Imperialism and the rise and decline of the British Economy 1688-1989, O'Brien

(49): four stages

1. 1688 to 1846, First Ind Rev, Mercantilism and Imperialism
2. 1846 to 1914, W. Hegemon and Guardian of 'Liberal' Ec. Order
3. 1913 to 1945, 'neo-mercantile' period of intensified competition
4. 1945 to today, decline

(50): 1688 marks discontinuity, as Britain starts to get more involved in G. Power politics

(51): taxes to national income at 18%, in 1815; only 3% during reign of James II; enormous rise in national debt, to 60% of revenues after defeat of Napoleon

(51): 1688 to 1915, only 1/3rd of years were peaceful in Europe

(52): in 1688, ratio of exports to GDP was 8%

(53-54): in sum--trade was growing, but was it important in the mercantile period to England's growth? debate among historians. negative cas is that (1) proportions were too low; (2) commerce's growth was endogenously determined; (3) gains from trade were small, even if positive. [O'Brien begs to differ, re: this period--for him, imperialism was important, though the case is not uncontested--basically takes recourse in an evasion, see p. 56]

(57): consistently high levels of investment in Navy/State [proves what, exactly?]

(58): as 'safety valve' for migration [but in all of this, there is no real proof advanced for the significance of mercantilism.]

(59): again, summarizing his case against the 'endogenous' case, re: development between 1688 and 1815. counter-factual w/o imperialism seems implausible, to him. 


(61): citing Smith as suggesting that imperial commerce made possible a more extensive division of labour (40 to 50% of non-ag workforce produced for markets overseas!) [hmm]

(62): in short, taking a middling position--against liberal histoiography that imperialism has no place. not wanting to be the world-systems fools, either.

(63): in short, for 1846-1914 period, reproducing argument of nineteenth-century radicals that, once Britain was powerful, it had no need for empire--costs outweighed benefits. some groups, of course, did benefit--subgroups.

(64): proportion of trade on imperial markets declined, in this period. almost everything supplied by imperial markets could have been purchased elsewhere.

(64-65): finds c-factual, in this era, plausible. 1.1 percent hit to GDP in 1870; 2.6% in 1913.

(66): citing Hobsbawm, 'imperial status' was a cushion for decline. a cushion for which taxpayers were paying a high premium.

(67): export of capital? but most went to white dominions (65%). and something like 2/3 of all assets were purchase of governemtn bonds and stable securities.

(70-73): imp--England could have adjusted better to 2nd Ind Rev, w/o Empire (domestic investment, banking system, etc.)

(73-75): imp--Empire implied a high taxation burden on domestic population

(77): and, as Germany was emerging as rival, Britain was unable to adjust the various burdens to compete better

path dependency, or why Britain became an industrialized and urbanized economy long before France, O'Brien (1996)

(213): std. of living before the Great War were probably not that far apart, actually

(214, see 242 also): argument: difference was a function of (1) geographical endowments, and (2) a system of property rights inherited from feudal past [either an alternative to or a misspecification of the Brenner thesis--or, an attempt to answer to questions the Brenner thesis begs?]

(215): importance of agriculture is three-fold (lists four, but 1 and 3 are the same)

1. supports growth of populations off of the land (and releasing labour and capital)
2. supplying them with food and RM
3. acting as a home market for manufactured goods, urban services

(216-217): land productivity comparable or higher in France between 1700 and 1910 (which was a function of intensification of labour inputs--i.e., not welfare enhancing!); but labour productivity far superior in England 

(219): imp-- it was not so much 'innovation', in this period (1500-1800), as it was the application of already-existing 'know-how'. rudimentary practices to store and accumulate nitrogen. [this is a very important point, as regards the Brenner thesis]

(222): availability of animals per capita was very important--progressive agrarian regions were most distinguished by this. (this becomes an 'endowment', that's important to the question at-hand)

(223-224): hints toward a 'geographic explanation'[but low bar, here, since it's just a two-country comparison]--availability of fodder crops, and less need for investment in inter-regional transport

(224-225): in sum--importance of animals, providing energy, fertilizer, etc., all raising yields and releasing labour.

