anwar shaikh, david ricardo (lecture 5 – 09/28)

Ricardo wants to know how to establish the relative influence of the relative capital-labor ratios (viz-a-viz the Z_ij term which involves the calculation of average profit-wage ratios)

(1) Numerical illustration (so the spreadsheet shows that K/L difference of 100% translates to a price difference of 10%)

(2) Z_ij depends on the profit rate. So let me hold everything constant, but vary the wage rate; even if you bring the profit rate down, enormously, relative prices will still not vary much more than 7%. The change in the relative price, in percentage terms, is going to be less than roughly 7%. [Here we have the discussion of Schwartz and the ingenious idea to compare peak to trough, which has the effect of keeping technology constant amidst turbulence—profit rates drop in a recession, but he showed that relative prices aren't terribly sensitive to a drop in profit rates]

Ricardo says that the market wage oscillates around a 'natural price of labour'--what is this natural price? It depends on the quantity of food, necessary, and conveniences which have come to be habit for the reproduction of labor. It's not a physical subsistence wage; it's a social process of producing a standard of living (pg. 96-97).

Ricardo's Theory of (Differential) Rent

We are not discussing the 'leasing' of produced goods (that's going to be derivative of the 'selling' of produced goods).

Ricardo proceeds instead in the following way.

At the beginning of the story, the price of corn is based on the cost plus the natural profit rate. But as you proceed towards less and less convenient and then fertile land, the productivity of labour will fall. The costs of production on less fertile and more fertile land will be different. Those on good land, of course, will then be able to mark up a bit. This is where rent, for Ricardo, arises. (Note that the transition from Land A to Land B depends on the price having increased enough to make it possible to make normal profits on Land B, which is a result of demand putting ever-increasing pressure on supply)

What about technical change? Well it will lower the price of corn—but it will also lower the price of steel. But there is still something specific about the price of agricultural goods, because of relative differences in fertility on land (is this why? Marx will object to this, arguing that technical change can obviate differences in fertility). For this reason, though there are various forces on this ratio, the ratio of price of agricultural goods to the price of industrial goods will rise (because the price of corn is on an upward tick, all else being equal).

The connection to rent, then, is fairly clear. It is the landlord's charge for the 'excess profits' (I can't charge you more, of course, otherwise you'll pick up and leave). The question of the length of the lease, of course, relates to this dynamic—for the producer it's better to have a longer lease b/c prices will be rising (a fixed rent), but for landlords it's the opposite.

Rent, remember, is not just affiliated to a specific class—it's an economic category. So even if I'm my own landlord, I will get an abnormal return (it will be profit + rent).

(There's a question, also, of what determines 'rent' on the very first plot—Marx will speak about this as 'absolute rent')

(A link to the question of excess profit between firms, too—can treat 'new lands' as 'new investment'. So if you want to measure the rate of profit you want to look at the rate of return on new investment, Shaikh is arguing).

If you follow the 'tiered' logic of Ricardo's argument, you will see that rent is going to rise persistently (as you move to less and less fertile land). So we've established that (1) the price of corn is going to rise, that (2) rent is grounded in the difference between ruling natural price and natural price on better lands, and that (3) rent is going to rise.

Now we may want to know about the price of land. It is, for Ricardo, the presently-discounted value of expected income from that land. It is not from the cost of land, of course, which is effectively zero, (The price of land, of course, will as a result be dependent on the interest rate. If you have land that yields rent of $100 and the interest rate is 10%, you'll sell it for the equivalent of a bond equivalent in years to the expected longevity of the land)

There is also, in Ricardo, an acknowledgement that an element of 'risk' enters into the calculation of the profit rate.

Finally, for Ricardo, the thing that makes landlords richer and richer also kills capitalists. This is Ricardo's theory of the falling rate of profit (Smith saw this, but didn't have an explanation). Because of the diminishing fertility of land, the ruling profit rate will fall (since it's set at the margin).

[There's a claim, here, about the determination/identification of the profit rate that I don't fully understand—which presumably explains how the profit rate in corn ramifies throughout the economy -->The answer to this last question, of course, is through the wage-basket. The productivity is declining in wage-basket production, which means that the price of labour will rise. And this will be behind the declining rate of profit.]

