the global gamble, peter gowan

(4): the international monetary regime as US-centric and 'political' (not outcome of technical/economic shifts)

(5): this form of globalization was Nixon's response to the crisis of the 60s, but it was one of a range of possible responses

(8): imp--most of what happens in global 'capital markets' is not oriented towards productive investment--what does happen is not useful, should be viewed as a 'charge' upon that more basic, important duty. in fact, very large flow of funds into productive investment don't pass through capital markets.

(10): 1/2 of biggest banks in Europe publicly-owned in early 1990s

(11): the secondary market in securities doesn't contribute to productive investment, at all

(11): this kind of 'parasitism' is the preserve of 'rentiers' and 'speculators'

(12): again, much of the activity doesn't facilitate productive investment.

(12): key division in capitalism--money-dealing capital vs productive capital [hmm]

(13): balance of power between two sectors governed by business cycle (former more powerful in recession, latter in boom), but also by institutional configurations

(14): former like hot flows, latter like cold flows [why, necessarily? a bit too stylized, this]

(14): with the end of Keynesianism has come the 'resurrection of the rentiers'

(17): pressure on US dollar the late 1960s causing Nixon to break up Bretton Woods

(19): key--break-up of Bretton Woods was a strategy for restoring dominance of US capitals (two decisive moments--ending convertibility, 'engineering' of oil price rises)

(20): a 'fake', re: SDRs, in order to push people towards dollar std

(20): key--what happens is that the US is able to move the exchange price of the dollar without suffering consequences that others would suffer, if they tried similar things (privilege of seigniorage)

(21): key--Nixon admin tried very hard to take international financial relations out of hands of state banks, into hands of private financial operators. this was done through exploiting US control over oil supplies, its influence on OPEC--'economic statecraft' [taking pains to emphasize that this is not conspiratorial]. other gov'ts wanted to recycle through IMF, US said no

(22): US had to lean on banks to lend to the South [different from Sunkel and Griffith-Jones' story, where it's the competition between banks that leads to this]

(23, 31): key--all this was a tactic to avoid US economic weakness--this would preserve the privileged position of the US.

(23): imp--stability of a State's currency would depend not only on balance of payments position, now, but also on State's creditworthiness in private international financial markets [of course, these won't be entirely decoupled, right?]

(25): US vs. Chad-- privilege of printing the reserve currency

(26): DSWR has had four effects

1. private banks become central
2. lack of public supervision
3. developments in US financial markets became very influential
4. competitive pressures within banking systems, where deregulation in US prompts deregulation abroad

(27): not a global financial market, as much as an American financial market dominating other national markets

(28-29): US has power over interest rates, regulation, via bailouts

(32, 41): in the 80s, after initial hesitation, there was a concerted move to use the IMF/WB to exert influence. under Baker.

(35-36): regime generates crises in the South [a bit stylized, the story, but OK]. but financial crises in the South don't weaken the regime, they strengthen it. all heightens the centrality of the dollar (capital flight, exports to earn dollars, etc.)

(40): the switch comes with the Volcker shock

(40): but to take advantage of high IR's without choking the US economy, Reagan needed to eliminate capital controls overseas

(42, 57): key--interests behind SAPs are US rentiers, US industry (cheaper inputs), US companies (take advantage of privatization) [insufficient--but this is the 'international story,' i guess]. the later excerpt highlights also domestic money-capital (which escapes to Wall Street), export sectors, and capital as a whole. ISI elites suffer, though, is the implication.

(44): intra-European monetary union as defensive response to DSWR

(45): Mitterand's last Keyneisan hurrah, 1981-1983

(45): Atlantic neo-liberalism as 'forced' on the economies of Europe, almost, through competitive/private pressures issuing from DSWR

(47, 51): Japan --> SE Asia in 80s [much later than in Vivek's book...]

(48): easy borrowing was response to crisis of ISI

(49): citing Rodrik--ought to have adjusted, rather than borrowed [but like Rodrik, this misses the fundamental points that Vivek's book makes, about productivity, etc. you can't devalue your way into international competitiveness]

(50): Mexico 1994-1995 as neoliberalism's first crisis. shocking.

