historical roots of mass poverty in SA, tapan rayachaudhuri (1985)
(801):
phenomenon of large groups of half-starving people (underdevelopment)
is not a holdover from pre-modern times. this, in India, is traceable to
new institutional arrangements in Ag. starting in 1813.
(801): output of foodgrains per head of pop declined, as cashcrops were promoted
(801): moreover, this was an already established fact by the time that populations started to increase
(802):
according to Kuznets, income per head in traditional societies in Asia
was probably higher than in pre-industrial phase of Europe
(802): citing evidence of 'very high' both land and labour yields in pre-industrial agrarian India [hmm]
(802): Greater Bengal had been free from recurrent famines, 1570-1770
(802-803):
level of revenue demand had been kept in check by labour shortages in
Mughal period (oppressed peasants could 'vote with their feet']
(803): not a 'uniformly immiserated peasantry'
(803): there were no 'absolute' shortages of food in pre-colonial India [i.e., per capita grain availability]
(804):
those with no rights to land were and are likely to suffer, but in
pre-colonial India this was a small portion of the pop--nowhere near 45%
(804-805): 1813 as key turning point, w/ end of Company's monopoly [but evidence adduced here is weak]
(805): key--colonial government introduced tenurial systems which gave proprietary rights to about 4% of
population dependent on agriculture (identical with old class that had
'superior rights' in land, but it eliminated the 'usufractory right of
other agricultural classes')
(805): details of p. capita growth; availability per capita of foodgrain declining in 20th C.
(806):
as revenue came to be collected in cash, agricultural producer pressure
to sell. conditions of selling were very unfavourable; monopsony in
buyers, monopoly in suppliers.
Saturday, July 9, 2011
intercontinental trade and the development of the third world since the industrial revolution, patrick o'brien (1997)
(76): productivity growth in Europe was 'endogenous' (citing A. Maddison)
(77): [1. GOODS] key--commerce in 'the Wallerstein period (1492-1789)' had more in common with a 'medieval' past--before 1846, export+import/production ratios were in the region of 1-2 percent. for Britain, Portugal, Holland, below 15%.
(77): before railways, most prices set locally, not influenced by long-distance trade.
(78): [2. CAPITAL] European money going abroad was a 'miniscule percentage' of world capital formation--persistent imperfections in international capital markets
(78): [3. LABOUR] numbers migrating in mercantile era were very small--most went close to place of birth
(79): wasn't until 1914, that overland transportation had competitive advantage over waterborne
(80): Treaty of Vienna allowed for 'peaceful' development of international commerce
(80, see 86): 1821-1921, 138 new colonies for Europe; by 1914, population of 530 million under their sway. nominally independent countries opened up (Ottoman, S Aerica, Arabia, Indian princely States, China, etc.)
(81): after 1815, a 'liberal' trade regime [very different from Bairoch's account, take note]
(81): trade grew at 4-5% in 1800s, after 1% in 1700s
(82): by 1913, ratio of exports+imports/income were about 30%; they were about 2-3% at beginning of 1800s.
(82): [1. GOODS, 1800s] key--main supplier region of RM for Europe was white settlement countries overseas; second was Europe's peripheries; third was Third World.
(83): [2. LABOUR, 1800s] between 1821 and 1915, 46 million people left native lands for overseas--most, though, were Europeans going to US (and they left, in the main, the poorer regions, especially in the latter half of this period)
(84): benefited both labour-surplus and labour-scarce regions--an equilibrium-restoring process, at a general level
(84): [3. CAPITAL, 1800s] as much as 30% of savings going overseas [!]. most financed regions of European settlement (see p. 91--$131 per capita in white settlement, $11 in Asia and Africa). [O'Brien has a very sanguine story about what happened when it went to Third World, but without that angle the point remains]
(86): in 1913, European countries included 11 times more land, 18 times more people in their colonies, than in their core
(86-92)): assessment of dev of und argument--(1) the share of European exports going to TW went from 15% in 1830, to only 21% in 1910 (a real increase of nineteen times, but not much in relative share; (2) the share of European imports coming from TW also negligible (details within)
(93): 1820-1910, terms of trade move in favour of the TW [read around here, some oversanguine conclusions]
(95): most 'gains' from export trade went to expat Europeans
(96-97): in sum--suggestion that not only did imperialism not explain development, it doesn't do much to explain underdevelopment (if it did, all it did was divert talents/energies!). underdevelopment, instead, is explained by antecedent factors--(1) initial factor endowments and (2) ability to attract European investment [this latter half will require response that does more than just use India as example, though that is important]
(98, see 104): imp--1913-1945 marks the Dark Age for Third World, b/c of wars and international depression [these are regarded, almost, as exogenous to the Era of Progress that preceded them]
(99): there were three trends, though, that exacerbated all this:
(105): in sum--TW not doing well, 1900-1950, in terms of manufacturing output, welfare, etc. [the implication, here, though is that TW intellectuals misunderstood the problem; it was a breakdown of trade that was responsible, not its continued operation--see p. 109 ('the North is responsible, but only for initiating wars that ruined commerce')]
(106-108): imp--many reasons to suspect that 'gains from trade' were likely weaker, in TW (b/c of expats, b/c of structure of plantations, etc.); but fair point that theoretical speculation needs to be backed by data, of which there isn't enough
(108): noting, though, that peasant mode of production isn't always superior, for development, to plantation mode
(114-115): TW share of global exports decreased from 40% after WWII to 22% in 1990s [though this is obviously symptomatic of deeper problems; not the problem, itself!]
(115-116): key--N-N trade represents about 60-65% of total trade, in post-WWII period; S-S trade is about 10%; S-N trade is about 30-40%
(118): oil price rise checked decline of TW exports as global proportion; and checked increasing proportion of manufactures in world trade. but these two trends stand out, when this is taken into account.
(121): tendency of net terms of trade is to move against primary products, in 20th C [but check against Bairoch]. this highlights necessity for developers to move into industrial goods.
(126): ends with banal call for end to protectionism.
(76): productivity growth in Europe was 'endogenous' (citing A. Maddison)
(77): [1. GOODS] key--commerce in 'the Wallerstein period (1492-1789)' had more in common with a 'medieval' past--before 1846, export+import/production ratios were in the region of 1-2 percent. for Britain, Portugal, Holland, below 15%.
(77): before railways, most prices set locally, not influenced by long-distance trade.
(78): [2. CAPITAL] European money going abroad was a 'miniscule percentage' of world capital formation--persistent imperfections in international capital markets
(78): [3. LABOUR] numbers migrating in mercantile era were very small--most went close to place of birth
(79): wasn't until 1914, that overland transportation had competitive advantage over waterborne
(80): Treaty of Vienna allowed for 'peaceful' development of international commerce
(80, see 86): 1821-1921, 138 new colonies for Europe; by 1914, population of 530 million under their sway. nominally independent countries opened up (Ottoman, S Aerica, Arabia, Indian princely States, China, etc.)
(81): after 1815, a 'liberal' trade regime [very different from Bairoch's account, take note]
(81): trade grew at 4-5% in 1800s, after 1% in 1700s
(82): by 1913, ratio of exports+imports/income were about 30%; they were about 2-3% at beginning of 1800s.
(82): [1. GOODS, 1800s] key--main supplier region of RM for Europe was white settlement countries overseas; second was Europe's peripheries; third was Third World.
(83): [2. LABOUR, 1800s] between 1821 and 1915, 46 million people left native lands for overseas--most, though, were Europeans going to US (and they left, in the main, the poorer regions, especially in the latter half of this period)
(84): benefited both labour-surplus and labour-scarce regions--an equilibrium-restoring process, at a general level
(84): [3. CAPITAL, 1800s] as much as 30% of savings going overseas [!]. most financed regions of European settlement (see p. 91--$131 per capita in white settlement, $11 in Asia and Africa). [O'Brien has a very sanguine story about what happened when it went to Third World, but without that angle the point remains]
(86): in 1913, European countries included 11 times more land, 18 times more people in their colonies, than in their core
(86-92)): assessment of dev of und argument--(1) the share of European exports going to TW went from 15% in 1830, to only 21% in 1910 (a real increase of nineteen times, but not much in relative share; (2) the share of European imports coming from TW also negligible (details within)
(93): 1820-1910, terms of trade move in favour of the TW [read around here, some oversanguine conclusions]
(95): most 'gains' from export trade went to expat Europeans
(96-97): in sum--suggestion that not only did imperialism not explain development, it doesn't do much to explain underdevelopment (if it did, all it did was divert talents/energies!). underdevelopment, instead, is explained by antecedent factors--(1) initial factor endowments and (2) ability to attract European investment [this latter half will require response that does more than just use India as example, though that is important]
(98, see 104): imp--1913-1945 marks the Dark Age for Third World, b/c of wars and international depression [these are regarded, almost, as exogenous to the Era of Progress that preceded them]
(99): there were three trends, though, that exacerbated all this:
- rising proportion of food satisfied by domestic production, b/c nations worried about self-sufficiency
- substitution of synthetic materials depressed demand for natural RM
- rise of NA as industrial power, and it used its own RM
(105): in sum--TW not doing well, 1900-1950, in terms of manufacturing output, welfare, etc. [the implication, here, though is that TW intellectuals misunderstood the problem; it was a breakdown of trade that was responsible, not its continued operation--see p. 109 ('the North is responsible, but only for initiating wars that ruined commerce')]
(106-108): imp--many reasons to suspect that 'gains from trade' were likely weaker, in TW (b/c of expats, b/c of structure of plantations, etc.); but fair point that theoretical speculation needs to be backed by data, of which there isn't enough
(108): noting, though, that peasant mode of production isn't always superior, for development, to plantation mode
(114-115): TW share of global exports decreased from 40% after WWII to 22% in 1990s [though this is obviously symptomatic of deeper problems; not the problem, itself!]
