britain ascendant, crouzet

(346): 'free trade policy' no sure recipe -- protectionism as absolutely necessary to the survival of most Continental industries (mistake is to carry it to extreme lengths, as did the French)

(349): between 1815 and 1850, the gap between England and the Continent had enormously widened and was formidable

(351): development by 1850 in W. Europe (w/ exception of England) had a 'dualistic' character. pockets of growth, and pockets of backwardness.

(351-352): sort of catching up with Britain by 1914 was result of Britian's slowing down, also

(353): growth was not a problem of 'diffusing innovations'

(355): key--it was not a question of availability of innovations/technology, but a question of incentives. the problem is economic -- the thinness of markets

(356-358): key--constraints on demand side were (1) thinness of home markets (which was a result of agrarian backwardness, citing P. Barioch as explaining agricultural revolution starting in 1820s); and (2) external markets, could not develop a strong export trade because of Britain's dominance

(359): existence of advanced industrial countries is a problem

(360): neither transport nor banking systems are primary barriers

(360-361): imp--on supply side, factor endowments were a problem--resources, capital, labour (derivative of agrarian structure), and socio-cultural framework (which seems related to agrarian structrue)

(364): Continental countries had to look for niches -- they adapted to particular sectors of industry (manufacture of high quality fashionable luxury goods, where mechanization was not forthcoming)

(366): they 'succeeded to the extent that they were different'

(368): imp--lessons?

1. necessity of widening the market (critically, this depends on transformation of agrarian structure)
   
2. successful industrialization is not a slavish imitation of what went before

(379): French backwardness in 'big industry'

(380): origins of differences between English and French agrarian systems go to the heart of the middle ages [what does this mean for a theoretical understanding of why England developed?]

(380): French technical change did happen, in agriculture [how, if peasants had no incentives?]

(381): imp--the retention of a large agricultural population in France was responsible for the slow redistribution of labour towards industry

strategic factors in economic development, nicholas kaldor (1967)

(vii): economic constraints are critical (labour supply being central) -- not efficiency of management, what have you

(6): the major explanation for industrial take-off is going to be an economic one (response of supply to demand, response of demand to supply)

(7): fast rates of growth are centrally dependent on fast rate of growth of manufacturing (this characterizes the transition from 'immaturity' to 'maturity')

(12): it's not productivity or rate of technological change that explains why the secondary sector is central

(15): the fundamental reason is a dynamic relationship between changing rates of productivity and output (not static)

(21): mining and agriculture, on the other hand, are 'diminishing returns' industries -- growth of productivity outpaces growth of output

(22): services sector will also be insufficient [though reason given here is a bit hurried]

(23): sum

(29): three sources of demand, driving growth

1. real income/consumer demand -- the more consumers make, the more they'll spend on manufactured goods
2. capital investment -- growth of manufacturing sector generates own demand
3. changing structure of foreign trade -- here story of Phase I (where country substitutes home production in light industries, ISI) --> Phase II (where country starts exporting consumer goods) --> Phase III (where country starts to do ISI in capital goods) --> Phase IV (where country starts to export capital goods)

(33): two constraints on supply, inhibiting growth

1. domestically--when industrial sector grows, it needs to absorb goods and services; externally--will need increased imports, which can threaten balance of trade
2. manpower -- a country will need 'employment' growth, which in the early stages will come from the 'disguised unemployment' on the land.

