(...) It was netinvestment in the private sector that was once the major driver of the capitalist economy, absorbing a growing economic surplus. It was relatively high net private non-residential fixed investment (together with military-oriented government spending) that helped to create and sustain the “Golden Age” of the 1960s. The faltering of such investment (as a percent of GDP) in the early 1970s (with brief exceptions in the late 1970s–early 1980s, and late 1990s), signaled that the economy was unable to absorb all of the investment-seeking surplus that it was generating, and thus marked the onset of deepening stagnation in the real economy of goods and services. The whole problem has gotten worse over time. Nine out of the ten years with the lowest net non-residential fixed investment as a percent of GDP over the last half century (up through 2006) were in the 1990s and 2000s. Between 1986 and 2006, in only one year—2000, just before the stock market crash—did the percent of GDP represented by net private non-residential fixed investment reach the average for 1960–79 (4.2 percent). This failure to invest is clearly not due to a lack of investment-seeking surplus. One indicator of this is that corporations are now sitting on a mountain of cash—in excess of $600 billion in corporate savings that have built up at the same time that investment has been declining due to a lack of profitable outlets. What has mainly kept things from getting worse in the last few decades as a result of the decline of net investment and limits on civilian government spending has been soaring finance. This has provided a considerable outlet for economic surplus in what is called FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate), employing many new people in this non-productive sector of the economy, while also indirectly stimulating demand through the impact of asset appreciation (the wealth effect).
collected snippets of immediate importance...

Thursday, October 30, 2008
Not just mortgage lenders and subprime borrowers were caught up in the frenzy. A growing crowd of real estate speculators got into the business of buying houses in order to sell them off at higher prices. Many homeowners also began to view the rapid increase in the value of their homes as natural and permanent, and took advantage of low interest rates to refinance and withdraw cash value from their homes. This was a way to maintain or increase consumption levels despite stagnant wages for most workers. At the height of the bubble new mortgage borrowing increased by $1.11 trillion between October and December 2005 alone, bringing outstanding mortgage debt as a whole to $8.66 trillion, equal to 69.4 percent of U.S. GDP.
(...) It was netinvestment in the private sector that was once the major driver of the capitalist economy, absorbing a growing economic surplus. It was relatively high net private non-residential fixed investment (together with military-oriented government spending) that helped to create and sustain the “Golden Age” of the 1960s. The faltering of such investment (as a percent of GDP) in the early 1970s (with brief exceptions in the late 1970s–early 1980s, and late 1990s), signaled that the economy was unable to absorb all of the investment-seeking surplus that it was generating, and thus marked the onset of deepening stagnation in the real economy of goods and services. The whole problem has gotten worse over time. Nine out of the ten years with the lowest net non-residential fixed investment as a percent of GDP over the last half century (up through 2006) were in the 1990s and 2000s. Between 1986 and 2006, in only one year—2000, just before the stock market crash—did the percent of GDP represented by net private non-residential fixed investment reach the average for 1960–79 (4.2 percent). This failure to invest is clearly not due to a lack of investment-seeking surplus. One indicator of this is that corporations are now sitting on a mountain of cash—in excess of $600 billion in corporate savings that have built up at the same time that investment has been declining due to a lack of profitable outlets. What has mainly kept things from getting worse in the last few decades as a result of the decline of net investment and limits on civilian government spending has been soaring finance. This has provided a considerable outlet for economic surplus in what is called FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate), employing many new people in this non-productive sector of the economy, while also indirectly stimulating demand through the impact of asset appreciation (the wealth effect).