(115-116): key--N-N trade represents about 60-65% of total trade, in post-WWII period; S-S trade is about 10%; S-N trade is about 30-40%
(118): oil price rise checked decline of TW exports as global proportion; and checked increasing proportion of manufactures in world trade. but these two trends stand out, when this is taken into account.
(121): tendency of net terms of trade is to move against primary products, in 20th C [but check against Bairoch]. this highlights necessity for developers to move into industrial goods.
(126): ends with banal call for end to protectionism.
kenya, what does dependency mean?, colin leys
(109): critique of kaplinsky. evidence points to fact of african capital's entry; kaplinsky denies this by asserting mitigating factors that, actually, match up with history of capitalist development more generally (hand of State, help of foreign capital, beginnings as petty capital, etc.)
(111, 112): citing Bill Warren's critique, in which it's asserted that dependency theorists rely on an 'idealized' model of capitalist development (in which there's no unevenness, no inequalities, no cycles). this is taken as evidence of inability to break out of underdevelopment [the strong version of this critique is of course nonsense]
(109): critique of kaplinsky. evidence points to fact of african capital's entry; kaplinsky denies this by asserting mitigating factors that, actually, match up with history of capitalist development more generally (hand of State, help of foreign capital, beginnings as petty capital, etc.)
(111, 112): citing Bill Warren's critique, in which it's asserted that dependency theorists rely on an 'idealized' model of capitalist development (in which there's no unevenness, no inequalities, no cycles). this is taken as evidence of inability to break out of underdevelopment [the strong version of this critique is of course nonsense]
Thursday, June 23, 2011
the political system of pakistan, sayeed
(12): instrumental obscurantism--SAK enjoning muslims not to join Congress by saying can't be 'friends' with non-Muslims
(16): British cobble together 51 'representative' Muslims, 1909 -- 41 were landowners!
(16): 1910, tensions in ML with arriving 'lawyer party'
(17): Congress failure to attract Muslims b/c
- ML convincing 'Muslims'
- Congress use of Hindu symbolism in Maharashtra (Tilak and Gokhale)
(18): Swadeshi was borrowed from Chinese boycott of American goods
(21): Jinnah joins ML in 1913, as 'lawyer/liberal' wing of ML becoming more powerful
(21): this is context of Lucknow Pact in 1916 (high-water mark of unity)
(22): Jinnah suggestion that only 'matriculates' should be allowed into Congress
(24): Jinnah disdainful at agitation/discord during Khlilafat campaign ('inviting chaos')
(24): all manner of anti-British fatwas passed
(26): Simon Comission was all-white; Nehru report was the Congress' response (rejected separate electorates)
(27): Jinnah put forward 14 points , in 1928, as objection (separate electorates, strong representation at centre). Rejected at by All-Parties Conf.
(28): RTConf and CDisobdience, 1930-32
(29): Gov't of India Act 1935
(32): Congress' contradictions, imp--in UP in favour of land reforms, but in Bengal opposed to them; in Punjab and Sind opposed legislation against moneylenders
(34): in '36'-'37, Jinnah wanted to push for negotiations with Congress; but Congress was in strong position, and regarded ML as unimportant
(35): this attitude exemplified in Congress dismissiveness to ML in UP, 1947 elections (demanded that ML merge with Congress). Azad focused on this as leading to Pakistan
(36): Nehru on Muslims--'I come into greater touch with Muslim massess.."
(36): Congress launching Muslim mass contact movement, a challenge to ML
(36): suggestion that this induces Sir Sikander, Fazlul Hug, Saadullah to push their members to join ML
(40-41): ambiguity over Lahore resolution, 1940
(42): Jinnah alliance with titled genry in Punjab, NWFP and Sindh, who loved the British.
(42): imp, this added to the several reasons that collaborationist stance during WWII was essential to ML success
(43): Jinnah-Gandhi negotiations in 1944--denouncing proposed Pakistan as 'moth-eaten', but forced to accept just that in 1947...
(44): Jinnah wrecked Simla conference, 1945, with uncompromising attitude
(45): 1946 elections, ML did much better (but ML ministries only in Bengal and Sind)
(45): Cripps in 1946, failed to bridge differences between Congress and ML
(48): Jinnah launched murderous DAD August 1946 in response to Cabinet Mission Plan failure to give ML sole right to nominate Muslim members to interim government
(52): critical--when up against it, in 1945-1946, ML's path to the masses was through ulama, pirs. divine displeasure against candidates who didn't vote for ML.
(53): lefties in the ML, in this period (GM Syed expelled, of course, because of outspoken criticisms)
(54): in this period (37-47), ML went through a steady centralization
(54-55): character of ML Council--landlord dominated, second biggest party was lawyers
(57-58): important, ML by itself was very weak in Bengal and Punjab, b/c of weight of non-Muslims. had to make alliances with provincial parties. ML also very weak in Frontier and Sindh.
(59): 'popularity' of ML in this time period, moreover, was very short-lived ('pakistan and Islam,' not 'issue-based')
(59): the organizational structure of the ML was very, very weak. Jinnah-heavy, full of pliable men.
Sunday, May 22, 2011
the costs and benefits of British imperialism 1846-1914, patrick o'brien
(199): only King Leopold offered supernormal profits!
DEBATE
Kennedy Reply
(187): disputing the 'leaving India' counterfactual--the non-existence of the Raj would have meant an end to exports/imports
(187-188): disputing the 'end to the imperial Navy' counterfactual
(188-189): O'Brien's claim that they could have focused on German militarism misunderstands how burdensome this kind of a policy might have been
(189-191): disputing O'Brien's calculations that British taxpayers bore unequal burdens: b/c of higher standard of living, not true
(192): concluding that Cobdenite criticism becomes more compelling by the 1950s if not the 30s, but less in Empire's heyday
O'Brien Reply
(192-193): Kennedy's position that India would cease to export/import is mistaken; is an apology for British rule [hmm]
(196): re-asserting the case for greater fiscal burdens, in GB [O'Brien does seem to win on this point]
(163-164): here not concerned with industrial take-off (that was the earlier article); instead, concerned with costs/benefits to British people, between 1846 and 1914
(164): in the spirit of the classical critics of Empire (Smith, Hobson, etc.)
(165): four topics of central concern, in the debate in the 19th and early 20th centuries
- emigration of labour overseas
- investing money overseas; did it help capital formation at home?
- political infrastructure helped trade and commerce?
- kingdom's security?
(166-170): TRADE
- (166): this period was one in which economy was increasingly internationalized; Britain produced only half of foodstuffs domestically; 90% of non-coal raw materials came from abroad
- (167): BUT--only 1/4 of imports came from Empire (more food than raw materials, and more from dominions than from India and other countries; moreover, plausibly obtainable from other countries [hmm]); only 1/4 to 1/3 of exports went to Empire--significant, but not overwhelming.
- (167-168): if political ties severed, calculated costs from trade losses are in the range of 3-5 % of GDP [i.e., if dominions and dependent countries were allowed to pursue independent policy, etc.]
- (169): applies c-factual logic to India; Kennedy dissents, of course
- (170): Hobsbawm arg that imperial mkts allowed Britain to postpone adjustments
(170-175): MIGRATION OF CAPITAL AND LABOUR
- (170-173): lots of problem w/ data used
- (173): BUT--only 1/4 of investible funds flowed into Empire (about 20% private, 30% government). of those that did, most into the 'white dominions' (about 65%) (see tables 1 and 2)
- (174): concludes that 'little capital exported' [not exactly little, but OK]
- (174-175): 2/3 of people leaving UK went outside empire [doesn't really draw out questions of this fact's implications; but this does, also, take us beyond the question as rightly narrowly posed]
(175-186): RETURNS ON INVESTMENT IN EMPIRE
- (175-177): Marxist arg. was that they were staving off diminishing returns (export of capital, etc.), but no clear support for this in data available (1.58% gap, but not widening, not too significant)
- (177-179): big data problems, re: random/representative profit data
- (180): from different data set, also no support for hypothesis that investments in empire were consistently more profitable than domestic investments.