[Also interesting question regarding the relationship of the profit rate to the interest rate. Smith will argue that they're proportional. Shaikh is making the point that it will depend centrally on inflation/the price level].

anwar shaikh, adam smith/david ricardo (lecture 04 – 09/21)

key, Smith's argument re: labor and price: the ratio of the price of two commodities will be equal to ratio of labor time of these two commodities if (a) all value added goes to labor; (b) part of value added goes to labor, rest goes to capital/landlord, but in the same proportion for both. (c) but natural profit in a sector is not determined in proportion to its labor time but rather in proportion to its capital (because the natural profit in any sector is the uniform rate of profit multiplied by the amount of capital invested. So obviously, if the capital labor ratios are equal across sectors, then the natural profit is also to proportional to labor in each sector, which means that natural prices are still proportional to labor time) [the equation is: natural profit = rate of profit multiplied by capital invested ]

1. what determines the uniform rate of profit? we want to know what determines the size of this difference, which will be influenced by the rate of profit?

2. what causes the difference in capital-to-labor ratio? differences in the capital labor ratio can cause differences between relative prices and relative labor-times – how do they do this?

There is a deep logic to this. Ricardo is going to answer these two questions that Smith leaves unanswered (indeed, he's going to start with them).

- - - - -

the first question that Ricardo addresses: what determines the profit rate? let's suppose that we abstract away from differences in capital-labor ratios, and think of the output as one whole (made of parts of the same substance). Ricardo will argue that this is justified, because you can represent things in terms of common inputs/outputs.

this is where we get Ricardo's corn-corn model (economy as a single sector).

Ricardo's answer is that it will depend on the conditions of production in corn (abstracting, remember), and the wage rate.

you have a hundred workers, and your wage rate is .008 corn bushels/worker

you will need .8 bushels of corn in advance, of course.

you will employ these .8 bushels in the course of production

your output for these hundred workers is 1 bushel of corn (remember, your output must be greater than your cost, for this to make sense)

the profit is .2 bushels of corn.

your profit rate (profit divided by capital) is 25%

here it's very clear, then, that the profit rate is dependent on the level of technology and the wage rate. he's solved the first problem in Adam Smith, which is the question of the determination of the profit rate.

we have more.

what happens if I was to raise the wage rate, to .009? profit goes down, as does your profit rate. So Ricardo establishes the antagonistic relationship between wages and the profit rate.

economists will say, “but the economy is not one sector?”

Sraffa's reply was simple. think of this model as an average sector, which becomes the center of gravity of a complex economy (any given wage in that sector will give you the profit rate). this sector will have the property that outputs and inputs will be made of the substance.

so we have an argument not just about a single sector, but about a general sector (Marx has a concept of the “standard industry,” which he doesn't develop).

the second question relates to the issue of relative prices. when we have acknowledged that capital-labor ratios are not equal, how do differences in the capital-labor ratios affect relative prices? (see spreadsheet—the difference between the capital-labor ratios is 'muted' in the difference in relative prices)

to look at the effects of differences in the wage rates, you increase the wage rate in the corn sector (which raises the prices). But you will see that this doesn't greatly affect relative prices.

having done this reasonsing and analysis, Ricardo's hypothesis is that relative prices are not very sensitive to distributions in the changes of income. the dominant determinant is the capital-labor ratio, and the secondary element is the distributions of income.

(NB: the natural price is not necessarily the price you will get on the market, remember—you have to fight for the natural price)

Ricardo couldn't run this whole thing empirically, because he didn't have any information on direct and indirect labor time. We, however, have input/output tables, which were started by the Soviets, but are now published regularly.

the main point of all of this is that the center of gravity is set, structurally. the second row in Shaikh's table (Price of Production vs. Market Price) would suggest that supply/demand, taxes, monopoly, etc. can only explain 8.2% of the deviation from Mkt Price.

Rethinking the French Revolution, George Comninel

(xi-xii): in sum--three guiding principles of Comninel's position on French Rev

1. (a) in contrast with Britain, capitalist class relations did not yet exist in France in town or countryside; (b) the bourgeoisie was not a class opposed to the aristocracy but rather shared with it the essential social relations of property ownership (in land) and state office; (c) consequently, the two were 'partners in exploitation'
2. this partnership was an unequal one -- it was over the 'political' control of the state and spoils of office (army, administration) that a conflict arose that led to the revolution
3. major result of the Revolution was to unify the nation and centralize the state; but it did not transform France into a capitalist country.