(...) It was netinvestment in the private sector that was once the major driver of the capitalist economy, absorbing a growing economic surplus. It was relatively high net private non-residential fixed investment (together with military-oriented government spending) that helped to create and sustain the “Golden Age” of the 1960s. The faltering of such investment (as a percent of GDP) in the early 1970s (with brief exceptions in the late 1970s–early 1980s, and late 1990s), signaled that the economy was unable to absorb all of the investment-seeking surplus that it was generating, and thus marked the onset of deepening stagnation in the real economy of goods and services. The whole problem has gotten worse over time. Nine out of the ten years with the lowest net non-residential fixed investment as a percent of GDP over the last half century (up through 2006) were in the 1990s and 2000s. Between 1986 and 2006, in only one year—2000, just before the stock market crash—did the percent of GDP represented by net private non-residential fixed investment reach the average for 1960–79 (4.2 percent). This failure to invest is clearly not due to a lack of investment-seeking surplus. One indicator of this is that corporations are now sitting on a mountain of cash—in excess of $600 billion in corporate savings that have built up at the same time that investment has been declining due to a lack of profitable outlets. What has mainly kept things from getting worse in the last few decades as a result of the decline of net investment and limits on civilian government spending has been soaring finance. This has provided a considerable outlet for economic surplus in what is called FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate), employing many new people in this non-productive sector of the economy, while also indirectly stimulating demand through the impact of asset appreciation (the wealth effect).
In much of the Western world the rate of profit of non-financial corporations fell steeply between 1950–73 and 2000–06—in the US, by roughly a quarter. In response, firms ‘invested’ increasingly in financial speculation, and the us government helped offset the resulting shortfall of non-residential private investment by boosting military spending (the Pentagon’s annual budget happens to be around the same as the figure put on the Treasury’s recent rescue plan).

(...) For a decade, the combined tails of the housing market and financial sector have wagged the dog of the British economy. As in the us, consumption grew much faster than gdp, financed by rising debt, thanks to booming house prices. A grateful electorate returned the Labour government to office twice in a row.

(...) For a decade, the combined tails of the housing market and financial sector have wagged the dog of the British economy. As in the us, consumption grew much faster than gdp, financed by rising debt, thanks to booming house prices. A grateful electorate returned the Labour government to office twice in a row.
Labels:
capitalist crisis,
debt,
facts,
keynes,
neo-liberalism
Friday’s currency turmoil and stock market plunge was a case of the chickens coming home to roost from the class-war policies being waged by European and Asian industry and banking squeezing their domestic consumer markets – that is, labor’s living standards – in favor of export production to the United States. The internal contradiction in this industrial and financial class warfare is now clear: To the extent that it succeeds in depressing labor’s income, it stifles the domestic consumer-goods market. This disrupts Say’s Law – the principle that “production creates its own demand,” based on the assumption that employees will (or must) be paid enough to buy what they produce.
(...) This is not to say that no class warfare is being fought in the United States. Indeed, living standards for most wage earners today are down from the “golden age” of the late 1970s. But the U.S. economy had its own financial deus ex machina to soften the blow: Alan Greenspan’s asset-price inflation that flooded the banks with credit, which was lent out to homebuyers and stock market raiders. Rising home prices were applauded as “wealth creation” as if they were a pure asset, much like dividends suddenly being awarded to one’s savings account. Homebuyers were encouraged to “cash out” on the rising “equity” margin, the (temporarily) rising market price of their homes over and above their (permanent) mortgage debt. So while most mortgage money was used to bid up the price of home ownership, about a quarter of new lending was reported to be spent on consumption goods. Credit card debt also soared. In the face of a paycheck squeeze, U.S. consumers were maintaining their living standards by running further and further into debt.
(...) To understand the dynamics at work, one needs to look at the balance of payments – not so much the balance of trade itself, but the currency speculation, international lending and arbitrage that has dominated exchange rates over the past two decades. Exchange rates no longer reflect relative wage levels, “purchasing power parity” or living costs as in times past. Today, they reflect the flow of international borrowing where interest rates are low and lending at a markup where credit is tight – and then hedging this arbitrage, and jumping on the bandwagon to speculate on which way currencies will go.
