scanlon, tanner lectures

(151, 166) contractualism/system of co-deliberation--"an act is right if it would be required or allowed by principles which no one, suitably motivated, could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement" [a good starting point, certainly, but the devil is in the details of 'suitably motivated' and 'reasonable rejection,' it seems to me]

(152) the Causlal Thesis (i.e., according to which morality is bunkum if every act can be explained]

(168) praise and dispraise to replace praise and blame]

(174) "the most general moral demand is that we exercise our capacity for self-governance in ways that others could reasonably be expected to authorize"

(184) "in my view, to show that a social institution is legitimate one must show that it can be justified to each person affected by it on grounds which that person could not reasonably reject"

(184-185): it's the obligation of SI to offer agents 'reasonably favourable conditions' under which to make choices [and then, of course, we can hold them responsible. similar to Shelby's argument about the ghetto]

(189) [This then becomes a principle on the basis of which institutional arrangements are erected -- i.e., they should safeguard the value of choice]

(192-193): the 'forfeiture view' -- if alternative routes exist [depending, of course, on their quality or quantitiy] people cannot complain

(198) objective (primary goods) vs. subjective (preferences) measures of well-being [the question of responsibility for preferences arises here, to which GA Cohen has a response to Dworkin. 'expensive tastes' can not be punished if agent isn't responsible for them]


(203) the intentional infliction of harm (punishment) carries a heavy burden of justification [extraordinarily radical implications, I should think]

(208) Frankfurt's two drug addicts (one who has a second-order desire to resist his desire, one who doesn't), only the first is 'unfree' [unhelpful, but interesting]

(212) "to feel onself subject to moral blame is to be aware of a gap between the way one in fact decided what to do and the form of decision which others could reasonably demand'

(216) "Moral indignation towards lawbreakers is entirely in order, and the sufferings we inflict upon them may be justified. But in justifying these sufferings, and inflicting them, we have to say not 'You asked for this' but 'There for the grace of god go I.'

nagel, libertarianism without foundations (1975)

(137) Nozick offers no foundations for his defense of what he deems fundamental rights (to property, etc.). [right, they absolutely beg this foundation]

(140-141) Nozcik scales up from micro-inter-personal interactions to macro-generalizations about the world (a logically illegitimate technique, because a whole host of considerations are introduced)

(142) 'benefit to others, for Nozick, can never outweigh the cost to oneself [Nagel rightly insisting this is outrageous. millions starving can be Pareto optimal, which is an absurd def of justice]

(148) Nagel arguing, though, that the arbitrariness of inequality is not sufficient grounds to object to it [I disagree. provided we begin with our bare-bones premise]

scanlon, nozick on rights, liberty and property (1976)

(4) historical (depends on how something came about) vs. end-state/patterned (targetd)
conceptions of justice

(5) for Nozick, any voluntary transfer is 'just,' irrespective of patterns that result (thus, his conception of justice is historical and unpatterned)

(9) one of four justifications of egalitarianism -- 'all differences in treatment require justification' [absolutely. based on bare-bones premise that we are undeniably all human]

(13) nozick's objection to 'unfreedom' of workers on low wages-metaphor is marrying an unattractive bride [the obvious failing here is that only human action can be a source of unfreedom. can't be social institutions. and here, too, there is the implicit importing in of limits of what's possible (i.e. not everyone can be attractive). but, certainly, everyone can have a lovely standard of living, so the comparison is moot]

(17) actual consent vs. hypothetical consent

(19) consent can't rule considerations of justice

(23) in Locke, the justification of perperty rights is limited to what's needed to store up 'conveniences of life' [hmm, interesting]

sanyal, review of humeira iqtidar

(2) key claim is that individual, unmeidated understanding of qur'an empowers individual. empowers, in fact, women whose membership inthese organization can widen option and life trajectories [problem, of course, is that this only works as a negative corrective to militant liberals. there is still an obvious problem of freedom limitation in this process]

ben selwyn, gershcenkorn and trotsky (2012)

(426) institutional innovation enables adoption of technology, its not a given

(429) backwardness generates an industrial response (Gerschenkron)

(433) elements of Nazi ideology present in Junkers' attempt to win over peasantry

(436) Gerschenkron saw principal barriers as internal--but political sovereignty and w-system are important, obv. 

(439) Gershenkron's c-tendencies anticipate cumulative causation

(444) Chang and company are guilty of the 'fallacy of composition' because they don't quite acknowledge that conditions change (i.e., become more exacting) as time and the world-system advances

guy robinson, philosophy and mystification


essay 1 

(5) vs. social constructivists--our 'inputs' are products of our own tussle w/ nature (no 'starting point')

(5) against 'foundationalism

(5-6) nature/material world <--> human history (superior to both idealism and ahistorical materialism)

essay 2

(9) against 'empiricism'--without sociall-given categories or capacities, we wouldn't be able to process the world
 

post, what is left of leninism (2012)

(2-3) three waves of struggle: early 1890s, 1905-1907, 1912-1914

(3) metal workers particularly important to revolutionary LW of social democracy

(3): reformism is not the struggle for reforms, but the substitution of routinized bargaining for mass struggle

(6) SD key difference w/ Bolsheviks was not aspiration to build a different kind of praty, but fact that they built in different conditions. b/c of absence of parliamentary institutions, official co-optation of Bolsheviks was not possible

(7) 'left communism' in post-WWI Communist movement was a reaction to the routinization of SD

(7) minority went into the 3rd international; most of pre-war Left remained on the LW of SD (France, Italy, USPD). at least until '20-'21, with the turn towards UF and efforts to bring these elements into Comintern

(8) pre 1924-1925 Leninism just meant organization of rev workers against officaldom

(9) after 1935, Communist parties adopted the political strategy of SD, as well as its social composition. and all w/o internal dem norms [Hmm]

(10) [seems far too unfair a portrait of CP's, because it can't account for resilience]

(11) SD strategy of CP's was exposed in mid-60s, as slowdown --> struggle (1968-1974) [definitely true]

(14) efforts to build new parties in 60s/70s w/ radicalizing workers were ultimately unsuccessful because of the reduced size/weakness of militant minorities [this, of course, begs its ownquestion]

(19) revival of 'rational core' of Leninism is the goal