heper and evin, state democracy and the military: turkey in the 1980s


(83): effect of political system was to re-found party system on a modern footing


(138): Menderes was an expression of non-urban elite discomfort of secularist-statis turn; military was unfriendly to landed elite who were culturally more conservative


(164-165): [from William Hale article] young officers marginalized in later coup, precisely because of 'coup within a coup' fears

the political economy of turkish democracy, caglar keyder (1979)

(4) key argument is the absence of a hereditary aristocracy; it was politically expropriated by the bureaucratic elite (beginning of its dissolution in the late 19th century, with the Tanzimat reforms)

(5) weak landlord class

(7) w/ independence in 1923, there was the birth of a new bourgeoisie

(7) key--those who had benefited from the explusion of the Greeks and the Armenians (who were merchants and rich peasants, respectively) were the social basis of Turkish nationalism

(9-10) the independence movement was categorically not a social revolution, no fundamental change in the economic structure

(9) Kemalism was a partial break from original ideology of CUP period


(12) Kemal's reforms in the 1920s sought to imitate the superstructure of Western modernity, and he was forced to defend these against the peasantry. Probably made easier by healthy state of economy

(13-14) from the 1930s to WWII, v. close to fascism in its essentials, though (!) it lacked a popular base. 'only repression kept the regime intact'

(15) almost half of trade in 1936 conducted w/ Germany

(15-18) in mid-1930s, conscious prioritization of industry; landowners and m-peasantry suffering, which would become basis of DP. rooted in landlords, m-peasantry, and some disaffected bourgeoisie

(19) most vilalges had v. few landlords, mostly poor-mid peasants

(20) key claim--relative 'success' of democracy was based on (1) absence of aristocracy; (2) millions of middle peasants

(23) in 30s/40s/50s, Turkey marked by scarcity of foreign capital

(25) May 1960 coup in context of (1) student movement; (2) support of urban intelligentsia; (3) DP authoritarianism

(26) in 1961, RPP got same number of votes as in 1957 (residual sympathy for the DP, after assasination)

(28): key--Turkey's unique democracy was b/c of (1) large small-holding peasantry; (2) absence of foreign capital, and, w/ 1960s, (3) stalemate between fractions of the bourgeoisie (i.e., agrarian capitalists vs. commercial bourgeoisie)

(30): March 1971 to Oct 1973 coup, followed massive workers' demo in June 1970

(31): motivated, at least partly, by a clash between big capital and small capital--over control of Chambers of Commerce, etc.

(31): by 1970s, easy phase of ISI coming to an end

(32) 'petty bourgeois radicalism' had a hand to play in this. idea that radical schemes could be passed through the military.

(34) key--Army driven out of political life b/c (1) continuing strength of military reformist tradition, which respects constitution. recrutiment from lower-class milieu, rather than landowning aristocracy; (2) credibility of political parties

(36-40): RPP becoming more radical, winning some w-class support. but not quite a SD party



(

R. Walker, "Putting Capital In Its Place" (1999)

(264) ability to pay high wages = 1. productivity + 2. w-class capacity + 3. politics of labour (social contract, etc.) + 4. profit on investment + 5. condition of place

(264) we are very far from living in a low-cost world--still serious c-tendencies

(266) there are place-specific assets

(267) obv--not all industry has moved to Haiti, yet

(268) agglomeration economies

(269) cheap labour competition is an issue, but a minor one

(269-270) what matters are unit costs: wages x productivity (Germany at 80% of Us, Japan at 50% of US in 1980s)

(272) It's the success of the NIC's that has raised the spectre of 'cheap labour'

(273-274) immigration is a small proportion of the labour force; except in exceptional cases, difficult to see how they could bring down wages (think, also, that immigration to US was highest during first boom, and was cut off only in the 20s)

(277) low-road capitalisms have done well, on occasion, but never matched records of their high road rivals

(278) investment drives productivity growth (w/o determining it entirely, of course)

(279) Japan went to SE Asia (partly) in reaction to US attempts to protect domestic manufacturing in 1985

(280) servioces grew most because the rate of profit there has held up the best

(280) overcapacity in the world economy as fundamental cause of slowdown

 (281) for Europe and Japan post-WWII, not high nor low road, but 'divided highway' (i.e., some of their competitive advantage did come from low wage costs)
 

Walker, "A Requiem for Corporate Geography" (1989)

