quite straightforward--the state, as public)

chapter 8, three european cities (165-186)

(165): gentrification in europe vs. US

(167): in netherlands, "deregulation and privatization of the housing sector was driven as much by mounting budgetary constraints as by an ideological agenda, unlike in Britain perhaps, where Thatcher's privatization of housing was, before anything, ideologically led."

(168): state regulation in amsterdam has meant that disinvestment has never been as severe

(172): summary passage: "the story of gentrification in amsterdam..." [key difference with US, really, is the character of the state -- slowly leaves the market in amsterdam, where in US much more activist]

(174): re: budapest, "gentrification is integral to this changing social, economic, and political geography of Budapsest occuring at the behest of global integration..."

(175): state-centered reasons for disinvestment in the urban center (investment in social housing at the urban periphery)

(177): "the question of demand" -- there in US/Europe, but not really in Hungary (as a contingent phenomenon, in other words--interesting)

(179): "the momentum behind housing privatization and the extent to which the state remains committed to providing affordable housing for the working class will be crucial..."

(185): in sum, "no continental divide" between the Europe and NA -- of course, in other words, a "general theoretical stance" is necessary.

part three--chapter nine, mapping the frontier (189-209)

(190): intention is to actually map the front line, in the lower east side

(190-194): the obvious economic rationality of all actors involved in an ongoing process of disinvestment, but also trying to write against the argument that it is "self-fulfilling" [there is no place for practice here, though]

(198): resolved to tracking sustained disinvestment through tax arrears

[skipping this chp, for now]

(209): local complexity of gentrification pattern--not a simple straight-line.

chapter 10, to the revanchist city (210-232)

(210): de-gentrification?

(211): at least, "gone is the white, upper-middle-class optimism of gentrification which was supposed to reclaim the 'new urban frontier'... in its place has come the revanchist city..."

(211): important-- "this revanchist antiurbanism represents a reaction against the supposed 'theft' of the city, a desperate defense of a challenged phalanx of privileges, cloaked in the populist language of civic morality, family values, and neighborhood security."

(213): the world that the white upper-class male can no longer control

(217): "the revengeful reaction to the city in the 1990s represents a response to a failed urban optimism at the end of the 1980s" (turning point, depression from 1988-1992)

(218): "liberal concern for homeless people, kindled initially by the surge in homelessness int he 1980s expansion, and nurtured in neighborhoods like the Upper West Side, began to diffuse..."

(223): "eviction, in fact, represented the only true homeless policy of the dinkins administration between 1990 and 1993"

(223): key--failure of liberalism is "primarily a failure of political will"; ultimately, never cares enough

(224): "it was on this foundation of the abject failure of liberal urban policy... that a newly elected Mayor Rudy Giuliani set about consolidating the emerging revanchist city in 1994" (as crisis began to try sympathy for the homeless, as well)

(224): "'we're working on the weather'"!!!

(225): horrific account of police brutality

(225): neoliberal revisionism--"discussion of causes increasingly reverted to aspects of individual behavior rather than societal shifts..."

(229): "de-gentfrification" as a "passing lapse in an otherwise fervid rebuliding"--

(231): the Sioux as vanguard model!? and squatting...