Anderson, "Why Partition?" (2012) 

(2) Gandhi and 'Das Kapital'

(6) useful description of ML Weakness

(7) Nehru arrogance re: unity of India (when Congress was only 3% Muslim)

(8) from Muslims as trouble-makers (post-Mutiny), to Hindus (during nationalist movement), to Muslims (under Mountbatten) [this seems somewhat exaggerated, given the dividends of the ML posture during WWII]

(9) Labour committed to United India, for strategic reasons

(10) Jinnah couldn't sqaure the circle: how could a Muslim-majority 'secede'/be autonomous while also protecting Muslim minorities in the other provinces

(11) League talked of partition, prepared for confederation; Nehru talked of unity, prepared for secession (motivated by commitment to presiding over central State)

(11) Menon and Commonwealth

(12) NWFP was the only place that held a referendum

(12) Jinnah was willing to accept a United Bengal

(14) Redshirts boycotted referendum, angry at Congress' willingness to consider Partition

(14) great quote, re: partition from above: 'never did so few divide so many, so needlessly'

(15) more violence in Punjab than Bengal, though huge numbers crisscrossing inboth

(16) Partition as 'the single most contempible act..'

(16) 550 out of 560 of the native princes were Hindu potentates

(17) Kashmir as obscurantist feudal tyranny--death to Muslim peasants that killed cow, etc.

(17) Sheikh Abdullah regarded Jinnah an athiest

(20) Patel waving accession document, 'As if the fate of five million were a lottery ticket'

(20) Indian case rests on Sheikh Abdullah working w/ Nehru

(20) NWFP referendum [Anderson mentioning Pakistan won, but not at all mentioning the extremely reactionary ways in which ML persuaded poor villagers to vote]

(21) Gandhi treachery--Kashmir belongs to the Maharajah, etc., etc.

(22) 'Condition of Ambedkar's sanity was breaking with Hinduism', which Nehru didn't do [going a bit Dawkins on me?]

(23) 27,000 to 40,000 Muslims killed after Hyderabad invasion [!]

(23) Ratio of natives to colonials was highest in Raj (1:3,650 vs. 1:475 in Vietnam)

(24) Punjab was the British model--not 'divide-and-rule', but unite-the-reactionaries

(24) Gandhi 'injected' religion [but this is precisely how Jinnah built the base you're extolling]

(26) Congress' was a 'fatal partisan arrogance'

(27) [way too forgiving towards the ML]

(27) religious revivalism was inevitable--something to do with the 'deep culture' of this place [WTF is that about, Perry?]

Bruce Western, A Comparative Study of Working-Class Disorganization (1995)

(179, 197) institutions matter -- these countries were experiencing a common structural transformation, but they had divergent experiences -- > the transformations of institutions that protected class identities (centralized wage bargaining, SD parties) produced declining union density

(180) increased dispersion of union densities in post-war period

(180) strike wave of 1960s --> increase in union density of 15 pts (Western dismisses this, summarizing other arguments)

(181) Table of union densities [Graph this]

STRUCTURAL FACTORS

(181) [Assuming that trade is the context of the change in economic conditions that set the stage--there are echoes of Brenner here, but this narrative could be better, regardless]

(182) Freeman shows union decline rooted in employer resistance (recognition of elections, etc.)

(182) Flexible work --> decline in union density (except in Germany?)

LABOR MOVEMENT EXPLANATIONS


(182) where unions were strong, they stayed strong-- this is where they most successfully organized service sectors [though, as per the other article, service sector growth was not as important as it was in other countries]

(183) strike waves in Sweden and Denmark, 1979-1985, encouraged unionization [again, Western will dismiss this, partly on grounds that these don't distinguish between lockouts and strikes]

WESTERN'S INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS

(183) two-fold (a) decentralization of labor-market institutions; (b) decline of SD parties

(184) Table 2 --> decentralization of bargaining across much of Europe

(185) 'wage drift'

(186) Aroux laws under Mitterand, strengthening power of labour [hmm]