(2): Cobban opened the revisionist historiography, refusing to see the French rev as a 'social revolution' (not an objection to analyzing it in terms of social/economic interests)

(6): Lefebvre, on the other hand, saw it as a 'necessary bourgeois social revolution'

(9): an uneasy alliance between Marxists and liberals

(16): three central points of the Marxist perspective

1. the bourgeoisie had been agent of growth in commerce and industry
2. the aristocratic and absolutist structure had been a feudal hindrance to this growth
3. and that the bourgeoisie had led the Revolution in order to overthrow this system, clearing the ground for capitalism

(19): Cobban's three counter-points

1. bourgeois revolutionaries were 'not capitalists'
2. shared in full range of landed income--including portion derived from fedual dues
3. Revolution did not give rise to capitalist production but preserved the essential social characteristics of the Ancien Regime

(20): we have, thus, a 'single elite'

(20-25): int. section on 'conservative liberalism' of the revisionist challenge (for revisionists, what the revolution was about is not the interesting question; they, rather, saw it as their task to prove what it was not about)

(30): by 1850, Marx and Engels had come to the conclusion that the bourgeoisie would not lead a bourgeois revolution, simply because an aristocratic regime held power

(33): Marxism retreated into theoretical 're-mixing' of the history, rather than confronting this wealth of historical evidence head-on (which demonstrated that there was no 'social frontier' separating the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy, etc.)

(50): even Hill, writing about the English Civil War, conceded that the gentry played a large role. for him, the bourgeois revolution is not one which is led by the bourgeoisie (paradoxically, this one was led by the nobility), but one which creates the conditions for capitalism. Brenner takes this further, obviously, noting instead that you get radical and conservative positions within the ruling class leading to Civil War.

(56): Marx's debt to bourgeois materialism ('I did not discover the existence of classes.' [Guizot, Mignet, etc.]) [Comninel's main argument here, of course, is that Marx is giving credit where credit is not due--the 'critique of political economy' actually is a critique of the liberal categories Marx adopted in his early work]

(61): a fundamentally Smithian account of history: 'middle-class industry' as the prgoressive force of civilization, hampered by tradition, etc. Modern, bourgeois progress.

(65): the 'stages' theory is also a legacy of liberal materialism

(68): for liberal materialism, it was the 'mechanistic force of population growth which provided the essential impetus of social development' [you have density-->division of labor, in essence--Durkheim]

(74): key--the 'bourgeois revolution' that Marx imported into his account of history was borrowed from this type of an understanding of the mechanics of history (a liberal class, straining to break free)

(78): against orthodox Marxism -- in which the bourgeois revolution has pride of place (Hobsbawm being its exemplar)

(82): against Structuralist Marxism -- a scientific theory that will be filtered through Marxist categories (but, in essence, Comninel is arguing, these categories that Structuralist Marxism took for granted are flawed). moreover, it is descriptive--can't answer dynamic questions about the MoP, social structure

(106): the question is not whether you had a clash of ideologies in the Rev (you did--'constitutional liberalism' vs 'aristocratic constitutionalism'); the question is whether this reflected a fundamental social clash.

(111-112): 'classlessness' as a common ideology, for all participants in the French Rev (even if in different ways, all clung to some understanding of the 'nation')

(112-113): imp--it proved impossible to defende the Revolution while also attempting to containe the threat of popular sovereignty (explaining its move left) [remember--the argument is not that the 'masses' represented clashing social interest to the bourgeoisie/aristocracy, which is relevant] [one question, here, might be why such a trenchant conflict was fought over political spoils? his point will be the intra-ruling class struggles can be quite profound. do we accept it?]

(117): classes, in liberal history, were not defined in terms of fundamental relations of exploitation--but defined ideologically (active/passive, etc.)

(125): insisting that we remember that HM developed through the critique of capitalism--the critique of political economy

(138): imp--already by 1847, Marx coneived property relatoins as historically specific expressions of the antagonistic relations of production fundamental to each particular epoch.

