heper and evin, state democracy and the military: turkey in the 1980s


(83): effect of political system was to re-found party system on a modern footing


(138): Menderes was an expression of non-urban elite discomfort of secularist-statis turn; military was unfriendly to landed elite who were culturally more conservative


(164-165): [from William Hale article] young officers marginalized in later coup, precisely because of 'coup within a coup' fears

the political economy of turkish democracy, caglar keyder (1979)

(4) key argument is the absence of a hereditary aristocracy; it was politically expropriated by the bureaucratic elite (beginning of its dissolution in the late 19th century, with the Tanzimat reforms)

(5) weak landlord class

(7) w/ independence in 1923, there was the birth of a new bourgeoisie

(7) key--those who had benefited from the explusion of the Greeks and the Armenians (who were merchants and rich peasants, respectively) were the social basis of Turkish nationalism

(9-10) the independence movement was categorically not a social revolution, no fundamental change in the economic structure

(9) Kemalism was a partial break from original ideology of CUP period


(12) Kemal's reforms in the 1920s sought to imitate the superstructure of Western modernity, and he was forced to defend these against the peasantry. Probably made easier by healthy state of economy

(13-14) from the 1930s to WWII, v. close to fascism in its essentials, though (!) it lacked a popular base. 'only repression kept the regime intact'

(15) almost half of trade in 1936 conducted w/ Germany

(15-18) in mid-1930s, conscious prioritization of industry; landowners and m-peasantry suffering, which would become basis of DP. rooted in landlords, m-peasantry, and some disaffected bourgeoisie

(19) most vilalges had v. few landlords, mostly poor-mid peasants

(20) key claim--relative 'success' of democracy was based on (1) absence of aristocracy; (2) millions of middle peasants

(23) in 30s/40s/50s, Turkey marked by scarcity of foreign capital

(25) May 1960 coup in context of (1) student movement; (2) support of urban intelligentsia; (3) DP authoritarianism

(26) in 1961, RPP got same number of votes as in 1957 (residual sympathy for the DP, after assasination)

(28): key--Turkey's unique democracy was b/c of (1) large small-holding peasantry; (2) absence of foreign capital, and, w/ 1960s, (3) stalemate between fractions of the bourgeoisie (i.e., agrarian capitalists vs. commercial bourgeoisie)

(30): March 1971 to Oct 1973 coup, followed massive workers' demo in June 1970

(31): motivated, at least partly, by a clash between big capital and small capital--over control of Chambers of Commerce, etc.

(31): by 1970s, easy phase of ISI coming to an end

(32) 'petty bourgeois radicalism' had a hand to play in this. idea that radical schemes could be passed through the military.

(34) key--Army driven out of political life b/c (1) continuing strength of military reformist tradition, which respects constitution. recrutiment from lower-class milieu, rather than landowning aristocracy; (2) credibility of political parties

(36-40): RPP becoming more radical, winning some w-class support. but not quite a SD party



(

R. Walker, "Putting Capital In Its Place" (1999)

(264) ability to pay high wages = 1. productivity + 2. w-class capacity + 3. politics of labour (social contract, etc.) + 4. profit on investment + 5. condition of place

(264) we are very far from living in a low-cost world--still serious c-tendencies

(266) there are place-specific assets

(267) obv--not all industry has moved to Haiti, yet

(268) agglomeration economies

(269) cheap labour competition is an issue, but a minor one

(269-270) what matters are unit costs: wages x productivity (Germany at 80% of Us, Japan at 50% of US in 1980s)

(272) It's the success of the NIC's that has raised the spectre of 'cheap labour'

(273-274) immigration is a small proportion of the labour force; except in exceptional cases, difficult to see how they could bring down wages (think, also, that immigration to US was highest during first boom, and was cut off only in the 20s)

(277) low-road capitalisms have done well, on occasion, but never matched records of their high road rivals

(278) investment drives productivity growth (w/o determining it entirely, of course)

(279) Japan went to SE Asia (partly) in reaction to US attempts to protect domestic manufacturing in 1985