(186) four reasons decentralization leads to declining union density
(a) extends union wages to the unorganized, muting employer oppositoin (so, in the US, the higher the union wage premium, the more employer's will oppose unions) [good support for the Henwood line]
(b) weakens demand [?]
(c) weakens central confederations, in turn reducing movement's power to influence economic policy and increasing corporation-friendly policy
(d) interunion rivalry peaks

(187) SD lost power in Scandinavia, throughout the 1976-1991 period, as well as changing its character

(187) in US and UK, 'active union constraint'

(190) modeling 'first differences'/hazard rate

(192-194) finding that 'everything matters' (except strike rates)

(195) Sweden and Finland defy model's predictions

(196) institutional factors could be tied up with economic conditions, of course

(194) openness --> decline in density

Lee, "International Migration..." (2005)

(argument) Deindustrialization --> Decline in union density; Immigration --> Decline in union density

(72) end of centralized wage bargaining --> decline in union density

(75-76) reasonable summary of the debates on deindustrialization

(78) inflation --> unionization (spurs people to protect wages)

(79) 'Ghent system' has protected union density, in Scandinavian countries, etc.

(79) Immigration is significant

(80) Industrial employment is significant (but not trade)

(82) Institutional arrangements matter, of course [and this is where it would make sense to discuss the state of the labour movement, etc; as well as the question of why the Scandinavian countries have seen an explosion in union density despite deindustrialization]

Zolberg, Response to Tilly (1995)

(30) 'Demobilizing' effect of affluence

(31) Only place workers were a numerical majority was Belgium, 1900-1930 (Pzeworski argument, here)

(31) End of blue-collar worker --> End of electoral socialism (French, Italian CP's)

(32) No 'rebellion in the air' b/c of affluence

(34) Luebbert on 30s as key critical juncture for social democracy (farmer-labour alliances, etc.)

(35) 'Globalization' --> Institutional/political factors -->Effect on labour

(36) Capital flight was a game changer (US had experienced this internally, eralier, what with the consequences of federalism and race to the bottom in taxes)

iversen and cusack, the causes of welfare state expansion (2000)

(313) technology-induced structural transformations are what's at issue in discussions of de-industrialization

(315) in US, expansion of services faster than loss of traditional jobs [losses which look quite minimal, in comparison, because the recent peak was lower], so there's been employment growth

(316) the growth in transfers has been explained by endogenous employment loss, not "globalization"

(317): Rodrick: trade openness/globalization --> insecurity --> WS expansion

(318) domestic market volatility > international market volatility

(319) US is far and away least trade dependent of the OECD economices, yet has highest volatility (wage, output, employment) (volatility = std dev of wage/output/employment)

(320) no evidence that volatility is related to exposure to trade, nor evidence for capital mkt openness --> volatility

(321, FN 20) for less developed countriy, this relationship probably doesn't hold, because trade-dependence on primary goods brings volatility associated with primary goods

(321) Garrett operationalizes 'Left Labor power'

(324) Garrett: WS is compatible w/ globalization; Cusack and Iversen agree, but also want to insist that globalization is not what's responsible for it's expansion (which is what Garrett goes ahead and argues)

(325) mass sectoral shift to services, away from industry --> growth in transfers

(325) find little evidence for a 'pricing out' effect, from trade with LDC's [this is interesting, but needs more specification--disaggregate by industry, country, etc.]


 (325) w/o State intervention, transferability of skills > transferability of benefits (i.e., firms are never going to give benefits on a basis wider than the skills that their employee has. I will give firm-level benefits to extract firm-level skills, and to make sure that my worker is bound to me). when people loss a job and they have to transgress a skill boundary to seek benefits, the State has to step in (to re-skill, etc.)

