social democracy as a historical phenomenon, adam przeworski 

(28): goal is to chart a course btw the two 'reefs', Rosa Luxemburg--abandoning the 'mass character ' of the movement, or abandoning the final goals of the movement

(29): three 'effects' of the bourgeois State on the workers' movement

1. individualization--each person is a citizen, not a worker
2. representation--relations within a class become relations of representation [how is this specific to the bourgeois State?]
3. organization and embourgeoisement (i.e., Robert Michels)

(30): universal suffrage changes the context--now, parties have to decide between a 'legal' road, and an 'extra-parliamentary one' [this has to be rough, of course--SPD chose legal road before full universal suffrage, no?]

(31): key--the normal conditions in which you build socialist organizations doesn't prepare you to be the kind of movement that is likely to seize power (SPD is case in point)

(33): for a long time, Social Democracy understood universal suffrage as the means to the final goal--"seemed to guarantee socialist victory"

(36): Bebel at Erfurt--'most in the room will live to see the day' [!]

(38): illusory myth of the proletarian majority

(39): and, what follows, the impossibility of winning elections if you're a party endeavouring to represent the interests of one clas,s as class

(39): most starkly--"socialists must choose between a party homogenous in its class appeal, but sentenced to perpetual electoral defeats, and a party that struggles for electoral success at the cost of diluting its class character." 

(40): thus, to participate in elections means that the task of emancipating the working-class can no longer be the task of workers themselves. 

(40): cf. Engels advice to recruit the small peasantry

(42): moreover, social democratic parties have never obtained the votes even of those they've claimed to represent (significant fractions of workers have gone elsewhere). 

(43): SD parties have found it necessary to appeal to workers as individuals, not as class (as the poor, etc.)

(47-48): imp--when they found themselves in power in the interwar period, they were unable to make inroads--private property was intact [he gives two reasons: (a) lack of a coherent program; (b) didn't have the parliamentary support sufficient to do this

(50): maximalist vs. minimalist debate--be revolutionary, and people will flock (Norway in 1928, people fled government fell) vs. protect welfare, set the stage for later transformation (but no economic program of their own, until the depression, when they became adept at 'administering' capitalist economies) [the causal argument is a bit confused here, let's sort it out--what is the source of their degeneration? ideas? lack of balance of forces in favour? lack of parliamentary support?]

(52): Keynesianism didn't need nationalization

(54): and soon, Social Democracy ceased to be a 'reformist' movement, in the classical sense. this "is a direct consequence of those reforms that have been accomplished

(55-56): pithy version of theory of the State--unless you nationalize, you can't escape the dependence of your economy on the profitability of private intereprise ('business confidence')

(56): ultimately, key claim is that this is the source of SD treachery--"nationalization of the means of production has turned out to be electorally unfeasible; radical redistributive policies result in economic crises... and general affluence can be increased only if capitalists are made to cooperate..." 

(58): within capitalism, you cannot have a socio-economic revolution without precipitating an economic crisis (sorry Leon Blum)

paul pierson, new politics of the welfare state

(348): retrenchment process does not follow same process as reform

(350): welfare state generates constituencies


(351): little evidence of cutbacks (covering '75 to '90)

(355): radical reform difficult where power is well-distributed, and there are lots of veto-points (Germany, USA); but even where there are less, it is difficult

1. danger of pluralist faith--Pierson is not alive enough to the fact that, even where populations stick to welfare state, if powerful interests want its abolition, one can expect to see it [this is aside from the question of whether we've seen it or not]

neil gilbert, transformation of the welfare state

(32): four factors

1. structural changes
2. globalization of economy
3. changing ideas
4. changing socio-political processes

(46): in the enabling State, a move towards Durkheimian vision of social cohesion (not the State/public leading it, but private actors in civil society)

(51): sees convergence, when you look at total social transfers, but include everything from tax breaks to private contributions.data is from 1999.

1. no theory, here--just description. and if there is a causal argument about which of the factors come first, it seems confused.

2. implications of 'convergence' are, partly, that welfare is as American as apple pie, but also, that the Scandinavian model is less generous and certainly less different than one might think


walter korpi, the power resources model

(78): parity amongst labour and capital is not possible, as capital is superior on all of the dimensions laid out

(82):political democracy can be conceptualized as the effective use of increasing power resources (a la Vanhanen)

esping-anderson, three worlds of welfare capitalism

(161): focus on spending is misplaced (we need to focus on decommodification, in the spirit of Marshall)

(163): self-reinforcing, in the sense that de-commodification (which is when a person can maintain a livelihood w/o selling labour-power) often increases the ability of labour to organize (tighter labour markets, etc.)