(280) servioces grew most because the rate of profit there has held up the best

(280) overcapacity in the world economy as fundamental cause of slowdown

 (281) for Europe and Japan post-WWII, not high nor low road, but 'divided highway' (i.e., some of their competitive advantage did come from low wage costs)
 

Walker, "A Requiem for Corporate Geography" (1989)

(44) Myrdal's influence on location theory through concept of 'cumulative causation'

(46) in contrast to classic theory, the calculus of large firms is basically indistinguishable from small firms [part of the attempt to recenter discussions on the economy/capitalism, away from firm parameters]

(47) organizational characteristics also don't change parameters of firm calculus (again, beyond corporate geography)

(50) corporate goegraphers promote 'industrial organization' over processes of industrialization [reminder that you can't escape capitalism]

(53) neoclassicals smuugle everythin in through the back door--everything important that affects/defines production is exogenous to their model, in effect

(53) 'efficacy' vs. 'cost efficiency'

(57) wide variety of organizational forms can work

(60) against 'uneven development', no notion of fixed hierarchy of places

(62-63) 'affection for petty bourgeois palliatives (i.e., small business, etc.)--need, in short, for a more "capacious socialist agenda"

 

walker, "geography of production" (2000)

(14) including everything manufacture-like not classified as such, estimates are 40-50% of total labour force

(119) skyscrapers as 20th century's 'dark satanic mills'

(119) workplace integration presents various advantages, but doesn't mean you need River Rouge -- 'importance of factory as a business strategy' diminishing..

(120) "no single best solution" [the problem, here, is that this becomes just a nice way of saying you have nothing to say]

(123) industrial location is not about pre-given costs, but about creating systems of innovation, etc.

(126) technological development has its own logic, dependent on the industry/sector (i.e., mechanization in agriculture is different from mechanization in healthcare)

justice as equality, christopher ake (1975)

(71) justice is to be understood as complete equality in benefits and burdens (it can, of course, be traded for other social virtues)

(76-77) Barry's critiqeu of Rawls: difference principle is not about justice, exclusively, but actually incorporates considerations of welfare [the whole 'better off' bit]

(80) crux of the argument is that justice comes apart from other considerations; and that it absorbs common distributive maxims

(81) friend who finds book? reward only the one who found it, or the one who looked without finidng it? only the former, but this is because it's competition within the rules of a contest

(86) intentions matter to the extent that they reflect burdens borne [the danger, in all this, is that Ake's argument simply narrows what we use 'justice' to describe, w/o actually assisting in any solution to the problem of how to arrange institutions to fit intuitions]

(88) effort and need are not opposed criteria, on this conception--both are burdens that people bear

parasites, pimps, and capitalists: a naturalistic conception of exploitation, tommie shelby (2002)

(382) defending a nonmoral notion of exploitation

(389) 'outcome' model of parasitism--paraiste benefits, host is harmed vs. process model of parasitism--parasite scrounges on host's foraging efforts (i.e., distribution of benefits vs. how exploiters obtain benefits)

(393) 'basic structure of exploitation' (BSE): (a) if Y forced to make sacrifice which benefits X; (b) X obtains this advantage by virtue of some power over Y

(394-395) defining 'harm'/'sacrifice'  -- it can't be the case that it's only exploitation of the exploited gets no benefit, because there are examples of exploitative relationships in which the exploited gets some benefit (i.e., a wage, a gig, etc.) [seems to me you'll have to introduce some kind of counterfactual notion]

(397-398) the cause of compulsion need not be another agent--compulsion by circumstance can lead to 'opportunistic' compulsion [vs. Nozick]

(403) does Shaq exploit his opponents?

(403) domination and exploitation can come apart, at times

(404) for the MArxist concept, exploitative relationships need to be self-reproducing. in other words, add (c) to BSE's (a) and (b). (c) being that the relationship persists and is essential to reproduction

(408) sum of SER in Marxist terms [Shelby cashing this out w/o the LTV]

(412) surplus appropriation can be non-exploitative provided tht benefits don't accrue b/c of a group's power over productive resources

(413) conditions of SER (forced to do surplus labour) can be product of compulsion by circumstance, for sure

(413) opportunistic exploiters (capitalists who benefit from workers' double-freedom) vs. coercive exploiters (added dimensions of the pimp-prostitute relationship, etc.)