(326) employers can support this because it minimizes risks of investing in nontransferable skills to workers, who are then more likely to get trained, etc. [perhaps understates employer's power over employee, but OK]

(328, 341-342) the rise and fall of industry as % of the population in the US is much smaller than elsewhere (the amplitude is higher in all late industrializers, for understandable reasons--given the period that we're looking at)

(329, 334) WS expansion can be more or less egalitarian depending on political parameters--partisan effects matter

(332-334) findings

(337) US/Canada/etc. are more effective at generative service self-employment because of wage disperson (i.e., inequality). Where you have centralized bargaining, these sectors don't grow as fast [their argument involves growth of productivity, etc., but I might be missing something b/c this seems clear-cut example of sectors growing that are parasitic on rich people's ability to live luxuriously]

sakallioglu, "the anatomy..." (1997)

(152) 'professionalism' predisposes the military to political influence (Stepan vs. Huntington)

(153) Turkish military intervention in politics as a subtler form of 'indirect influence' --not the kind of direct influence seen in Thailand or Indonesia (a kind that respects civil-military boundaries, etc.)  [to be distinguished, also, from Pakistan, then?]

(154) 1982 constitution gives the military veto power

(154) 1971 and 1980, the military had a small # of allies (vs 1960); it was "at a distance from the rest of society" [this could form part of the argument about lacking a domestic constituency]

(155) 60s gov't relented to challenge military prerogatives

(157) 1980s, various constitutional interventions further entrenched military's autonomous powers--the evolution of the National Security Council was case-in-point; also, the office of the President [again, praetorian like Pakistan?]

(158-159) Evolution of COS position (towards greater autonomy)

(161) NIA (like the ISI) had considerable powers; though not quite a "state within a state"

(162) military's influence becoming even more pronounced; 1980s interventions were 'more authoritarian than ever before' [much of the explanation has to relate to this argument about the lack of domestic allies. though, again, the lack of domestic allies is twinned to the fact that people remain more trusting of the military than of civilian elites]

tanel demirel, "soldiers and civilians" (2010)

(127, 131) blaming soldiers' self-perception

(129) 1923-1945, single-party regime under RPP; 1945, transition to multi-party

(130) with each intervention, the military acquired legal privileges and economic resources [it's important to clarify where exactly the difference w/ Pakistan lies--the explanans and explanandum]

(131) military's perception of civilians impedes their acceptance of civilian supremacy [but he goes on to say that this is something that they've 'chosen', which begs the important questions]

(132) military had praetorian powers ("continued to wield significant powers over the elected governments when it did not directly step in"), its willingness to let civilians govern [more than in Pakistan, say] is explained by its traditions. [which is to say that he has explained nothing]

(132, FN 23) long-term military rule was made difficult because it couldn't find a real constituency (Turkey didn't have a large, land-owning class, and foreign capital was weak) [bizarre that he is suggesting this, but seems plausible--at least the first arm. resurrecting Alavi, ahh!]

(133-134) evolution of military-civilian balance hasn't suggested that military's role has been ebbing--indeed, it's been 'increasing'

(137) TUSIAD (business organization) is pro-democracy because it's pro-EU


(138) the flimsiness of the civilian challenge to the military is an important explanation for military supremacy [important to incorporate into paper]

(138) claim, implicitly, is that democracy isn't seen as important by the man on the street--that there is more trust in the army than in the civilians [this is important--true about Pakistan but probably not true about Latin America] [here it's important to make two theoretical points: (1) democratization has been pushed by worker's organizations because workers need political rights to win their economic rights, typically; (2) when workers haven't been aware of this, it's been because their organizations have been weak, and thus the 'commonsense' has been lacking]

(140-141): the three military interventions never reached violent proportions (Chile, Argentina)--the military has maintained its popular standing [this is a bit different from Pakistan, though that might have to do with what he's qualifying as violent. need to read more]

(146) the 'military mind' [but this is stupid. this is true everywhere, how can you explain variation? something like this applies to aqil shah's stuff too, I should think]

Zeki Sarigil, "Deconstructing the Turkish Military's Popularity" (2009)

(712) June 1997, forcing Erbakan to resign [is this a muted version of Pak in the 1990's]

(714) 1978, PKK founded

(714) 1984-1999, 30,000 people died in the conflict

Rustow, "The Army and the Founding..." (1959)

(513) 1908, Young Turk Revolution

(513) 1923, Proclamation of Republic

(513, 551) 1919-1923, Kemalist military intervention ends all military interventions [haha, writing one year before the first coup!]