(...) [carry trade] Hundreds of billions of dollars, euros and sterling worth of yen were borrowed and duly converted into foreign currencies to lend out at a markup. Arbitrageurs made billions by acting as financial intermediaries making income on the margin between low yen-borrowing costs and high foreign-currency interest rates. As Ambrose Evans-Pritchard wrote over a year ago in the Financial Times, “the Bank of Japan held interest rates at zero for six years until July 2006 to stave off deflation. Even now, rates are still just 0.5 per cent. It also injected some $12bn liquidity every month by printing money to buy bonds. The net effect has been a massive leakage of money into the global economy. Faced with a pitiful yield at home, Japan's funds and thrifty grannies shoveled savings abroad. Banks, hedge funds, and the proverbial Mrs Watanabe, were all able to borrow for near nothing in Tokyo to snap up assets across the globe. BNP Paribas estimates this "carry trade" to be $1,200bn.”
(...) As global currency markets no longer provide the easy pickings of the last decade, the yen carry trade is being wound down. This involves converting Icelandic currency, euros, sterling and other non-Japanese currencies back into yen to settle the debts owed to Japanese banks. This repayment – and hence re-conversion into yen – is pushing the yen’s price up. This threatens to make Japanese exports higher-priced in terms of dollars, euros and sterling. Last week, Sony forecast that its earnings will fall as a result, and other Japanese companies face a similar squeeze in sales, not only from rising yen/dollar prices but from the global slowdown resulting from two decades of pro-financial anti-labor economic policies.
(...) The soaring yen and plunging foreign currency rates are the result of unwinding the Japanese “carry trade” strategy to rescue its banks. Japanese industry will pay the bill. And despite the fall in sterling and the euro, Europe’s policy of emphasizing exports to the American market rather than to sell to its own domestic labor force looks pretty bad in view of the imminent economic slowdown in store. U.S. consumer spending and living standards will have to fall – and it seems, to fall sharply – in order to finance the “trickle down” economy at the top. Current Treasury policy is to bail out the creditors, not the debtors. The banks are being saved, but not U.S. industry, and certainly not the U.S. wage earner/consumer. Instead of pursuing a Keynesian type of deficit spending in a manner that will increase employment (government spending on goods and services, infrastructure spending and transfer payments), the Treasury and Federal Reserve are providing money to the banks to buy each other up, consolidating the U.S. financial system into a European-type system with only a few major banks. The financial system is to become monopolized and trustified, reversing two centuries of economic policy aimed at preventing financial dominance of the economy.
(...) Seeing the imminent shrinkage of the U.S. market, lenders and investors are dumping their shares, not only those of U.S. firms but also stocks in European and Asian export sectors. This is the “inner contradiction” of today’s financial rescue operation. Finance itself cannot survive in the face of a stifled domestic “real” economy.
(...) [the crux] So the world ought to be at an ideological turning point. But the last thing that Europe’s oligarchy wants to see is higher labor standards. Nor does the U.S. financial class. Europe and Asia put their faith in a U.S. consumer-goods market rather than their own. The U.S. financial sector found this appealing as long as consumption was financed by running into debt, not by workers earning more money or paying lower taxes. Industrial and political leaders throughout the world have been so anti-labor that there is little thought of raising domestic living standards via higher wage levels and a tax shift off labor and industry back onto property where progressive tax policies used to be based.
(...) As foreign exporters are rudely awakened the dream of an American demand, when will the point come at which Europe and Asia seek to build up their own domestic consumer markets as an alternative? The first problem is to overcome the ideological bias in which central bankers are indoctrinated, in a world where politicians have relinquished economic policy to bankers trained in Chicago School financial warfare against labor and even against industry. It probably is too much to hope that today’s European central bankers and kindred economic managers will drop their neoliberal anti-labor ideology and see that without a thriving domestic market, their own industrial firms will languish. The solution must come from a revived political sector representing the interests of labor, and even of industry itself as it sees the need to revive domestic markets.
(...) This is not to say that no class warfare is being fought in the United States. Indeed, living standards for most wage earners today are down from the “golden age” of the late 1970s. But the U.S. economy had its own financial deus ex machina to soften the blow: Alan Greenspan’s asset-price inflation that flooded the banks with credit, which was lent out to homebuyers and stock market raiders. Rising home prices were applauded as “wealth creation” as if they were a pure asset, much like dividends suddenly being awarded to one’s savings account. Homebuyers were encouraged to “cash out” on the rising “equity” margin, the (temporarily) rising market price of their homes over and above their (permanent) mortgage debt. So while most mortgage money was used to bid up the price of home ownership, about a quarter of new lending was reported to be spent on consumption goods. Credit card debt also soared. In the face of a paycheck squeeze, U.S. consumers were maintaining their living standards by running further and further into debt.