(416) three kinds of Marxist approaches to the problem of exploitaiton: (a) distributive, that exploitation unjustly distributes some important good; (b) principled, that exploitation violates some important principle; (c) nonmoral, which Shelby is arguing we should take seriously [the claim, again, is not that this undermines the moral critique of Marxists, just that the fact of exploitation can be established independent of its evaluation]

GA Cohen, Nozick and Wilt Chamberlain: How Patterns Preserve Liberty (1977)

(5) Nozick vs. Socialism: (1) Liberty is justice; (2) Socialism is incompatible w/ liberty [Cohen is going to agree w/ (1) and reject (2), whereas most take the tack of rejecting (2) but accepting (1)]

(7) for Nozick, 'voluntary self-enslavement' is not unjust [which has an appeal on our intuitions]

(8) key, the desires have to be somewhat sensible--the person can't be making an uninformed or coerced decision; it's disturbing if the decision is being made on false pretenses

(9) this begins to undermine the applicability of Nozick's principle to market-generated state of affairs [important, I think, also to stress the conditions under which the cdecision is being made]

(14) arguing re: change in human nature, under socialism [not the way to go]

(16) Nozick's argument prohibits any and all limitations on freedom (it's not a maximizing freedom argument). Justified via Kant

(19) Nozick: a person is not forced if all other people ar not focing [can't conceive of compulsion by circumstance]

(20) Farmer's fence and the villager example (the question, again, is whose freedom/liberty is being supported/maximized)

(21) if Z is unfree, then justice and freedom actually come apart (in other words he has to acknowledge, then, he's defending the freedom of a particular class as 'justice')

GA Cohen, LTV and explotiation

(338, thesis): don't need LTV ("mutual irrelevance"

(340) the substantive thesis of volume 1 is that (3) socially necessary labour time determines 'equilibrium price' (whether or not the definitional claim is (1) socially necessary labour time is value; or (2) value is equilibrium price)

(340) LTV does not give you LT of surplus-value

(341) nice, pithy statement of the 'origin of non-wage income'--""the difference between the value of labor power and the value produced by him/her in whom it inheres. it is the difference between the amount of time it takes to produce what is needed to keep a producer in being for a certain period and the amount of time he spends producing during that period"

(343) Traditional Marxist Argument leaves its moral premises unstates: (1) that one is entitled to the fruits of one's labour; (b) that one is 'forced' to enter into this relation

(344) You can drop the LT of SV from the account, because all you need is for the capitalist to accumulated some of the value produced by the worker for the TMA to be coherent

(346) strict vs. popular doctrine of LTV (hinging on whether labour is source of all value--can't be, if 'past labour' is involved)

(349) the objective here is to puncutre the 'pop idea of creating value', to show that, even according to LTV, labour does not create value

(352) Marx vs. Ricardo is a 'popular' distinction,

(354) exploitation is not about appropriation of value, but about the appropriation of the product

(354-355) Recall only labour is a producer (which is different from saying that labour is responsible for the production of all value) (take lending you a knife, as an example--productive activity vs. producing activity)

(356) Simpler Marxist Argument drops claims about (a) all value being created by labour; (b) value being what's appropriated

sachs and shatz, "trade and jobs in US manufacturing" (1994)

(3,4) sum of findings is that trade matters, but doesn't explain most of the job loss

(5) macroec summary (good data)

(5) Krugman and Lawrence say the 'trade --> decline in manufacturing' argument is spurious; for them, it's a success of productivity story [use]; this is generally correct, but the 70s and 80s were particularly sharp declines--an 'unexplained gap' of about 3 million jobs. the final estimate is that about 1.2 million of these job losses are explained by trade. 