(514) Unease/Centrality of Army was a response to the military supremacy of Europe, viz-a-viz declining Ottoman Empire

(518) War w/ Italy in 1911, Balkan Wars 1912-1913--brought Turkey close to being a garrison State in 1908-1918 period

(520) Army offered organization to nationalist stirrings, post-Armistics

(526) Istanbul vs. Anatolian movement

(544) Kemalists had solid civilian base

(549) Ataturk and Inonu administered the country as civilian leaders, rather than military--they had support from RPP, bureaucracy

(549) 1921-1944, Fezvi Cakmak COS

(549) the Military didn't intervene in this first period because of its association with and trust in Ataturk

(550) Military officers were heavily involved in politics, as individuals
 

brown, the military and society (1989)

(387): 1938, Ataturk dies

(388) 1950s, Democrat Party and Menderes alienated the military establishment

(388) May 27, 1960, "Bloodless coup"

(389) National Security Council allowed the military to return to the barracks [i.e., they institutionalize the authority of senior commanders in the State apparatus

(389) Fall 1961, return to civilian rule -- (1) Justice Party, under Demirel; (2) RPP w/ Inonu (coalition / (3) REligious elements /Marxists

(389) March 1971, military intervenes again (domestic turmoil); 'coup by communique'

(389) 1971-1973, rule by civil servants

(390) 14 October 19763, return ot civilian rule (elections uncertain)

(390) 12 September 1980, military intervention


(391) [identical to Musharraf  (to 'resolve' democracy) [1] ethnic heterogeneity? Kurds vs. 4 provinces; (2) US role is similar, so effectively held constant]

(399) military corporate identity is perpetuated through recruitment patterns


(400) in sum: intervened reluctantly; and has withdrawn with ease because it was well-institutionalized within the State [but if this is the explanation, why has Pak not withdrawn? because it, too, was well-institutionalized within the State]

bronfenbrenner, raw power... 1997

(24) l. markets as tight as they were in the 60s, what's changed is capital mobility

(25) shift in strateegies away from manufacturing

(29) vast majority actually have no intention of shutting down [hmm. a bit different from the story tole in the longer piece, where capital does exercise its option (the Tultex drive)]

dasgupta and singh 2006

(4) manufacturing as % of employment can decline, but it can still be of m-economic importance b/c of its centrality to the C-A blaance

(5) turning-point to services used to be at GDP/capita of $10,000; now its $3,000

(10) service sector 'behaves' like manufacturing, in terms of its effect on the growth of productivity [hmm]

(14) 'informal manufacturing' as a survival strategy/self-exploitation/super-exploitation (generates lots of shitty jobs)

kim moody, contextualising organized labour in expansion and crisis: the case of the US (2012)

(5-6) late 50s (downturn) --> 1958-1963 (first management offensive) --> mid-1960s to 1970s (class upsurge) --> 1973-1975 (recession) / 1980-1982 (recession), both of which broke the momentum of the upsurge

(6) the surrender of '79, encapsulated in Fraser's agreement to major concession with the Chrysler Corporation

(7) between 1979 and 1983, union membership fell by 26%

(8) there was a transition away from industry-level bargaining by the 1980s (which is also the period a series of concessions are made, from work-rule changes to wage concessions, etc.)