(44) Myrdal's influence on location theory through concept of 'cumulative causation'

(46) in contrast to classic theory, the calculus of large firms is basically indistinguishable from small firms [part of the attempt to recenter discussions on the economy/capitalism, away from firm parameters]

(47) organizational characteristics also don't change parameters of firm calculus (again, beyond corporate geography)

(50) corporate goegraphers promote 'industrial organization' over processes of industrialization [reminder that you can't escape capitalism]

(53) neoclassicals smuugle everythin in through the back door--everything important that affects/defines production is exogenous to their model, in effect

(53) 'efficacy' vs. 'cost efficiency'

(57) wide variety of organizational forms can work

(60) against 'uneven development', no notion of fixed hierarchy of places

(62-63) 'affection for petty bourgeois palliatives (i.e., small business, etc.)--need, in short, for a more "capacious socialist agenda"

 

walker, "geography of production" (2000)

(14) including everything manufacture-like not classified as such, estimates are 40-50% of total labour force

(119) skyscrapers as 20th century's 'dark satanic mills'

(119) workplace integration presents various advantages, but doesn't mean you need River Rouge -- 'importance of factory as a business strategy' diminishing..

(120) "no single best solution" [the problem, here, is that this becomes just a nice way of saying you have nothing to say]

(123) industrial location is not about pre-given costs, but about creating systems of innovation, etc.

(126) technological development has its own logic, dependent on the industry/sector (i.e., mechanization in agriculture is different from mechanization in healthcare)

justice as equality, christopher ake (1975)

(71) justice is to be understood as complete equality in benefits and burdens (it can, of course, be traded for other social virtues)

(76-77) Barry's critiqeu of Rawls: difference principle is not about justice, exclusively, but actually incorporates considerations of welfare [the whole 'better off' bit]

(80) crux of the argument is that justice comes apart from other considerations; and that it absorbs common distributive maxims

(81) friend who finds book? reward only the one who found it, or the one who looked without finidng it? only the former, but this is because it's competition within the rules of a contest

(86) intentions matter to the extent that they reflect burdens borne [the danger, in all this, is that Ake's argument simply narrows what we use 'justice' to describe, w/o actually assisting in any solution to the problem of how to arrange institutions to fit intuitions]

(88) effort and need are not opposed criteria, on this conception--both are burdens that people bear

parasites, pimps, and capitalists: a naturalistic conception of exploitation, tommie shelby (2002)

(382) defending a nonmoral notion of exploitation

(389) 'outcome' model of parasitism--paraiste benefits, host is harmed vs. process model of parasitism--parasite scrounges on host's foraging efforts (i.e., distribution of benefits vs. how exploiters obtain benefits)

(393) 'basic structure of exploitation' (BSE): (a) if Y forced to make sacrifice which benefits X; (b) X obtains this advantage by virtue of some power over Y

(394-395) defining 'harm'/'sacrifice'  -- it can't be the case that it's only exploitation of the exploited gets no benefit, because there are examples of exploitative relationships in which the exploited gets some benefit (i.e., a wage, a gig, etc.) [seems to me you'll have to introduce some kind of counterfactual notion]

(397-398) the cause of compulsion need not be another agent--compulsion by circumstance can lead to 'opportunistic' compulsion [vs. Nozick]

(403) does Shaq exploit his opponents?

(403) domination and exploitation can come apart, at times

(404) for the MArxist concept, exploitative relationships need to be self-reproducing. in other words, add (c) to BSE's (a) and (b). (c) being that the relationship persists and is essential to reproduction

(408) sum of SER in Marxist terms [Shelby cashing this out w/o the LTV]

(412) surplus appropriation can be non-exploitative provided tht benefits don't accrue b/c of a group's power over productive resources

(413) conditions of SER (forced to do surplus labour) can be product of compulsion by circumstance, for sure

(413) opportunistic exploiters (capitalists who benefit from workers' double-freedom) vs. coercive exploiters (added dimensions of the pimp-prostitute relationship, etc.)