- (180-181): suggestion that there was a dynamic whereby rational investors were 'gulled' into investing abroad, b/c of sense of security, etc.
- (183-185): hinting at argument that this investment was dysfunctional--a kind of 'drain' that depressed domestic levels of investment (i.e., part of the radical critique of the times: (1) depressed savings; (2) forestalled dev of mass consumer mkt; (3) small firms crowded out)
- (185): legacy of 'institutional sclerosis', hampering innovation and ability to compete during 'second industrial revolution'
(186-): IMPERIAL BUDGETS AND STRATEGIC NECESSITIES
- (186): for contemporaries, question was more difficult to establish than it is for us
- (187-188): serious tax burden borne by British taxpayers (37% of gov't revenue), and subsidy to dominions (not India, though)
- (189): dominions were able to spend more lavishly on public development, etc.
- (189): c-factual, british taxes might have been lowered by 40%[!]
- (191-193): imp. of British naval hegemony to commerce? suggestion that no, commerce could have flourished w/ restricted role [Kennedy challenges him, here]
- (194): Brits bearing 2-3 times the costs faced by other citizens
- (195, 200): of course, even as tax system was becoming more progressive, the burden was born by the non-elite; the elite benefited from much of the Empire [points at the larger argument, of course]
- costly to taxpayers
- didn't ensure higher rates of return on investments abroad
- not productive destination for capital (same as 2) or labour
- not fundamental to ensuring access to markets/supplies of food/rawmaterials
(199): only King Leopold offered supernormal profits!
DEBATE
Kennedy Reply
(187): disputing the 'leaving India' counterfactual--the non-existence of the Raj would have meant an end to exports/imports
(187-188): disputing the 'end to the imperial Navy' counterfactual
(188-189): O'Brien's claim that they could have focused on German militarism misunderstands how burdensome this kind of a policy might have been
(189-191): disputing O'Brien's calculations that British taxpayers bore unequal burdens: b/c of higher standard of living, not true
(192): concluding that Cobdenite criticism becomes more compelling by the 1950s if not the 30s, but less in Empire's heyday
O'Brien Reply
(192-193): Kennedy's position that India would cease to export/import is mistaken; is an apology for British rule [hmm]
(196): re-asserting the case for greater fiscal burdens, in GB [O'Brien does seem to win on this point]
Saturday, May 21, 2011
european economic development: the contribution of the periphery, o'brien (1982)
(2): not, here, discussing the impact on peripheral countries of trade; here the concern is with contribution of core to W. European development. covering period 1400-1750
(3): thesis--commerce proceeded on small scale, was not uniquely profitable, and not decisive. in sum, commerce between W. Europe and periphery forms insignificant part of explanation for accelerated rate of economic growth.
(4): as % of trade, by end of 1700s some 20% of exports and 25% of imports (but this is biased, since uptick in trade with periphery only occured in 1650
(4): as % of GNP, trade with periphery only about 1% (late 1700s).
(5): of course, these are insufficient--we want some sense of how the gains for trade were re-invested, and what impact that had. using Bairoch's data for 1800, contribution of profits from trade is 1% of GDP, or roughly 10% of total investment. so not very significant.
(5-7): but did it have a more conjunctural impact? looking at 1760-1850, only provided about 15% of gross investment expenditures undertaken in Britain. moreover, capital formation was only one of many factors--technical progress, organizational efficiency were just as important.
(8): in trade, after 1650 prices were forced down significantly (once trade in tropical products ceased to be domain of the very rich), and profits could not have been supernormal. very competitive.
(9): after supernormal profits for Portugese in its early days, by the late 1600s slave trade was no longer supernormal profits [i.e., so this would matter out of proportion to its size. but it didn't]
(9): running the c-factual through, w/o slave trade--not much difference
(10): imp--did the commercial trade free up resources for industrial specialization? no, it can't matter out of proportion to its size.
(10-11): some stimulus to shipbuilding, some to commerce. but larger story holds
(11): maize and potato were important (Americas crops), but their contribution to caloric counts came later, after industrial take-off
(11-12): textiles--seem important, here, and linked crucially to international trade. but amount to some 7% of economy [and O'Brien is opposed to a leading sector view of industrialization more generally, so] counterfacutal w/o textiles/Lancashire, all still well
(13): bullion only adds about 25% to money supply. plus you had some incipient moves to paper money and credit, already.
(13): it wasn't the only path out of the money constraint.
(14): bullion helped in the trade deficit with Asia. but (a) services were involved; (b) trade was still small.
(14): helped in the Baltic trade. but here only about 1/3 was bullion.
(15): the price levels argument has many holes. mechanism is supposed to be that inflation creates space for investment, because wages are sticky. but many reasons that this story wouldn't work out, this way.
(16): setting all the smallness of the numbers aside, note also that they were at their peak only in the late 1700s, when Britain's advantage was already underway, before the 1800s.
(17): moreover, Britain was exceptionally involved. so if the argument doesn't work, in Britain's case, it certainly doesn't apply to the other cases.
(18): nice Braudel quote--to paraphrase the world of the trading posts in the Mediterranean was the sexy world to which everyone gives attention, but 'superstructural.' the real action was in the world of peasants/tenant farmers/landowners, and the patterns there determined "destiny of the age."
(2): not, here, discussing the impact on peripheral countries of trade; here the concern is with contribution of core to W. European development. covering period 1400-1750
(3): thesis--commerce proceeded on small scale, was not uniquely profitable, and not decisive. in sum, commerce between W. Europe and periphery forms insignificant part of explanation for accelerated rate of economic growth.
(4): as % of trade, by end of 1700s some 20% of exports and 25% of imports (but this is biased, since uptick in trade with periphery only occured in 1650
(4): as % of GNP, trade with periphery only about 1% (late 1700s).
(5): of course, these are insufficient--we want some sense of how the gains for trade were re-invested, and what impact that had. using Bairoch's data for 1800, contribution of profits from trade is 1% of GDP, or roughly 10% of total investment. so not very significant.
(5-7): but did it have a more conjunctural impact? looking at 1760-1850, only provided about 15% of gross investment expenditures undertaken in Britain. moreover, capital formation was only one of many factors--technical progress, organizational efficiency were just as important.
(8): in trade, after 1650 prices were forced down significantly (once trade in tropical products ceased to be domain of the very rich), and profits could not have been supernormal. very competitive.
(9): after supernormal profits for Portugese in its early days, by the late 1600s slave trade was no longer supernormal profits [i.e., so this would matter out of proportion to its size. but it didn't]
(9): running the c-factual through, w/o slave trade--not much difference
(10): imp--did the commercial trade free up resources for industrial specialization? no, it can't matter out of proportion to its size.
(10-11): some stimulus to shipbuilding, some to commerce. but larger story holds
(11): maize and potato were important (Americas crops), but their contribution to caloric counts came later, after industrial take-off
(11-12): textiles--seem important, here, and linked crucially to international trade. but amount to some 7% of economy [and O'Brien is opposed to a leading sector view of industrialization more generally, so] counterfacutal w/o textiles/Lancashire, all still well
(13): bullion only adds about 25% to money supply. plus you had some incipient moves to paper money and credit, already.
(13): it wasn't the only path out of the money constraint.
(14): bullion helped in the trade deficit with Asia. but (a) services were involved; (b) trade was still small.
(14): helped in the Baltic trade. but here only about 1/3 was bullion.
(15): the price levels argument has many holes. mechanism is supposed to be that inflation creates space for investment, because wages are sticky. but many reasons that this story wouldn't work out, this way.
(16): setting all the smallness of the numbers aside, note also that they were at their peak only in the late 1700s, when Britain's advantage was already underway, before the 1800s.
(17): moreover, Britain was exceptionally involved. so if the argument doesn't work, in Britain's case, it certainly doesn't apply to the other cases.
(18): nice Braudel quote--to paraphrase the world of the trading posts in the Mediterranean was the sexy world to which everyone gives attention, but 'superstructural.' the real action was in the world of peasants/tenant farmers/landowners, and the patterns there determined "destiny of the age."
Thursday, May 12, 2011
JPS October 1974, Vol 2 No 1
Comparative Development of the European Manorial System and the Latin America Hacienda System, Cristobal Kay
(69): manorial (100s-1700s, W. Europe) and hacienda (late 1600s to pre-LR period, in LA) consist of two classes--landlords and peasants--with corresponding economies. three tenures: demesne, peasant tenures, and communal land.
(70): in Europe, (1) Grundherrschaft--where landlord leased out all of estate to peasants, who paid rents; and (2) Gutscherrschaft, where demesne was predominant agricultural enterprise, drawing on servile labour. former predominant in West, latter in East. they rarely coexisted for sustained periods of time.
(71): Kay telling classic story about urban economic development acting as solvent
(71): citing classical story of bourgeois revolutions--peasantry, emerging proletariat helped overthrow the feudal structure (as early as 1381!)