(39): the labour-intensiveness in services means that productivity growth causes it to 'mop up' a significant proportion of the w-force

(41, 45): this can be a problem, if it prevents people from working for industry (because of decent wages in services), given manufacturing's centrality to growth (Kaldor using example of the UK)

(46): advanced vs. mature -- an advanced country is one in which the supply of labour to industry is elastic, whereas a mature country experiences a shortage of labour to industry when demand calls (all countries headed towards maturity)

(54): agriculture, even if highly productive, cannot drive growth (when highly productive it can only absorb a fraction of the working population)

(55): key--one general cause explaining underdevelopment is 'backwardness of agriculture' -- you can't grow secondary and tertiary sectors without an 'agricultural surplus'

(56): key--agricultural growth does not take 'external stimuli', but presupposed endogenous changes in the social framework of agriculture

(57): low productivity (despite low wages) make industrial development for many countries in age of 'free trade'

(59): key--the growth of domestic industry is dependent on the growth of internal purchasing power, which will demand robust growth in agriculture (suggestion that ISI was done in by the failure of the agricultural sector to respond to the stimulus adequately)

(61, 62): key-- it is important to keep developing unless one raises export potential by improving the growth of domestic output to be competitive--but this presupposes a robust internal market, which will help productivity rise to the point at which one can be competitive

(62-63): you cannot devalue/tweak exchange rates and become competitive. there is no substitute for productivity/lower costs

(65): advanced countries protect their industries, thus posing obstacles for underdeveloped countries

(66): protectionism as 'luddism'

(67): the existence of advanced countries has not been a 'bad' thing for underdeveloped countries, all things considered [hmm]

industrialization in nineteenth-century europe, tom kemp

(2): world market --> forces of change and disturbance (as solvent) [too much of this, in kemp's argument]

(4): Britain was unique because development was not part of a preconceived program ('organic' or 'autonomous')

(5): the 'advantages' of lateness -- ability to 'leap over' stages

(7): key--existence of a free labour force as a vital condition of industrialization

(7): merchants becoming industrialists [a bit too much of the orthodox narrative, again]

(8): key--traditional agrarian structure as block

(9): considerable unnevenness--wide regional differences across parts of Europe

(10): resource endowments were quite important, when you look at regions that were developing across the continent

(10-11): pithy answer to 'Why Europe?' is the nature of European feudalism ('looser, more individualist, etc.')

(11): key--it was the productive relations which were decisive (not trade)

(12): key--the creation of a class of landless wage-earners was critical

(13): suggesting that the political revolutions were crucial, in preparing the environment (political-juridical) [but how does this sit with his other arguments?]

(14): again, market forces as a 'dissolvent'

(15): emancipation from customary restrictions in the 1700s was important [how do we make sense of this? didn't take a 'State', but it did take a 'political revolution'? was this the inevitable outcome of the transformation of the agrarian structure?]

(16): the limitations of putting-out became clear by the 1700s -- couldn't realize further economies of scale, needed the factory

(17-18): imp--core of innovations took place in textiles, but this was driven by what was happening to demand and supply outside of textiles (important to note that inventive capacity was equally well-developed in other parts of Europe, but they suffered because they lacked England's reformed agrarian structures)

(20): development of credit networks was important; the Continent had them, but there the power of banks/finance was overweening (in England, most investment was from profits)

(21): sluggishness after a time, b/c of headstart?

(22-23): imp--protectionism was a widespread response -- but a more successful response was to search for niche markets, where Britain was not a competitor

(24): slow progress was not due to 'cultural preferences'/luddism

(24): they had to figure out a strategy to fit the period of British dominance

(25): capital goods industries were more important to late developers, than they were to British at comparable stages

(26): there were also differences in firm patterns (size, integration, etc.) (though he recommends against exaggerating this)

(27): imp-- rural artisans are understood as 'feudal relics', dead once the mass market emerges

(28) int--stressing the importance of links to the international division of labour, without which industrialization in Britain would have been slowed down

(29): 1848-1873 was a period of liberalizing markets, but 'free trade' was dealt a blow by the depression (industrialists sided with agrarian interests demanding protectionism)

(29): Britain didn't need protectionism, though, partly on account of her large formal and informal empire ('colonial development' as a substitute) [though presumably the dominance of her industry was sufficient?]

(30): lack of State in Britain was quite exceptional

(30-31): advantages of lateness need to be put in perspective -- they derive advantages only really in interindustry comparisons, but until 1914 nationally are inferior

(34): weakness of central powers in European feudalism [how to make sense of 'absolutist reaction' to declining seigneural revenues after the crisis of the 14th and 15th centuries, then? surely this disrupts the attempt to read European development back into a 'weak feudalism'?]

