Chandresekhar at Columbia, April 2010

collapse of actually-existing socialism 'has to do' with the collapse of finance—the increasing exposure of hese countries to finance. [?]

an 'informational inadequacy' that confronts central planning, it is argued (hayek's fatal conceit). planners working at cross-purposes.

the danger, also, of 'bureaucratization' (irfan habib: when socialism is established, there is no economic law pushing it in advance.)

the argument is premised on the proposition that the alternative has to be fully elaborated. you can only elaborate these mechanisms in practice.

what we do need to recognize is that the 'collapse of actually-existing socialism' has delayed the Left alternative. with this in mind, there need to be 'reformist'/'welfarist' measures in the interim (without making us sound like those who call for a 'human face')

in Latin America, neo-liberalism is thoroughly discredited. in Africa, it destroyed the State. but in Asia, you have 'successful' engagement with international capital (E. Asia). you have countries like China and India, as well. the point is that these are 'successes'. (crisis of 1997 was because of a more definite shift to neoliberalism, loss of financial controls, etc.). Asia as the region on which the reputation of neo-liberalism depends.

this 'working' (in a growth and balance of payments sense) means two things

1. there exist a group of people who can sustain this kind of growth trajectory—you have a section of the upper middle-class which (1) has additional incomes; (2) generates a situation where you expand the univers of borrowers because of the freedom you give to investors (you relax the requirements on financiers) [the 'feel-good' factor: confident lenders and confident borrowers are both necessary if you want a debt-financed trajectory to work]. today you're in a situation where you have double-digit inflation, but not seen as a threat. this used to be fatal. now not so much, because vocal classes have been co-opted. in other words, the 'middle-classes' are separated from the Left.
2. as part of your 'success', you are the 'flavor of the season'-- you need foreign capital and footloose productive capital. you're caught, then, in a situation where pushing against the status quo, you're confronted with the exit of capital. you can't even find your way to a reformist line.

you use all of these arguments, at an ideological level, to discount all alternatives.

the obvious implication is that you have to pursue different tactics, which the Left is doing. basically, we are talking about the need to be innovative.

in addition, fundamental structural constraints:

1. the organized working class is 6 or 7% of the total working class; and you're anyway confronting growth of informal and casualized labor (you're not progressing amongst the vanguard class, but in fact progressively seeing the undermining of the vanguard class). even within the formal sector, you're getting a lot of informal workers.
2. when employment increases, most of it is amongst self-employed workers. you have workers who don't have an 'enemy' in their productive life. who do you organize these workers against?
3. stagnation in real wages, but a rise in productivity-- you have a collapse of the shares of wages in value-added. those who are outside this citadel of formal workers have to come to terms with the fact that what set the standard is something that, itself, is eroding.

so you have what seems, almost, like a conspiracy. an attack all-round.

this is not to say that there is no Left, that the Left has disappeared. it is simply to say that this is a long and arduous struggle.

- - -

anwar's questions

1. neoliberalism as a global phenomenon?

what is it about capitalism that in the US, for example, one of the most tightly regulated financial sectors in the world was demolished. why did capitalism 'allow' for this trajectory? now, ruling classes pursue the path of 'international' financial credit, rather than public expenditure (taxation, etc.)

2. success as growth and employment?

success, the real argument, is growth, resolution of balance of payments problems, and the attenuation of inflation.

3. multiplier effects of public and private investment?

- -

it doesn't make any sense to argue that we need growth before we can re-distribute surpluses, precisely because the form of growth that is pursued has the effect of incapacitating the State (the State's ability to do anything in the long-term, certainly, but also its ability to attenuate short-term deprivation). and I would add,in fact, that this is entirely unscientific and politically backward—who, exactly, is going to demand and push the redistribution of that surplus at the end point?

Capitalism, Development and Democracy, RSS (1992)

(2): capitalism is necessary, but not sufficient for democracy

(4): working to make sense of the cross-national finding that democracy is correlated to development, in specific, historically-robust terms (pg. 30—the veto of the empirical generalization)

(5): considering three balances of power

1. classes and class coalitions
2. the State and its relationship to civil society
3. impact of transnational power relations

(6): summary of argument—urban working class as most frequent proponent of the extension of democratic rights.

(6): capitalism does a few things to push this process forward—brings workers together, urbanization, improving means of communication increases literacy (tending towards a 'dense civil society')

(7): it is not the protagonists of capitalism (the market, and the capitalists) that are at the vanguard of the push toward democracy; rather, it is an unintended result of its contradictions (the working class and the middle class growing stronger, the landed elite being weakened)

(8): class profiles

1. working-class, most consistently democratic (except where co-opted by charismatic authoritarianism)
2. landed upper-class, most consistently anti-democratic
3. bourgeoisie, generally supportive of constitutional and representative gov't, but not the extension of suffrage
4. middle classes were ambiguous, pushed for their own inclusion but otherwise contingent on the threat they faced, and available alliances
5. peasantry also was variable—independent family farmers were pro-democratic, but where dominated by large landholdings they were more authoritarian

(8): note that in L. America, the middle-classes played the leading role, but democratization was consistently of a restricted form as a result.