(53): high level of fragmentation of US banking system

(54): a 'speculative strike force' in the form of the hedge funds, attakcing currency

(55-56): imp--why has the US allowed this? fundamentally, not b/c of links to speculators, campaign contributions, but because all strategic social groups have been captured by finance (industry, pensioners, etc.) [satisfying? and what exactly is this an explanation of?]

(62-63): unlike both mainstream and neo-mercantilist views of IR, we see both cooperation and conflict between capitalist economies. it is precisely because they don't see capitalism that they can't grasp this.

(64): imp--there are different ways for capitalists to increase their profits, only a few of which will coincide with growth on a national level

(65, 69): State has to see to the international interests of its domestic capitalists, as well. five hypotheses in this regard.

(69, 75): strategic problem confronting Clinton--'historic strategic review'

(70-71, 129): nice--India/Asia saved Lancashire, just like 'dependent' regimes will save US (as captive markets, in other words--as well as providers of cheap inputs) [nice, though I'm not sure how well this holds. worth exploring this parallel in more detail]

(77): Clinton's political team were holdovers from Carter. it was the economic team that really did the work.

(80): nice--while America's capacity to kill has gone up several fold, it's capacity to die has not

(90): seeking allies with domestic rentiers

(92): currency warfare with the Yen, which was reversed by Summers in 1995 all laid the groundwork for the Asian crisis. undermined their export capacity significantly.

(94): considering questions of intentionality, no definite conclusions. parallels to Reagan vs. France, in 1981-1983

(96): attacking hedge fund speculation [awesomely parasitic and harmful, this]

(134): interesting argument that 'fiannce' gains power in times of stagnation

(134): causes of 'long stagnation' in overproduction/etc. (and not, then, in neoliberalism--which is an attempt to deal with this, not its cause)

(134): missed opportunity b/c of DSWR

moving politics, gould

(3-4): not a question of dismissing other factors, but seeing how emotion 'articulates with' more frequently studied actors

(8): mourning -- > militancy

(9-10): imp-- earlier, anger had been one of many emotions. towards the end it was dominant. this will be the 'overarching argument' [begs questions, of course]

(10): political opportunities doesn't help. ACT UP developed despite (because of) lack of pol opportunities (Reagan era)

(13-14): against 'rationality' (the way it was presented). not an account of 'emotion' as irrationality, though.

(15): critique of p. process for 'evacuating emotion' from study of protest (they shared assumption, with c. behavior theorists, that 'emotions are irrational')

(15): in short--protestors are 'broadly rational', but this is not the whole story.

(17): emotion doesn't preclude rationality. irrationality doesn't preclude thought [i am getting confused. she hasn't yet defined rationality]

(18): imp--key concepts (pol opportunties, greivances) matter only insofar as 'emotional charges' are attached to them

(19, 21, 22): definitions--'affect' as nonconscious exp. of bodily energy; 'emotion' as the vague naming of that sensation. 'feeling' as both taken together.

(23): unlike Goodwin et. al., argument is that 'feelings' can diverge from reasoning selves. can't be folded into cognition [save me!]

(24): argument that 1981-1986, gay shame + some gay pride prohibited anything more confrontational than what was done. 'contradictory and unsettling' feelings.

(24): affect as always 'nonrational'--not necessarily irrational. outside of rather than contrary to decision-making.

(25): affective ontology offers three insights

1. complexity/indeterminacy of motivation/behavior
2. affect is a dimension in which social reproduction and social change takes place (attachment to leaders, etc.) using affect to explain the hold of ideology. [here we see invoking affect to explain inaction, when rationality will do just fine, and she doesn't realize it]
3. affect as itself motivating. you want to know what you feel--movements fulfill this function, often. help make sense of affective states [?!?]

(31): affect is not 'presocial'

(32-38): 'emotional habitus' [gobbledygook]

(41): main claim--emotional habitus shapes what people feel, and thus can be tremendously influential in moving people to action.