(71): during classic period of feudalism, corvees were about two to three days a week (in Fr and Eng, demense was about 1/4-1/5 of the land)
(71-72): this was preceded, interestingly, by a in-kind/money rent period. so you go from Grund to Gut back to Grund
(72): partly this was forced by conditions of labour scarcity, etc. in W. Europe. though in E. Europe this was not obstacle, due to political power of lords.
(72): a transitory second serfdom in England?
(72-73): crisis of demesne farming in 1500s, due to unprofitability of the demesne, and impact of monetary devaluation
(73): in England, peasant economy eventually failed, though, because expropriations also began at this time. the enclosure movement. thus began capitalist agriculture, with a lord, a capitalist farmer, and wage labourers.
(74): in France and SW Germany, dissolution of Grunderschrafft proceeded through expropriation of the landlords
(74, see also 87): in 1850-1900 period, ending of feudalism in East was mitigated by redemption payments, etc. so small peasantry rarely ended up with the land. instead, it was the junker-type class that benefited.
(75): 'Second Serfdom' dated to 1400 and 1500s, in East. in West, 'peasantry continued road to freedom'
(75-76): interesting stuff about in-kind and money rents
(76): landlords leasing out parts of demense when productivity in peasant economy was greater than in their own
(76): imp--export of cereals from E. to W beginning in 1400s, and this was impetus behind 'second serfdom.' this was because demesne production ensured greater control over cereal production, given background condition of cheap serf labour, also (adding that this was also enabled by lack of bourgeoisie, etc.) [hmm]
(77): imp--distinction between market as internal in West (classical picture of dissolution), and external in East (so classical story is able to be retained)
(77): int--'Second Serfdom', as market-induced dependent export-oriented production, as one of the first cases of 'historical underdevelopment'
(78): gentry (who used wage-labour) vs. Junkers (who intensified labour rents on demense). as consequence, clash with bourgeoisie in latter but not in former (citing Engels, B. Moore, etc.)
(78): in England farmer and landlord are different persons; in Prussia landlord and farmer are unified as Junker (who thereby appropriates profit and rent)
(78-79): in LA, encomienda kind of like Grunderschrafft--but didn't entail property rights
(79): encomonderos would impose tribute (either kind, money, or labour--discussion of this here) on 'pueblos de indios'; if labour, it would be used on an 'estancia'
(80): imp--out of these institutions the hacienda soon emerged, though: (1) in places with more developed form of indigenous organization (Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, Guatemala) this took centuries to develop, b/c of resistance; (2) in more underpopulated and 'primitive' areas (Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil) process was quicker
(80): orthodox argument that LAmerican colonies were 'of great importance to European development' [here for Spain and Portugal!]
(80): moreover, as result of colonialism, 'town-country' conflict never developed [more classical story]
(80): timeline--encomienda system declining from 1650-1800 (after mining rush was over, much less profitable). in 1700-1800s, landlord-tenant relations were developing. main method of recruiting labour services of Indians was by expropriating them from communal lands (depriving them of access to means of subsistence)
(81, though see 83): imp--like the European story, where export market was weaker, Grunderschrafft-type relations were dominant. but hacienda enterprises expanded where export market did exist. though peasants in LA were not 'serfs', artificially created 'overpopulation' (due to expropriation) allowed extraction of rents
(82): development of a 'latifundia-minifundia complex'
(83-84): following Dobb, two types of proletarianization
(85): in LA, basically no kulakization in pre-Land Reform period. peasant differentiation was minimal; no ec/political opportunities to develop. proletarianization benefited only landlords/capitalists
(85): great similarities, in this regard, between LA and E. European countries (Russia a case apart)
(87-88): in sum--some movement toward liberation of peasantry in Bolivian rev, and Mexican rev. but by and large b/c of absence of rural yeomanry and 'revolutionary bourgeoisie' in LA, only the w-class can bring structural change...
Peasant Movements: Lessons of the Present Stage of the Class Struggle in Piura
(102): not the legal road, but the campesino road!
(102): nice--using bourgeois democracy (military training) against it [the Stalinists have something right!]--to prepare land seizure.
Book Reviews
(122): not clear that rising of 1381 motivated by declining standards of living
JPS January 1975, Vol 2 No 2
The Peasantry and the English Revolution, Brian Manning
(133): don't normally talk about peasantry in ER discussions, which is surprising
(133): the scene--from about 1530 to 1620, std. of living for peasantry was rising (though mainly bigger farmers and mid framers benefiting). smaller farmers doing less well, especially when had to buy grain on mkt (this was time of rising rel prices in ag)
(134-138): imp, initially landlords were being 'fleeced' by fixed rents at time of rising prices; this threatened to undermine their economic power, and through this, their political power. BUT, by early decades of 1600s, landlord counterattack, through the crown and institution of the law (interpreting tenants as tenants-at-will, etc.--getting rid of copyholds and replacing them with leaseholds and competitive rents) [lots of details here]. in sum, "a reversal of expectations in 1620s and 1630s," for the middle and upper strata of peasantry. overpopulation was putting pressure on std of living, also. and also, soon, a series of bad harvests were to hit, impoverishing lower peasants/landless, etc.
(140): clash btw landlords and lower strata of peasants over the common lands was central agrarian issue of the English Revolution (cf. Dobb)
(140, 144): Charles I breaking up common forests, by excluding them from Forest Law, and coastal saltmarshes, wastes of manors, etc. "a great and bitter conflict."
(144): imp--all this was eroding the authority of landlords, courts, the King, etc.
(148): all this was the grounds for peasant support for constitutionalists
(148): though Manning also telling classic account of ER -- some supporrt amongst gentry/nobility, but largely in 'towns'. king's support more amongst gentry than towns [maybe hedging of language reflects something]
(149): lack of support of peasantry "probably explains the defeat of the royalists in the civil war" (even though peasantry was not actively supporting other side, this was more a 'lack of enthusiasm')
(154): imp, shortcomings of peasant resistance--no 'general revolt' of the peasantry against a system (this was why revolution didn't go any further than it did). three reasons they weren't revolutionaries: (1) localized grievances; (2) differentiation of peasantry was a source of disunity; (3) bulk of peasantry accepted manorial system, as it offered a measure of protection to smaller peasants against large. struggle against enclosure of common lands was in this sense a 'reactionary' one
Marx on Peasants, Michael Duggett
(160): Marx not 'against' entirely--more a posture of 'ambivalence' [not a terribly strong argument], thanks partly to new textual evidence
(165): Germanic vs. Orient [Asiatic?] vs. Warrior-city -- as three pre-capitalist forms evolving out of primitive stage
(168): by 1750 (citing Marx, here) the tripartite structure of capitalist agricultural life in England had congealed
(168): Marx's account of PAcc has a forces of production-bent. the needs of accumulation, etc.
(169): key--the FR had not expropriated the peasantry, of course (unlike processes already completed in England), but had expropriated the rural upper classes, creating a social structure where 'peasantry's weight was decisive'
(170): the 'barbarism within civilization' quote comes in the context of the writings on Bonaparte. he anticipated, though, a loss of faith on their part, etc. and, possibly, as a result they would play the role of 'chorus' in the proletarian revolution to come (though then this passage was ommitted from a later version)
(171-172): suggestion re: peasant revolts and 'isolation' -- individual self-sufficiency reduces amount of community (here sack of potatoes quote relevant). argument here is that Marx's views are unclear, even unhelpful
(173): good to remember--his vision of the peasantry in 1871 is different--they are kept unaware by bourgeoisie, else they would join the ranks (though there was no answer to the question of what a revolutionary government would do about them)
(173, 175): exactly--the trouble for socialists was that defending peasants from encroachment of capitalism would require, if successful, the socialist government to carry out the historic tasks of proletarianization. Marx doesn't discuss this explicitly, but it's in his writings on Russia: the possibility of bypassing the 'pitiless laws of capitalism'
(176): rightly being noted that Marx is a bit unfair to his own argument, when writing to Vera. Capital does have some implications for Russia.
(176-177): ambivalence (in short, suggestion is that he doesn't really come down on the side of either the Narodniks or the side of Lenin)--on the one hand suggestion that commune can be starting point for socialism; on the other hand supposition is NOT that peasants can do this themselves
Peasant Leadership and the Pugachev Revolt, Philip Longworth
(183): Pugachev Revolt (1773-1775, involving up to 2 million people) as consequence of both long-term factors (enserfment, etc.) and short-term factors (conscription/taxation owing to Russo-Turkish war 1769-1774)
(183-184): the leaders--Cossacks carried some privileges vs. peasants (no taxation), but had much more onerous military obligations. the Yaik Cossacks (around Ural river) had not yet reached 'agricultural stage). they did all retain some links to the peasantry, however. there was also internal oligarchization, at this stage, that grated rank and file.
(184): the led--peasantry, comprising of several overlapping groups.