(416) three kinds of Marxist approaches to the problem of exploitaiton: (a) distributive, that exploitation unjustly distributes some important good; (b) principled, that exploitation violates some important principle; (c) nonmoral, which Shelby is arguing we should take seriously [the claim, again, is not that this undermines the moral critique of Marxists, just that the fact of exploitation can be established independent of its evaluation]

GA Cohen, Nozick and Wilt Chamberlain: How Patterns Preserve Liberty (1977)

(5) Nozick vs. Socialism: (1) Liberty is justice; (2) Socialism is incompatible w/ liberty [Cohen is going to agree w/ (1) and reject (2), whereas most take the tack of rejecting (2) but accepting (1)]

(7) for Nozick, 'voluntary self-enslavement' is not unjust [which has an appeal on our intuitions]

(8) key, the desires have to be somewhat sensible--the person can't be making an uninformed or coerced decision; it's disturbing if the decision is being made on false pretenses

(9) this begins to undermine the applicability of Nozick's principle to market-generated state of affairs [important, I think, also to stress the conditions under which the cdecision is being made]

(14) arguing re: change in human nature, under socialism [not the way to go]

(16) Nozick's argument prohibits any and all limitations on freedom (it's not a maximizing freedom argument). Justified via Kant

(19) Nozick: a person is not forced if all other people ar not focing [can't conceive of compulsion by circumstance]

(20) Farmer's fence and the villager example (the question, again, is whose freedom/liberty is being supported/maximized)

(21) if Z is unfree, then justice and freedom actually come apart (in other words he has to acknowledge, then, he's defending the freedom of a particular class as 'justice')

GA Cohen, LTV and explotiation

(338, thesis): don't need LTV ("mutual irrelevance"

(340) the substantive thesis of volume 1 is that (3) socially necessary labour time determines 'equilibrium price' (whether or not the definitional claim is (1) socially necessary labour time is value; or (2) value is equilibrium price)

(340) LTV does not give you LT of surplus-value

(341) nice, pithy statement of the 'origin of non-wage income'--""the difference between the value of labor power and the value produced by him/her in whom it inheres. it is the difference between the amount of time it takes to produce what is needed to keep a producer in being for a certain period and the amount of time he spends producing during that period"

(343) Traditional Marxist Argument leaves its moral premises unstates: (1) that one is entitled to the fruits of one's labour; (b) that one is 'forced' to enter into this relation

(344) You can drop the LT of SV from the account, because all you need is for the capitalist to accumulated some of the value produced by the worker for the TMA to be coherent

(346) strict vs. popular doctrine of LTV (hinging on whether labour is source of all value--can't be, if 'past labour' is involved)

(349) the objective here is to puncutre the 'pop idea of creating value', to show that, even according to LTV, labour does not create value

(352) Marx vs. Ricardo is a 'popular' distinction,

(354) exploitation is not about appropriation of value, but about the appropriation of the product

(354-355) Recall only labour is a producer (which is different from saying that labour is responsible for the production of all value) (take lending you a knife, as an example--productive activity vs. producing activity)

(356) Simpler Marxist Argument drops claims about (a) all value being created by labour; (b) value being what's appropriated

sachs and shatz, "trade and jobs in US manufacturing" (1994)

(3,4) sum of findings is that trade matters, but doesn't explain most of the job loss

(5) macroec summary (good data)

(5) Krugman and Lawrence say the 'trade --> decline in manufacturing' argument is spurious; for them, it's a success of productivity story [use]; this is generally correct, but the 70s and 80s were particularly sharp declines--an 'unexplained gap' of about 3 million jobs. the final estimate is that about 1.2 million of these job losses are explained by trade. 

(7) growing inequality between skilled and unskilled is an 80s phenomenon

(9) international trade would matter through putting pressure on output prices

(11) consistent with timing of trade with developing countries

(15) did lead to job losses [though this is rooted in what seems to me to be a particularly naive view of the labour market]

(16) capital flight (remember, trade model assumes immobile capital)

(17) table of skill deciles (ranked by ratio of productive/nonproductive workers)

(18) the US' basic relation with developing countries--the US exports h-skill, imports l-skioll

(21) w/ low wage countries trade is interindustry, w/ high wage countries intra-industry

(21) and because of this, lower job losses expected according to skill intensity [don't quite grasp logic]

(23) '78-'91, tarriffs were more intense on l-skill than high-skill industries; this pattern became slightly stronger in '91 than in '78

(25) decline in employment was clearly greatest in 'low-skill' secotrs

(23) skill-intensity of production rises in every decile

(26) employment fell most in (a) low skill sectors; (b) capital-intensive sectors [collinearity problems?]; fell least in (a) high-skill sectors

(28) c-factual model: rise in net imports resulted in 7.2 and 2.1 % job loss from developing countries

(30) certain industries experience declines unrelated to trade shifts (steel, in particular)

(34) Wood: "understating job loss by using average skill-intensity". but showing that this is not borne out by data

(34) manufacturing trends can't explain income inequality in US (mainly because of hos small a fraction of LF is in manufacturing)

(36-37) effective prices in low-skill goods fell vs. not fell (Sachs vs. Lawrence/Slaughter)

(40-41) Biased technical change--increase in proportion of skilled to nonskilled [v. strange assertion that this might raise the relative wage of low-skilled  workers--assuming full employment + all gains to worker?]