(226): key--institutions of developing capitalist agriculture in Britain just wouldn't retain as much redundant labour--peasantry evolved into wage-dependent agricultural labour force well before 1800, which is very different from the rest of Europe

(228-229): key--revolutionary agrarian reforms, in France, helped secure peasantry in its place; 1800s was a century of challenge, which they met by selling below market prices, exploiting family labour, etc (self-exploitation)

(230): key--peasants stayed peasants because they wanted to minimize risks, maintain access to land. avoid uncertainty of proletarian life.

(232-233): referencing Bloch, here, arguing that reforms of 1789 were illustrative of general peasant strength, in Fr., to maintain access to land; very different from what's true, in Britain (good stats on how this translated into tenant farmer dominance, in Eng., but p-proprietor dominance, in Fr.)

(236): at beginning of 1600s, about 1/3rd of English farms were capitalist, another 1/3rd both family and hired labour. 45% of farms were removed from open fields.

(237): imp, waves of enclosure: between 1450 and 1525, in check till 1660, and then 1660-1815 [contradicts thesis that increasing enclosures were key to p. resistance in ECW, see JPS readings]

(239): there's a feedback loop, here, too: food prices went up as peasants migrated to cities, prompting further consolidation of capitalist farming in countryside, further migration of peasantry, etc.

(241): in sum, 'going back to the land' gives us as persuasive account of economic develoment as any (though concession that it's not reducible to agrarian fundamentals)

agricultural productivity and european industrialization, 1890-1980, o'brien (1992)

(514): ag. is important because successful early industrialization has been closely associated with improvements in productivity in land

(515-526): extensive discussion of measurement techniques

(526): disputing Bairoch's argument that protectionism in late 19th C. helped European Ec. (it depends on correlations), but no evidence for counter-argument offered

(529-530): key--no Eu economy had gone as far as Britain in 'freeing up' a labour force for industrialization, which was a function of the lower level of productivity (per worker) in agriculture. productivity per hectare was of course not the issue; UK hardly topped, on that count.

(531): US, also, was very impressive

(534): in claim that Medit. economies remain behind, hinting at 'ecological' explanation of backwardness

historical roots of mass poverty in SA, tapan rayachaudhuri (1985)

(801): phenomenon of large groups of half-starving people (underdevelopment) is not a holdover from pre-modern times. this, in India, is traceable to new institutional arrangements in Ag. starting in 1813.

(801): output of foodgrains per head of pop declined, as cashcrops were promoted

(801): moreover, this was an already established fact by the time that populations started to increase

(802): according to Kuznets, income per head in traditional societies in Asia was probably higher than in pre-industrial phase of Europe

(802): citing evidence of 'very high' both land and labour yields in pre-industrial agrarian India [hmm]

(802): Greater Bengal had been free from recurrent famines, 1570-1770

(802-803): level of revenue demand had been kept in check by labour shortages in Mughal period (oppressed peasants could 'vote with their feet']

(803): not a 'uniformly immiserated peasantry'

(803): there were no 'absolute' shortages of food in pre-colonial India [i.e., per capita grain availability]

(804): those with no rights to land were and are likely to suffer, but in pre-colonial India this was a small portion of the pop--nowhere near 45%

(804-805): 1813 as key turning point, w/ end of Company's monopoly [but evidence adduced here is weak]

(805): key--colonial government introduced tenurial systems which gave proprietary rights to about 4% of population dependent on agriculture (identical with old class that had 'superior rights' in land, but it eliminated the 'usufractory right of other agricultural classes')

(805): details of p. capita growth; availability per capita of foodgrain declining in 20th C.

(806): as revenue came to be collected in cash, agricultural producer pressure to sell. conditions of selling were very unfavourable; monopsony in buyers, monopoly in suppliers.

intercontinental trade and the development of the third world since the industrial revolution, patrick o'brien (1997)

(76): productivity growth in Europe was 'endogenous' (citing A. Maddison)

(77): [1. GOODS] key--commerce in 'the Wallerstein period (1492-1789)' had more in common with a 'medieval' past--before 1846, export+import/production ratios were in the region of 1-2 percent. for Britain, Portugal, Holland, below 15%.

(77): before railways, most prices set locally, not influenced by long-distance trade.