(...) To understand the dynamics at work, one needs to look at the balance of payments – not so much the balance of trade itself, but the currency speculation, international lending and arbitrage that has dominated exchange rates over the past two decades. Exchange rates no longer reflect relative wage levels, “purchasing power parity” or living costs as in times past. Today, they reflect the flow of international borrowing where interest rates are low and lending at a markup where credit is tight – and then hedging this arbitrage, and jumping on the bandwagon to speculate on which way currencies will go.
(...) [carry trade] Hundreds of billions of dollars, euros and sterling worth of yen were borrowed and duly converted into foreign currencies to lend out at a markup. Arbitrageurs made billions by acting as financial intermediaries making income on the margin between low yen-borrowing costs and high foreign-currency interest rates. As Ambrose Evans-Pritchard wrote over a year ago in the Financial Times, “the Bank of Japan held interest rates at zero for six years until July 2006 to stave off deflation. Even now, rates are still just 0.5 per cent. It also injected some $12bn liquidity every month by printing money to buy bonds. The net effect has been a massive leakage of money into the global economy. Faced with a pitiful yield at home, Japan's funds and thrifty grannies shoveled savings abroad. Banks, hedge funds, and the proverbial Mrs Watanabe, were all able to borrow for near nothing in Tokyo to snap up assets across the globe. BNP Paribas estimates this "carry trade" to be $1,200bn.”
(...) As global currency markets no longer provide the easy pickings of the last decade, the yen carry trade is being wound down. This involves converting Icelandic currency, euros, sterling and other non-Japanese currencies back into yen to settle the debts owed to Japanese banks. This repayment – and hence re-conversion into yen – is pushing the yen’s price up. This threatens to make Japanese exports higher-priced in terms of dollars, euros and sterling. Last week, Sony forecast that its earnings will fall as a result, and other Japanese companies face a similar squeeze in sales, not only from rising yen/dollar prices but from the global slowdown resulting from two decades of pro-financial anti-labor economic policies.
(...) The soaring yen and plunging foreign currency rates are the result of unwinding the Japanese “carry trade” strategy to rescue its banks. Japanese industry will pay the bill. And despite the fall in sterling and the euro, Europe’s policy of emphasizing exports to the American market rather than to sell to its own domestic labor force looks pretty bad in view of the imminent economic slowdown in store. U.S. consumer spending and living standards will have to fall – and it seems, to fall sharply – in order to finance the “trickle down” economy at the top. Current Treasury policy is to bail out the creditors, not the debtors. The banks are being saved, but not U.S. industry, and certainly not the U.S. wage earner/consumer. Instead of pursuing a Keynesian type of deficit spending in a manner that will increase employment (government spending on goods and services, infrastructure spending and transfer payments), the Treasury and Federal Reserve are providing money to the banks to buy each other up, consolidating the U.S. financial system into a European-type system with only a few major banks. The financial system is to become monopolized and trustified, reversing two centuries of economic policy aimed at preventing financial dominance of the economy.
(...) Seeing the imminent shrinkage of the U.S. market, lenders and investors are dumping their shares, not only those of U.S. firms but also stocks in European and Asian export sectors. This is the “inner contradiction” of today’s financial rescue operation. Finance itself cannot survive in the face of a stifled domestic “real” economy.
(...) [the crux] So the world ought to be at an ideological turning point. But the last thing that Europe’s oligarchy wants to see is higher labor standards. Nor does the U.S. financial class. Europe and Asia put their faith in a U.S. consumer-goods market rather than their own. The U.S. financial sector found this appealing as long as consumption was financed by running into debt, not by workers earning more money or paying lower taxes. Industrial and political leaders throughout the world have been so anti-labor that there is little thought of raising domestic living standards via higher wage levels and a tax shift off labor and industry back onto property where progressive tax policies used to be based.