(44) TNC-based trade declined w/ developing countries, raised w/ developed countrieds

(46) factors that drive trade (can't trade w/ poor countries)

(52) China-US trade details

(54) wage gap at outset of trading ties was enormous! (1.9% of US wages)

Anderson, "Why Partition?" (2012) 

(2) Gandhi and 'Das Kapital'

(6) useful description of ML Weakness

(7) Nehru arrogance re: unity of India (when Congress was only 3% Muslim)

(8) from Muslims as trouble-makers (post-Mutiny), to Hindus (during nationalist movement), to Muslims (under Mountbatten) [this seems somewhat exaggerated, given the dividends of the ML posture during WWII]

(9) Labour committed to United India, for strategic reasons

(10) Jinnah couldn't sqaure the circle: how could a Muslim-majority 'secede'/be autonomous while also protecting Muslim minorities in the other provinces

(11) League talked of partition, prepared for confederation; Nehru talked of unity, prepared for secession (motivated by commitment to presiding over central State)

(11) Menon and Commonwealth

(12) NWFP was the only place that held a referendum

(12) Jinnah was willing to accept a United Bengal

(14) Redshirts boycotted referendum, angry at Congress' willingness to consider Partition

(14) great quote, re: partition from above: 'never did so few divide so many, so needlessly'

(15) more violence in Punjab than Bengal, though huge numbers crisscrossing inboth

(16) Partition as 'the single most contempible act..'

(16) 550 out of 560 of the native princes were Hindu potentates

(17) Kashmir as obscurantist feudal tyranny--death to Muslim peasants that killed cow, etc.

(17) Sheikh Abdullah regarded Jinnah an athiest

(20) Patel waving accession document, 'As if the fate of five million were a lottery ticket'

(20) Indian case rests on Sheikh Abdullah working w/ Nehru

(20) NWFP referendum [Anderson mentioning Pakistan won, but not at all mentioning the extremely reactionary ways in which ML persuaded poor villagers to vote]

(21) Gandhi treachery--Kashmir belongs to the Maharajah, etc., etc.

(22) 'Condition of Ambedkar's sanity was breaking with Hinduism', which Nehru didn't do [going a bit Dawkins on me?]

(23) 27,000 to 40,000 Muslims killed after Hyderabad invasion [!]

(23) Ratio of natives to colonials was highest in Raj (1:3,650 vs. 1:475 in Vietnam)

(24) Punjab was the British model--not 'divide-and-rule', but unite-the-reactionaries

(24) Gandhi 'injected' religion [but this is precisely how Jinnah built the base you're extolling]

(26) Congress' was a 'fatal partisan arrogance'

(27) [way too forgiving towards the ML]

(27) religious revivalism was inevitable--something to do with the 'deep culture' of this place [WTF is that about, Perry?]

Bruce Western, A Comparative Study of Working-Class Disorganization (1995)

(179, 197) institutions matter -- these countries were experiencing a common structural transformation, but they had divergent experiences -- > the transformations of institutions that protected class identities (centralized wage bargaining, SD parties) produced declining union density

(180) increased dispersion of union densities in post-war period

(180) strike wave of 1960s --> increase in union density of 15 pts (Western dismisses this, summarizing other arguments)

(181) Table of union densities [Graph this]

STRUCTURAL FACTORS

(181) [Assuming that trade is the context of the change in economic conditions that set the stage--there are echoes of Brenner here, but this narrative could be better, regardless]

(182) Freeman shows union decline rooted in employer resistance (recognition of elections, etc.)

(182) Flexible work --> decline in union density (except in Germany?)