(50): question is why the movement took to the streets in May 1987 (before there were vigils, etc., and then there was direct action)? (no pol opportunities is established; devastation was ongoing for ages; grievances/strain seems inadequate?) [could it be that emotions are adequate to explain this question, but--aside from being impossible to substantiate properly--the claim is rendered unimportant because the question is so narrow?]

(52): ACT UP as a revitalization of early gay liberation politics

(55): claim -- emotional habitus generates a political horizon.

(56): between 1981-1986, movement stayed off the streets? why? [nature of emotional habitus is going to be the answer]

(58-59): importance of fear and shame in this period, at limiting people to the forms of activism they adopted

(62, 63-64, 90): argument of chapter 1--'ambivalent' feelings shaped the response. political horizon formed authorized some forms of activism, but deligitimized more confrontational activism.

(72): influence of 'lifestyle theories' on early gay response--the 'shame', she's arguing

(93-94, 97-98): some calls for stepping it up -- but didn't resonate widely, even though it got some response. her argument is that this is because the people making the call had no background int he movement, no credibility. but the response was made in a way that bolstered existing emotional habitus [she is at a stage where she can say anything she wants]

(100): of course, if emotional habitus shapes response to new proposals in a way that closes them off, the implication is that it's stuck, unchanging..

(101): Cecchi's speech. [is this empirical evidence for a movement-wide 'emotional habitus'?!?!]

(114): 1985-1986 as transitional moment

(116): new movement suggests a new emotional habitus was forming [um. if this is your reasoning, then the argument is entirely tautological: what causes the new movement? new emotional habitus. how do we know a new emotional habitus is forming? a new movement is forming.]

(118): exploding AIDS crisis was a factor--snowballing cases, gov't attempts to cut funding. but this is not sufficient, she's suggesting.

(121): outrageous Supreme Court Opinion, on homosexuality--can't cast asside millenia of moral teaching

(121, 173): imp--June 1986 ruling 'triggered' a collective response on the part of the lesbian/gay community [so, emotion here is only a vehicle ('outrage', etc.)--the real work is being done by repressive legislation, etc. in other words, if there isn't a viable counterfactual where the SC ruling doesn't result in outrage, then emotion doesn't add anything? if there is, then what explains the fact that this resulted in outrage, rather than something else?]

(131): a movement certainly--shut down W. Street for four hours, etc.

(133): imp--she rightly notes that pol. process model doesn't really work here--this was a closing of political opportunities, but it was the 'spark'. she wants to go from here to a theory of the event! [what we need, instead, is to realize that pol. opportunities isn't everything. intuitively, it doesn't seem to make sense to rule out movements that begin b/c of provocation ('threat')]

(134): Sewell on 'event' [no Hardwick ruling, no ACT UP? are you sure you want to commit to this]

(134-135): Jasper on 'moral shock' [reasonable. but this can only be a 'trigger', the underlying causes should also be part of our 'model': 'escalating grievances,' etc.]

(136): imp--'moral shock' of Hardwick --> change in emotional habitus --> direct-action movement [as noted, two problems: (1) emotions doing independent work? (2) Hardwick as only cause?]

(137): two problems--why Hardwick ruling? why reaction with direct-action? b/c of political terrain of already bad responses (pg. 139), and b/c emotional habitus was already shifting (pp. 139-140). [hmmm--this is just meddling to try and make things fit. confusing the model totally]

(144-145): did the fact that ACT-UP was predominantly white, male, middle-class help explain the turn to direct-action? in other words, did something like 'organizational resources' matter

(150): media reinforced this

(151): mainstream became militant, as well

(156): ACT-UP had 60 people at 1987 parade [so, hold on--what are we explaining, exactly?]

(163): people were still ambivalent, of course

(164): the 'emotional-imaginative' space--an attempt to show that emotions are not necessarily individual. processes structure political possibilities (but don't determine them) [yes, the don't determine is necessary because you have no idea what you're committed to, as an argument]

(169-170): the 'genocide frame' [this whole discussion of meaning-making is full of BS. no real claim. multiple processes, interpretive context, etc.--total waste of paper]

(172): against 'rationality' explanation, she's operating with an 'optimizing' conception of rationality--all you have to say,though, is that they didn't persist with a strategy that was demonstrably 'irrational'. not that they pursued the best tactics at all times.