(185): useful-- problem of no inter-village organization, despite intra-village communal forms. problem was to gather the 'scattered sacks', not to put potatoes in a sack [nicely put]. problem demonstrated by how often resistance erupted before, without becoming a movement
(187): it was for this reason that leadership was going to be critical. but how?
(187): Pugachev didn't appeal to Rights of Man or anything of this sort, but pretended to be the rightful Tsar of Russia. exploited a powerful social myth of 'the just Tsar' (and there were many precusors to this, too). pretended to speak german, etc., even though he was illiterate
(191-192): Pugachev was surprisingly effective at creating an organization to administer the rebellion--a 'College of War', a Great Army on Cossack lines, etc.
(193): "...there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the rebels' organization was consistent with the general hypothesis that the organization of a peasant movement tends to reflect the culture of the society in which it occurs." [hmm? by this he means 'existing organizational patterns'in society; authoritarian character of Russian State reflected in authoritarian nature of movement's central organization, etc. but also elements of direct democracy, from society also]
(193): "Peasant movements commonly rely on outside leadership." here, of course, the Cossacks
(196): based on analysis of 100 leaders, not social status, etc., but knowledge of the outside world which was most decisive
(198): unlike Hobsbawm's bandits, Pugachev was married with three children
(199-200): the probability of reprisals also built solidarity amongst the rebellion
(201): the movement had no ideology in the Marxist sense--but it would be wrong to say there was no shared belief (the 'just tsar', ideal life of historical Cossackdom)
concepts and terms: surplus
(221): if subsistence as consumption of primitive societies, then surplus non-existent till modern era; if subsistence as 'biological minimum', then surplus present 'always'
(221-222): also claim that surplus ought to be wedded to existence of exploiting class (existence of latter is adduced as evidence for former)
(222): Gough 1972 and Harrison 1973, re: unproductive labour
(223): for Marxists, 'subsistence' as always hisotrically and socially determined
book reviews
(241): in Sahlin's Stone Age Economics, suggestion that hunters and gatherers were affluent; reproduction in less time than modern wage labourer, b/c of low needs low level of productivity didn't matter [hmm].
(250): Adamson book on the regeneration of the plantation economy in Guiana, through deliberate acts of policy by planter-controlled legislature (post-emancipation--all happening in the second half of 1800s). reviewer suggestion, though, is that the peasant economy would have collapsed under the weight of its own backwardness, absent planter policy.
JPS April 1975, Vol 2 No 3
A Project for Research on the Peasant Revolution of our Time, Jerzy Tepicht
(258, see also 267): re: Russian Rev, suggestion that 'class-conscious workers' served as shock troops for oncoming tide of the peasantry, "which became principal beneficiary[!] and master of the subsequent destiny of the revolution" [hmm--see 260]. this is fruit of defining a revolution by its outcome, he argues (a 'peasant socialist revolution')
(258): obsession with employment/labour-intensive nature of industrialization reflects importance of peasantry, in post-rev. Russia
(264): labour saving industry in the interests of skilled, upper reaches of the workforce; labour-intensive in the interests of w-class [hmm, certainly not true]
(264): oh no, GLF as birth of a new kind of civilization...
(266): 'no question of reading Lenin or Marx, but when I read Stalin I feel at home' [!]
(266): Lenin as 'narodnik' towards peasantry (re: NEP, I think)
(267): Poland, Czechs, and Bulgarians all advised against collectivization a la USSR, by USSR.
(267): Trotskyists as mystics, for their faith in the working class
Peasants and Revolution: The Case of China, L. Bianco
(313-315): concerned to show that there was lots of agitation, independent of the Communists. that the peasants have agency, and were active (tax riots, protests against requisition of labour for infrastructure projects)
(315): the 'Nanking decade' (1927-1937), in which the land-tax burden was considerable
(317): at the same time, an 'overall submissiveness'. less class consciousness than intra-class rivalry, amongst tenants [hmm--then what's the point of this essay, exactly?]
(320): peasant uprisings not led by Communists displayed an overriding concern with local interests. and, again, intra-class competition was very pervasive. the task of the Communists was 'tremendous'
(321): stomach of bandit opened up, and all that's found is grass
(321): most of the actions were 'defensive in nature'
(322): in sum, "rural masses did not question the status quo, but only certain new developments which represented a blow to it..."
(323): what mobilized peasants was not any underlying deterioration in their condition, but rather the exceptional/accidental
(324): hmm, insurgent armies consisted more of bandits, secret society members, etc., than of peasants. Mao criticized for lack of faith in peasant masses.
(325): imp--"during this early period of the peasant revolution, Communist and other intellectual revolutionary leaders in central and south-central China quite often sought a shortcut to victory through the formation of armies consisting of elements mostly marginal to peasant society."
(325): admitting that much of this was out of necessity (reliance on 'elements declasses'), after the pogroms in the cities of 1927. surviving by any means necessary, since peasants were not willing
(325-326): these elements declasses were linked to the peasants (as former peasants, themselves)
(326): charge that the pre-1931 period was characterized by 'guerillaism'/Mao as warlord (though take this charge with a grain of salt, it's being suggested)
(327-328): ok--nonetheless, with the consolidation of rural bases, revolutionary leaders did get a chance to demonstrate the appeal of their rural policies; this is how they built their support base. (this, he's noting, shouldn't obscure the fact that the Communists entered the villagers' lives as 'leaders,' as elements 'from the outside')
(328-329): 'peasant masses' often wanted a land reform more radical than the soviet authorities. but, he's arguing, this did not mean they were 'ahead' of the party.
(330-331): in sum--China as a case of 'guided political action'. "peasant masses alone were not capable of seizing power in the countryside..." and also, though, a critique of the revolution: "the greatness of the achivevement cannot obscure the price which is still being paid... the post-1949 Chinese revolution has largely been a revolution from above."
Notes and Memoranda
On the Politics of Production: A comment on 'Peasants and Politics' by Eric Hobsbawm, Philip Corrigan
(341-342): Hobsbawm allows peasants only 'political ignorance'; the general peasant movement is a myth (except where inspired from outside)
(343, 345): Hobsbawm reifying urban/rural divide, rather than paying attention to actual social relations of production. with this comes an obsession with forces of production.
(345-346): advocating a 'relational' understanding of consciousness, as against FOP-centered
(346): Hobsbawm presents a reified, unified proletariat (and ignores their heterogeneity) when comparing them with the peasantry
(347): "peasants are profoundly political; as for professors..." [!] [of course, Corrigan continuously references the Maoists, but there's something healthy in all this, that aside]
Hobsbawm Reply
(349-351): most of Corrigan's claims miss mark, because they caricature my position [generally fair retort, I think]
Book Reviews Cycles, Trends, and Academics among the Peasantry of NW India, Frank Perlin
(360): charge that much of the dirty work hasn't been done in Indian historiography; too much generalization, w/o basis
(362-363): importance of way in which administrative apparatus (for taxation, etc.) structures rural life (neglected in book being reviewed)
(365): interesting stuff on peasant demography--citing Mamdani, poorer families have constraints on their zies; large family may be the product of wealth
The Pattern of the Chinese Past, Mark Elvin
(379): manorial system during Sungy dynasty in China, with some critical differences
(380): going into decline by 1700s
(380): China's population doubled in 1700s--rising living standards, etc.
(380-382): reviewer, using classic account of development of capitalism, critiquing Elvin for not centering his account of non-development of capitalism in China on absence of bourgeoisie. Elvin's own answer has a Brenner-esque feel, suggesting that rational strategies discouraged technical change
JPS April 1975, Vol 2 No 3
Chayanov and the Economics of the Russian Peasantry, Mark Harrison
(390): neopopulist emphasis on viability of peasant agriculture, and its ability to survive under any circumstances; no necessary tendencies to differentiation; village homogeneity; cooperative organization was path forward, conserving family small-holding
(391): assessments of Chayanov have been insufficiently critical; his work partakes of a holistic tradition of thoughts, and can't be cherry-picked for interesting points
(392): 1870s as starting point for study of Russian peasantry
(392): Chayanovian thought started from two problems:
(395): 'subsistence requirement must be achieved at any cost,' for peasantry [in early models?] [a lot of detail here, which bears re-reading--the idea basically seems to be that income above and beyond subsistence is not really valued by them , which is why bourgeois accounting can't really make sense of peasant rationality]
(398-401): problem of inequality--Chayanov's non-Marxist explanation was largely demographic; the "purely peasant processes of a homogenoues family-based economy" [the same data, for the Leninists, became evidence of capitalist differentiation of the peasantry]
(401-402): greatest strain when there are kids, but no extra hands to work. so families search for extra capital/land. BUT, this doesn't match the data, nor well-explained, it's being charged [fairly]
(407): unsophisticated understanding of 'backwardness,' where backwardness is unrelated to present development.
(408): crucial point of difference, again, is that Chayanovian understanding accorded labor mkt negligible importance in peasant economy, whereas Marxists saw it as important, and growing. for Marxists, peasant economy was breaking up; for Chayanovians, it was stable.