LABOR MOVEMENT EXPLANATIONS


(182) where unions were strong, they stayed strong-- this is where they most successfully organized service sectors [though, as per the other article, service sector growth was not as important as it was in other countries]

(183) strike waves in Sweden and Denmark, 1979-1985, encouraged unionization [again, Western will dismiss this, partly on grounds that these don't distinguish between lockouts and strikes]

WESTERN'S INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS

(183) two-fold (a) decentralization of labor-market institutions; (b) decline of SD parties

(184) Table 2 --> decentralization of bargaining across much of Europe

(185) 'wage drift'

(186) Aroux laws under Mitterand, strengthening power of labour [hmm]

(186) four reasons decentralization leads to declining union density
(a) extends union wages to the unorganized, muting employer oppositoin (so, in the US, the higher the union wage premium, the more employer's will oppose unions) [good support for the Henwood line]
(b) weakens demand [?]
(c) weakens central confederations, in turn reducing movement's power to influence economic policy and increasing corporation-friendly policy
(d) interunion rivalry peaks

(187) SD lost power in Scandinavia, throughout the 1976-1991 period, as well as changing its character

(187) in US and UK, 'active union constraint'

(190) modeling 'first differences'/hazard rate

(192-194) finding that 'everything matters' (except strike rates)

(195) Sweden and Finland defy model's predictions

(196) institutional factors could be tied up with economic conditions, of course

(194) openness --> decline in density

Lee, "International Migration..." (2005)

(argument) Deindustrialization --> Decline in union density; Immigration --> Decline in union density

(72) end of centralized wage bargaining --> decline in union density

(75-76) reasonable summary of the debates on deindustrialization

(78) inflation --> unionization (spurs people to protect wages)

(79) 'Ghent system' has protected union density, in Scandinavian countries, etc.

(79) Immigration is significant

(80) Industrial employment is significant (but not trade)

(82) Institutional arrangements matter, of course [and this is where it would make sense to discuss the state of the labour movement, etc; as well as the question of why the Scandinavian countries have seen an explosion in union density despite deindustrialization]

Zolberg, Response to Tilly (1995)

(30) 'Demobilizing' effect of affluence

(31) Only place workers were a numerical majority was Belgium, 1900-1930 (Pzeworski argument, here)

(31) End of blue-collar worker --> End of electoral socialism (French, Italian CP's)

(32) No 'rebellion in the air' b/c of affluence

(34) Luebbert on 30s as key critical juncture for social democracy (farmer-labour alliances, etc.)

(35) 'Globalization' --> Institutional/political factors -->Effect on labour

(36) Capital flight was a game changer (US had experienced this internally, eralier, what with the consequences of federalism and race to the bottom in taxes)

iversen and cusack, the causes of welfare state expansion (2000)

(313) technology-induced structural transformations are what's at issue in discussions of de-industrialization

(315) in US, expansion of services faster than loss of traditional jobs [losses which look quite minimal, in comparison, because the recent peak was lower], so there's been employment growth

(316) the growth in transfers has been explained by endogenous employment loss, not "globalization"

(317): Rodrick: trade openness/globalization --> insecurity --> WS expansion

(318) domestic market volatility > international market volatility

(319) US is far and away least trade dependent of the OECD economices, yet has highest volatility (wage, output, employment) (volatility = std dev of wage/output/employment)

(320) no evidence that volatility is related to exposure to trade, nor evidence for capital mkt openness --> volatility

(321, FN 20) for less developed countriy, this relationship probably doesn't hold, because trade-dependence on primary goods brings volatility associated with primary goods

(321) Garrett operationalizes 'Left Labor power'

(324) Garrett: WS is compatible w/ globalization; Cusack and Iversen agree, but also want to insist that globalization is not what's responsible for it's expansion (which is what Garrett goes ahead and argues)

(325) mass sectoral shift to services, away from industry --> growth in transfers

(325) find little evidence for a 'pricing out' effect, from trade with LDC's [this is interesting, but needs more specification--disaggregate by industry, country, etc.]


 (325) w/o State intervention, transferability of skills > transferability of benefits (i.e., firms are never going to give benefits on a basis wider than the skills that their employee has. I will give firm-level benefits to extract firm-level skills, and to make sure that my worker is bound to me). when people loss a job and they have to transgress a skill boundary to seek benefits, the State has to step in (to re-skill, etc.)