(164): needs-testing, targeted benefits serve to curtail the de-commodifying effect

(166): universalism was only possible in a historically peculiar class structure (where vast majority of people aer 'little people); but once you get the 'new middle-classes,' dualism is inevitable [hmm]

(167): and somewhat unlike Pierson, the emergence of dualism is likely to make m-class less supportive of a universalistic transfer system

(170): need to move away from simple causality, to a constellation of effects that interact (class movilization, class-political coalitions, regime structures)

(171): historically, before WWII, the attitude of farmers were critical--rural class politics determined political dominance. afterwards, the rising white-collar strata becomes the linchpin for political majorities


(172): it's the political leanings of these new middle-calsses that determines what the w. state will look like -- either they'll be integrated into a universal system, part of a dualist system, or part of a system that's more generous but segregated


1. obviously, total independence from the market is a sham--this would be the end of wage-labour

yergin and stanislaw, the commanding heights

(14, 124): "underlying all this has been a fundamental shift in ideas"

(15): "importance of leaders and leadership"

(20): Atlee was a social worker

(21, 26-27): insofar as they have a concept of crisis, it's "war"/devastation [the politics of that crisis, w/ the Left in ascendancy, etc., is all obscured.]

 (29): "nationalization as a capitalist weapon" [there is a great deal of truth to this--nationalization can be a great boon for capitalists]

(34): the 'chicken feed' argument!

(51): FDR and the New Deal [no mention of Labor/Left role, strife, uncertainty, etc.]

(64): more regulation under Nixon [and Dem Congress, of course] than under any president since New Deal [is it coincidental that this post-dated second significant wave of struggle? yet no mention of this.]

(74): 'Permit Raj,' but of course

(81, 91): no acknowledgment of the successes of ISI [this framing permits 'idealism'--because then it really is the failing of ideas, and the superiority of alternative ideas, that explains historical change. interests/power be damned! must look at centrality of profits and class power, rather than the question of whether one or the other policy is 'better' for society]

(87, 91): corruption, also, is un-explained

(93): Keith Joseph as catalyst

(96): Edward Heath was UK's Richard Nixon--an unfortunate Keynesian

(107): in 1974, Thatcher and Joseph break with Heath and the Tory mainstream

(108): the first three years were a 'non-event'--only after Falklands

(113): confrontation with NUM and Scarrgill, in 1984

(115): State companies were inefficient, found it difficult to compete--in this, of course, there's always an element of truth. [on the other hand, we're confronted with the track record of neoliberalism]

(123): in total, only 46 privatizations

(124, 140, 145): again, "beliefs" as driving change [there are always all sorts of ideas around. the question is why certain ideas get selected for]

(139): getting literature on E. Asian miracle backwards--consensus is different

(142): LSE in the 1930s became redoubt of liberalism

Harvey, Neoliberalism

(19): centrally--it's a political project, not a utopian project

(31-33): difficulties w/ class--resolved by pointing to finance

Williams, Keynes

(74): Keynes actually didn't write much about social policy/welfare

(76): engaged welfare State through obsession w/ unemployment

kohli, the indian media business

(19): Indian TV mkt, unlike US, yet to move to pay-based--still ad-subsidised (this means heightened influence of advertisers)

(28-29): circulation-advertising split, for newspapers, was 60:40; but in English more adverse.

(29): ownership of a media house is sometimes more effective than lobbying [hmm]

(33): in 1980, 80% of ad spending went to print

(35): TOI is only national newspaper--circulation of 2 million

(38): English newspapers charge more for ads, because advertisers are interested in their base

(38, 46): key--one factor setting India apart is its 'overdependence on advertising'. "newspapers at mercy of advertisers--circulation only brings in 20% in English-language"

(43): allegedly, though, not significant media concentration--no real pan-India publishers

(44, 56): allowing foreign stakes in media, starting 2002

(83): imp--in TV, too, Indian operators earn 80% from advertising, and only 20% from subscription--sign of market 'immaturity' [confusion over figures, see p. 86)

(204): 40 million internet users

goodin and mitchell, foundations of the welfare state 

(x): geographical mobility undermined earlier forms of poor relief, which were localized/parish-based

(xii): breadwinner's welfare state vs. univeralized benefits

(xiii): regime types--'liberal', 'social democratic,' 'corporatist'

(xiv): nowadays, a return to 1601 and localism -- importantly, 'in an era of declining public budgets'

(xv): imp--here, the shift to neoliberalism/decline is seen as a response to changing economic circumstances. [is this not mediated by politics!? come on]

(xvi): other reasons for its decline [but, again, all these sidestep the question of shifts in the balance of forces. it's not an objective fact that SS is unpayable, for example, etc.]