(412-413): Chayanov's suggestion that peasants were 'voluntarily unemployed' was, Marxists argued, an ideological cover for famine/scarcity
(413): the suggestion, remember, was that peasants actually achieved subsistence requirements--and that, as a result, "no need to nationalize, socialize, municipalize or collectivize it. everything was already for the best."
Agrarian Reform and the Transition to Socialism in Chile, 1970-1973, Cristobal Kay
(418-419): latifundia system--2% of farm proprietors owning 55% of the land, generating extraordinary inefficiencies. though labour productivity higher on latifundia than minifundia (and, of course, land productivity higher on the latter)
(419): context, then, was declining per capita food production
(419): beneficiaries of LR were not minifundistas--but those that worked on the latifundia (inquilinos)
(420-421): details of Frei reform, 1967 -- limited in its scope (about 20% of total irrigated land, 1/3 latifundistas not touched, 6% of rural workers benefited). intention was to produce a petty bourgeoisie, acting as a "buffer for the social tensions resulting from the conflicts between the rural bourgeoisie and the agrarian proletariat."
(421): expansion of unions in Frei period
(422): on balance, improvement for capitalists and richer peasants, but did little for poorer strata
(434): before LR process began, proletarianization was already underway in Chile: inquilino and sharecropper had lost means of production; demesne production with wage labour was taking place of peasant production and/or tenant labour.
Comparative Development of the European Manorial System and the Latin America Hacienda System, Cristobal Kay
(69): manorial (100s-1700s, W. Europe) and hacienda (late 1600s to pre-LR period, in LA) consist of two classes--landlords and peasants--with corresponding economies. three tenures: demesne, peasant tenures, and communal land.
(70): in Europe, (1) Grundherrschaft--where landlord leased out all of estate to peasants, who paid rents; and (2) Gutscherrschaft, where demesne was predominant agricultural enterprise, drawing on servile labour. former predominant in West, latter in East. they rarely coexisted for sustained periods of time.
(71): Kay telling classic story about urban economic development acting as solvent
(71): citing classical story of bourgeois revolutions--peasantry, emerging proletariat helped overthrow the feudal structure (as early as 1381!)
(71): during classic period of feudalism, corvees were about two to three days a week (in Fr and Eng, demense was about 1/4-1/5 of the land)
(71-72): this was preceded, interestingly, by a in-kind/money rent period. so you go from Grund to Gut back to Grund
(72): partly this was forced by conditions of labour scarcity, etc. in W. Europe. though in E. Europe this was not obstacle, due to political power of lords.
(72): a transitory second serfdom in England?
(72-73): crisis of demesne farming in 1500s, due to unprofitability of the demesne, and impact of monetary devaluation
(73): in England, peasant economy eventually failed, though, because expropriations also began at this time. the enclosure movement. thus began capitalist agriculture, with a lord, a capitalist farmer, and wage labourers.
(74): in France and SW Germany, dissolution of Grunderschrafft proceeded through expropriation of the landlords
(74, see also 87): in 1850-1900 period, ending of feudalism in East was mitigated by redemption payments, etc. so small peasantry rarely ended up with the land. instead, it was the junker-type class that benefited.
(75): 'Second Serfdom' dated to 1400 and 1500s, in East. in West, 'peasantry continued road to freedom'
(75-76): interesting stuff about in-kind and money rents
(76): landlords leasing out parts of demense when productivity in peasant economy was greater than in their own
(76): imp--export of cereals from E. to W beginning in 1400s, and this was impetus behind 'second serfdom.' this was because demesne production ensured greater control over cereal production, given background condition of cheap serf labour, also (adding that this was also enabled by lack of bourgeoisie, etc.) [hmm]
(77): imp--distinction between market as internal in West (classical picture of dissolution), and external in East (so classical story is able to be retained)
(77): int--'Second Serfdom', as market-induced dependent export-oriented production, as one of the first cases of 'historical underdevelopment'
(78): gentry (who used wage-labour) vs. Junkers (who intensified labour rents on demense). as consequence, clash with bourgeoisie in latter but not in former (citing Engels, B. Moore, etc.)
(78): in England farmer and landlord are different persons; in Prussia landlord and farmer are unified as Junker (who thereby appropriates profit and rent)
(78-79): in LA, encomienda kind of like Grunderschrafft--but didn't entail property rights
(79): encomonderos would impose tribute (either kind, money, or labour--discussion of this here) on 'pueblos de indios'; if labour, it would be used on an 'estancia'
(80): imp--out of these institutions the hacienda soon emerged, though: (1) in places with more developed form of indigenous organization (Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, Guatemala) this took centuries to develop, b/c of resistance; (2) in more underpopulated and 'primitive' areas (Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil) process was quicker
(80): orthodox argument that LAmerican colonies were 'of great importance to European development' [here for Spain and Portugal!]
(80): moreover, as result of colonialism, 'town-country' conflict never developed [more classical story]
(80): timeline--encomienda system declining from 1650-1800 (after mining rush was over, much less profitable). in 1700-1800s, landlord-tenant relations were developing. main method of recruiting labour services of Indians was by expropriating them from communal lands (depriving them of access to means of subsistence)
(81, though see 83): imp--like the European story, where export market was weaker, Grunderschrafft-type relations were dominant. but hacienda enterprises expanded where export market did exist. though peasants in LA were not 'serfs', artificially created 'overpopulation' (due to expropriation) allowed extraction of rents
(82): development of a 'latifundia-minifundia complex'
(83-84): following Dobb, two types of proletarianization
- through evictions, landlord-led
- intra-peasant exploitation, rich peasant-led
(85): in LA, basically no kulakization in pre-Land Reform period. peasant differentiation was minimal; no ec/political opportunities to develop. proletarianization benefited only landlords/capitalists
(85): great similarities, in this regard, between LA and E. European countries (Russia a case apart)
(87-88): in sum--some movement toward liberation of peasantry in Bolivian rev, and Mexican rev. but by and large b/c of absence of rural yeomanry and 'revolutionary bourgeoisie' in LA, only the w-class can bring structural change...
Peasant Movements: Lessons of the Present Stage of the Class Struggle in Piura
(102): not the legal road, but the campesino road!
(102): nice--using bourgeois democracy (military training) against it [the Stalinists have something right!]--to prepare land seizure.
Book Reviews
(122): not clear that rising of 1381 motivated by declining standards of living
JPS January 1975, Vol 2 No 2
The Peasantry and the English Revolution, Brian Manning
(133): don't normally talk about peasantry in ER discussions, which is surprising
(133): the scene--from about 1530 to 1620, std. of living for peasantry was rising (though mainly bigger farmers and mid framers benefiting). smaller farmers doing less well, especially when had to buy grain on mkt (this was time of rising rel prices in ag)
(134-138): imp, initially landlords were being 'fleeced' by fixed rents at time of rising prices; this threatened to undermine their economic power, and through this, their political power. BUT, by early decades of 1600s, landlord counterattack, through the crown and institution of the law (interpreting tenants as tenants-at-will, etc.--getting rid of copyholds and replacing them with leaseholds and competitive rents) [lots of details here]. in sum, "a reversal of expectations in 1620s and 1630s," for the middle and upper strata of peasantry. overpopulation was putting pressure on std of living, also. and also, soon, a series of bad harvests were to hit, impoverishing lower peasants/landless, etc.
(140): clash btw landlords and lower strata of peasants over the common lands was central agrarian issue of the English Revolution (cf. Dobb)
(140, 144): Charles I breaking up common forests, by excluding them from Forest Law, and coastal saltmarshes, wastes of manors, etc. "a great and bitter conflict."
(144): imp--all this was eroding the authority of landlords, courts, the King, etc.
(148): all this was the grounds for peasant support for constitutionalists
(148): though Manning also telling classic account of ER -- some supporrt amongst gentry/nobility, but largely in 'towns'. king's support more amongst gentry than towns [maybe hedging of language reflects something]
(149): lack of support of peasantry "probably explains the defeat of the royalists in the civil war" (even though peasantry was not actively supporting other side, this was more a 'lack of enthusiasm')
(154): imp, shortcomings of peasant resistance--no 'general revolt' of the peasantry against a system (this was why revolution didn't go any further than it did). three reasons they weren't revolutionaries: (1) localized grievances; (2) differentiation of peasantry was a source of disunity; (3) bulk of peasantry accepted manorial system, as it offered a measure of protection to smaller peasants against large. struggle against enclosure of common lands was in this sense a 'reactionary' one
Marx on Peasants, Michael Duggett
(160): Marx not 'against' entirely--more a posture of 'ambivalence' [not a terribly strong argument], thanks partly to new textual evidence
(165): Germanic vs. Orient [Asiatic?] vs. Warrior-city -- as three pre-capitalist forms evolving out of primitive stage
(168): by 1750 (citing Marx, here) the tripartite structure of capitalist agricultural life in England had congealed
(168): Marx's account of PAcc has a forces of production-bent. the needs of accumulation, etc.