(7) growing inequality between skilled and unskilled is an 80s phenomenon

(9) international trade would matter through putting pressure on output prices

(11) consistent with timing of trade with developing countries

(15) did lead to job losses [though this is rooted in what seems to me to be a particularly naive view of the labour market]

(16) capital flight (remember, trade model assumes immobile capital)

(17) table of skill deciles (ranked by ratio of productive/nonproductive workers)

(18) the US' basic relation with developing countries--the US exports h-skill, imports l-skioll

(21) w/ low wage countries trade is interindustry, w/ high wage countries intra-industry

(21) and because of this, lower job losses expected according to skill intensity [don't quite grasp logic]

(23) '78-'91, tarriffs were more intense on l-skill than high-skill industries; this pattern became slightly stronger in '91 than in '78

(25) decline in employment was clearly greatest in 'low-skill' secotrs

(23) skill-intensity of production rises in every decile

(26) employment fell most in (a) low skill sectors; (b) capital-intensive sectors [collinearity problems?]; fell least in (a) high-skill sectors

(28) c-factual model: rise in net imports resulted in 7.2 and 2.1 % job loss from developing countries

(30) certain industries experience declines unrelated to trade shifts (steel, in particular)

(34) Wood: "understating job loss by using average skill-intensity". but showing that this is not borne out by data

(34) manufacturing trends can't explain income inequality in US (mainly because of hos small a fraction of LF is in manufacturing)

(36-37) effective prices in low-skill goods fell vs. not fell (Sachs vs. Lawrence/Slaughter)

(40-41) Biased technical change--increase in proportion of skilled to nonskilled [v. strange assertion that this might raise the relative wage of low-skilled  workers--assuming full employment + all gains to worker?]

(44) TNC-based trade declined w/ developing countries, raised w/ developed countrieds

(46) factors that drive trade (can't trade w/ poor countries)

(52) China-US trade details

(54) wage gap at outset of trading ties was enormous! (1.9% of US wages)

Anderson, "Why Partition?" (2012) 

(2) Gandhi and 'Das Kapital'

(6) useful description of ML Weakness

(7) Nehru arrogance re: unity of India (when Congress was only 3% Muslim)

(8) from Muslims as trouble-makers (post-Mutiny), to Hindus (during nationalist movement), to Muslims (under Mountbatten) [this seems somewhat exaggerated, given the dividends of the ML posture during WWII]

(9) Labour committed to United India, for strategic reasons

(10) Jinnah couldn't sqaure the circle: how could a Muslim-majority 'secede'/be autonomous while also protecting Muslim minorities in the other provinces

(11) League talked of partition, prepared for confederation; Nehru talked of unity, prepared for secession (motivated by commitment to presiding over central State)

(11) Menon and Commonwealth

(12) NWFP was the only place that held a referendum

(12) Jinnah was willing to accept a United Bengal

(14) Redshirts boycotted referendum, angry at Congress' willingness to consider Partition

(14) great quote, re: partition from above: 'never did so few divide so many, so needlessly'

(15) more violence in Punjab than Bengal, though huge numbers crisscrossing inboth

(16) Partition as 'the single most contempible act..'

(16) 550 out of 560 of the native princes were Hindu potentates

(17) Kashmir as obscurantist feudal tyranny--death to Muslim peasants that killed cow, etc.

(17) Sheikh Abdullah regarded Jinnah an athiest

(20) Patel waving accession document, 'As if the fate of five million were a lottery ticket'

(20) Indian case rests on Sheikh Abdullah working w/ Nehru

(20) NWFP referendum [Anderson mentioning Pakistan won, but not at all mentioning the extremely reactionary ways in which ML persuaded poor villagers to vote]

(21) Gandhi treachery--Kashmir belongs to the Maharajah, etc., etc.

(22) 'Condition of Ambedkar's sanity was breaking with Hinduism', which Nehru didn't do [going a bit Dawkins on me?]

(23) 27,000 to 40,000 Muslims killed after Hyderabad invasion [!]