(326) employers can support this because it minimizes risks of investing in nontransferable skills to workers, who are then more likely to get trained, etc. [perhaps understates employer's power over employee, but OK]

(328, 341-342) the rise and fall of industry as % of the population in the US is much smaller than elsewhere (the amplitude is higher in all late industrializers, for understandable reasons--given the period that we're looking at)

(329, 334) WS expansion can be more or less egalitarian depending on political parameters--partisan effects matter

(332-334) findings

(337) US/Canada/etc. are more effective at generative service self-employment because of wage disperson (i.e., inequality). Where you have centralized bargaining, these sectors don't grow as fast [their argument involves growth of productivity, etc., but I might be missing something b/c this seems clear-cut example of sectors growing that are parasitic on rich people's ability to live luxuriously]

sakallioglu, "the anatomy..." (1997)

(152) 'professionalism' predisposes the military to political influence (Stepan vs. Huntington)

(153) Turkish military intervention in politics as a subtler form of 'indirect influence' --not the kind of direct influence seen in Thailand or Indonesia (a kind that respects civil-military boundaries, etc.)  [to be distinguished, also, from Pakistan, then?]

(154) 1982 constitution gives the military veto power

(154) 1971 and 1980, the military had a small # of allies (vs 1960); it was "at a distance from the rest of society" [this could form part of the argument about lacking a domestic constituency]

(155) 60s gov't relented to challenge military prerogatives

(157) 1980s, various constitutional interventions further entrenched military's autonomous powers--the evolution of the National Security Council was case-in-point; also, the office of the President [again, praetorian like Pakistan?]

(158-159) Evolution of COS position (towards greater autonomy)

(161) NIA (like the ISI) had considerable powers; though not quite a "state within a state"

(162) military's influence becoming even more pronounced; 1980s interventions were 'more authoritarian than ever before' [much of the explanation has to relate to this argument about the lack of domestic allies. though, again, the lack of domestic allies is twinned to the fact that people remain more trusting of the military than of civilian elites]

tanel demirel, "soldiers and civilians" (2010)

(127, 131) blaming soldiers' self-perception

(129) 1923-1945, single-party regime under RPP; 1945, transition to multi-party

(130) with each intervention, the military acquired legal privileges and economic resources [it's important to clarify where exactly the difference w/ Pakistan lies--the explanans and explanandum]

(131) military's perception of civilians impedes their acceptance of civilian supremacy [but he goes on to say that this is something that they've 'chosen', which begs the important questions]

(132) military had praetorian powers ("continued to wield significant powers over the elected governments when it did not directly step in"), its willingness to let civilians govern [more than in Pakistan, say] is explained by its traditions. [which is to say that he has explained nothing]

(132, FN 23) long-term military rule was made difficult because it couldn't find a real constituency (Turkey didn't have a large, land-owning class, and foreign capital was weak) [bizarre that he is suggesting this, but seems plausible--at least the first arm. resurrecting Alavi, ahh!]

(133-134) evolution of military-civilian balance hasn't suggested that military's role has been ebbing--indeed, it's been 'increasing'

(137) TUSIAD (business organization) is pro-democracy because it's pro-EU


(138) the flimsiness of the civilian challenge to the military is an important explanation for military supremacy [important to incorporate into paper]

(138) claim, implicitly, is that democracy isn't seen as important by the man on the street--that there is more trust in the army than in the civilians [this is important--true about Pakistan but probably not true about Latin America] [here it's important to make two theoretical points: (1) democratization has been pushed by worker's organizations because workers need political rights to win their economic rights, typically; (2) when workers haven't been aware of this, it's been because their organizations have been weak, and thus the 'commonsense' has been lacking]

(140-141): the three military interventions never reached violent proportions (Chile, Argentina)--the military has maintained its popular standing [this is a bit different from Pakistan, though that might have to do with what he's qualifying as violent. need to read more]

(146) the 'military mind' [but this is stupid. this is true everywhere, how can you explain variation? something like this applies to aqil shah's stuff too, I should think]

Zeki Sarigil, "Deconstructing the Turkish Military's Popularity" (2009)

(712) June 1997, forcing Erbakan to resign [is this a muted version of Pak in the 1990's]

(714) 1978, PKK founded

(714) 1984-1999, 30,000 people died in the conflict

Rustow, "The Army and the Founding..." (1959)

(513) 1908, Young Turk Revolution

(513) 1923, Proclamation of Republic

(513, 551) 1919-1923, Kemalist military intervention ends all military interventions [haha, writing one year before the first coup!]