(21): Weber on Russia—hangs bourgeois reform on 'ideals'.

(22): summary of O'Donnell's work on ISI, and dependent development/authoritarianism, which undercuts the modernization thesis

(23): critique of Moore for evacuating the working-class

(36-37): outline of the methodological strategy--'analytic induction'

(43): certainly, they are critical of democracy, but see in it the important role it plays in advancing the interests of the working-class—even the long-term interests, they think [this is being done via a misreading of the Marxist position, I would argue]

(46): central thesis is that democratization can be explained by class interest; fundamentally shaped by the balance of class power ('relative class power')

(54-55): the 'inherent ambiguity of collective action', re: the working class

(59): relative size and density of organization of working class are of critical importance (discussion of impact of uneven development, etc.)

(60): the more landowners rely on state-backed coercion, the more anti-democratic they will be

(61): the bourgeoisie is caught between the formal liberalism of bourgeois democracy, and the substantive demands made by subordinate classes.

(63-64): the thesis of potential, variable autonomy of the State [hmm...]

(66): not too much State dependence on dominant classes, but not so much autonomy that it can't be tamed.

(68): absolutism towards bureaucratic universalism?

(72): dependent capitalist development has two unfavorable effects: attenuates decline of large landowners, doesn't strengthen working-class as much as it should

(82): early vs. late industrialization—effects on position of bourgeoisie viz-a-viz the State

(83): argument is that other classes were prominent in the early phases, and even though the working class took the lead later in the game, it needed allies. Where the large landowners were available and politically powerful, this was a problem for democratization.

(87): Switzerland – no opposition from bourgeoisie to full democracy, because there was no developed labor movement. Demonstrates importance of small-holders.

(87-90): France – Moore neglects the continuing influence of agrarian elite into the 19^th century; key, of course, was that they were disenfranchised and not part of the State apparatus after the Revolution.

(91): WWI effect on democratization

(92): Sweden—exhibits German patterns, as late industrialization; but it had no large landed upper class that lorded over the peasantry. This meant that the Swedish bourgeoisie didn't have the option of allying with the landed elite, as its German counterpart did.

(96): summary of these cases, thus far

(96): Moore ignored the Chartist movement

(98): again, working class as dominant force

(105): Italian Fascism was not a mass electoral movement

(106): Key amendment to Moore's account of Germany—the bourgeoisie and the alleged 'weak impulse' (it was in their economic interest to do what they did, in other words)

(108): again, comparison with Sweden

(125): Comparing the US North and West with Switzerland—in both places, democratization pushed by small farmers. And the landlords, in the US—not worried about the political process.

(126): Tilly's critical amendment, to the question of State and labor control—it was not necessarily for control, it was for guaranteeing that the control wouldn't be challenged.

3/25/10

problem, again, is to adduce a structural mechanism by which the State would align itself with the capitalist class.

in Poulantzas, we have the mechanism of 'atomization', via 'citizenship' (but this doesn't explain how the capitalist class is 'organized', as a counter-tendency).

we are left with an account of disorganization, then, but not what we're looking for.

- - - - -

this week's readings also take on 'instrumental' theories, as did Poulantzas. Offe raises an additional problem—it will have to be accompanied by a 'masking' effect (otherwise the State will run into a legitimacy problem). Offe does not take a clear position, though; more sets the stage.

Block adduces a mechanism. the need to maintain 'business confidence'--to maintain a healthy economic climate. if policies are proposed which have the effect of convincing firms and investors that will bring in a less-than-acceptable rate of return, the reaction will be to slow down the pace of investment, to exit, or even to go on an investment strike. all this spells disaster, for the regime. States will find it in their own interests, in short, to attend to the preferences of capitalists.

this is a feature of the Capitalist state, insofar as the State doesn't possess an independent source of surplus generation.

in the actual practice of State reproduction, State managers internalize the imperative of keeping 'business confidence' alive. they know that the key to their success, is this—State managers actively solicit the cooperation of capitalists. You don't hazard approaching those limits (in this sense, it doesn't work so much as a 'constraint'). And this reinforces the class-bias of the State.

To the untheoretical observer, this may look like 'influence'. But this is not the case.

Regardless, all this raises a question. How do you get the New Deal? How do you get Social Democracy? Block's answer is class struggle.