(23) Ratio of natives to colonials was highest in Raj (1:3,650 vs. 1:475 in Vietnam)

(24) Punjab was the British model--not 'divide-and-rule', but unite-the-reactionaries

(24) Gandhi 'injected' religion [but this is precisely how Jinnah built the base you're extolling]

(26) Congress' was a 'fatal partisan arrogance'

(27) [way too forgiving towards the ML]

(27) religious revivalism was inevitable--something to do with the 'deep culture' of this place [WTF is that about, Perry?]

Bruce Western, A Comparative Study of Working-Class Disorganization (1995)

(179, 197) institutions matter -- these countries were experiencing a common structural transformation, but they had divergent experiences -- > the transformations of institutions that protected class identities (centralized wage bargaining, SD parties) produced declining union density

(180) increased dispersion of union densities in post-war period

(180) strike wave of 1960s --> increase in union density of 15 pts (Western dismisses this, summarizing other arguments)

(181) Table of union densities [Graph this]

STRUCTURAL FACTORS

(181) [Assuming that trade is the context of the change in economic conditions that set the stage--there are echoes of Brenner here, but this narrative could be better, regardless]

(182) Freeman shows union decline rooted in employer resistance (recognition of elections, etc.)

(182) Flexible work --> decline in union density (except in Germany?)

LABOR MOVEMENT EXPLANATIONS


(182) where unions were strong, they stayed strong-- this is where they most successfully organized service sectors [though, as per the other article, service sector growth was not as important as it was in other countries]

(183) strike waves in Sweden and Denmark, 1979-1985, encouraged unionization [again, Western will dismiss this, partly on grounds that these don't distinguish between lockouts and strikes]

WESTERN'S INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS

(183) two-fold (a) decentralization of labor-market institutions; (b) decline of SD parties

(184) Table 2 --> decentralization of bargaining across much of Europe

(185) 'wage drift'

(186) Aroux laws under Mitterand, strengthening power of labour [hmm]

(186) four reasons decentralization leads to declining union density
(a) extends union wages to the unorganized, muting employer oppositoin (so, in the US, the higher the union wage premium, the more employer's will oppose unions) [good support for the Henwood line]
(b) weakens demand [?]
(c) weakens central confederations, in turn reducing movement's power to influence economic policy and increasing corporation-friendly policy
(d) interunion rivalry peaks

(187) SD lost power in Scandinavia, throughout the 1976-1991 period, as well as changing its character

(187) in US and UK, 'active union constraint'

(190) modeling 'first differences'/hazard rate

(192-194) finding that 'everything matters' (except strike rates)

(195) Sweden and Finland defy model's predictions

(196) institutional factors could be tied up with economic conditions, of course

(194) openness --> decline in density

Lee, "International Migration..." (2005)

(argument) Deindustrialization --> Decline in union density; Immigration --> Decline in union density

(72) end of centralized wage bargaining --> decline in union density

(75-76) reasonable summary of the debates on deindustrialization

(78) inflation --> unionization (spurs people to protect wages)

(79) 'Ghent system' has protected union density, in Scandinavian countries, etc.

(79) Immigration is significant

(80) Industrial employment is significant (but not trade)

(82) Institutional arrangements matter, of course [and this is where it would make sense to discuss the state of the labour movement, etc; as well as the question of why the Scandinavian countries have seen an explosion in union density despite deindustrialization]

Zolberg, Response to Tilly (1995)

(30) 'Demobilizing' effect of affluence

(31) Only place workers were a numerical majority was Belgium, 1900-1930 (Pzeworski argument, here)

(31) End of blue-collar worker --> End of electoral socialism (French, Italian CP's)

(32) No 'rebellion in the air' b/c of affluence

(34) Luebbert on 30s as key critical juncture for social democracy (farmer-labour alliances, etc.)