(169): key--the FR had not expropriated the peasantry, of course (unlike processes already completed in England), but had expropriated the rural upper classes, creating a social structure where 'peasantry's weight was decisive'
(170): the 'barbarism within civilization' quote comes in the context of the writings on Bonaparte. he anticipated, though, a loss of faith on their part, etc. and, possibly, as a result they would play the role of 'chorus' in the proletarian revolution to come (though then this passage was ommitted from a later version)
(171-172): suggestion re: peasant revolts and 'isolation' -- individual self-sufficiency reduces amount of community (here sack of potatoes quote relevant). argument here is that Marx's views are unclear, even unhelpful
(173): good to remember--his vision of the peasantry in 1871 is different--they are kept unaware by bourgeoisie, else they would join the ranks (though there was no answer to the question of what a revolutionary government would do about them)
(173, 175): exactly--the trouble for socialists was that defending peasants from encroachment of capitalism would require, if successful, the socialist government to carry out the historic tasks of proletarianization. Marx doesn't discuss this explicitly, but it's in his writings on Russia: the possibility of bypassing the 'pitiless laws of capitalism'
(176): rightly being noted that Marx is a bit unfair to his own argument, when writing to Vera. Capital does have some implications for Russia.
(176-177): ambivalence (in short, suggestion is that he doesn't really come down on the side of either the Narodniks or the side of Lenin)--on the one hand suggestion that commune can be starting point for socialism; on the other hand supposition is NOT that peasants can do this themselves
Peasant Leadership and the Pugachev Revolt, Philip Longworth
(183): Pugachev Revolt (1773-1775, involving up to 2 million people) as consequence of both long-term factors (enserfment, etc.) and short-term factors (conscription/taxation owing to Russo-Turkish war 1769-1774)
(183-184): the leaders--Cossacks carried some privileges vs. peasants (no taxation), but had much more onerous military obligations. the Yaik Cossacks (around Ural river) had not yet reached 'agricultural stage). they did all retain some links to the peasantry, however. there was also internal oligarchization, at this stage, that grated rank and file.
(184): the led--peasantry, comprising of several overlapping groups.
(185): useful-- problem of no inter-village organization, despite intra-village communal forms. problem was to gather the 'scattered sacks', not to put potatoes in a sack [nicely put]. problem demonstrated by how often resistance erupted before, without becoming a movement
(187): it was for this reason that leadership was going to be critical. but how?
(187): Pugachev didn't appeal to Rights of Man or anything of this sort, but pretended to be the rightful Tsar of Russia. exploited a powerful social myth of 'the just Tsar' (and there were many precusors to this, too). pretended to speak german, etc., even though he was illiterate
(191-192): Pugachev was surprisingly effective at creating an organization to administer the rebellion--a 'College of War', a Great Army on Cossack lines, etc.
(193): "...there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the rebels' organization was consistent with the general hypothesis that the organization of a peasant movement tends to reflect the culture of the society in which it occurs." [hmm? by this he means 'existing organizational patterns'in society; authoritarian character of Russian State reflected in authoritarian nature of movement's central organization, etc. but also elements of direct democracy, from society also]
(193): "Peasant movements commonly rely on outside leadership." here, of course, the Cossacks
(196): based on analysis of 100 leaders, not social status, etc., but knowledge of the outside world which was most decisive
(198): unlike Hobsbawm's bandits, Pugachev was married with three children
(199-200): the probability of reprisals also built solidarity amongst the rebellion
(201): the movement had no ideology in the Marxist sense--but it would be wrong to say there was no shared belief (the 'just tsar', ideal life of historical Cossackdom)
concepts and terms: surplus
(221): if subsistence as consumption of primitive societies, then surplus non-existent till modern era; if subsistence as 'biological minimum', then surplus present 'always'
(221-222): also claim that surplus ought to be wedded to existence of exploiting class (existence of latter is adduced as evidence for former)
(222): Gough 1972 and Harrison 1973, re: unproductive labour
(223): for Marxists, 'subsistence' as always hisotrically and socially determined
book reviews
(241): in Sahlin's Stone Age Economics, suggestion that hunters and gatherers were affluent; reproduction in less time than modern wage labourer, b/c of low needs low level of productivity didn't matter [hmm].
(250): Adamson book on the regeneration of the plantation economy in Guiana, through deliberate acts of policy by planter-controlled legislature (post-emancipation--all happening in the second half of 1800s). reviewer suggestion, though, is that the peasant economy would have collapsed under the weight of its own backwardness, absent planter policy.
JPS April 1975, Vol 2 No 3
A Project for Research on the Peasant Revolution of our Time, Jerzy Tepicht
(258, see also 267): re: Russian Rev, suggestion that 'class-conscious workers' served as shock troops for oncoming tide of the peasantry, "which became principal beneficiary[!] and master of the subsequent destiny of the revolution" [hmm--see 260]. this is fruit of defining a revolution by its outcome, he argues (a 'peasant socialist revolution')
(258): obsession with employment/labour-intensive nature of industrialization reflects importance of peasantry, in post-rev. Russia
(264): labour saving industry in the interests of skilled, upper reaches of the workforce; labour-intensive in the interests of w-class [hmm, certainly not true]
(264): oh no, GLF as birth of a new kind of civilization...
(266): 'no question of reading Lenin or Marx, but when I read Stalin I feel at home' [!]
(266): Lenin as 'narodnik' towards peasantry (re: NEP, I think)
(267): Poland, Czechs, and Bulgarians all advised against collectivization a la USSR, by USSR.
(267): Trotskyists as mystics, for their faith in the working class
Peasants and Revolution: The Case of China, L. Bianco
(313-315): concerned to show that there was lots of agitation, independent of the Communists. that the peasants have agency, and were active (tax riots, protests against requisition of labour for infrastructure projects)
(315): the 'Nanking decade' (1927-1937), in which the land-tax burden was considerable
(317): at the same time, an 'overall submissiveness'. less class consciousness than intra-class rivalry, amongst tenants [hmm--then what's the point of this essay, exactly?]
(320): peasant uprisings not led by Communists displayed an overriding concern with local interests. and, again, intra-class competition was very pervasive. the task of the Communists was 'tremendous'
(321): stomach of bandit opened up, and all that's found is grass
(321): most of the actions were 'defensive in nature'
(322): in sum, "rural masses did not question the status quo, but only certain new developments which represented a blow to it..."
(323): what mobilized peasants was not any underlying deterioration in their condition, but rather the exceptional/accidental
(324): hmm, insurgent armies consisted more of bandits, secret society members, etc., than of peasants. Mao criticized for lack of faith in peasant masses.
(325): imp--"during this early period of the peasant revolution, Communist and other intellectual revolutionary leaders in central and south-central China quite often sought a shortcut to victory through the formation of armies consisting of elements mostly marginal to peasant society."
(325): admitting that much of this was out of necessity (reliance on 'elements declasses'), after the pogroms in the cities of 1927. surviving by any means necessary, since peasants were not willing
(325-326): these elements declasses were linked to the peasants (as former peasants, themselves)
(326): charge that the pre-1931 period was characterized by 'guerillaism'/Mao as warlord (though take this charge with a grain of salt, it's being suggested)
(327-328): ok--nonetheless, with the consolidation of rural bases, revolutionary leaders did get a chance to demonstrate the appeal of their rural policies; this is how they built their support base. (this, he's noting, shouldn't obscure the fact that the Communists entered the villagers' lives as 'leaders,' as elements 'from the outside')
(328-329): 'peasant masses' often wanted a land reform more radical than the soviet authorities. but, he's arguing, this did not mean they were 'ahead' of the party.
(330-331): in sum--China as a case of 'guided political action'. "peasant masses alone were not capable of seizing power in the countryside..." and also, though, a critique of the revolution: "the greatness of the achivevement cannot obscure the price which is still being paid... the post-1949 Chinese revolution has largely been a revolution from above."
Notes and Memoranda
On the Politics of Production: A comment on 'Peasants and Politics' by Eric Hobsbawm, Philip Corrigan
(341-342): Hobsbawm allows peasants only 'political ignorance'; the general peasant movement is a myth (except where inspired from outside)
(343, 345): Hobsbawm reifying urban/rural divide, rather than paying attention to actual social relations of production. with this comes an obsession with forces of production.
(345-346): advocating a 'relational' understanding of consciousness, as against FOP-centered
(346): Hobsbawm presents a reified, unified proletariat (and ignores their heterogeneity) when comparing them with the peasantry
(347): "peasants are profoundly political; as for professors..." [!] [of course, Corrigan continuously references the Maoists, but there's something healthy in all this, that aside]
Hobsbawm Reply
(349-351): most of Corrigan's claims miss mark, because they caricature my position [generally fair retort, I think]
Book Reviews Cycles, Trends, and Academics among the Peasantry of NW India, Frank Perlin
(360): charge that much of the dirty work hasn't been done in Indian historiography; too much generalization, w/o basis
(362-363): importance of way in which administrative apparatus (for taxation, etc.) structures rural life (neglected in book being reviewed)
(365): interesting stuff on peasant demography--citing Mamdani, poorer families have constraints on their zies; large family may be the product of wealth
The Pattern of the Chinese Past, Mark Elvin
(379): manorial system during Sungy dynasty in China, with some critical differences
(380): going into decline by 1700s
(380): China's population doubled in 1700s--rising living standards, etc.