(8) from post-WWII to 80s, South grew faster than traditional regions

(8) in auto, meatpacking, trucking low-cost/high-prod firms intervene; in textiles, garments, and primary metals, international competition intervenes

(11) productivity increases of 1980s weren't mainly due to investment, but instead were due to reorganization of work [this complicates a relationship that Brenner looks at]

(12) auto is majority non-union by 1970s, and this is particularly pronounced amongst suppliers

(14) two reasons for low level of resistance (besides exhaustion/fear of job loss in recession): (a) the low level of inflation; (b) the fall in the interest rate (debt)

(15) the 'surrender of 1979' + recession of 1980-1982 --> recovery, post 1982. then, restructuring + lean production --> further fall in the value of labour power --> expansion

(16) unions shifted from manufacturing to services (density in manufacturing fell to 11%, from 33%)

(17) card check not in more than 15% of all organizing

(23) the broken link between productivity and wages is key to explaining the recovery of 1982

bronfenbrenner, uneasy terrain (2000) 

 (1) 1990’s, US economy grew at 4%; labor productivity at double the rate in last economic expansion, unemployment below 4%

(2) gains in 1990s were very modes, though. tight labour markets should have resulted in benefits, but they didn’t [her explanation will be threat of flight]

 (5) FDI explosion, post-NAFTA

(6) ‘net loss’ of 3.2 million jobs (9, 48) weakness of labour law enforcement (HRW report) (10) tight labour markets in the 1960s were unlike tight labour markets in 1990s b/c (1) unionization rates; (2) capital mobility [and (3) union cravenness, we’d have to add]

 (16) unions shifted to organizing the service sector, in the late 90s

 (18) increase in number of campaign w/ threats, pre- and post-NAFTA and trade agreemetns

 (29) v. weak enforcement of law against unjustified threats

 (32) reluctance to file charges against employers (resources at NLRB, etc.)

 (33-34) shift to organizing companies that are subsidiaries of large, foreign companies, or the public sector

(37) employer financial condition ahd very little do with whether or not they issued a quit threat

 (55) story of Tultex, where a union victory in 1994 (largest in manufacturing in a decade) was compromised because the company moved to Mexico/Jamaica in 2000

 (55) mobile industries: apparel/textile, auto parts, electronics, telecommunications, steel fabrication, food processing

 (in sum) the claim is not just that companies threaten to use capital flight to undermine unionization efforts (which is true, and they do plenty of the time), but it is also that capital does use capital flight to undermine unionization efforts. the solution, for her, is building restrictions on capital mobility, through protections in trade agreements, etc., etc.

GA Cohen, on the currency of egalitarian justice


chapter 7

(151) freedom of non-owners is safeguarded/promoted by intervention

(152) capitalism, then, is a particular distribution of freedom AND unfreedom

(153) libertarians account of freedom, then, is not normatively neutral

(155) capitalism doesn't encode liberty--it only encodes that liberty which is compatible with the existing distribution of private property. put differently, it equally encodes nonfreedom for non-owners

(155) 'capitalism doesn't end up living up to its own professions"

(155) communal ownership can enhance liberty/freedom (idle skis, idle tools, idle homes)

chapter 2

(46) Sen's criteria, midfare, comes between goods (objective) and welfare (Subjective)

(50) vs. Sen, 'capability'

chapter 6

(128) 'justice' vs. legitimacy (which is what you get from the W. Chamberlain example)

(129) 'Justice' vs.  freedom (they can come into conflict--so something can advance freedom, but not justice)

(131) against Dworkin, "option luck" vs. "brute luck" (deliberate gambles vs. involuntary)

chapter 8


(168) to lack money is not just to lack means, it is to be interfered with (this is what Berlin, Rawls don't acknowledge)

(168) libertarians define intervention as preventing someone from continuing an action--but what about preventing someone from embarking on an action in the first place?

sharon street, objectivity and truth: you'd better rethink it 

(1) practical standpoint vs. theoretical standpoint

(2) normative realism (some normative facts/truths that hold independent of our evaluative attitutudes) vs. normative antirealism (reasons to act are not objective, but particular to agent)

(3) Kantian anti-realism (you begin from individual judgement, but this entails burdens that rule out a whole host of acts) vs .Humean anti-realism (strong substantive conclusions do not follow from particular points of view)

(5-6) naturaist realists (normative facts exist as natural facts) vs. non-natural realists (Dworkin, Scanlon, etc.)