(139): HM's critique of liberal ideology was to reveal its class content, and the specificity of its concepts

(141-143, 147-148, 150): key-- GI carries liberal ideology within it--division of labor as a motive force, along with increase of production (technical aspects of division of labor predominate, a la Smith; focus is on the social division of labor). two aspects: (1) conflation of liberal conception of class with Marx's own; (2) subordination of history of class society to technical development of division of labor

(151): how can you make sense of the bourgeois revolution, though, without taking into account the fundamental exploitative relationship of the epoch (namely, bourgeoisie/aristocracy with the peasantry)?

(152): Sweezy-Dobb debate--capitalism as developing external to feudalism, versus as an 'internal dynamic' in class history (here Comninel mentions there is a great deal to be said for an intervening period between feudalism and capitalism)

(156-158): critical--distinction between social division of labor, and technical division of labor, in capitalism (excellent line from Poverty of Philosophy)

georges lefebvre, the coming of the french revolution

(vii-ix): translator defense of revolution's necessity

(xiv-xv): imp--different interests of the classes arrayed in the revolution [though here a recognition that there are facts "awkward to a purely materialist theory of class conflict," there's no attempt to rethink the basic categories of 'bourgeoisie' in the way that Comninel demands]

(xvi): the bourgeoisie had to offer something to everbyody--so they seized on the philosophy of natural rights (the philosophy of the 18th century)

(1-2): key--a new class growing within the aritsocratic order -- it was a revolution to restore the harmony between fact and law [as Marx argued--it is in this sense that Lefebvre's is the classic account]

(3): people were not the original force, but events moved steadily in the direction of the popular revolution

(7): clergy owned a tenth of the land

(8): but wasn't much of a class--"the aristocracy meant the nobility"

(9-10): nobility owned about half of the land, from which they collected dues [here he's acknowledging, again, the fact that the bourgeoisie could also own land and collect dues]

(12): nobility of the sword (wedded most to tradition) vs. nobility of the robe (of recent bourgeois extraction, wealthy because offices had high mkt value)

(16): imp--18th century was not just the time of the bourgeois revolution, but it was also the "last offensive of the aristocracy"

(20): Montesqieu's "Spirit of Laws" as the handbook of the aristocracy--arguing for 'bodies' in opposition to the monarchy; a 'liberty' of the aristocracy

(22): debt servicing in 1788 amounted to 50% of government expenditures (couldn't repudiate it because of the Parliaments and the Paris bourgeoisie--who would have forsaken further assistance)

(23): key--"under the Old Regime, the richer a man was, the less he paid. Technically the crisis was easy to meet: all that was necessary was to make everybody pay."

(25): "the character of the King and Queen must be included." [!?]

(27): aristocracy wanted to use the deficit to assert themselves, viz-a-viz the King

(29-30): battle on--around 1787-1788, between the King and the Aristocracy

(33): calling for the Estates-General, but in a way that favors the aristocracy ("a common front against royal power")

(34-37): key--at this stage, the aristocracy was imagining a France without the power of the absolutist monarchy. their model would have been England post-1688 [this is the c-factual Lefebvre raises--"had the aristocracy had their way"]; they had no intention of surrendering their privileges.

(41): key--[in direct contrast to Comninel's conception of them as exploiters,] Lefebvre suggesting that it was only because the bourgeoisie was intermixed with the rest of the population that they could assume leadership of the revolution.

(42-44): levels of the bourgeois class: (1) finance (pg. 42 -- tax farmers, rentiers); (2) merchants (pg. 43--industry, which was subordinate, is grouped here); (3) liberal professions; (4) skilled workers/crafstmen/sans-culottes, who were hostile to capitalism

(46): in short--extreme diversity of positions reflected in the diversity of life; most bourgeoisie were not very well off, and were intimately connected to common people [well, then, in what sense a coherent class, at all? upper bourgeois simply seems to mean non-nobles living off taxes/rent, and lower bourgeois simply seems to mean not proletarian--but what connects the two?]