(35): towns as 'dissolvents'

(36): village cultivation as a 'collective effort'

(37): external forces --> disintegration

(38): critical -- reforms/revolution of basic agrarian structure was required, in order to give peasant cultivators incentives to pursue technical improvements

(39): emergence of a landless class

(40): labour force starting to develop in England by late Middle Ages; in France by 1700s; in Germany by 1700s; in E. Europe and Russia by late 1800s. this marks the development of capitalism.

(42): the old agrarian structures prohibit accumulation, imposing a brake upon the rate of economic progress

(43): consolidated power of the village community was also a block

(45): reciprocity in agrarian and industrial spheres [how to make (theoretical) sense of this more precisely, given the primacy of the impetus given by agrarian transformation?]

(46): importance of the potato, which was introduced in the 1700s

(47-48): imp-- French Rev was successful in safeguarding the rights of the French peasantry, which would act as a block on French development

(49): two pressures on French peasantry, after revolution: (1) modernization; (2) Napoleonic 'reform from above'. but this didn't change the basic story.

(50): imp-- story about the encroachment of the market breaking down old rural self-sufficiency, and bringing peasant/farmer into the market economy [again, this needs interrogation. how can this happen, if not 'from above'?]

(51): necessity of extra-European supplies of food

mancur olson, the logic of collective action (1967)

(2): it doesn't follow from the premise of self-interested individuals that a collective will act in its collective self-interest, given that collective action can be understood as a 'public good'. people will have incentives to shirk their obligations, because they know that the work is likely to get done even if they neglect to incur the costs associated with action [this is the crux of his book's argument]

(16): large organizations that can't make membership compulsory will need to offer some noncollective goods to members, to induce participation

(20): the traditional theory is functionalist -- when there is a need for a group, small or large, it will emerge

(21): but Americans aren't joiners, argues Olson

(25): sum of the mathematical section

(28, 35): the provision of collective goods, in groups, is suboptimal [has to do with all people not putting in equal amounts of effort for similar gain]

(34): people will contribute to collective action if they find that their personal gain will exceed the cost of providing it. this makes it less and less likely, of course, that collective goods will be provided in large groups, or in groups where people stand to benefit in equal measure (inequality will help)

(39-41): inclusive vs. exclusive groups -- in the latter, people have an incentive to be holdouts, which makes group-oriented action less likely

(44): there is some ground between small groups and large groups where the possibility of collective action is intedeterminate

(45): noting three factors

1. size
2. the more unequal members' interest is
3. collective goods which are extremely valuable in relation to cost

(46): the larger a group is, the more organization will be needed to obtain collective goods (because the less incentive any individual will have to pursue the collective good unilaterally)

(48): three costs for large groups

1. less reward for taking group-oriented action [doesn't this assume that the collective good is finite; so not something like 'building a public lake']
2. (seems to be the same)
3. the larger the group, the more the organizational costs
   

(50): privileged (where one person has considerable interest such that collective good will be provided) vs. intermediate (indeterminate) vs. latent (nope) groups

(51): in latent groups, separate and 'selective' incentives will be needed.

(60): even in cases where there is consensus that a particular course of action would be best, collective action does not follow

(64): 'rational' does not mean 'selfish'

(64): imperceptibility [hmm]

(66): labour unions started small [doesn't this have anything to do with the size of early industries?]