1. changing nature of work
2. women's increasing participation in the labour force

marshall, citizenship and social class

(149): three sorts of rights--civil (property rights, negative rights), political, and social (welfarish)

(150): civil rights, of course, were entirely functional for a market economy (from Status to Contract)

(151, 154): good--civil rights run up against social rights. the welfare state has to fight the effects of free operation of mkts [acknowledged in the others, but clearest here]

[1] In the sense of the last argument, the Welfare State is one thing and NOT many. Reforms that attenuate the ravages of the market. It may be true that this takes different forms at different times and in different places, but the fact that, at heart, its a question of redistributing resources ought to alert us to the importance of a structural theory of its implementation. The wealthy don't just give up resources because (1) changing philosophical fashions; (2) moral concerns.

pierson and leimgruber, intellectual roots

(32): though it's been identified with the historical project of SD, its origins "more usually" lie in liberal/conservative thought [!]

(34): [BUT] acknowledging that motivated by an attempt to answer the 'social question'. [well, who was posing the social question, for god's sake? is the idea that it was posed purely passively, because there was increasing misery, etc.? of course not!]

(37-38): idealism--the forward role of the ideas of the 'new' or 'social' liberalism. [let us clarify the claim--at its strongest, its explanatory! nutty]

(39): the New Deal bringing through earlier ideas and concepts [but come on, this makes it difficult to (a) explain the ND; (b) understand how transformative of a break it was w/ past policy, no?]

[1] There's a real need to clarify exactly what we're doing, here. A genealogy of the welfare state, ok. But none of this can suffice as an explanation of its origins, which is what Pierson and Co. lapse into, routinely.

asa briggs, on the welfare state

(222): what once seemed fixed (the fact of welfare), obviously is not

(223): not one 'movement', but remedies for specific problems [I'm sure this is true--but let's not obscure the important point, which is that these are all part of a single effort to attenuate the effects of the free operation of mkts]

(225): 'it was increasingly regarded as an obligation of government to ward of distress...' [OK, but why? Need to think systematically about this. State actors can change their minds--though surely in response to things happening around them, not arbitrariliy--but they also have certain imperatives to which they have to hew. So what determines policy? At the very least, not their preferences alone...]

(227): 'consensus' years of 1945 to 1950, in the UK [why?!?]

(228): definition of Welfare State: (1) minimum income; (2) meeting social contingencies; (3) range of services to all citizens

(232): Fabians kept the 'masses' in the background, only later discovered the trade unions.

(241): Oastler and the 'feudal Welfare State'

(249): Bismarck worried about SDem

(251): complexity of lineage of 19th century welfare state [but at least part of the reason that this is less relevant is because these were not nearly as significant, in terms of impact/scope, as 20th century welfare States]

(253): implicitly, the explanation is a moral one--State actors couldn't avoid the moral pressure of reformers [this just can't explain very much]

(256-257): US is different. [but no attempt to explain this!?]

ruth berins collier, paths toward democracy (1999)

(20): key point: literature is 'overstylized' -- neither w-class-led nor elite-led images capture the democratization process, in its first or second phases. there are several corners to the cube.

(28-32): difficulties in classifying democratization (UK, Chile, etc.)

(34): M-Sec Democratizatoin -- led by m-class groups, in the main

(54): Electoral Support Mobilization -- attempt to garner support of an existing movement

stanley kochanek, business and politics in India (1974)

(x): relative to other groups, business associations are 'relatively well-developed'

(x): unlike other groups, have developed as interest group autonomous from political parties

(xi): not quite the 'modern functional representation', though--b/c of importance of 'primordial identities'

(198): alleging 'low prestige of private sector' in the public eye, which makes it difficult to exert influence

(208): traditionally business associations have taken defensive stands; as grievance bodies. but slowly becoming more pro-active.

(211): "major Indian business houses already own almost all the important metropolitan newspapers..."

