post, what is left of leninism (2012)

(2-3) three waves of struggle: early 1890s, 1905-1907, 1912-1914

(3) metal workers particularly important to revolutionary LW of social democracy

(3): reformism is not the struggle for reforms, but the substitution of routinized bargaining for mass struggle

(6) SD key difference w/ Bolsheviks was not aspiration to build a different kind of praty, but fact that they built in different conditions. b/c of absence of parliamentary institutions, official co-optation of Bolsheviks was not possible

(7) 'left communism' in post-WWI Communist movement was a reaction to the routinization of SD

(7) minority went into the 3rd international; most of pre-war Left remained on the LW of SD (France, Italy, USPD). at least until '20-'21, with the turn towards UF and efforts to bring these elements into Comintern

(8) pre 1924-1925 Leninism just meant organization of rev workers against officaldom

(9) after 1935, Communist parties adopted the political strategy of SD, as well as its social composition. and all w/o internal dem norms [Hmm]

(10) [seems far too unfair a portrait of CP's, because it can't account for resilience]

(11) SD strategy of CP's was exposed in mid-60s, as slowdown --> struggle (1968-1974) [definitely true]

(14) efforts to build new parties in 60s/70s w/ radicalizing workers were ultimately unsuccessful because of the reduced size/weakness of militant minorities [this, of course, begs its ownquestion]

(19) revival of 'rational core' of Leninism is the goal 

acemoglu et. al., the consequences of radical reform (2009)

(4) effects of FR were positive, but didn't show up till 1850 [mechanisms in this argument are essentially Smithian--freeing of people from 'fetters']

(5) Radical reforms can be more efficacious than limited reforms [responding to Burkean wisdom]

(7) [Terrible lit review!]

(9) Guild restrictions as 'fetters'

(13) in most places Napoleon made 'a genunine attempt' to implement reforms

(22) postivie effects started showing by 1900, process kicked in by 1850 [difficulty is that there were a series of political upheavals before this--admittedly, they attempt to control for varoius things. but they don't control for impact of 1848 rev. too much happens in the interim]

(31) [Data hardly supports the notions that fetters were 'burst']

 

Civil-Military Relations in 'Islamic Democracies', Lenze 2011

(198-199): useful for Turkey timeline

(208): distinguishing characteristic of Turkey is army's possession of broad popular support

(229: Though, still, occasionally take pains to avoid the 'poor, conservative, peasant electorate'

(241): Kemalist shift to the Left in the 1960s

(252): 1980 coup in context of an economic crisis

(258): After 1980 coup military imposes restrictive constitution before handing back power

(261): Military continuity into civilian era (i.e., re-democratization with persistent powers)

267): 1989, Turkey gets its first civilian president

(272): International incentives to be democracy (EU, etc.)

(283): AKP successfully passed legislation that increased civilian control over the military

(285, 298): Here, an (1) individual-based explanation of why the military didn't intervent after the AKP intruded on its privilege; plus (2) fact that the economy was doing well

Christian Democracy and the AKP: Parallels and Contrasts, Hale 2007

(294): CD has its origins in the immediate post-WWII environment (as fascism was discredited but communism ascendant)

(295): Vatican came to democracy only in 1944

(297): These were 'catch-all' parties that followed the general drift towards neoliberalism; always strongly pro-Europe

(302): AKP inherited an economic mess, initially turned to IMF

(304): CHP/Military involved in public devates [This has to be distinguished from praetorianism]

(305): Political Parties Law a serious intervention--prohibits unions from affiliating with political parties..

(306): AKP less middle-class than the CD parties

The evolution of civil-military relations in post-war Turkey, Karabelias (2006)

(131): 1876, Turkey's first constitution and Parliament

(132): DP punished for pursuing policies that hurt military, 1950-1960

(133): Between 1960-1965, and 1971-1973, military in power--able to resolve pol/organizational problems [Did this better than Pak military? Why?]

(133): 1980 Coup happened after economic crisis and 'mobilization'

(133): 12 September 1980 to 6 December 1983, military rule

(134): important--military sponsored a constitutional intervention to safeguard its powers (Constitution of 1982), and institutionalized themselves in power, shaping the terrain of political competition, banning parties, etc. [How is this different from praetorian democracy?]

(139): in the early-mid 1990s, a series of crises meant that the Military still wielded substantial control

(140): military as an institution was (1) very large and important; (2) very cohesive [True of Pakistan as well, though. This can't explain much of anything]

(140): Details re: military's independent economic power [Again, here important to see what exactly the contrast with Pakistan consists in]

(141): Civilians have relatively less legitimacy [Means miltary can open the democratic process w/o as much fear?]

A Paradigmatic Shift for the Turkish Generals.., Aydinli (2009)

(585): The popular coup? "Society" supports its Army [Overstated, of coruse--but certainly greater legitimacy has something to do with its ability to relinquish power more quickly than in Pakistan. Something like, 'better institutionalized']

(587): Two groups in military: Bukukenit (conservative bloc), and Ozkok (progressive bloc)

(593): 'soft power' now, 'hard power' before [same idea as 'support from society']

religion and culture in turkey, andrew mango (2004)

(999): education in Turkey coresponds to lower level of mosque attendance; opposite of Europe