But this needs to be filled out, a bit.

The mere existence of class struggle will not induce the effect of concession. It is only when class struggle is able to make it cheaper to enact reforms than to oppose them (when it imposes 'costs') that this happens. When mobilization gets to the point that political demands are made, it is better to appease workers than to risk losing power altogether.

To an extent, for politicians, the mobilization of the working-class counteracts the power of the capitalists. Aggregation of the working-class cannot be ignored (in other words, the worker has to overcome the constitutional collective action problem).

At the same time, this also imposes two costs on politicians:

1. they may lose tax revenues
2. workers represent blocs of political power, that might threaten the politicians.

In other words, 'space' is opened up for the State. 'Autonomy' from the ruling class is increased (the State, don't forget, is always autonomous from labor—the puzzle, for Marxists, is when it can be more or less autonomous from capitalists)

The structural theories of the State don't mean to explain the whole gamut of State action. Argument here is that they make themselves apparent at critical junctures. You rarely actually 'see' them. A set of 'nested constraints'. [Not sure this makes sense to me]

Regardless, when labor's power increases, these regular constraints widen.  

PPIGS: EU's Internal Periphery, Left Forum 2010

Are the Germans going to drive the continent into recession to maintain their own fiscal health?

- - - - - -

Jeffery Sommers

Latvian economy gone from celebrated as Baltic tiger, to the poorest performing economy in Europe.

Burning up of its currency reserves to rescue its banks—those are not available, anymore, for rescuing its economy.

A serious demographic crisis that verges on the euthanizing of the population (the young generation is streaming out of the country). The 'exit' option—some 10,000 people on the streets in January, but this didn't go anywhere.

As early as the 1980s, there was great interest in Latvia—the crisis of the 70's had given rise to a desire to acquire raw materials located in the old Soviet Union. Latvia had warm water ports to facilitate this. An entrepreneurial class was well-positioned to take advantage of this; moreover, offshore banking/etc. saw an opportunity in this trade, as well (the money that was being used to purchase this raw materials was eventually being returned to the West, of course).

We see the beginnings, in short, of a highly corrupt offshore infrastructure.

With the fall of the Soviet Union, there was a need/desire to cement this arrangement—attract FDI, etc. (turned out to be largely speculative)

Simultaneous to this, the EU was launching its currency project (Maastricht) – one way to mitigate the unemployment in W. Europe was to dump goods in the old Soviet bloc (we see a reversal of trade flows, which served the interests of Germany and France; strong currencies in this regions served the interests of exporters in those W. Countries).

Despite political changes, there has been great consistency in the country's finance policies for the past 20 years. They have been resolute in their defence of the policies that have led to today's crisis.

25 banks for 2.3 million people, most of which are serving these offshore interests.

Latvia has reached a point where the legitimacy of the neoliberal paradigm is finally under question. We do see the possibility of some of the political parties in the country demanding some change in economic policy. Not enough mobilization from below, of course.

Biggest steps that need to be taken.

1. Introduce industrial policy.
2. Tax policy revision (high on labor, low on capital thus far) – this has made Latvia uncompetitive, when coupled with its high currency
3. Development of the agricultural sector (Lativa historically a major producer of grains, but neglected in the neoliberal era, completely)

- - - - - -

Mark Weisbrot

Latvian Central Banker pursuing a 'pro-cylical' policy – i.e., making the recession worse until wages fall enough to 'fix' the economy.

This will be a record loss of output for a cyclical downturn (slated to be greater than US depression in 1929-1933; comparable to destruction of Argentinian economy, where they tried to adjust the economy without adjusting the exchange rate. Defaulted, their currency collapsed—retracted for three months, and then grew 63% in the ensuing years)

The IMF has a fair bit of money, again. Alas. (In Latvia, the main thing that enforces these policies is the European Commission—a very powerful material interest, since European banks have loaned in excess of $1.4 trillion dollars to central and E. Europe. They stand to lose tremendously. A lot of money has been given to the IMF by major countries to 'save' Europe, in effect)

The economics of this crisis, then: when you have a situation like Latvia's (or the PIIGS), there are three macro policies

1. fiscal policy (as has been used, a little bit, in the US)
2. monetary policy (interest rate policy; 'quantitative easing')
3. exchange rate policy (let your currency fall in order to stimulate your exports and cut down your imports)

Latvia and Greece are in a situation where all of these policies are basically off-limits. If Greece, or Spain, could devalue their currencies, they may be on the road to recovery. Part of this would be the trade impact, but not all. When you have a fixed, overvalued exchange rate, you are in a situation where you can't use the other two policies, either—you can't use monetary policy, because you are afraid that when you do that, you will get a run on the currency (and then you've lost your precious peg, which they're holding so they can get the Euro).

