religion and culture in turkey, andrew mango (2004)
(999): education in Turkey coresponds to lower level of mosque attendance; opposite of Europe
(999): education in Turkey coresponds to lower level of mosque attendance; opposite of Europe
Monday, June 4, 2012
globaliation and capital mobility in the automobile industry, aschoff (2010)
(1): perception of competition over wages is at the root of declining union power (i.e., that unions' subscription to the globalization narrative explains their failed strategies) [interesting but surely marginal]
(6): not 'race to the bottom' [this is better framed as 'filling out' the other pressures that capital faces]
1. large market
2. skilled workforce
3. proximity to assemblers/suppliers
4. state policies
5. pressures from finance
(9): US has been the site fo much new investment
(11-12): Serious pressures to move to low-wage sites [The point of the argument, then, can only be that this isn't the only thing going on. Not that it's entirely unimportant, which is sometimes how the claim is presented]
(16): New jobs have been created by new assembly/component firms, thanks to foreign capital moving to the US (and this is equal to the job loss)
(19): why capital moves? 1. location theory; 2. political conditions; 3. laobur
(29): Aschoff wants to introduce four dynamics: 1. intercapitalist competition; 2. capital-labour competition; 3. gepolitics; 4. financialization
(44): for Delphi, "a tacitcal decision' was made to move abroad--it wasn't mandated by economic exigencies, but was a strategic decision
Chapter 2
(49): 1. There have been more oepneings than closings in the US, based on Aschoff's sample
(53): 2. Investment is also happening in 'traditional' regions
(59): 3. US assemblers opened almost as many as Asia suppliers have; US suppliers have opened far more
(63): 4. There's been a 'stretching' of production, rather than a replacement of North by South
(65): Low-value added production has moved to Mexico; high value-added has stayed within US
(68): in sum, we have seen 'restructuring,' rather than simple job loss
(71): in the 1990-2005 period there was expansion (but without addition of labour)
(74): important--new investment in traditional regions has remained unorganized [strongly suggesting that it's union bankruptcy rather than the bogey of the 'US South' that's prohibited expansion]
Chapter 3
(84-85): suggestion of ways in which apartheid was dysfunctional for Capital
Chapter 4
(131-132): Delphi's trajectory is not a 'production costs' one, but (1) rise of finacne + (2) inter-capitalist competition story [Again, these are all pressures, yes--but it's still true that lowering costs would still be a way of alleviating pressures. It's distinct from the globalization story, but it is not a total refutation of that story's central mechanism, for good reason.]
(142): Volcker shock hit manufacturing hard (tight credit, high dollar)
(143): Ec recovery by 1982, but interest rates were still high
(145): 'State policies "matter" [But of course they do. It seems an odd 'central mechanism' for an analysis of why capital moves, though]
(146): Now, three processes matter: (1) export restrcitions; (2) financialization; (3) GM-UAW relations
(153): 'quick-fix' solutions to deep problems were pursued
(155): key--restructuring in response to pressures int he 1980s undermined post-war compact between Capital and Labour (through (1) geographical mobility; (2) technical changes; (3) firing [In this sense, the post-war compact was unwound as much by the normal operation of capitalism, as it was by 'bureeaucracy'. The key question, which Aschoff doesn't really ask, is what could labour have done realistically. Counter-factually, had a different strategy been pursued, how might this have looked?]
(157): a 'cooperative' stance didn't work [so, again, what would have? Militancy?]
(159): There's a 'lazy' argument here that the Reagan counterrevolution made it difficutl to resist [At best this ignores the effects of bureaucratization; at worst, this ignores capitalism!]
(177, 183): Accessions, concessions, etc. [Good place to ask the counterfactual question]
(187): Firms closed above and beyond what was necessary--used this opportunity to restructure/streamline so as to better position themselves to be competitive
(203): Labour costs are a small % of value [for a diss that wants to evaluate the importance of labour costs in determining capital mobility, surely this has to be brought up earlier!?]