(68): the 'closed shop' has an early history

(71): all workers have serious incentives to cross picket lines [unless there is threat of some form of sanction]

(72): trade unions had to also provide certain noncollective benefits, in order to attract members

(75): compulsory membership is critical

(76): Perlman's silly 'job consciousness' argument

(86): you see people decline to participate in the union, but willing to vote for it

(89): inveighing against the inconsistency of liberals shouting coercion when they see 'closed shop,' but saying nothing about other public goods

(95): flipping the argument about public corporations and public goods on its head [this is all curious, but not very interesting, really]

(105): imp--Marx as a 'rationalist', but wrong about what follows from that -- "class-oriented action will not occur if the individuals that make up a class act rationally" [he was a polemicist too, Mr. Olson]

(106): Lenin/Trotsky as the small vanguard necessary to move a class to action [see below]

(115): Commons' argument for pressure groups -- to counter the disparities wrought by the market mechanism

(121): criticizing Bentley for saying that groups have power in correlation to their size [this is strange, of course -- but it resembles the mistake that he will make, at the end]

(126-127): crux of his critique of the orthodoxy -- it does not follow, again, from the fact of interest that groups will form.

(131): the anarchistic fallacy

(133): lobbies as 'by-products' of groups' being organized in some other way -- some other function that gives them a captive membership. and to do that, they'd have to already be offering positive benefits to their individual members.

(137): compulsion is a feature of all professional organizations (so why only rail on the unions, Olson reminds us)

(142-144): key failing--business is very well-organized, allegedly because of its small #'s (as oligopolies)

(146): large business will have the same problem [um, the Chamber of Commerce seems to have no such problem)

- - - -

[1] there's an evasion here -- it might be the case that the vast majority of people are unwilling to lead 'collective action' on a day-to-day basis, but characterizing 'class action' as something that's led entirely and always by a small minority is a mistake. what about exceptional moments of history, where it is quite clearly the fact that the masses burst onto the scene ? NB: it might be possible to recast this in terms of his argument--the 'potential gains' of collective action have gotten enormous, such that most everyone has an incentive, and/or that 'costs' aren't seen as costs anymore

[2] argument about business being well-organized because it exists in small groups is obviously quite inane. why don't we see powerful organizations of scrabble-players? there needs to be a way to think about the prior endowments of groups when they try and get organized. business has at least two: (1) greater resources; (2) structural privilege. Olson is, effectively, accepting a pluralist premise -- the State is neutral with respect to all groups, but business is better organized so it cedes to them. but this is insufficient. if we think about that the power that business actually wields in a capitalist economy (namely, that the State has to take care of them because it has to think about the level of investment), we see that his position scratches the surface.

robert brenner, property and progress

(58): nice definition of s-p relations: "relations among direct producers, relations among exploiters, and relations between exploiters and direct producers that, taken together, make possible/specify the regular access of individuals and families to the means of production and/or the social product"

(59): evolution of a society of a given type versus transition from a society of one type to another are qualitatively different phenomenon. this is the 'closed rules of reproduction' point.

(61): the key condition is that people be subject to the competitive constraint. this is only the case if people are dependent upon the market. being involved in the market is insufficient.

(62): pre-capitalist MoP as a 'single broad type' of social-property relations

(65): ruling classes needed to organize to extract surplus (organized force). this typically required endowing subordinates with politically constituted private property, or 'rights to an income' derived from peasant wealth

(67): Smith's fatal flaw is to fail to think about the potential 'losses' incurred by new participants on a market. he sees only gains.

(70): the key pt re: Lordly rules of reproduction is not that they don't have the incentive to increase their product, but that they don't have the capacity to innovate/specialize in pursuit of that goal (there's no workforce compelled to work for them, the costs of constructing one/supervising it are prohibitive) . they can pursue extensive growth.

(76): towns, for Brenner, weren't external to feudalism -- but politically constituted communities that also shielded producers from the market [this is the source of their political conservatism, in the revolutions. cue the revisionist challenge to the Marxist orthodoxy].