(194): recuperating queer sexuality

(196-197): um, humour, too

(200, 207): intense, as well; 'collective effervescence'

(212, see also 255): in sum-- importance of feelings in sustaining/nourishing activism [this is intuitive, but serious problems nonetheless: (1) research design. movements that don't sustain themselves lack this factor? movements that have sustained themselves always have this factor? (2) if you tweaked everything but this factor about ACT UP, it wouldn't have succeeded [perhaps] (3) most importantly, can we not take it for granted that these practices will evolve, as a movement evolves? (4) if not, what determines whether these practices will evolve, or not? [surely we can't leave this hanging?]

(224): competing use of people's grief--into activism, rather than into passivity [but what esactly is this meant to explain? if activism was this easy, then we'd all be revolutionaries. you could stitch a story together about many an unsuccessful movement]

(234): Ashes action--how many people, though? a movement?

(253): prevailing emotional habitus discourages protest

(255): if ACT UP had not engaged in emotional work, it would not have succeeded? [implications?]

- - -

1. q. of replicability. participant more likely to concentrate on emotional aspect of movement, of course.

2. q. of difficulty of 'proving' shifts in emotional habitus, whether they're your explanans, explanandum, or whatever. much more difficult to operationalize than something like 'organizational resources'. becomes too much like political opportunities at its worst

3. how to establish a theory of social movements, when the explanandum varies so widely?

4. people 'feeling' differently might be good enough an explanation for a student group. but if we have a movement as our explanandum, feelings just can't be enough. (1) they vary randomly; (2) if they don't vary randomly, and everyone feels the same way at some time, there is something to be explained--which will invariably be structural/political in nature

breakdown of democratic regimes, juan linz (introduction)

(3): intention is to look at dynamic process of breakdown, rather than offer 'stable' correlates

(4): acknowledging importance of structural factors (all operating via a worried elite), concerned to represent the 'how' of breakdown more carefully. implication is that c-factuals re: tactics for p-democratic forces, will be raised. what they could have done better.

(5): 'political processes actually precipitate the ultimate breakdown.'

(5-6): def. of democracy is closer to a classical liberal one (universal suffrage not necessary)

(7-8): imp--analysis not applicable to Pakistan/Nigeria, where breakdown had something to do with the difficulties of 'state-building'. all these regimes have stable states before they have democratic regimes.

(10): again, against broad explanations (like Moore's), in favor of looking at the specifics of the breakdown process

(13, 14): in effect, suggestion here is that the blame for breakdown of democracy rests on those seeking 'revolutionary change' and not valuing democracy. they invite the counterrevolution.[silly, but predictable]

(14): most breakdowns have been 'counterrevolutionary', as in seeking to guard against changes of the social order

(15): importance of the direct intervention of the military in effecting breakdown of stabilized states (this explains why Left has not been responsible for democratic breakdown, despite mass support) [int, but inadequate]

(16): democracy depends on some measure of collective legitimacy--more so than other regimes

(18): minimal definition of 'legitimacy'--considered to be least evil form of government.

(18-19): efficacy (20) effectiveness (22) also important

(20): extra importance of well-organized sectors--giving example of capital flight [not really the fact that they're well-organized. linz is inviting charge of pluralism, here]

(21): problems of consolidation exacerbate issues [but if problems of consolidation last 60 years, they can't really be called 'consolidation' problems!]

(23): using 'ineffectiveness' to characterize bourgeois-Socialist failiure, in Spain, to effect agrarian reform [but 'ineffectiveness', in this case, clearly obscures much more than it clarifies]

(24-25): two-party system encourages 'ideological polarization' [this essay is degenerating. and it didn't start out very well]. the proximate thing that worries us in democratic breakdown is large ideological distance separating political competitors.