(380-382): reviewer, using classic account of development of capitalism, critiquing Elvin for not centering his account of non-development of capitalism in China on absence of bourgeoisie. Elvin's own answer has a Brenner-esque feel, suggesting that rational strategies discouraged technical change
JPS April 1975, Vol 2 No 3
Chayanov and the Economics of the Russian Peasantry, Mark Harrison
(390): neopopulist emphasis on viability of peasant agriculture, and its ability to survive under any circumstances; no necessary tendencies to differentiation; village homogeneity; cooperative organization was path forward, conserving family small-holding
(391): assessments of Chayanov have been insufficiently critical; his work partakes of a holistic tradition of thoughts, and can't be cherry-picked for interesting points
(392): 1870s as starting point for study of Russian peasantry
(392): Chayanovian thought started from two problems:
- peasants didn't seem to maximize net return per day nor surplus per year
- farm organization as derived from the social unit (rather than from exogenous forces)
(395): 'subsistence requirement must be achieved at any cost,' for peasantry [in early models?] [a lot of detail here, which bears re-reading--the idea basically seems to be that income above and beyond subsistence is not really valued by them , which is why bourgeois accounting can't really make sense of peasant rationality]
(398-401): problem of inequality--Chayanov's non-Marxist explanation was largely demographic; the "purely peasant processes of a homogenoues family-based economy" [the same data, for the Leninists, became evidence of capitalist differentiation of the peasantry]
(401-402): greatest strain when there are kids, but no extra hands to work. so families search for extra capital/land. BUT, this doesn't match the data, nor well-explained, it's being charged [fairly]
(407): unsophisticated understanding of 'backwardness,' where backwardness is unrelated to present development.
(408): crucial point of difference, again, is that Chayanovian understanding accorded labor mkt negligible importance in peasant economy, whereas Marxists saw it as important, and growing. for Marxists, peasant economy was breaking up; for Chayanovians, it was stable.
(412-413): Chayanov's suggestion that peasants were 'voluntarily unemployed' was, Marxists argued, an ideological cover for famine/scarcity
(413): the suggestion, remember, was that peasants actually achieved subsistence requirements--and that, as a result, "no need to nationalize, socialize, municipalize or collectivize it. everything was already for the best."
Agrarian Reform and the Transition to Socialism in Chile, 1970-1973, Cristobal Kay
(418-419): latifundia system--2% of farm proprietors owning 55% of the land, generating extraordinary inefficiencies. though labour productivity higher on latifundia than minifundia (and, of course, land productivity higher on the latter)
(419): context, then, was declining per capita food production
(419): beneficiaries of LR were not minifundistas--but those that worked on the latifundia (inquilinos)
(420-421): details of Frei reform, 1967 -- limited in its scope (about 20% of total irrigated land, 1/3 latifundistas not touched, 6% of rural workers benefited). intention was to produce a petty bourgeoisie, acting as a "buffer for the social tensions resulting from the conflicts between the rural bourgeoisie and the agrarian proletariat."
(421): expansion of unions in Frei period
(422): on balance, improvement for capitalists and richer peasants, but did little for poorer strata
(422): UP class analysis saw latifundistas as main enemy -- main aim was to expropriate them, while politically neutralizing the middle-elements (by placating them)
(423): part of transition to socialism, but not socialist themselves (nationalizing banks, creating cooperatives, etc.--this had happened in Mexico, Bolivia and Peru)
(424): union expansion under CD was of a piece with their strategy--trade unionist demands, and alleigance to CD, concentrated in middle sectors. but UP escalated in 1970-1973, unionizing rural proletariat, etc.
(424): UP unwilling to use repressive apparatus against the wave of 'tomas' that took place, after they took power
(425): problem for UP was that many tomas took place not on latifundios, but below the 80 HRB barrier that the UP gov't had set for expropriation
(425): UP-allied elements led some tomas, but very late in the game
(426, 427): creation of 'peasant councils'--not, though, as expression of independent peasant power, but as a medium for communication between UP and peasant movement. came to be dominated by CD organizations.
(427-428): about half of rural workers were proletarian nature (only 5% were the asentados); over-representation of the latter in the peasant councils (a MIR demand was to reorganize these 'por la base')
(429): key issue--peasant councils were never given power by gov't
(431-432): in reformed units (cooperatives), clash between collective tasks and the peasant economy; basic lack of incentives for peasants to work for collective
(432): didn't expropriate machinery and livestock along with land, which led to difficulties on land that came into gov't's posession
(433-434): collapse in production in 1973, partly due to failings of reform, partly due to lorry owner's strike, etc.
(434): before LR process began, proletarianization was already underway in Chile: inquilino and sharecropper had lost means of production; demesne production with wage labour was taking place of peasant production and/or tenant labour.
(435): in short--spread of peasant economy within reformed sector spread a petty-bourgeois consciousness that undercut revolution (asentamientos were ideologically aligned to c-revolution, etc.)
(436): UP should have encouraged tomas, as this was the only way to curb petty bourgeois tendencies
(436): also, LR doubled the size of the medium rural bourgeoisie (betwen 40 and 80 HRB), and their alleigances were clear, as things heated up
(437): acknowledging successes, but focusing on limitations [quite right]
(437-438): nice sum of shortcomings
(439): (some of the) recommendations [verging on voluntarism, but ok--brief nod to 'objective limitations']
- expropriate medium bourgeoisie also
- more collective reofmred sector
- peasant councils actually expressions of peasant power
(440): imp--much of the problem was that intensifying the class struggle would have forfeited support of middle-classes, without whom electoral road to socialism was unviable.
Agriculture and the State... The Case of Turkey, Faruk Birtek and Caglar Keyder
(446-447): looking at State-peasant relations, 1923-1950
(447): 1923, 80% of LF in agriculture
(448): appropriation of rural surplus is obvious site of conflict (taxes, regulation, availability of inputs); peasant will decide how much surplus to bring to mkt on basis of incentives (i.e., prices). thus, internal terms of trade are crucial
(449): 'middle farmer' as crux of support for RPP (Republican party); alienation of middle farmer behind downfall of regime, in 1950
(449): middle farmer particularly prone to crisis, since he's specialized but also making small profits.
(451): agricultural export drive, in first years, and marketization of peasantry
(451): this meant GDepression had big impact
(452): after GD, protectionist policies implemented, due to disenchantment with liberal policies
(452-453, sum on 454-455): imp--and Gov't making concereted effort to court middle farmers; couldn't guarantee the dominant position needed, re: industrialization, in relation to the large farmers, for whom closing of economy had detrimental effects (early 30s on)
(455): surplus for ISI had to come from agriculture, given dearth of foreign capital--through taxation, and manipulation of terms of trade. but the whole situation only started to become detrimental to farmers by mid-1930s; in the early 30s, there had been a period of support pricing in order to generate a food surplus
(457): basic story is that both were benefiting in this period
(459): imp--alliance begin to fall apart beginning of WWII; gov't had created a political force that it couldn't disengage from. pressure because of military mobilization (this strengthened capital-intensive large farmers viz-a-viz middle farmers), support prices low with manufacturing prices high, new taxes
(460-461): LR in 1946, fairly moderate except for a 'clause 17', which stipulated land to the tiller. died in committee, after opposition from landlords, etc. this opposition would dominate state from 1950-1960, to be removed by military coup.
(461): the alternative path would have been to forge an alliance with poor peasants. clause 17 hinted at this, but there was no real chance of this happening due to politics of party
[interesting, as a case study of battles over investment funds for industry in an underdeveloped setting--think Preobrazhensky]
Stability and Change 1300-1700, Cicely Howell
(468): question is how you get from medieval peasant economy to commercially-based small-holders; from 12-24 acre subsistence holding, to 60-100 acre capitalist farmers
(469-470): both have been called 'peasants,' but they are actually worlds apart
(470): picture of medieval village, between 1066 and 1400
(470-471): size of holdings dependent on soil, pop density, and--this is his contribution, as he sees it--inheritance custom
(471): suggestion, though, that monogeniture itself comes after equal shares in land has put too much pressure on person/land ratios. but with this comes underemployment, of course. can't throw family in streets.
(471-473): what was needed was cash surpluses, in order to set the sons free [uh-oh, this is going to be the mechanism!?!]. opening presented itself in 1348-1391, amidst the plagues; threw large tracts of land onto the market. basically: larger farmers emerge who, when population pressures are again felt, have made enough money to be able to give extra sons cash, rather than land. [hmm]
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