(85): re: the transition, Brenner's argument doesn't allow for the accretion of micro-level intiativies/action. Smith, he's saying, doesn't understand the constraints imposed by feudal s-p relations

(86): market can consolidate a feudal mode of production (as it did E. of the Elbe)

(92-93): absolutist State as a result of the seigneurial reveneue crisis of the late 1200s (in Fr. and W. Germany, at least), because lords were to weak to stand up to monarchs. absolutist State didn't mind free peasantry (sometimes), as long as it could guarantee centralized taxes [hmm]

(96-98): in aftermath of Black Death in England English lords didn't construct a tax office State, in response, but to use their political organization (and the monarchical State) to seize ownership [here the story could be clearer; in particular the contrast with France and W. Germany]

India-backed NA coming up as late as Sep 2009
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/226531

"While far from perfect, you will find Zardari is pro-American, anti-extremist and eager to be seen as working with the USG."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/213170

"While the party had no grassroots supporters, its candidates in both 2002 and 2005 performed well due to their personal influence in their local areas."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/135859

"As he has before, Zardari stressed that the Global War on Terror (GWOT) was "Pakistan's war."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/156183

"The decision was no surprise; Zardari advised Ambassador weeks ago that he felt he had to move to rein in Nawaz (Ref ). However, in a phone call, Zardari--just back from his latest trip to China--told Charge February 25 that he had "nothing to do with the decision" and had been surprised by Shahbaz's disqualification. He noted that the Court had ruled against the government, which had been representing the Sharifs. He said he had ordered PPP Punjab Governor Taseer to temporarily take over the Punjab government until new elections for a Chief Minister could be held. He expected the PPP would have a candidate and thought the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) party would also be interested in running a candidate."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/193807

" There may be as many as 5000 such terrorist detainees currently in the custody of the Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps from operations in Malakand, Bajaur, and Mohmand. As operations in these areas and other parts of the FATA proceed, this number will increase."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/224469

"The Pakistani Army has for just the second time approved deployment of U.S. special operation elements to support Pakistani military operations. The first deployment, with SOC(FWD)-PAK elements embedded with the Frontier Corps in XXXXXXXXXXXX, occurred in September (reftel). Previously, the Pakistani military leadership adamantly opposed letting us embed our special operations personnel with their military forces."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/229065

"During Ambassador's fourth meeting in a week with Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Kayani on March 10, he again hinted that he might, however reluctantly, have to persuade President Zardari to resign if the situation sharply deteriorates. He mentioned Asfundyar Wali Khan as a possible replacement. This would not be a formal coup but would leave in place the PPP government led by PM Gilani, thus avoiding elections that likely would bring Nawaz Sharif to power. We do not believe Army action is imminent. We do believe Kayani was laying down a clear marker so that, if he has to act, he can say he warned the U.S. in advance and gave us ample opportunities to pressure both sides to back down. Kayani is trying to leverage what he considers predominate U.S. influence over Zardari, instead of seeking a direct confrontation that could provoke an unhelpful civil-military clash... He told Nawaz that he would win the next election and should just be patient; by pressing now, he threatened a political vacuum that would be filled by the Army. This time, warned Asfundyar, Nawaz might not be sent into a comfortable exile. Nawaz refused to budge."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/196412

"General Petraeus raised the likelihood of an alternative shipment route for NATO through central Asia, stressed the continued need for the route through Khyber, and expressed appreciation for increased cooperation on the border with ISAF forces."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/188670

"Zardari is our best ally in Pakistan right now, and U.S. interests are best served by preventing another cycle of military rule... We now are providing approximately $2 billion annually to Pakistan, including: $1.2 billion in Coalition Support Fund reimbursements; $150 million to improve socio-economic conditions in FATA; $300 million in ESF aid for the rest of Pakistan; over $10 million for internally displaced persons fleeing combat in Bajaur, Mohmand and Swat; $300 million (not yet received); and an imminent $15 million in aid to the NWFP police.8. (C) If approved and financed, the Kerry-Lugar legislation will enable us to triple non-military aid to $1.5 billion per year. We will plan in FY 2010 to spend over $100 million to augment civilian police and $873 million to build counter-insurgency capability."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/193196

"Baitullah Mehsud and the military are the predominant
actors in South Waziristan. However, as the government plays
out a strategy of divide and rule, the alliances, feuding, and
maneuverings of other militants as well as tribal and political
figures bears watching in assessing the direction that
operations in South Waziristan will take. End comment."
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/07/09PESHAWAR147.html