(10) the puzzle is to make sense of this coincidence--that what I belive also happens to be what's objectively true

(11) constructivism is a response--moral reason are internal to individuals

(12) Dworkin's response, of course, is that if it's a coincidence, so be it

(18) the 'normative lottery'--just like it should be crazy to think you won the lottery, so it should be crazy to accept Dworkin's coincidence

(18-21)

richard feldman, epistemological puzzles about disagreement

(crux) we're not often honest with ourselves. if we actually agree that a capable person is disagreeing with us, and they're reasonably doing so, and they have exposure to the same facts as us, then we ought to suspend belief

(421) much rides on the definition of what makes somebody reasonable, when they disagree

(421) effects of intuition might make possession of 'same evidence' a real-world impossibility (but then we're not operating in situations of 'full discolsure'; and tolerance can't be said to be in good faith, here)

shelby, justice, deviance, and the dark ghetto (2007)

(127) if overall social arrangements are unjust, then one has to think about the obligations of the poor quite differently than if the society were just. we distinguish between civic duties that they have as citizens (which clearly they can't be said to have), and natural duties that they have as moral agents (which they can't escape)

(144) in effect, what gives us the right to demand that someone play fair in a game that is unfair

(151) duties to each other without their being duties to society (not to be cruel, to help the needy, not cause unnecessary suffering, etc.)

(152-153) there is also the duty of justice -- obligation to help bring just institutions into existence (applies to both the wealthy, and the poor provided that it doesn't impose particularly onerous burdens on the latter)

(in sum) criticism of the ghetto poor is legitimate--but hardly ever of the traditional sort (deviance in an unjust society can be justified). instead, criticism has to be founded on progressive grounds--the basic, natural duties remain important, and we should also be working for a better world

jeremy waldron, homelessness and the issue of freedom (1981)

(309) homelessness as troubling on liberal grounds

(313) homeless forever at the mercy of others, regarding where they can be

(315) "[Homelessness] is one of the most callous an tyrannical exercises of power in modern times by a (comparatively) rich and complacent majority against a minority of their less fortunate fellow human beings" [let's not hold all the non-homeless reponsible, but ok]

(316) [Take-away is that everyone needs certain prerequisites in order to make use of freedom--one of which is a place to be, but others can be freedom from want, etc., etc.]

(317) In other words, it's absurd to speak of freedom separate of 'needs'--denial of basic needs is emphatically a denial of freedom

(318): the point about homelessness can be made in terms of 'negative freed' -- this is not about enabling people, but ensuring that they're not banned  [of course, this speaks to the ambivalence of the positive vs. negative distinction]

(321) to justify a property system that condemns some to unfreedom, you need to summon other values. not freedom.

(329-330) you don't need individual intention for unfreedom to be of concern. [the 'invisible hand' can intend it, that's enough]

nozick (excerpt: 'how liberty upsets patterns')

(163) why 'forbid' capitalist acts between consenting adults'? in other words, maintenance of a given distribution requires continuous intervention (Wilt Chamberlain, etc., etc.)

[but, it should be clear that Wilt is a terrible analogy for social institutions, and the 'choice' that people make. if we could agree that people voluntarily opt for work in which they consistently lose 25 cents to their boss, then this has some merit. but that's just a terribly impoverished conception of what makes an act voluntary.

in response, Nozick's analogy--that the condition of the low-wage worker is like the condition of a man stuck with an unattractive bride--is idiotic, for three reasons. first, he takes it to suggest that unfreedom can only be the product of deliberate human intervention, which is simply untrue. second, our intuitions from one don't travel to another, because the stakes of the two realms are different. third, it depends on our assuming a limited supply of good jobs, which is not at all a natural fact in the same way that the distribution of attractiveness/unattractiveness is.]

thomas nagel, moral conflict and political legitimacy (1987)

(219) convergence (Hobbes--right because it's rationally accepted) vs. common standpoint theories (rationally accepted because it's right)

(220) liberalism as a mixture of the two, because it involves 'a form of reasoning that includes moral concerns'. more than Hobbesian convergence

(222) Is liberalism more than just another sectarian doctrine? Why should antagonists abandon their conception of the good and accept impartiality?