(514) Unease/Centrality of Army was a response to the military supremacy of Europe, viz-a-viz declining Ottoman Empire

(518) War w/ Italy in 1911, Balkan Wars 1912-1913--brought Turkey close to being a garrison State in 1908-1918 period

(520) Army offered organization to nationalist stirrings, post-Armistics

(526) Istanbul vs. Anatolian movement

(544) Kemalists had solid civilian base

(549) Ataturk and Inonu administered the country as civilian leaders, rather than military--they had support from RPP, bureaucracy

(549) 1921-1944, Fezvi Cakmak COS

(549) the Military didn't intervene in this first period because of its association with and trust in Ataturk

(550) Military officers were heavily involved in politics, as individuals
 

brown, the military and society (1989)

(387): 1938, Ataturk dies

(388) 1950s, Democrat Party and Menderes alienated the military establishment

(388) May 27, 1960, "Bloodless coup"

(389) National Security Council allowed the military to return to the barracks [i.e., they institutionalize the authority of senior commanders in the State apparatus

(389) Fall 1961, return to civilian rule -- (1) Justice Party, under Demirel; (2) RPP w/ Inonu (coalition / (3) REligious elements /Marxists

(389) March 1971, military intervenes again (domestic turmoil); 'coup by communique'

(389) 1971-1973, rule by civil servants

(390) 14 October 19763, return ot civilian rule (elections uncertain)

(390) 12 September 1980, military intervention


(391) [identical to Musharraf  (to 'resolve' democracy) [1] ethnic heterogeneity? Kurds vs. 4 provinces; (2) US role is similar, so effectively held constant]

(399) military corporate identity is perpetuated through recruitment patterns


(400) in sum: intervened reluctantly; and has withdrawn with ease because it was well-institutionalized within the State [but if this is the explanation, why has Pak not withdrawn? because it, too, was well-institutionalized within the State]

bronfenbrenner, raw power... 1997

(24) l. markets as tight as they were in the 60s, what's changed is capital mobility

(25) shift in strateegies away from manufacturing

(29) vast majority actually have no intention of shutting down [hmm. a bit different from the story tole in the longer piece, where capital does exercise its option (the Tultex drive)]

dasgupta and singh 2006

(4) manufacturing as % of employment can decline, but it can still be of m-economic importance b/c of its centrality to the C-A blaance

(5) turning-point to services used to be at GDP/capita of $10,000; now its $3,000

(10) service sector 'behaves' like manufacturing, in terms of its effect on the growth of productivity [hmm]

(14) 'informal manufacturing' as a survival strategy/self-exploitation/super-exploitation (generates lots of shitty jobs)

kim moody, contextualising organized labour in expansion and crisis: the case of the US (2012)

(5-6) late 50s (downturn) --> 1958-1963 (first management offensive) --> mid-1960s to 1970s (class upsurge) --> 1973-1975 (recession) / 1980-1982 (recession), both of which broke the momentum of the upsurge

(6) the surrender of '79, encapsulated in Fraser's agreement to major concession with the Chrysler Corporation

(7) between 1979 and 1983, union membership fell by 26%

(8) there was a transition away from industry-level bargaining by the 1980s (which is also the period a series of concessions are made, from work-rule changes to wage concessions, etc.)

(8) from post-WWII to 80s, South grew faster than traditional regions

(8) in auto, meatpacking, trucking low-cost/high-prod firms intervene; in textiles, garments, and primary metals, international competition intervenes

(11) productivity increases of 1980s weren't mainly due to investment, but instead were due to reorganization of work [this complicates a relationship that Brenner looks at]

(12) auto is majority non-union by 1970s, and this is particularly pronounced amongst suppliers

(14) two reasons for low level of resistance (besides exhaustion/fear of job loss in recession): (a) the low level of inflation; (b) the fall in the interest rate (debt)

(15) the 'surrender of 1979' + recession of 1980-1982 --> recovery, post 1982. then, restructuring + lean production --> further fall in the value of labour power --> expansion

(16) unions shifted from manufacturing to services (density in manufacturing fell to 11%, from 33%)

(17) card check not in more than 15% of all organizing

(23) the broken link between productivity and wages is key to explaining the recovery of 1982

bronfenbrenner, uneasy terrain (2000) 

 (1) 1990’s, US economy grew at 4%; labor productivity at double the rate in last economic expansion, unemployment below 4%

(2) gains in 1990s were very modes, though. tight labour markets should have resulted in benefits, but they didn’t [her explanation will be threat of flight]

 (5) FDI explosion, post-NAFTA

(6) ‘net loss’ of 3.2 million jobs (9, 48) weakness of labour law enforcement (HRW report) (10) tight labour markets in the 1960s were unlike tight labour markets in 1990s b/c (1) unionization rates; (2) capital mobility [and (3) union cravenness, we’d have to add]

 (16) unions shifted to organizing the service sector, in the late 90s

 (18) increase in number of campaign w/ threats, pre- and post-NAFTA and trade agreemetns

 (29) v. weak enforcement of law against unjustified threats

 (32) reluctance to file charges against employers (resources at NLRB, etc.)