(78): [2. CAPITAL] European money going abroad was a 'miniscule percentage' of world capital formation--persistent imperfections in international capital markets

(78): [3. LABOUR] numbers migrating in mercantile era were very small--most went close to place of birth

(79): wasn't until 1914, that overland transportation had competitive advantage over waterborne

(80): Treaty of Vienna allowed for 'peaceful' development of international commerce

(80, see 86): 1821-1921, 138 new colonies for Europe; by 1914, population of 530 million under their sway. nominally independent countries opened up (Ottoman, S Aerica, Arabia, Indian princely States, China, etc.)

(81): after 1815, a 'liberal' trade regime [very different from Bairoch's account, take note]

(81): trade grew at 4-5% in 1800s, after 1% in 1700s

(82): by 1913, ratio of exports+imports/income were about 30%; they were about 2-3% at beginning of 1800s.

(82): [1. GOODS, 1800s] key--main supplier region of RM for Europe was white settlement countries overseas; second was Europe's peripheries; third was Third World.

(83): [2. LABOUR, 1800s] between 1821 and 1915, 46 million people left native lands for overseas--most, though, were Europeans going to US (and they left, in the main, the poorer regions, especially in the latter half of this period)

(84): benefited both labour-surplus and labour-scarce regions--an equilibrium-restoring process, at a general level

(84): [3. CAPITAL, 1800s] as much as 30% of savings going overseas [!]. most financed regions of European settlement (see p. 91--$131 per capita in white settlement, $11 in Asia and Africa). [O'Brien has a very sanguine story about what happened when it went to Third World, but without that angle the point remains]

(86): in 1913, European countries included 11 times more land, 18 times more people in their colonies, than in their core

(86-92)): assessment of dev of und argument--(1) the share of European exports going to TW went from 15% in 1830, to only 21% in 1910 (a real increase of nineteen times, but not much in relative share; (2) the share of European imports coming from TW also negligible (details within)

(93): 1820-1910, terms of trade move in favour of the TW [read around here, some oversanguine conclusions]

(95): most 'gains' from export trade went to expat Europeans

(96-97): in sum--suggestion that not only did imperialism not explain development, it doesn't do much to explain underdevelopment (if it did, all it did was divert talents/energies!). underdevelopment, instead, is explained by antecedent factors--(1) initial factor endowments and (2) ability to attract European investment [this latter half will require response that does more than just use India as example, though that is important]

(98, see 104): imp--1913-1945 marks the Dark Age for Third World, b/c of wars and international depression [these are regarded, almost, as exogenous to the Era of Progress that preceded them]

(99): there were three trends, though, that exacerbated all this:

1. rising proportion of food satisfied by domestic production, b/c nations worried about self-sufficiency
2. substitution of synthetic materials depressed demand for natural RM
3. rise of NA as industrial power, and it used its own RM

(101, 102): 1910-1950, no increase in rail track per square mile in TW [this is the archetypal liberal account of 'gains from trade', but it isn't really stood on solid ground]

(105): in sum--TW not doing well, 1900-1950, in terms of manufacturing output, welfare, etc. [the implication, here, though is that TW intellectuals misunderstood the problem; it was a breakdown of trade that was responsible, not its continued operation--see p. 109 ('the North is responsible, but only for initiating wars that ruined commerce')]

(106-108): imp--many reasons to suspect that 'gains from trade' were likely weaker, in TW (b/c of expats, b/c of structure of plantations, etc.); but fair point that theoretical speculation needs to be backed by data, of which there isn't enough

(108): noting, though, that peasant mode of production isn't always superior, for development, to plantation mode

(114-115): TW share of global exports decreased from 40% after WWII to 22% in 1990s [though this is obviously symptomatic of deeper problems; not the problem, itself!]

(115-116): key--N-N trade represents about 60-65% of total trade, in post-WWII period; S-S trade is about 10%; S-N trade is about 30-40%

(118): oil price rise checked decline of TW exports as global proportion; and checked increasing proportion of manufactures in world trade. but these two trends stand out, when this is taken into account.

(121): tendency of net terms of trade is to move against primary products, in 20th C [but check against Bairoch]. this highlights necessity for developers to move into industrial goods.