(223-228) this depends on interpreting impartiality in a particular way, that depends on 'loose epistemological preferences'. not asserting oneself against others who believe differently, but also not ceding to their beliefs everywhere [epistemelogically. politically, no limit on the latter save for the harm principle]

(229-230) Nagel calls this 'epistemological restraint,' not skepticism. 'liberalism should provide the devout with a reason for tolerance' (i.e., even when you're convinced in the correctness of a position, you cede). this is because our beliefs should be regarded as just that (our beliefs), unless they can reasonably be defended from an entirely impersonal standpoint. no society should legislate on the assumption that they're truth.

scanlon, tanner lectures

(151, 166) contractualism/system of co-deliberation--"an act is right if it would be required or allowed by principles which no one, suitably motivated, could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement" [a good starting point, certainly, but the devil is in the details of 'suitably motivated' and 'reasonable rejection,' it seems to me]

(152) the Causlal Thesis (i.e., according to which morality is bunkum if every act can be explained]

(168) praise and dispraise to replace praise and blame]

(174) "the most general moral demand is that we exercise our capacity for self-governance in ways that others could reasonably be expected to authorize"

(184) "in my view, to show that a social institution is legitimate one must show that it can be justified to each person affected by it on grounds which that person could not reasonably reject"

(184-185): it's the obligation of SI to offer agents 'reasonably favourable conditions' under which to make choices [and then, of course, we can hold them responsible. similar to Shelby's argument about the ghetto]

(189) [This then becomes a principle on the basis of which institutional arrangements are erected -- i.e., they should safeguard the value of choice]

(192-193): the 'forfeiture view' -- if alternative routes exist [depending, of course, on their quality or quantitiy] people cannot complain

(198) objective (primary goods) vs. subjective (preferences) measures of well-being [the question of responsibility for preferences arises here, to which GA Cohen has a response to Dworkin. 'expensive tastes' can not be punished if agent isn't responsible for them]


(203) the intentional infliction of harm (punishment) carries a heavy burden of justification [extraordinarily radical implications, I should think]

(208) Frankfurt's two drug addicts (one who has a second-order desire to resist his desire, one who doesn't), only the first is 'unfree' [unhelpful, but interesting]

(212) "to feel onself subject to moral blame is to be aware of a gap between the way one in fact decided what to do and the form of decision which others could reasonably demand'

(216) "Moral indignation towards lawbreakers is entirely in order, and the sufferings we inflict upon them may be justified. But in justifying these sufferings, and inflicting them, we have to say not 'You asked for this' but 'There for the grace of god go I.'

nagel, libertarianism without foundations (1975)

(137) Nozick offers no foundations for his defense of what he deems fundamental rights (to property, etc.). [right, they absolutely beg this foundation]

(140-141) Nozcik scales up from micro-inter-personal interactions to macro-generalizations about the world (a logically illegitimate technique, because a whole host of considerations are introduced)

(142) 'benefit to others, for Nozick, can never outweigh the cost to oneself [Nagel rightly insisting this is outrageous. millions starving can be Pareto optimal, which is an absurd def of justice]

(148) Nagel arguing, though, that the arbitrariness of inequality is not sufficient grounds to object to it [I disagree. provided we begin with our bare-bones premise]

scanlon, nozick on rights, liberty and property (1976)

(4) historical (depends on how something came about) vs. end-state/patterned (targetd)
conceptions of justice

(5) for Nozick, any voluntary transfer is 'just,' irrespective of patterns that result (thus, his conception of justice is historical and unpatterned)

(9) one of four justifications of egalitarianism -- 'all differences in treatment require justification' [absolutely. based on bare-bones premise that we are undeniably all human]

