Anderson, "Why Partition?" (2012) 

(2) Gandhi and 'Das Kapital'

(6) useful description of ML Weakness

(7) Nehru arrogance re: unity of India (when Congress was only 3% Muslim)

(8) from Muslims as trouble-makers (post-Mutiny), to Hindus (during nationalist movement), to Muslims (under Mountbatten) [this seems somewhat exaggerated, given the dividends of the ML posture during WWII]

(9) Labour committed to United India, for strategic reasons

(10) Jinnah couldn't sqaure the circle: how could a Muslim-majority 'secede'/be autonomous while also protecting Muslim minorities in the other provinces

(11) League talked of partition, prepared for confederation; Nehru talked of unity, prepared for secession (motivated by commitment to presiding over central State)

(11) Menon and Commonwealth

(12) NWFP was the only place that held a referendum

(12) Jinnah was willing to accept a United Bengal

(14) Redshirts boycotted referendum, angry at Congress' willingness to consider Partition

(14) great quote, re: partition from above: 'never did so few divide so many, so needlessly'

(15) more violence in Punjab than Bengal, though huge numbers crisscrossing inboth

(16) Partition as 'the single most contempible act..'

(16) 550 out of 560 of the native princes were Hindu potentates

(17) Kashmir as obscurantist feudal tyranny--death to Muslim peasants that killed cow, etc.

(17) Sheikh Abdullah regarded Jinnah an athiest

(20) Patel waving accession document, 'As if the fate of five million were a lottery ticket'

(20) Indian case rests on Sheikh Abdullah working w/ Nehru

(20) NWFP referendum [Anderson mentioning Pakistan won, but not at all mentioning the extremely reactionary ways in which ML persuaded poor villagers to vote]

(21) Gandhi treachery--Kashmir belongs to the Maharajah, etc., etc.

(22) 'Condition of Ambedkar's sanity was breaking with Hinduism', which Nehru didn't do [going a bit Dawkins on me?]

(23) 27,000 to 40,000 Muslims killed after Hyderabad invasion [!]

(23) Ratio of natives to colonials was highest in Raj (1:3,650 vs. 1:475 in Vietnam)

(24) Punjab was the British model--not 'divide-and-rule', but unite-the-reactionaries

(24) Gandhi 'injected' religion [but this is precisely how Jinnah built the base you're extolling]

(26) Congress' was a 'fatal partisan arrogance'

(27) [way too forgiving towards the ML]

(27) religious revivalism was inevitable--something to do with the 'deep culture' of this place [WTF is that about, Perry?]

Bruce Western, A Comparative Study of Working-Class Disorganization (1995)

(179, 197) institutions matter -- these countries were experiencing a common structural transformation, but they had divergent experiences -- > the transformations of institutions that protected class identities (centralized wage bargaining, SD parties) produced declining union density

(180) increased dispersion of union densities in post-war period

(180) strike wave of 1960s --> increase in union density of 15 pts (Western dismisses this, summarizing other arguments)

(181) Table of union densities [Graph this]

STRUCTURAL FACTORS

(181) [Assuming that trade is the context of the change in economic conditions that set the stage--there are echoes of Brenner here, but this narrative could be better, regardless]

(182) Freeman shows union decline rooted in employer resistance (recognition of elections, etc.)

(182) Flexible work --> decline in union density (except in Germany?)