(35) 'Globalization' --> Institutional/political factors -->Effect on labour

(36) Capital flight was a game changer (US had experienced this internally, eralier, what with the consequences of federalism and race to the bottom in taxes)

iversen and cusack, the causes of welfare state expansion (2000)

(313) technology-induced structural transformations are what's at issue in discussions of de-industrialization

(315) in US, expansion of services faster than loss of traditional jobs [losses which look quite minimal, in comparison, because the recent peak was lower], so there's been employment growth

(316) the growth in transfers has been explained by endogenous employment loss, not "globalization"

(317): Rodrick: trade openness/globalization --> insecurity --> WS expansion

(318) domestic market volatility > international market volatility

(319) US is far and away least trade dependent of the OECD economices, yet has highest volatility (wage, output, employment) (volatility = std dev of wage/output/employment)

(320) no evidence that volatility is related to exposure to trade, nor evidence for capital mkt openness --> volatility

(321, FN 20) for less developed countriy, this relationship probably doesn't hold, because trade-dependence on primary goods brings volatility associated with primary goods

(321) Garrett operationalizes 'Left Labor power'

(324) Garrett: WS is compatible w/ globalization; Cusack and Iversen agree, but also want to insist that globalization is not what's responsible for it's expansion (which is what Garrett goes ahead and argues)

(325) mass sectoral shift to services, away from industry --> growth in transfers

(325) find little evidence for a 'pricing out' effect, from trade with LDC's [this is interesting, but needs more specification--disaggregate by industry, country, etc.]


 (325) w/o State intervention, transferability of skills > transferability of benefits (i.e., firms are never going to give benefits on a basis wider than the skills that their employee has. I will give firm-level benefits to extract firm-level skills, and to make sure that my worker is bound to me). when people loss a job and they have to transgress a skill boundary to seek benefits, the State has to step in (to re-skill, etc.)

(326) employers can support this because it minimizes risks of investing in nontransferable skills to workers, who are then more likely to get trained, etc. [perhaps understates employer's power over employee, but OK]

(328, 341-342) the rise and fall of industry as % of the population in the US is much smaller than elsewhere (the amplitude is higher in all late industrializers, for understandable reasons--given the period that we're looking at)

(329, 334) WS expansion can be more or less egalitarian depending on political parameters--partisan effects matter

(332-334) findings

(337) US/Canada/etc. are more effective at generative service self-employment because of wage disperson (i.e., inequality). Where you have centralized bargaining, these sectors don't grow as fast [their argument involves growth of productivity, etc., but I might be missing something b/c this seems clear-cut example of sectors growing that are parasitic on rich people's ability to live luxuriously]

sakallioglu, "the anatomy..." (1997)

(152) 'professionalism' predisposes the military to political influence (Stepan vs. Huntington)

(153) Turkish military intervention in politics as a subtler form of 'indirect influence' --not the kind of direct influence seen in Thailand or Indonesia (a kind that respects civil-military boundaries, etc.)  [to be distinguished, also, from Pakistan, then?]

(154) 1982 constitution gives the military veto power

(154) 1971 and 1980, the military had a small # of allies (vs 1960); it was "at a distance from the rest of society" [this could form part of the argument about lacking a domestic constituency]

(155) 60s gov't relented to challenge military prerogatives

(157) 1980s, various constitutional interventions further entrenched military's autonomous powers--the evolution of the National Security Council was case-in-point; also, the office of the President [again, praetorian like Pakistan?]

(158-159) Evolution of COS position (towards greater autonomy)

(161) NIA (like the ISI) had considerable powers; though not quite a "state within a state"

(162) military's influence becoming even more pronounced; 1980s interventions were 'more authoritarian than ever before' [much of the explanation has to relate to this argument about the lack of domestic allies. though, again, the lack of domestic allies is twinned to the fact that people remain more trusting of the military than of civilian elites]

tanel demirel, "soldiers and civilians" (2010)

(127, 131) blaming soldiers' self-perception

(129) 1923-1945, single-party regime under RPP; 1945, transition to multi-party

(130) with each intervention, the military acquired legal privileges and economic resources [it's important to clarify where exactly the difference w/ Pakistan lies--the explanans and explanandum]

(131) military's perception of civilians impedes their acceptance of civilian supremacy [but he goes on to say that this is something that they've 'chosen', which begs the important questions]

(132) military had praetorian powers ("continued to wield significant powers over the elected governments when it did not directly step in"), its willingness to let civilians govern [more than in Pakistan, say] is explained by its traditions. [which is to say that he has explained nothing]

(132, FN 23) long-term military rule was made difficult because it couldn't find a real constituency (Turkey didn't have a large, land-owning class, and foreign capital was weak) [bizarre that he is suggesting this, but seems plausible--at least the first arm. resurrecting Alavi, ahh!]