(126): ends with banal call for end to protectionism.

kenya, what does dependency mean?, colin leys

(109): critique of kaplinsky. evidence points to fact of african capital's entry; kaplinsky denies this by asserting mitigating factors that, actually, match up with history of capitalist development more generally (hand of State, help of foreign capital, beginnings as petty capital, etc.)

(111, 112): citing Bill Warren's critique, in which it's asserted that dependency theorists rely on an 'idealized' model of capitalist development (in which there's no unevenness, no inequalities, no cycles). this is taken as evidence of inability to break out of underdevelopment [the strong version of this critique is of course nonsense]

the political system of pakistan, sayeed

(12): instrumental obscurantism--SAK enjoning muslims not to join Congress by saying can't be 'friends' with non-Muslims

(16): British cobble together 51 'representative' Muslims, 1909 -- 41 were landowners!

(16): 1910, tensions in ML with arriving 'lawyer party'

(17): Congress failure to attract Muslims b/c

1. ML convincing 'Muslims'
2. Congress use of Hindu symbolism in Maharashtra (Tilak and Gokhale)

(18): Swadeshi was borrowed from Chinese boycott of American goods

(21): Jinnah joins ML in 1913, as 'lawyer/liberal' wing of ML becoming more powerful

(21): this is context of Lucknow Pact in 1916 (high-water mark of unity)

(22): Jinnah suggestion that only 'matriculates' should be allowed into Congress

(24): Jinnah disdainful at agitation/discord during Khlilafat campaign ('inviting chaos')

(24): all manner of anti-British fatwas passed

(26): Simon Comission was all-white; Nehru report was the Congress' response (rejected separate electorates)

(27): Jinnah put forward 14 points , in 1928, as objection (separate electorates, strong representation at centre). Rejected at by All-Parties Conf.

(28): RTConf and CDisobdience, 1930-32

(29): Gov't of India Act 1935

(32): Congress' contradictions, imp--in UP in favour of land reforms, but in Bengal opposed to them; in Punjab and Sind opposed legislation against moneylenders

(34): in '36'-'37, Jinnah wanted to push for negotiations with Congress; but Congress was in strong position, and regarded ML as unimportant

(35): this attitude exemplified in Congress dismissiveness to ML in UP, 1947 elections (demanded that ML merge with Congress). Azad focused on this as leading to Pakistan

(36): Nehru on Muslims--'I come into greater touch with Muslim massess.."

(36): Congress launching Muslim mass contact movement, a challenge to ML

(36): suggestion that this induces Sir Sikander, Fazlul Hug, Saadullah to push their members to join ML

(40-41): ambiguity over Lahore resolution, 1940

(42): Jinnah alliance with titled genry in Punjab, NWFP and Sindh, who loved the British.

(42): imp, this added to the several reasons that collaborationist stance during WWII was essential to ML success

(43): Jinnah-Gandhi negotiations in 1944--denouncing proposed Pakistan as 'moth-eaten', but forced to accept just that in 1947...

(44): Jinnah wrecked Simla conference, 1945, with uncompromising attitude

(45): 1946 elections, ML did much better (but ML ministries only in Bengal and Sind)

(45): Cripps in 1946, failed to bridge differences between Congress and ML

(48): Jinnah launched murderous DAD August 1946 in response to Cabinet Mission Plan failure to give ML sole right to nominate Muslim members to interim government

(52): critical--when up against it, in 1945-1946, ML's path to the masses was through ulama, pirs. divine displeasure against candidates who didn't vote for ML.

(53): lefties in the ML, in this period (GM Syed expelled, of course, because of outspoken criticisms)

(54): in this period (37-47), ML went through a steady centralization

(54-55): character of ML Council--landlord dominated, second biggest party was lawyers

(57-58): important, ML by itself was very weak in Bengal and Punjab, b/c of weight of non-Muslims. had to make alliances with provincial parties. ML also very weak in Frontier and Sindh.

(59): 'popularity' of ML in this time period, moreover, was very short-lived ('pakistan and Islam,' not 'issue-based')

(59): the organizational structure of the ML was very, very weak. Jinnah-heavy, full of pliable men.