LABOR MOVEMENT EXPLANATIONS


(182) where unions were strong, they stayed strong-- this is where they most successfully organized service sectors [though, as per the other article, service sector growth was not as important as it was in other countries]

(183) strike waves in Sweden and Denmark, 1979-1985, encouraged unionization [again, Western will dismiss this, partly on grounds that these don't distinguish between lockouts and strikes]

WESTERN'S INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS

(183) two-fold (a) decentralization of labor-market institutions; (b) decline of SD parties

(184) Table 2 --> decentralization of bargaining across much of Europe

(185) 'wage drift'

(186) Aroux laws under Mitterand, strengthening power of labour [hmm]

(186) four reasons decentralization leads to declining union density
(a) extends union wages to the unorganized, muting employer oppositoin (so, in the US, the higher the union wage premium, the more employer's will oppose unions) [good support for the Henwood line]
(b) weakens demand [?]
(c) weakens central confederations, in turn reducing movement's power to influence economic policy and increasing corporation-friendly policy
(d) interunion rivalry peaks

(187) SD lost power in Scandinavia, throughout the 1976-1991 period, as well as changing its character

(187) in US and UK, 'active union constraint'

(190) modeling 'first differences'/hazard rate

(192-194) finding that 'everything matters' (except strike rates)

(195) Sweden and Finland defy model's predictions

(196) institutional factors could be tied up with economic conditions, of course

(194) openness --> decline in density

Lee, "International Migration..." (2005)

(argument) Deindustrialization --> Decline in union density; Immigration --> Decline in union density

(72) end of centralized wage bargaining --> decline in union density

(75-76) reasonable summary of the debates on deindustrialization

(78) inflation --> unionization (spurs people to protect wages)

(79) 'Ghent system' has protected union density, in Scandinavian countries, etc.

(79) Immigration is significant

(80) Industrial employment is significant (but not trade)

(82) Institutional arrangements matter, of course [and this is where it would make sense to discuss the state of the labour movement, etc; as well as the question of why the Scandinavian countries have seen an explosion in union density despite deindustrialization]

Zolberg, Response to Tilly (1995)

(30) 'Demobilizing' effect of affluence

(31) Only place workers were a numerical majority was Belgium, 1900-1930 (Pzeworski argument, here)

(31) End of blue-collar worker --> End of electoral socialism (French, Italian CP's)

(32) No 'rebellion in the air' b/c of affluence

(34) Luebbert on 30s as key critical juncture for social democracy (farmer-labour alliances, etc.)

(35) 'Globalization' --> Institutional/political factors -->Effect on labour

(36) Capital flight was a game changer (US had experienced this internally, eralier, what with the consequences of federalism and race to the bottom in taxes)

iversen and cusack, the causes of welfare state expansion (2000)

(313) technology-induced structural transformations are what's at issue in discussions of de-industrialization

(315) in US, expansion of services faster than loss of traditional jobs [losses which look quite minimal, in comparison, because the recent peak was lower], so there's been employment growth

(316) the growth in transfers has been explained by endogenous employment loss, not "globalization"

(317): Rodrick: trade openness/globalization --> insecurity --> WS expansion

(318) domestic market volatility > international market volatility

(319) US is far and away least trade dependent of the OECD economices, yet has highest volatility (wage, output, employment) (volatility = std dev of wage/output/employment)

(320) no evidence that volatility is related to exposure to trade, nor evidence for capital mkt openness --> volatility

(321, FN 20) for less developed countriy, this relationship probably doesn't hold, because trade-dependence on primary goods brings volatility associated with primary goods

(321) Garrett operationalizes 'Left Labor power'

(324) Garrett: WS is compatible w/ globalization; Cusack and Iversen agree, but also want to insist that globalization is not what's responsible for it's expansion (which is what Garrett goes ahead and argues)

(325) mass sectoral shift to services, away from industry --> growth in transfers

(325) find little evidence for a 'pricing out' effect, from trade with LDC's [this is interesting, but needs more specification--disaggregate by industry, country, etc.]


 (325) w/o State intervention, transferability of skills > transferability of benefits (i.e., firms are never going to give benefits on a basis wider than the skills that their employee has. I will give firm-level benefits to extract firm-level skills, and to make sure that my worker is bound to me). when people loss a job and they have to transgress a skill boundary to seek benefits, the State has to step in (to re-skill, etc.)