The other problem with a fixed currency, like this, is the great loss in investor confidence (they're borrowing at 6.5 percent due to the fear that the economy might collapse; Greece is facing a similar problem).

To generalize to Europe, at large, is that they're all start with an overvalued currency, which prohibits them from pursuing expansionary policies that would be used to get out of their crisis.

So what is the ultimate lesson? Neo-liberalism has failed, yes. Economic integration is not a bad notion, but it took place under a neoliberal framework. They are not going to be able to take commonsense measures to escape the recession.

on the characterization of authoritarian regimes in latin america, fernando cardoso

(33): puzzle is authoritarianism in 'modernizing' societies (caudillismo in haciendo/export-agriculture economies could be understood), contrary to expectations of modernization theory

(35): importance of 'bureaucratic-authoritarian', indicating the fact that military domination is institutional, and not individual (which was 'caudillismo')

(36): authoritarianism is distinct from fascism because the former aspires to induce apathy in the masses [perhaps, another way of putting it is that it is not coming to terms with the arrival of masses on the political stage, a la fascism, but rather pre-empting that arrival; though this is not exactly right, since 'bureaucratic-authoritarian' regimes do react to leftist movements]

(37): different 'ideological' content, too -- more hierarchial/conservative content, than 'racial' nationalism

(38): thesis--a form of regime that guarantees the continued advance of capitalist industrial development (rather than a new form of state)--in other words the basic alliance/pact of domination that exists among social classes remains unchanged

(39): form of State in Latin America is 'dependent' and 'capitalist'

(40): simple economic determination is clearly not useful--but we do need to think about how economic accumulation (which demands, in a 'dependent' and 'capitalist' country, increasing inequality) is managed in a political regime, and how the military option addresses this source of tension

(41): the metastasization of the 'executive' at the expense of the legislature [this clearly fits the Pakistan example, quite well]

(41): importance, also, of thinking through possible tension between the executive and military [stepan's reminders fit here]

(44): discussion of degree of liquidiation of representative mechanisms [Ayub's BD fits here well, of course] as corresponding to degree of distrust amongst dominant classes, for masses

(44): Thermidor in LA as a response, also, to threat of socialism (cold war, cuban revolution, etc.) [in Pakistan not so clear, one thinks--but E. Pakistan, clearly, as 'threat']

(47): different 'control capacity' of authoritarian regimes, re: public opnion [Peru vs. Uruguay/Argentina]

(50): clearly not in the service of landed elites; this is an outdated thesis, he is stressing

(50): moreover, argument, harkening back to State/regime, which is that military regimes have not pursued policies particularly distinct from those pursued by democratic regimes--it is the fact that the latter cannot stem social pressures that accounts for the turn to repression, really [this makes eminent sense in Ayub--but Zia, Musharraf, how to think through this?]

(51-52): noting the autonomous economic interests of the State -- that, otherwise, it is difficult to suggest that particular social classes benefit more under authoritarian rule than under democratic (Mexico and Brazil). and certainly, there is no one-to-one correspondence between military regime and economic policy (Peru vs. Chile)

03/11/10

the theory of the capitalist state (poulantzas and miliband)

up until the 1960s, in political science and sociology the reigning approach to the State was 'pluralism' (and it's still the dominant approach in the mainstream). this takes the State as a neutral actor; simply a site that takes in pressures and demands from outside groups, and acts accordingly (not necessarily a passive actor—but its direction comes from 'pressure groups', fundamentally)

it does not assign, to any particular pressure group, any advantage in access or influence. the list of potential pressure groups is quite large (students, employers, religious organizations, etc. – any 'civic' organization, which is pursuing its interests in an organized way).

politics, therefore, doesn't have any ex ante direction—all groups have potentially the same influence over state policy as any other group

around the 1960s, criticisms of this approach started to circulate.

in the US, you get C. Wright Mills ('a strange character').

it's Ralph Miliband's book, on the British state, which heralds this literature

primarily, this 'radical' approach attacks the illusion that no one pressure group has an ex ante advantage. simply put, because lobbying and pressure takes resources, groups that have greater resources will have a structural advantage in the political process.

in fact, there are four nested arguments, here:

1. social origins, recruitment from elite circles-- the highest echelons of State mangers, in the US, are recruited out of the corporate sector; in Britain, the civil service plays this role.
2. social networks—even if the social origins aren't aligned, the social networks into which these folks are cast define their buddies, allies, etc. (kids in private schools, etc.)
3. lobbying—in the form of think-tanks/advice, as well as the more obvious forms (in the US, any crucial legislation that's drawn up on business is drawn up by thinktanks—the simple reason for this, of course, is because lawmakers are idiots). expertise belongs to the people that run the economy.
4. finance—in the US, there are two elections, every four years: the less important one is the one we know—before you get the votes, there's an initial competition over funders. before politicans compete over votes, they compete over funders. cannot say anything that gives the impression they will act against the interests of their funders.