(214): most consistent political dilemma, for business, has related to strategy it should pursue, re: Congress--from "qualified support" to "partial alienation"

(216): Marwari (Birla) attitude to Congress very different from Tata (Bombay attitude). former conciliatory, latter behind efforts to go elsewhere (Swatantra party)

(216): 1947 to 1953 was a period of uncertainty; accomodation from 1954 to 1963

(220): but 1963 to 1967 brought reversal

(220): Nehru had been well-regarded amongst Marwaris, but never liked by those who weren't pro-Congress.

(220): though, "as one industrialist put it, '...Nehru never did anything to really affect business interests.'"

(220): again, 'old Bombay industrial elite' that was most strongly provoked

(222): business sought to intervene, against Congress, in 1967 elections--designed to humble Congress and make it more amenable to business pressure

(224): Left perceived business influence in '67 election very unfavourably

(225): a section of the Marwari houses did support Indira Gandhi, though; but opposition was well-financed, as well

(225): after interlude, there was another phase of accomodation, mirroring that under Nehru (post 1971, Kochanek is dating it)

(226): an old generation was uninterested in politics; a new generation, though, is taking active interest

(229): Business played an increasing role in '67 and '71 elections

(232): estimated that business provides about 90 % of election funds [but no citation]

(233): from 1962 to 1968, companies contributed 26 million Rs--Congress recieved Rs 20 million

(234-235): issue of 'company contributions' [i.e., direct donations] has been politically explosive for a while (since '67 elections), but estimated at no more than 20% of total money

(236): by and large, donations coming from business have been individual, not collective

(237): most funding goes to Congress mainly because there is no viable opposition [this has changed, obviously]

(240): during Nehru era, business activity in parliament was limited (no functional representation for business, no businessmen really contesting)

(256): noting the existence of some lobbying, but 'primitive by American standards'

(257, see also Chp XII): and Parliamentary lobbying is much less important than lobbying ministers and/or the bureaucracy

(258): most effective way is direct personal contact, rather than written communication

(258): and mainly concerned with short-term problems rather than long-term policy [part of Kochanek's general theme that business has been short-sighted, though increasingly less so as India develops--a lovely story]

(263): effectiveness of lobbying has been on the increase since the early 1960s (citing death of Nehru, growth of self-confidence in business community, and growing importance of Parliament)

(265, 267): imp--vast bulk of business energy and resources are concentrated on prime minister, cabinet, and the higher echelons of the bureaucracy. Parliament is less important, for the reason that it has less clout.

(266): Nehru refrained from extensive nationalizations, he heavily protected industry, and he laid the foundation for expansion of private sector [no indication, though, that this would affect Kochanek's very traditional judgement of the nature of the 'license raj']

(292): some hint at a 'revolving door', between business and politics. record of businesses hiring retired bureaucrats.

(297): Gandhi lived at Birla house during New Dehli summers, but of course. Scene of his assassination.

(302): again, the problem in Gov't-Business relations [for Kochanek] is that the 'political culture' is hostile to business. too much socialism in the air.

(321): extent of business influence is 'exaggerated by its enemies, understated by its friends'

(322): citing Birla to suggest that business has a 'limited influence', but can have an effect where well-organized and its resources are correctly utilized

(332): business has been most effective in gaining access to exective and bureaucracy, insofar as (a) they're powerful; and (b) out of the public eye

(333): as party politics splintered in '63 to '71 period, it gave business some leverage--but when Congress hegemony returned in 1971, this was lost

(337): under the forces of 'internal and systemic change,' business is becoming more sophisticated, moving toward 'new lobbying' and things like this

---

[1] Kochanek is working, more-or-less, with the classic picture of the 'license raj', where much of the initiative regarding long-term policy questions comes from bureaucrats and politicians, and business responds defensively. This ignores, of course, the structural power they wield (the 'investment strike' chronicled by Vivek).

[2] The book is pluralist, through-and-through, which makes it difficult to assess exactly what is being argued. Sometimes it's admitted that the resources wielded by business matter (or must matter) tremendously, and that they have greatest influence where it counts the most (in the executive arm and bureaucracy)--90% of all election funds are supplied by business, for example. But otherwise the picture is of an aggrieved business class, held hostage to politicians who have to toe a populist line in order to appease restless masses. This is misplaced, for obvious reasons.

[3] There is, though, throughout the book, a sense that business is getting better at precisely the things it needs to do to wield influence. There is a prediction, running through the book, that fits well with what seems to have happened in India. He attributes this to systemic/internal change, but it's unclear whether this is meant to be a natural consequence (in his argument) of industrialization, or whether he agrees that it must have something to do with shifting balance of class forces.