"Yes, ISI for the most part, is cooperative with U.S.
Consulate requests for information and support. They are an
important U.S. ally in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).
However, there is a divided loyalty within ISI ranks which may
cause inaction, or assistance to Taliban and anti U.S. groups."
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/07/09PESHAWAR147.html

ISI, (Note: Pakistan’s military intelligence. End note), during the in camera session of the parliament recently, had briefed lawmakers and senior GOP officials concerning the virtues of some taliban elements versus the “real militants.”
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/01/09PESHAWAR2.html

It is too early to predict how effective
this new alliance will be in launching cross-border attacks
on U.S./NATO forces, but its formation will provide the group
with unfettered access to Afghanistan across North and South
Waziristan. It is another indication that the GOP's tribal
divide and conquer strategy against militants is not working,
at least not to our advantage. Pakistan's security forces,
however, may see limited downsides to an arrangement that
focuses militant attacks outside of Pakistan.
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/03/09ISLAMABAD478.html

"This is just the second time that GHQ has approved deployment of U.S. special operations elements to support Pakistani military operations. In September 2009, four SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel who were embedded with the Frontier Corps (FC) at XXXXXXXXXXXX in the FATA, provided ISR for an FC operation (reftel). This support was highly successful, enabling the FC to execute a precise and effective artillery strike on an enemy location... U.S. special operation elements have been in Pakistan for more than a year, but were largely limited to a training role. The Pakistani Army leadership previously adamantly opposed letting us embed U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) with their military forces to support their operations. The recent approval by GHQ -- almost certainly with the personal consent of Chief of Army Staff General Kayani -- for SOC(FWD)-PAK deployments to XXXXXXXXXXXX appears to represent a sea change in Pakistani thinking. Patient relationship-building with the military is the key factor that has brought us to this point. The Pakistanis are increasingly confident that we do not have ulterior motives in assisting their operations. In addition, the direct recipients of SOC(FWD)-PAK training appear to have recognized the potential benefits of bringing U.S. SOF personnel into the field with them for operational advice and other support. In addition, the success of the initial deployment to XXXXXXXXXXXX likely helped catalyze the follow-up requests for new and repeat support."
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/10/09ISLAMABAD2449.html

DGISI Pasha said Kayani was receiving criticism on the bill from the Corps Commanders. Ambassador emphasized the bill’s long-term commitment to Pakistan and made three points: provisions of the bill could be waived; the bill only requires certifications and “assessments;” and the bill does not apply to the large amounts in the Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund or Coalition Support Fund but only, so far, to non-appropriated Foreign Military Financing. Pasha and Kayani repeated that the Army had taken huge steps this year in its bilateral cooperation with the US and in its campaign in Swat and Bajaur and was getting little public (or private) credit from the US for these historic steps. Kayani said he was considering a statement on the bill, but he was struggling with what to say. He realized that Senator Kerry and Vice President Biden, the original sponsor of the bill, were among Pakistan,s best friends. He predicted the parliamentary debate would be tough, but in the final analysis the government controlled the agenda.
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/10/09ISLAMABAD2427.html

the moderate muslim brotherhood, FA 2007

(108): MB as 'moderates' with whom the US can work

(110): for moderates in MB, democracy as compatible with 'slow Islamization'

(111): whereas for jihadists (Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi), democracy is 'polytheism'

(111): road to power is not revolutionary ('Fabian strategy')

(112): 'salafi?' but there is the Jamal al-Din al-Afghani kind (political participation), and the Saudi kind

(113): Qutb's ambiguous legacy

(115): reformist vs. conservative divide, re: question of political party

(115): no effective international organization -- ('no Comintern'). differences re: Iraq invasion, war in Lebanon, etc.

(118): no Islamists arrested in the French riots in 2005

(119): softness of the brotherhood in France (UOIF)