these four, taken together, have come to be known as the 'instrumentalist' theory of the State. the State is being wielded by the State, as an instrument (the capitalist class control the State apparatus—their physical proximity to the State, 'claims' over the State constitute their authority). this is to be contrasted to the 'structuralist' theory of the State, which we will come to.

vivek, however, is noting that the four 'instrumentalist' claims are better understood as a 'structuralist' theory (because the notion of unequal resources demands a 'structural' understanding, most obviously).

important--at the same time, it does share an important commonality with 'pluralism', which is that the State is more-or-less neutral (that all of these influences/pressures come from without, in a sense). it is, in some sense, a 'thing' to be wielded, even still. where they differ from pluralists is that they believe that certain pressure groups have structural advantages.

this is what Poulantzas is objecting to, principally (and others, too).

important--the political implications of the 'instrumentalist' view obviously problematic. the notion is that the institutions of the State can be changed, if the nature of the navigator and the maps change. the State is simply a machine, in a sense. it is a distinction understood, for example, as “the State in Capitalism” vs. “the Capitalist State” [the notion, of course, is that the State has to be smashed—that it

is intrinsically biased towards the interests of elites]

so what's the argument?

the challenge for structuralist state theory has been to adduce mechanisms which incline it toward dominant class interests. something about the State's very institutional structure that biases it toward capitalists' intrests.

what is Poulantzas' argument?

he begins by noting that the Capitalist State is characterized by a structural fact about the capitalist economy—which is that the extraction of the surplus does not require the use of political power to extract the surplus. feudalism, of course, works differently. in capitalism, force is not required—the 'dull compulsion' of economic relations is sufficient.

what, then, is the function of the State, under Capitalism? it switches from being an actor in extraction—instead, it manages the 'effects' of surplus extraction. it strives to be the factor of cohesion; it is what keeps the whole thing together. (this is compatible with the pluralist notion, vivek is arguing—it 'manages' difference. in other words, we can't stop here)

the question of its complicity in elites' interests, of course, relies on Poulantzas' argument that the 'way' in which it keeps things together is crucial.

in managing and organizing for the coherence of society, the State becomes a bourgeois state by virtue of the fact that it reproduces capitalist relations of production. this is a political function, two-fold:

1. disorganizes the dominated classes.
2. organizes the dominant classes.

how does it do this?

for the dominated classes, two things:

1. constitutes them as 'formally equal' to their exploiters—it reinforces economic atomization with political atomization (this is very different from the Feudal State, which enshrines status distinctions). abstracts away from class to found the nation (we can think of this as a separate function).
2. disorganizes the dominated classes by allowing for economic concessions, to them. the root of what Lenin called 'economism'

notice, though, that this 'atomization' of subjects applies to everybody. left to itself, then, this is a mechanism that should equally effect both classes. so this disorganization has to be complemented by the selective organization of elites. this is where the theory gets murky, vivek's arguing.

Poulantzas argues that the State organizes the dominant classes by “the play of its institutions”. the first claim: the action of the State institutions have to have the effect of increasing the organization of the dominant classes. the second claim: capitalist classes exist as a bloc of classes, which means that it has to organize a differentiated mass—how is it, then, that the State organizes the dominant classes into a power bloc?

in almost every instance, though, in Poulantzas' book he is exceedingly vague on how the State institutions organize the dominant classes. rather, it seems more that the dominant classes act on the State, in his narrative (in effect, here you have to introduce the 'instrumentalist' claims to make this sensible, in a way—but this is precisely what he is writing against).

it is not clear that it is the State which is making them cohere as a dominant power bloc. there is no sense that it is the State which is doing the work.

this is a weakness of the theory—but it doesn't necessarily make this theory useless.

it does show that the State disorganizes the dominated classes, as an effect of its own reproduction. but the second dynamic is not justified, in his account.

---

types of States (class character) vs. forms of State (within these class categories) – if the effect of disorganizing dominated classes is the task of the bourgeois state itself, it is hard to see how this could be true. this is an artifact of the 20^th century state—the bourgeois State has been around for four hundred years, and it was not the case that workers were formally equal to capitalists throughout this period. what Poulantzas is really describing, here, is the 'bourgeois-democratic' state. before this, it was the 'bourgeois-oligarchic' state.

---

structured totality (Althusserian conception—each part has its own integral logic) vs. expressive totality (everything is a jumble, expressing the overwhelming influence of the 'essence')

---

functional vs. intrinsic definition of a concept

---

'contradictoriness' of State intervention? certainly, every effect of the State is not an 'intended' effect; how do you account for this? 'functional' vs. 'accidental'?