(13) nozick's objection to 'unfreedom' of workers on low wages-metaphor is marrying an unattractive bride [the obvious failing here is that only human action can be a source of unfreedom. can't be social institutions. and here, too, there is the implicit importing in of limits of what's possible (i.e. not everyone can be attractive). but, certainly, everyone can have a lovely standard of living, so the comparison is moot]

(17) actual consent vs. hypothetical consent

(19) consent can't rule considerations of justice

(23) in Locke, the justification of perperty rights is limited to what's needed to store up 'conveniences of life' [hmm, interesting]

sanyal, review of humeira iqtidar

(2) key claim is that individual, unmeidated understanding of qur'an empowers individual. empowers, in fact, women whose membership inthese organization can widen option and life trajectories [problem, of course, is that this only works as a negative corrective to militant liberals. there is still an obvious problem of freedom limitation in this process]

ben selwyn, gershcenkorn and trotsky (2012)

(426) institutional innovation enables adoption of technology, its not a given

(429) backwardness generates an industrial response (Gerschenkron)

(433) elements of Nazi ideology present in Junkers' attempt to win over peasantry

(436) Gerschenkron saw principal barriers as internal--but political sovereignty and w-system are important, obv. 

(439) Gershenkron's c-tendencies anticipate cumulative causation

(444) Chang and company are guilty of the 'fallacy of composition' because they don't quite acknowledge that conditions change (i.e., become more exacting) as time and the world-system advances

guy robinson, philosophy and mystification


essay 1 

(5) vs. social constructivists--our 'inputs' are products of our own tussle w/ nature (no 'starting point')

(5) against 'foundationalism

(5-6) nature/material world <--> human history (superior to both idealism and ahistorical materialism)

essay 2

(9) against 'empiricism'--without sociall-given categories or capacities, we wouldn't be able to process the world
 

post, what is left of leninism (2012)

(2-3) three waves of struggle: early 1890s, 1905-1907, 1912-1914

(3) metal workers particularly important to revolutionary LW of social democracy

(3): reformism is not the struggle for reforms, but the substitution of routinized bargaining for mass struggle

(6) SD key difference w/ Bolsheviks was not aspiration to build a different kind of praty, but fact that they built in different conditions. b/c of absence of parliamentary institutions, official co-optation of Bolsheviks was not possible

(7) 'left communism' in post-WWI Communist movement was a reaction to the routinization of SD

(7) minority went into the 3rd international; most of pre-war Left remained on the LW of SD (France, Italy, USPD). at least until '20-'21, with the turn towards UF and efforts to bring these elements into Comintern

(8) pre 1924-1925 Leninism just meant organization of rev workers against officaldom

(9) after 1935, Communist parties adopted the political strategy of SD, as well as its social composition. and all w/o internal dem norms [Hmm]

(10) [seems far too unfair a portrait of CP's, because it can't account for resilience]

(11) SD strategy of CP's was exposed in mid-60s, as slowdown --> struggle (1968-1974) [definitely true]

(14) efforts to build new parties in 60s/70s w/ radicalizing workers were ultimately unsuccessful because of the reduced size/weakness of militant minorities [this, of course, begs its ownquestion]

(19) revival of 'rational core' of Leninism is the goal 

acemoglu et. al., the consequences of radical reform (2009)

(4) effects of FR were positive, but didn't show up till 1850 [mechanisms in this argument are essentially Smithian--freeing of people from 'fetters']

(5) Radical reforms can be more efficacious than limited reforms [responding to Burkean wisdom]

(7) [Terrible lit review!]

(9) Guild restrictions as 'fetters'

(13) in most places Napoleon made 'a genunine attempt' to implement reforms

(22) postivie effects started showing by 1900, process kicked in by 1850 [difficulty is that there were a series of political upheavals before this--admittedly, they attempt to control for varoius things. but they don't control for impact of 1848 rev. too much happens in the interim]

(31) [Data hardly supports the notions that fetters were 'burst']