(47): its imprudence in attacking the aristocracy was driven by a desire to eliminate legal, hereditary privilege

(48-50): int--doing them an injustice by suggesting they were motivated by their own interests alone. have to account for their 'historic mission', their idealism. [hmm]

(52): pivot point--in September 1788, the Parliament of Paris (aristocracy) rules that the Estates-General should be convened as in 1614--the bourgeoisie rebels, and redirects its ire on the aristocracy.

(53-54): the Committee of Thirty

(55): moderation of the 'patriot party', which had no objections to the idea of 'three orders' -- just wanted the 'doubling of the Third' (same number of reps as the nobility)

(58): December 12, 1788 -- a manifesto of the aristocracy, worried about the suppression of feudal rights, etc. [again--useful to think how we might re-interpret this, in light of the Comninel]

(61): November 1788-February 1789 -- the bourgeoisie was becoming 'more radical', in face of intransigence the 'doubling'. moving to question of voting by order or by head, and possibly even getting rid of the privileged orders

(65): Lawyers dominated the election process for the 3rd Estate

(68): representatives of the Third Estate identified the cause of their class with the cause of their nation.

(69-70): Sieyes was both the godfather and a gravedigger (before a pamphleteer and leading light; after the Fall of the Bastille, the popular revolution terrified him)

(72-75): imp--clear that all three orders were unanimously against absolute royal power--however, there were widely different positions on the question of privileges and civic equality, of course [a potential counterfactual, here -- suggesting that an official plan of reforms, akin to the Charter of 1814, could have saved the monarchy. 'but the court remained inert.]

(82-83): May 4, 1789 the Estates-General convenes; June 17, Third Estate takes the name of 'National Assembly'. King/Necker find themselves on the back foot.

(84-85): On June 20 they take the Tennis Court Oath (some reservations)

(87-89): imp--a of June 23rd shows the King willing to become a Constitutional Monarch, which itself shows that everything has moved forward. Decree is moot, because as July approaches the National Constituent Assembly is declared.

(92):imp--things are finely poised, the Assembly expects force to be used to expel them. BUT the force of the people intervened, and the Old Regime "went down beyond recall"

(97): imp--the Army was staffed by people who were suffering on account of high prices, mingling with townspeople, etc. [speaks to some truths about revolutions, I should think]

(98-99): the strength of insurrectionary movements lay with the 'lesser bourgeoisie' (handicraft workers, shopkeepers)

(99): very interesting--it was precisely because of the lack of coherence/organization of the working-class, Lefebvre is suggesting, that the bourgeosie was willing to move so far with the revolution. otherwise you might have had an 1848, is the implication. [this speaks to larger concerns about the 'bourgeois revolution' -- clearly there is some sense in which Comninel's invitation to think through the structure of exploitation has purchase, implicitly, in Lefebvre's account]

(102-105): economic distress (high price of bread, etc.) as an immediate cause of the insurrection

(108): almost one-half of the population (10 million out of 23 million), it's estimated, were in need of relief

(109): the economic crisis was read as an 'aristocratic conspiracy' by the Third Estate, however incorrectly

(114): attack on the Bastille was initially demand for 'arms'

(116): the 'tricolor' was a synthesis (red and blue for Paris, white for the King)

(118): int--a kind of bourgeois 'dual power'; the co-existence of the formal assembly (the common council) with district assemblies (direct democracy)

(120-122): the 'Terror', here, is made sense of through the fears of the 'aristocratic conspiracy'

(125): July 1789, a differential deepening of the Revolution--in some places the local revolution was complete; in some places democratic development was less pronounced; and yet in others the power of the Old Regime remained intact

(126): "France surged spontaneously in a federation of local units."

(127): National Guard was half-hearted in repressing disorder (the National Assembly tried to get people to pay old taxes, etc.-- but it "preached in the desert")

(133): key--Peasantry didn't enter the scene before July 14, despite being 3/4 of the population. Nonetheless, without their adherence the Revolution could hardly have succeeded. They suddenly revolted, and their uprising is one of the most distinctive features.

(132): France vs. England--unlike England, many French peasants were landowners, yet to be reduced to the ranks of the landless en masse (even though there were propertyless peasants, in quite sizeable numbers [confusing]).

(134): the Old Regime was afflicted by a serious 'agrarian crisis', owing to backwardness of cultivation (need for more land, which wasn't available).