---

Althusser was the first Western Marxist who argued that Marxism must be a 'science' (unlike the Frankfurt School and Lukacs). Yet his actual epistemology was fundamentally 'idealist' – 'generality 1, generality 2, generality 3'. Concepts working on concepts generating theories—so you have claims of science, rhetorical, that don't prove to be worth anything, philosophically. People who take the rhetoric seriously and abandon the philosophy became good Marxists. People who take the philosophy seriously become poststructuralists (Laclau/Mouffe).

---

Summary remarks: we're trying to understand whether the State, by its very institutional structure, is implicated in class power. Poulantzas is one attempt. Next week we will look at three reasons that this might be the case: Offa, Miliband, Bloch.

nicos poulantzas, political power and social classes (1973)

part 1, section 1

(37): classes as the 'effect' of certain levels of structures

(37): 'political' vs. 'politics' -- distinction between 'juridico-political superstructure of the state" (which is the political), and 'political class practices' (political class struggle, or 'politics)

(38): historicism--which "makes superfluous the theoretical study of the structures of the political and of political practice" (Lukacs, Korsch--an 'over-politicization')

(40): towards anti-historicism--the political as that "crucial level in which the contradictions of a formation are condensed" (only this, he's arguing, allows you to appreciate the anti-historicist character of the argument that the political class struggle is the motive force of history)

(41): a la Lenin, the 'political class struggle' (or political practice) as the nodal point where contradictions are condensed

(42): political structures are the 'institutionalized power of the state' [as distinct from political practice, no?]

(44-45): state's specific function is to constitute 'the factor of cohesion' in a social formation (a 'complex unity'), with two implications:

1. equilibrium is not given by the economic, but has to be maintained at the level of the political
2. transformation can only unfold at the level of 'political practice'

(46): a key point--under capitalism, the state acquires a 'specific autonomy', which underlies the 'specificity of the political'

(47): the problem of the overlapping of several modes of production in any concrete instance

(48): relating the state to the political class struggle demands relating the state to the 'ensemble of the levels of structures--to the articulation of instances that characterize a formation'

(49): the State as the official resume of society--the condensation or fusion of contradictions

(50): following Bukharin, State as 'regulator' -- maintaining conditions of production and conditions for the existence of the unity of a mode of production/formation

(53): the State and a 'twin role--corresponding to 'exploitation' and 'organization-cum-supervision'

(53): economic function, ideological function, political function

(53-54): in sum, two results

1. State's 'global role' as cohesive factor unfolds in particular modalities (economic, ideological, and political'
2. State's functions can be grapsed only their interrelation (and their role in 'political class conflict') [i.e., not just directly political, but also generally political]

(55): State intervention  in the economicvs. a 'liberal State' (non-intervention in the economic) [question of the dominant role--none of this, though, changes the general facts, he's arguing convincingly]

part 1, section 3

(99): power is 'constituted' in the field of class practices (i.e., not at the level of structures, but is an effect of the ensemble of these levels')

(102): 'power' cannot be enumerated at the level of structure (relations of production), but only at level of political class struggle

(104): rejecting class-for-itself/class-in-itself [why? interrogate]

(104): definition--power as capacity of a class to realize its specific objective interests

(107): important--a class can exist at the level of the class structure, without making itself felt in the political arena [it seems like in this case we will want to say they exist as a 'social force' but not politically -- though this is inconsistently the case in his argument, if it is the argument. the idea is fairly clear, though]

(108): ok--"power reveals relations not directly determined by the structure"

(111): important, needs interrogation--similarly, interests can only be related to the field of practices (not at the level of structures) [but in what sense can you have objective interests; this is where he introduces the 'near-side'/'far-side' stuff]

(112): class interests always relational

(112): 'objective', then, seems to refer to 'interests' once have abstracted away from 'ideology' and the way in which their represented by agents. it doesn't, though, mean that we understand them at the level of 'structure'--there can be no interests at this level, remember

(113): ok--'power relations' are determined 'in the last instance' by 'economic power'

(115): the 'relative autonomy' of the state is not due to the fact that the Stae has its own power, but because it constitutes 'power centers' (again, this function of unity/cohesion')

(116) state apparatus (personnel of the state) vs. state power (the social class or fraction of a class which holds power)

(117): not an 'instrumentalist' conception

(118): not zero-sum power--i.e., loss of power by the bourgeoisie does not mean gaining of power by the working-class

part 2, section 1

(124-125): we are not proceeding on the state/civil society schema, precisely because it abstracts from the 'class struggle' and hides real problems in the concept of separation

(128): important--the constituting of individuals as juridical-political individual citizens (which has 'real' and 'ideological' components)

(129): it is the separation of the direct producer from the means of production that produces the 'specific autonomy'

(130-131): at the level of the economic class struggle, the State has the effect of concealing the fact of classes from individuals (it imposes isolation, individualization). this is what makes it possible for the State to be implicated in the constitution of classes, at the level of the political class struggle.