(...) As foreign exporters are rudely awakened the dream of an American demand, when will the point come at which Europe and Asia seek to build up their own domestic consumer markets as an alternative? The first problem is to overcome the ideological bias in which central bankers are indoctrinated, in a world where politicians have relinquished economic policy to bankers trained in Chicago School financial warfare against labor and even against industry. It probably is too much to hope that today’s European central bankers and kindred economic managers will drop their neoliberal anti-labor ideology and see that without a thriving domestic market, their own industrial firms will languish. The solution must come from a revived political sector representing the interests of labor, and even of industry itself as it sees the need to revive domestic markets.
With soldiers under intense pressure in recent years to register combat kills to earn promotions and benefits like time off and extra pay, reports of civilian killings are climbing, prosecutors and researchers say, pointing to a facet of Colombia’s long internal war against leftist insurgencies.
(...) Reports of civilian killings rose to 287 from mid-2006 to mid-2007, up from 267 in the same period a year earlier and 218 the year before that, said the Colombian Commission of Jurists, a Bogotá human rights group.
(...) Reports of civilian killings rose to 287 from mid-2006 to mid-2007, up from 267 in the same period a year earlier and 218 the year before that, said the Colombian Commission of Jurists, a Bogotá human rights group.
Labels:
alvaro uribe,
colombia,
facts,
FARC,
war of terror,
war on drugs
Tuesday, October 28, 2008
Lord Keynes held forth (his wife, the prima donna ballerina Lydia Lopolava was the rage at Bretton Woods). He had not wanted to invite the rest of the world, as it were. They, he wrote acidly, “clearly have nothing to contribute and will merely encumber the ground.” If they were allowed, the Bretton Woods conference would be “the most monstrous monkey-house assembled for years.” There was only one woman at the table, Mabel Newcomer (a Vassar Professor of Economics). The delegates from the darker nations could not help set the agenda, for the few that came where were there at the sufferance of their colonial masters (such as the Indians and the Filipinos) , while the free people (such as some Latin Americans and the Chinese) were shown the door when the real deliberations began. The Chinese delegate, to be fair, was Dr. H. H. Kung, a descendant of Confucius and husband of Ailing (“Pleasant”) Soong (whose sisters had married Dr. Sun Yat Sen and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek). The richest man in China at that time, Kung didn’t seem to do much to pave the way for the reconstruction of a devastated Chinese mainland.
(...) The delegates from afar had to be there in the Gold Room to put their impressions on the final communiqué. No surprise then that the two major institutions that came out of Bretton Woods, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), had to be run by an European or an American respectively. No-one else would have a turn. Keynes’ disdain for those not like himself was shared by others, and it was this that moved them to disenfranchise the world from the governance of the IMF and the WB (the main votes on their Boards of Executive Directors are held by the U. S. and Europe). The silence of the colonized and semi-colonized meant that the new monetary policies favored those who had already seized the world’s wealth, and the trade policies that followed set inequality in stone. Chastened by the economic warfare of the 1920s and 1930s that not only brought on the hostilities of World War II, but also contributed to the prolongation of the Depression, the major powers now created a currency regime that would be less volatile. The WB was created to help manage the reconstruction of war ravaged Europe (not Asia, nor Africa, both also burnt to the crisp by European ambitions). The IMF emerged as an institution to tide over countries that had a balance of payments or short-term liquidity problem. There is no mandate to poverty reduction or to the elimination of the vast global inequalities that marked the end of the colonial era. The IMF and the WB were institutions for the maintenance of colonial domination by other means.