(25-38): discussion of 'loyal'/'semiloyal' opposition, its importance re: breakdown. [skipped]

(39): again stressing bias against using 'structural' factors to do anything but set the stage. quote from Tilly

the fourth round: history of land reform in pakistan, haris gazdar

(2): half of rural population is landless; top 5 percent own 33% of cultivatable land

(5): three 'estates': (1) collective self-governance, in Fata/Balochistan; (2) malawari, which ended up empowering landowners rather than village in Punjab, etc. (see pg. 9); (3) Ryotwari, which ended up regarding zamindar as cultivator in Sindh (see pg. 12)

(10): canal colonization as technically progressive but socially conservative

(13): in partition, about 1/5th of the cropped area was vacated (7 million acres, 18%). in 1965 40 million acres in cultivation. today 48 million.

(20): LR discussions had three components--tenancy reg, abolition of 'superior claims', redistribution above ceiling.

(21): Shariah Court ruled against '77 LR, upheld by Supreme Court

(22): here is that not enough attention was paid to non-cultivators, which seems a reasonable point [a lot of the rest of this is an exercise in mystification. silly]

(23): in Sindh, due to arid character, irrigation management has always been central. you can't make haris into owner-operators unless you do something about distribution of water, in other words.

(28): 2.3 million acres have been distributed to military officers as career incentives--this is roughly equivalent to the total area ever distributed by the state in LR!

---

of the rest of this article is quite unhelpful. calling for moving beyond an 'agrarian reform' framework, it opens with a statistic that still shows its applicability. totally lacking comparative context--other countries succeeded at LR, within this conventional framework. the lack of 'imagination' charge rings quite hollow.

reassessing the three waves, doorenspleet

(385-386): two problems with huntington--conceptual, not taking suffrage seriously; empirical, confusing creation of new states after decolonization with reversion from democracy.

(395): in 1972, only 8 out of 44 new states in Africa were democratic

bizarre coding of Pakistan!

it was like a fever, polletta

(ix): narrative ambiguity --> political resources [WTF]

(3): two claims

1. there are risks (storylines are limiting) and benefits (sustains groups, etc.) to storytelling for disadvantaged groups.
   
2. stories will depend on the context of their telling/hearing

(5): possibilities following from culture are 'unlimited', under structural conditions [WTF is going on here].

(15): relationships between culture, structure, story are variable. sometimes one way, sometimes another. [i.e., you have no idea what you're saying]

(19): example of child abuse laws [where are the movements? this is just insulting]

(34, 51-52): stories as galvanizing for orgs [sometimes, maybe, might be--aside from everything else, the obvious flaw is that there's no evidence that the 'story' being selected is representative of the way in which the movement was actually described. this is the least of the problems, of course.]

(55): need an account of the 'cultural/ideological' context that forecloses some strategic options [yawn]

(58): SNCC abandons participatory democracy when it becomes symbolically associated with 'white' dominance of the org. this in turn rules out local leadership, rules in central leadership which it turns to [hmm]

(84, 107-108): narrative in public deliberation can be both harmful for or facilitative of deliberative democracy, because wile it's normatively powerful it's also considered politically unserious [this arg makes no sense to me, but surely it's important that she is observing a public forum where there is basically no political disagreement?]

(111): casting oneself as victim doesn't necessarily reduce agency. narrative of victim with agency is possible

(143): officials constrained by institutional conventions of storytelling--King integrated into pluralist framework, and elected officials were the bearers of his dream. this was awkward [no shit]

(164-165): Mexicans had Zapata, whereas Sandinistas lacked Sandino, b/c of respective government attitudes [WTF!?!?!]

(166): narrative is both subversive and hegemonic [ok. what are the conditions that produce one or the other?]

(169): for activists, familiar stories are often more an obstacle than a resource. [ok--but the implied counterfactuals, here, are still ludicrous. alternative is to say we weigh tthis with other factors. but when we do that, this is revealed as basically unimportant, i think]

(179): narratives can help you arrive at causal stories [really? bs]

the market as prison, lindblom (1982)

(325-326): business posesses unique power to sanction policy, by withdrawing investment, etc.

(328): other groups don't have same power

(329): mkt imprisons policy-making, as a result. Polanyi underestimated the constraints

(332): no mkt society can be a fully democratic society (though not taking a position on whether this is possible, desirable)

(333): fact of mkt society has also imprisoned our premises/ways of thinking. mkt is taken for granted, when argued that higher wages will lead to inflation