(133): the capitalist State relates to the socio-economic relations in the form in which they appear in their isolation, insofar as socio-economic relations are already class practices [but consider our objection, here]

(133-134): in sum, two functions

1. sets up agents of production so as to produce the effect of isolation
2. represent the unity of the isolated relations (the "unity of an isolation" which is "largely its own effect")

(135): the 'specific autonomy' of the State from the relations of production is reflected by the autonomy that the 'political class struggle' possesses viz-a-viz the economic

(137): again, in sum [rich passage, needs some unpacking]--in constituting class unity out of the isolation of the economic class struggle, the State serves the interests of the dominatn classes. it has to constitute their unity, first of all. but it also, ideologically, constitutes their particular interests as the interests of the whole--this is made necessary by the autonomy of the political class struggle, and made possible by the isolation of the dominant classes.

(137): hegemony as based in political practices, not structures

(138): we are not going to use 'hegemony' in the sense of 'legitimacy' in the eyes of the dominated classes

(140-141): rather, hegemony will have a two-fold meaning applied to the political practices of the dominant classes

1. so, as they constitute themselves as the 'general interest'
2. also, though, to talk about the dominant role within the dominant classes (the leadership of the power bloc'

part 3, introduction

(187-190): useful summary of the claims thus far

1. CMP has specific autonomy of instances
2. state is the cohesive factor in the unity of a formation, which has several functions (economic, ideological, political) which are condensed in its strictly political function--"its function in relation to the field of the political class struggle"
3. the State 'determines' the class struggle, but only in the sense that it unfolds within limits set by it--additionally, the political class struggle redounds on the State, too [sense that he is trying to make sense of the Welfare State, social democracy, etc.]

(188-189): critical claim

1. for the dominated classes, the function of the capitalist state is to prevent their political organization which would overcome their economic isolation (an isolation which is partly produced by the state). for this the ideological role is critical, but obviously other functions have their place, too [the political-repressive, presumably]. 
2. for the dominant classes, the capitalist state is "permanently working otheir organization" by cancelling out their economic isolation (which is also the effect of the State and the 'ideological'--how so? this needs unpacking)

(189): nicely put--the State's contradiction is that it presents itself in its institutions as a class state, ruling over a society that it says are not 'divided into calsses' -- in other words, it is as if it believes that all people are part of the bourgeois class in whose interest it rules. [on second thought, this may be a liberal summary of his claim]

part 3, section 1

(190): capitalist state represents the political interests of the dominant classes, not their economic interests--it is the 'organizing agent'

(190-191): it can move against their immediate interests in the favor of the dominated classes, but only to secure the hegemony of the dominant

(191-192): crucial--the fact that the dominated classes can impose themselves, within limits, on the State, shows imply that the State presides over a society divided into classes (and functions not, then, as the simple tool of the dominant classes). it respects, though, these interests only to the extent that it can accommodate them into prolonged domination [there is an important question, then, about the institutionalization of these gains]

(193): explicit mention of the Welfare state, in this regard--making economic sacrifices in order to safeguard political power

part 3, section 4

(229): against a 'dualist' conception of the struggle between dominated and dominant

(230): point 1--the rule of a 'power bloc' is made possible/necessary by the nature of the capitalist state [unpack this--it doesn't seem terribly important to the larger argument, but worth understanding all the same]

(231): point 2--insofar as CMP is characterized by a plurality of dominant classes (citing landlords)

(232-233) point 3--the bourgeoisie appears as divided into fractions [the question, here, is along what lines it splits--due to competition (and thus as individuals), or due to circuits, etc.--he seems to imply the latter, but is this convincing?]

(234): definition of power bloc--contradictory unity of the politically dominant classes as related to the capitalist state

(237): hegemonic leadership within the power bloc

(239): summary of claims here--contradictory unity, and class struggle within power bloc

(243): the question of the 'supporting classes', who don't demand any real political sacrifices from the power bloc but offer their support primarily on the basis of 'ideological illusions' and also due to the fear of the power of the working class (specially the petty bourgeoisie). all this depends, he reminds us, on the state of political disorganization prevailing amongst these classes.