(1): perception of competition over wages is at the root of declining union power (i.e., that unions' subscription to the globalization narrative explains their failed strategies) [interesting but surely marginal]
(6): not 'race to the bottom' [this is better framed as 'filling out' the other pressures that capital faces]
1. large market
2. skilled workforce
3. proximity to assemblers/suppliers
4. state policies
5. pressures from finance
(9): US has been the site fo much new investment
(11-12): Serious pressures to move to low-wage sites [The point of the argument, then, can only be that this isn't the only thing going on. Not that it's entirely unimportant, which is sometimes how the claim is presented]
(16): New jobs have been created by new assembly/component firms, thanks to foreign capital moving to the US (and this is equal to the job loss)
(19): why capital moves? 1. location theory; 2. political conditions; 3. laobur
(29): Aschoff wants to introduce four dynamics: 1. intercapitalist competition; 2. capital-labour competition; 3. gepolitics; 4. financialization
(44): for Delphi, "a tacitcal decision' was made to move abroad--it wasn't mandated by economic exigencies, but was a strategic decision
Chapter 2
(49): 1. There have been more oepneings than closings in the US, based on Aschoff's sample
(53): 2. Investment is also happening in 'traditional' regions
(59): 3. US assemblers opened almost as many as Asia suppliers have; US suppliers have opened far more
(63): 4. There's been a 'stretching' of production, rather than a replacement of North by South
(65): Low-value added production has moved to Mexico; high value-added has stayed within US
(68): in sum, we have seen 'restructuring,' rather than simple job loss
(71): in the 1990-2005 period there was expansion (but without addition of labour)
(74): important--new investment in traditional regions has remained unorganized [strongly suggesting that it's union bankruptcy rather than the bogey of the 'US South' that's prohibited expansion]
Chapter 3
(84-85): suggestion of ways in which apartheid was dysfunctional for Capital
Chapter 4
(131-132): Delphi's trajectory is not a 'production costs' one, but (1) rise of finacne + (2) inter-capitalist competition story [Again, these are all pressures, yes--but it's still true that lowering costs would still be a way of alleviating pressures. It's distinct from the globalization story, but it is not a total refutation of that story's central mechanism, for good reason.]
(142): Volcker shock hit manufacturing hard (tight credit, high dollar)
(143): Ec recovery by 1982, but interest rates were still high
(145): 'State policies "matter" [But of course they do. It seems an odd 'central mechanism' for an analysis of why capital moves, though]
(146): Now, three processes matter: (1) export restrcitions; (2) financialization; (3) GM-UAW relations
(153): 'quick-fix' solutions to deep problems were pursued
(155): key--restructuring in response to pressures int he 1980s undermined post-war compact between Capital and Labour (through (1) geographical mobility; (2) technical changes; (3) firing [In this sense, the post-war compact was unwound as much by the normal operation of capitalism, as it was by 'bureeaucracy'. The key question, which Aschoff doesn't really ask, is what could labour have done realistically. Counter-factually, had a different strategy been pursued, how might this have looked?]
(157): a 'cooperative' stance didn't work [so, again, what would have? Militancy?]
(159): There's a 'lazy' argument here that the Reagan counterrevolution made it difficutl to resist [At best this ignores the effects of bureaucratization; at worst, this ignores capitalism!]
(177, 183): Accessions, concessions, etc. [Good place to ask the counterfactual question]
(187): Firms closed above and beyond what was necessary--used this opportunity to restructure/streamline so as to better position themselves to be competitive
(203): Labour costs are a small % of value [for a diss that wants to evaluate the importance of labour costs in determining capital mobility, surely this has to be brought up earlier!?]
Thursday, May 24, 2012
Kollmeyer 2009, "Explaining Deindustrialization"
(abs): two-way fixed-effects regression indicates that rising consumer affluence, differential productivity growth, and expanding trade all matter to deindustrialization (18 OECD countries, 1970 to 2003), but single greatest factor is rising consumer affluence
(abs): two-way fixed-effects regression indicates that rising consumer affluence, differential productivity growth, and expanding trade all matter to deindustrialization (18 OECD countries, 1970 to 2003), but single greatest factor is rising consumer affluence
wood 1995, "how trade hurt unskilled workers"
(61): using Olin model, trade w/ developing country brings the wages of the unskilled down
(61): the recent period has seen a shift from 'manufacturing autarky' for developed countries
(62): larger increase in important penetration is associate with a larger fall in manufacturing employment
(68): based on revised estimates, calculated to have reduced share of manufacturing employment by 5 percent
(70): there's been an increase as well ithe labour supply
(77): basically, low-skill manufactured goods are no longer produced in the US
(61): using Olin model, trade w/ developing country brings the wages of the unskilled down
(61): the recent period has seen a shift from 'manufacturing autarky' for developed countries
(62): larger increase in important penetration is associate with a larger fall in manufacturing employment
(68): based on revised estimates, calculated to have reduced share of manufacturing employment by 5 percent
(70): there's been an increase as well ithe labour supply
(77): basically, low-skill manufactured goods are no longer produced in the US
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