(326) employers can support this because it minimizes risks of investing in nontransferable skills to workers, who are then more likely to get trained, etc. [perhaps understates employer's power over employee, but OK]

(328, 341-342) the rise and fall of industry as % of the population in the US is much smaller than elsewhere (the amplitude is higher in all late industrializers, for understandable reasons--given the period that we're looking at)

(329, 334) WS expansion can be more or less egalitarian depending on political parameters--partisan effects matter

(332-334) findings

(337) US/Canada/etc. are more effective at generative service self-employment because of wage disperson (i.e., inequality). Where you have centralized bargaining, these sectors don't grow as fast [their argument involves growth of productivity, etc., but I might be missing something b/c this seems clear-cut example of sectors growing that are parasitic on rich people's ability to live luxuriously]

sakallioglu, "the anatomy..." (1997)

(152) 'professionalism' predisposes the military to political influence (Stepan vs. Huntington)

(153) Turkish military intervention in politics as a subtler form of 'indirect influence' --not the kind of direct influence seen in Thailand or Indonesia (a kind that respects civil-military boundaries, etc.)  [to be distinguished, also, from Pakistan, then?]

(154) 1982 constitution gives the military veto power

(154) 1971 and 1980, the military had a small # of allies (vs 1960); it was "at a distance from the rest of society" [this could form part of the argument about lacking a domestic constituency]

(155) 60s gov't relented to challenge military prerogatives

(157) 1980s, various constitutional interventions further entrenched military's autonomous powers--the evolution of the National Security Council was case-in-point; also, the office of the President [again, praetorian like Pakistan?]

(158-159) Evolution of COS position (towards greater autonomy)

(161) NIA (like the ISI) had considerable powers; though not quite a "state within a state"

(162) military's influence becoming even more pronounced; 1980s interventions were 'more authoritarian than ever before' [much of the explanation has to relate to this argument about the lack of domestic allies. though, again, the lack of domestic allies is twinned to the fact that people remain more trusting of the military than of civilian elites]

tanel demirel, "soldiers and civilians" (2010)

(127, 131) blaming soldiers' self-perception

(129) 1923-1945, single-party regime under RPP; 1945, transition to multi-party

(130) with each intervention, the military acquired legal privileges and economic resources [it's important to clarify where exactly the difference w/ Pakistan lies--the explanans and explanandum]

(131) military's perception of civilians impedes their acceptance of civilian supremacy [but he goes on to say that this is something that they've 'chosen', which begs the important questions]

(132) military had praetorian powers ("continued to wield significant powers over the elected governments when it did not directly step in"), its willingness to let civilians govern [more than in Pakistan, say] is explained by its traditions. [which is to say that he has explained nothing]

(132, FN 23) long-term military rule was made difficult because it couldn't find a real constituency (Turkey didn't have a large, land-owning class, and foreign capital was weak) [bizarre that he is suggesting this, but seems plausible--at least the first arm. resurrecting Alavi, ahh!]

(133-134) evolution of military-civilian balance hasn't suggested that military's role has been ebbing--indeed, it's been 'increasing'

(137) TUSIAD (business organization) is pro-democracy because it's pro-EU


(138) the flimsiness of the civilian challenge to the military is an important explanation for military supremacy [important to incorporate into paper]

(138) claim, implicitly, is that democracy isn't seen as important by the man on the street--that there is more trust in the army than in the civilians [this is important--true about Pakistan but probably not true about Latin America] [here it's important to make two theoretical points: (1) democratization has been pushed by worker's organizations because workers need political rights to win their economic rights, typically; (2) when workers haven't been aware of this, it's been because their organizations have been weak, and thus the 'commonsense' has been lacking]

(140-141): the three military interventions never reached violent proportions (Chile, Argentina)--the military has maintained its popular standing [this is a bit different from Pakistan, though that might have to do with what he's qualifying as violent. need to read more]

(146) the 'military mind' [but this is stupid. this is true everywhere, how can you explain variation? something like this applies to aqil shah's stuff too, I should think]