(135): property rights remained unquestioned--principle was penalizing enemies of 'the country', not those w/ property [hmm]

(136): key--the peasantry was critical of the bourgeoisie (here he means 'commercial wealth'), but was most aroused to a state of fury by the privileges of the aristocracy [this, obviously, directly refutes Comninel's contention that the two were twin exploiters--unless we are going to make a 'misperception' qulification, which seems fruitless]

(140): key--the 18th century had seen increasing burden on the peasantry, as well as the steady encroachment on the common rights of the peasantry

(142): bourgeois discomfort over peasant agitation over manorial rights (since that was a form of property)

(143): imp--the convocation of th E-G had an enormous impact on the peasantry--one cannot exaggerate the echoes, argues Lefebvre ('the King meant to give them satisfaction')

(144): the idea of an 'aristocratic conspiracy' against a 'good King' [construction of a usable history/present]

(146): the economic crisis had revolutionary consequences, in two ways

1. enflamed the peasants, turning them against the tithe owners and lords
   
2. it generalized a sense of insecurity which was blamed on the aristocracy

(148): the bourgeoisie wasn't spared [hints at the notion of twin exploitation, but not developed]

(157): the aristocrats had hoped to postpone the Declaration--the equality of rights threatened their privileges

(159): events were confirming the principles--"the people were not waiting upon deliberations of the Assembly to realize their desires"

(161): key--strongest hint that bourgeoisie and nobility had common interests [this is the closest we get to a recognition of Comninel's argument that the 'bourgeoisie's' source of wealth was in manors/fiefs, etc.]

(168): imp--only the National Assembly was able to achieve the national unity for the monarchy had long pined.

During last year, power sector losses were estimated at Rs250 billion. However, the government has been increasing the prices but failed to reduce losses which have surged to 30 per cent, almost equivalent to the cost it would recover through increasing prices. Over the past two years the tariffs have been increased by 70 per cent.

About one-fifth of the amount was evaded by 38 individuals hailing from Karachi, who managed to avoid payments worth Rs17.7 billion – a figure higher than the country’s education budget for this year. The discrepancies were pointed out during the audit of the accounts of 2008-09.

Dalton Conley, Honky

(8): discovering race [discuss? does this hit home? this is part of a larger discussion, which we wil have next week]

(15): allusion to social policy neglect [important, situate private troubles in context of social-structural issues]

(26-27): good example of what to do for papers [situate individuals in larger trends]

(30-31): again, good example of how to do personal descriptions in terms of social concepts

(48-49): race/ethnicity [a bit tricky, but worth tackling]

(51): they/we [arbitrariness of social policy--hits home?]

(54): thus far, a q. begging account of poverty in the projects [he alludes to lack of jobs, etc., at the end of the book--pg. 202. discuss]

(73): status hierarchies [it exists, what would our social theorists say about this, though?]

(87): social policy, re: sanitation department

(112): industrial --> post-industrial economy. ['sociological imagination' enter here]

(135): his father's attitude towards work, thanks to his class position [discuss. what are the implications of this for social reproduction, conceptions of social structure?]

(181): the fire, and 'middle-class' privilege [most powerful of the whole book -- allowed to talk it through with authority]

(188): "maintenance men" [can get at the concept of the occupational structure, through this -- used in tandem with traffic metaphor]

(202): still 'no jobs' [key]

(203): nice traffic metaphor [for getting at social structure]

(206): "literary truths, not scientific"

class struggle in the first french republic, daniel guerin

(1): not just a bourgeois revolution, but contained within it the modern form of the class struggle

(1): first modern revolution to have involved the broad mass of people

(2): key-- this doesn't mean that the bourgeoisie didn't play a leading role--but it did mean that they were unable to put an end to absolutism without the help of the bras nus. 14 July 1789, 5 October 1789, 4 August 1789, 10 August 1792 all examples of critical importance of the mass movement.