(...) The delegates from afar had to be there in the Gold Room to put their impressions on the final communiqué. No surprise then that the two major institutions that came out of Bretton Woods, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), had to be run by an European or an American respectively. No-one else would have a turn. Keynes’ disdain for those not like himself was shared by others, and it was this that moved them to disenfranchise the world from the governance of the IMF and the WB (the main votes on their Boards of Executive Directors are held by the U. S. and Europe). The silence of the colonized and semi-colonized meant that the new monetary policies favored those who had already seized the world’s wealth, and the trade policies that followed set inequality in stone. Chastened by the economic warfare of the 1920s and 1930s that not only brought on the hostilities of World War II, but also contributed to the prolongation of the Depression, the major powers now created a currency regime that would be less volatile. The WB was created to help manage the reconstruction of war ravaged Europe (not Asia, nor Africa, both also burnt to the crisp by European ambitions). The IMF emerged as an institution to tide over countries that had a balance of payments or short-term liquidity problem. There is no mandate to poverty reduction or to the elimination of the vast global inequalities that marked the end of the colonial era. The IMF and the WB were institutions for the maintenance of colonial domination by other means.
Labels:
bretton woods,
capitalism,
colonialism,
debt crisis,
keynes,
neo-colonialism
Not quite three trillion dollars in hedge funds, or $2.848.000.000.000? So claims Investors Offshore. Although such a sum may sound enormous and indeed amounts to more than twenty percent of the entire GDP of the European Union, it is modest compared to the real private money that is out there. Merrill-Lynch and Cap Gemini have recently published their twelfth annual World Wealth Report , a trustworthy source given that Merrill-Lynch wants to manage as much wealth as possible and therefore has an interest in getting the figures right. Their Report for 2008 counts a shade over ten million "High Net Worth Individuals" in the world-about one in every 670 people. These HNWIs, including the far richer and more exclusive group of "Ultra-HNWIs", in 2007 together controlled $40.7 trillion, that is, $40.700.000.000.000.
(...) The main WIDER findings were not surprising for those who have studied the subject: In the year 2000, 2 percent of adults in the world owned more than half of global household wealth. The richest 1 percent alone accounted for the ownership of 40 percent of global assets while the top 5 percent captured 71 percent and the top 10 percent held 85 percent of the wealth. The bottom half of humanity got along on barely 1 percent of total assets. These figures show the operation of the power law in high gear, especially since the WIDER definition of "wealth" was broader than that of Merrill-Lynch. The WIDER scholars used the classic "net worth" definition, meaning all physical and financial assets, including homes, the principle asset for most people who own anything, less debts.
(...) The main WIDER findings were not surprising for those who have studied the subject: In the year 2000, 2 percent of adults in the world owned more than half of global household wealth. The richest 1 percent alone accounted for the ownership of 40 percent of global assets while the top 5 percent captured 71 percent and the top 10 percent held 85 percent of the wealth. The bottom half of humanity got along on barely 1 percent of total assets. These figures show the operation of the power law in high gear, especially since the WIDER definition of "wealth" was broader than that of Merrill-Lynch. The WIDER scholars used the classic "net worth" definition, meaning all physical and financial assets, including homes, the principle asset for most people who own anything, less debts.
Labels:
european union,
inequality,
neo-liberalism,
wealth inequality
Monday, October 27, 2008
U.S. military and CIA drones that patrol the frontier region are believed to have carried out at least 15 strikes since August. The United States rarely confirms or denies involvement.
(or)
As with most of the previous attacks, yesterday's strike appeared to have failed to hit high value targets, initial reports said. Just one of the 18 attacks carried out in recent weeks is said to have killed a major al-Qa'ida figure. The rest claimed mostly civilian lives, provoking greater hostility towards Washington.
(or)
As with most of the previous attacks, yesterday's strike appeared to have failed to hit high value targets, initial reports said. Just one of the 18 attacks carried out in recent weeks is said to have killed a major al-Qa'ida figure. The rest claimed mostly civilian lives, provoking greater hostility towards Washington.
Labels:
facts,
fata,
imperialism,
nwfp,
Pakistan,
US meddling
Friday, October 24, 2008
Thursday, October 16, 2008
Wednesday, October 15, 2008
Tuesday, October 14, 2008
Labels:
ahtisaari,
boris yeltsin,
imperialism,
kosovo,
nato,
nobel peace prize,
US meddling,
yugoslavia
Wednesday, October 1, 2008
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