(247): political practice vs. political scene (parties, etc.) [which corresponds to form of state vs. form of regime, see 252--this is not a chronological distinction, though]

(250): discussing question of 'staffing' of the State, dealing with England through concept of hegemonic leadership and power bloc

(251): we need to be able to distinguish between 'party relations' and 'class relations', which is something that political science is not good at doing

part 4, section 1

(255): enumeration of the concept of 'unity', as it is peculiar to the capitalist state (due to the 'autonomized juridico-political superstructure')

(256): important--again, against the notion of the State as instrument--instead, a 'relative autonomy' viz-a-viz the power bloc and viz-a-viz allies/supports, which is unique to the Capitalist state.

(257): important, on two species of relative autonomy--to try and make all this explicit: the political class struggle has a 'relative autonomy' viz-a-viz the other instances; and the State, has relative autonomy viz-a-viz the dominant classes in this political class struggle (and, importantly, the latter fact 'reflects' the former) [unpack this, a bit]

(258): Bonapartism as a theoretical model of the capitalists state, when we abstract away from the historical story, there

(260): relative autonomy is not, at all, premised on some notion of equilibrium between the forces in the class struggle

part 4, section 2

(266): the 'ne0-liberal' theory of the State

(267-268): the institutionalist ('institutionalization of the class struggle')

(272): state socialist and Bismarckian illusions, premised on a notion that social forces are in equilibrium (and that the State form is foreshadowing the future--'planning', etc.) [return to text, if interested in his rebuttal]

(273): again, against instrumental theory of State monopoly capitalism

(274): again, the unique relation between the economic and political undergirds this theorization ('a new articulation of the economic and the political')

part 4, section 3

(275-277): again, useful summary section

1. the autonomization of the political class struggle viz-a-viz the relations of production, owing to the unique nature of capitalism. this induces isolation in the agents of production, despite a socialization of the labor-process. the effect of this is to conceal class rleations from the agents, for all classes. this fact of the 'isolated' economic class struggle is precisely why the political class struggle is of such importance. 
2. as well we have to consider other isolated classes in the social formation (they are overdetermined in their isolation by the state effects, in addition to what it already means to be a peasant or petty-bourgeois in the CMP)
3. state presents itself as the public unity of society--it represents the 'people nation', the 'poltical unity' of an 'economic isolation' which is its own effect'.
4. this is an ideological function, which is to occlude the class structure. (of course, this isn't the only function of the State's juridico-political superstitious--it also has 'real' effects)

(279): again, unique fact of capitalism is that class membership is absent from political institutions

(279): all this allows the State to function as the 'unambiguous' power of the dominant classes (how? follow the argument, now--this is where he begins to justify this claim, he's saying)

(282): key--it is precisely through the relative autonomy of the State that the State upholds the political interests of the politically dominant classes (he is noting some confusion about multiple uses of the term autonomy--both autonomy of political from economic, and of the State from the political). he is saying that unity is a condition of possibility for this autonomy--but isn't what he's actually arguing the other way around? that political unity is only possible if the State has relative autonomy.

(284): key--and this is the answer to why that's the case, again, which is specific to CMP

1. because the bourgeoisie is incapable of raising itself to the level of internal unity
2. because of the bourgeoisie's struggle with the dominanted classes, against whom it finds it difficult to realize political hegemony

(285): to rule better in its name, in sum; the political organizers of the dominant classes. [again, i think the question of dependence of the State on the bourgeoisie is less clear, in this formulation]

(287): again, we are not talking about those instances of relative autonomy that arise from 'equilibrium' in the class struggle' (this is something much more regular) [this does elide the question of what happens at those moments to the State--but one would think he would turn to Lenin and the constitution of a 'dual State', for answers]

(287-288): more summary--how does relative autonomy follow?

1. because of the isolation of the bourgeois calss, who can't raise themselves to the level of unity. the State must organize class domination
2. it must function to politically disorganize the working class, by presenting itself as the representative of the 'people-nation'
3. its important role viz-a-viz supporting classes.

(288): again, the conscious paradox of his formulation--that the State assumes relative autonomy from dominant classes precisely in order to serve them better.

(289): the question of equilibrium resulting from social forces--not much said, but just distinguishing it from the stable formulation of the concept of autonomy

(291): aspiration to legitimacy in the State's presentation of itself as representative of people-nation

(294):  'totalitarianism' is not actually that distinct from 'unambiguous class power in the capitalist state'

part 4, section 4

(298): again, bourgeoisie as a 'uniquely fractured class', which has its origins at the level of the actual relations of production [here we have a quote that suggests a competition-centered interpretation of this fact]

(299): State as 'political organizer' of the power bloc, precisely because individual parties and its fractions are unable to do so ['only because', he is saying--worth interrogation, because of its 'functionalist' implications]

(300): the State, remember, doesn't confront a politically unified dominant class--it is the agent of this unification

(303): question of separation of powers