(2): one finds the bourgeoisie equivocating (timorous b/c they knew that each step forward was a blow to the sanctity of private property --pg. 3), and each time it is the bras nus that pushes the bourgeois revolution forward

(3): bourgeoisie was only "very partially" an oppressed class -- they did share in the profits, also, with nobility and church

(4): split between bourgeoisie and bras nus was most pronounced in the cities

(4): thus French Revolution is example of Trotsky's law of combined development, too

(7): the bras nus' attitude to the war was entirely dictated by their class interests--didn't support it as a war of expansion, had to defend it when revolution was in danger

(10): Robespierre and Danton re: Brtain

(11): after Thermidor, you got rid of the revolutionary militia and inducgted a new generation of professional officers (the wars, of course, would rage till 1815)

(12): Edmund Burke, whipped up war feeling in Britain

(22): key--modern bourgeoisie had to argue that power resided with the people, but it simultaneously could not allow them to recognize it (this is where the institution of the Parliament is historically important--progressive, but also reactionary).

(25): Robespierre's Constitution of 1793 was the most democratic, but it didn't escape the logic of the revolutionary bourgeoisie--indeed, it demonstrated it at its "absolute limit" (he remained hostile to direct democracy)

(26): Malouet's warning, to the effect that the bourgeoisie could not contain the principle it was unleashing on the world

(28): the Paris Commune, in the French Revolution

(29-32): dual power, as it existed at different times throughout the revolution (Aug 1792, March 1793, Nov-Dec 1793, Feb-March 1794)

(34): from December 1793, the bourgeoisie strengthened the central power, in order to smash all chances of a federation ('revolutionary federalism', Guerin's arguing, will inspire Prodhoun, Bakunin, Marx, etc.)

(35): argument that the population was 'not ready' to build a different, democratic society

(36): Guerin arguing that a distinction should be made between the uncontrolled 'barbaric' terror and the 'terror' demanded by the popular vanguard that would be used specifically against saboteurs.

(37): again, claim about objective conditions.

(37-39, 43): important, religion--an integral part of the assault on the church. the bourgeoisie was torn, since it appreciated the role it played in maintaining social order, while also resenting the neo-feudal world it enshrined. Guerin also making the argument that the poor had little truck for the materialists/deists, and saw their popular morality through god ("they set to work to separate God from the priests)

(40): Rousseau and 'heavenly joy'

(43): extraordinary quotes from Napoleon on religion--''no society without inequality of wealth, and inequality of wealth can't exist without religion."

(45): the book is really about 1793-1795, which is where the modern class struggle makes its appearance -- when the bourgeoisie and bras nus come into conflict

(46): reviewing the nature of the initial war, which he's suggesting we understand as not much more than the latest bout in a longstanding rivalry between France and England (not a clash of ideologies--p. 53, but a clash of rivals)

(50): War was seen by the bourgeoisie in France as a solution to the economic crisis

(55): War was funded through inflation, and thus by the poor

(56): argument--1792 and especially 1793 saw the first signs of the antagonism between bras nus and bourgeoisie, as a result of the way that the War was waged.

(57): in this, at first, the Girondists and Montagnards found common ground

(62): members of the bras nus have trouble framing the demands (Tiger) -- but they have educated spokespeople in the enrages (Jacques Roux, Theophile Leclerc, Jean Varlet, and Gracchus Babeuf)

(64): "Three hours spent at a bakery door would do more to make a legislator than four years in the Convention" -- Leclerc

(64): enrages attacked the bourgeoisie directly

(65): but there were limits to their opposition--couldn't put forth a consistent programme

(66-68): in sum--they were "mirrors" (spokespeople of an ideal), rather than leaders of a revolutionary movement.

(72): critical--things reached a point where, in March-June 1793, for things to go forward it was going to be necessary for Robespierre to break with the Girondists. the revolution could not go forward without relieving public poverty--and the Girondists were unwilling to do this, because of their own hidebound interests.

(74-75): key--Girondists and Montagnards as different "class fractions". the former suffering under the impact of revolutoinary crisis, the other one profiting--therefore the first is unwilling to grant concessions, but the second is.

(79): sum--an important section of the bourgeoisie betrayed the bourgeois revolution by putting their own interests first.

(81, 87): Robespierre's tact was required to perform this surgery

(91): enrages were also pushed back

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[1] abiding question of bras nus viz-a-viz orthodox proletariat. what can be gained from this line of inquiry? re: 1848, too?