(133-134) evolution of military-civilian balance hasn't suggested that military's role has been ebbing--indeed, it's been 'increasing'

(137) TUSIAD (business organization) is pro-democracy because it's pro-EU


(138) the flimsiness of the civilian challenge to the military is an important explanation for military supremacy [important to incorporate into paper]

(138) claim, implicitly, is that democracy isn't seen as important by the man on the street--that there is more trust in the army than in the civilians [this is important--true about Pakistan but probably not true about Latin America] [here it's important to make two theoretical points: (1) democratization has been pushed by worker's organizations because workers need political rights to win their economic rights, typically; (2) when workers haven't been aware of this, it's been because their organizations have been weak, and thus the 'commonsense' has been lacking]

(140-141): the three military interventions never reached violent proportions (Chile, Argentina)--the military has maintained its popular standing [this is a bit different from Pakistan, though that might have to do with what he's qualifying as violent. need to read more]

(146) the 'military mind' [but this is stupid. this is true everywhere, how can you explain variation? something like this applies to aqil shah's stuff too, I should think]

Zeki Sarigil, "Deconstructing the Turkish Military's Popularity" (2009)

(712) June 1997, forcing Erbakan to resign [is this a muted version of Pak in the 1990's]

(714) 1978, PKK founded

(714) 1984-1999, 30,000 people died in the conflict

Rustow, "The Army and the Founding..." (1959)

(513) 1908, Young Turk Revolution

(513) 1923, Proclamation of Republic

(513, 551) 1919-1923, Kemalist military intervention ends all military interventions [haha, writing one year before the first coup!]

(514) Unease/Centrality of Army was a response to the military supremacy of Europe, viz-a-viz declining Ottoman Empire

(518) War w/ Italy in 1911, Balkan Wars 1912-1913--brought Turkey close to being a garrison State in 1908-1918 period

(520) Army offered organization to nationalist stirrings, post-Armistics

(526) Istanbul vs. Anatolian movement

(544) Kemalists had solid civilian base

(549) Ataturk and Inonu administered the country as civilian leaders, rather than military--they had support from RPP, bureaucracy

(549) 1921-1944, Fezvi Cakmak COS

(549) the Military didn't intervene in this first period because of its association with and trust in Ataturk

(550) Military officers were heavily involved in politics, as individuals
 

brown, the military and society (1989)

(387): 1938, Ataturk dies

(388) 1950s, Democrat Party and Menderes alienated the military establishment

(388) May 27, 1960, "Bloodless coup"

(389) National Security Council allowed the military to return to the barracks [i.e., they institutionalize the authority of senior commanders in the State apparatus

(389) Fall 1961, return to civilian rule -- (1) Justice Party, under Demirel; (2) RPP w/ Inonu (coalition / (3) REligious elements /Marxists

(389) March 1971, military intervenes again (domestic turmoil); 'coup by communique'

(389) 1971-1973, rule by civil servants

(390) 14 October 19763, return ot civilian rule (elections uncertain)

(390) 12 September 1980, military intervention


(391) [identical to Musharraf  (to 'resolve' democracy) [1] ethnic heterogeneity? Kurds vs. 4 provinces; (2) US role is similar, so effectively held constant]

(399) military corporate identity is perpetuated through recruitment patterns


(400) in sum: intervened reluctantly; and has withdrawn with ease because it was well-institutionalized within the State [but if this is the explanation, why has Pak not withdrawn? because it, too, was well-institutionalized within the State]