 (33-34) shift to organizing companies that are subsidiaries of large, foreign companies, or the public sector

(37) employer financial condition ahd very little do with whether or not they issued a quit threat

 (55) story of Tultex, where a union victory in 1994 (largest in manufacturing in a decade) was compromised because the company moved to Mexico/Jamaica in 2000

 (55) mobile industries: apparel/textile, auto parts, electronics, telecommunications, steel fabrication, food processing

 (in sum) the claim is not just that companies threaten to use capital flight to undermine unionization efforts (which is true, and they do plenty of the time), but it is also that capital does use capital flight to undermine unionization efforts. the solution, for her, is building restrictions on capital mobility, through protections in trade agreements, etc., etc.

GA Cohen, on the currency of egalitarian justice


chapter 7

(151) freedom of non-owners is safeguarded/promoted by intervention

(152) capitalism, then, is a particular distribution of freedom AND unfreedom

(153) libertarians account of freedom, then, is not normatively neutral

(155) capitalism doesn't encode liberty--it only encodes that liberty which is compatible with the existing distribution of private property. put differently, it equally encodes nonfreedom for non-owners

(155) 'capitalism doesn't end up living up to its own professions"

(155) communal ownership can enhance liberty/freedom (idle skis, idle tools, idle homes)

chapter 2

(46) Sen's criteria, midfare, comes between goods (objective) and welfare (Subjective)

(50) vs. Sen, 'capability'

chapter 6

(128) 'justice' vs. legitimacy (which is what you get from the W. Chamberlain example)

(129) 'Justice' vs.  freedom (they can come into conflict--so something can advance freedom, but not justice)

(131) against Dworkin, "option luck" vs. "brute luck" (deliberate gambles vs. involuntary)

chapter 8


(168) to lack money is not just to lack means, it is to be interfered with (this is what Berlin, Rawls don't acknowledge)

(168) libertarians define intervention as preventing someone from continuing an action--but what about preventing someone from embarking on an action in the first place?

sharon street, objectivity and truth: you'd better rethink it 

(1) practical standpoint vs. theoretical standpoint

(2) normative realism (some normative facts/truths that hold independent of our evaluative attitutudes) vs. normative antirealism (reasons to act are not objective, but particular to agent)

(3) Kantian anti-realism (you begin from individual judgement, but this entails burdens that rule out a whole host of acts) vs .Humean anti-realism (strong substantive conclusions do not follow from particular points of view)

(5-6) naturaist realists (normative facts exist as natural facts) vs. non-natural realists (Dworkin, Scanlon, etc.)

(10) the puzzle is to make sense of this coincidence--that what I belive also happens to be what's objectively true

(11) constructivism is a response--moral reason are internal to individuals

(12) Dworkin's response, of course, is that if it's a coincidence, so be it

(18) the 'normative lottery'--just like it should be crazy to think you won the lottery, so it should be crazy to accept Dworkin's coincidence

(18-21)

richard feldman, epistemological puzzles about disagreement

(crux) we're not often honest with ourselves. if we actually agree that a capable person is disagreeing with us, and they're reasonably doing so, and they have exposure to the same facts as us, then we ought to suspend belief

(421) much rides on the definition of what makes somebody reasonable, when they disagree

(421) effects of intuition might make possession of 'same evidence' a real-world impossibility (but then we're not operating in situations of 'full discolsure'; and tolerance can't be said to be in good faith, here)

shelby, justice, deviance, and the dark ghetto (2007)

(127) if overall social arrangements are unjust, then one has to think about the obligations of the poor quite differently than if the society were just. we distinguish between civic duties that they have as citizens (which clearly they can't be said to have), and natural duties that they have as moral agents (which they can't escape)

(144) in effect, what gives us the right to demand that someone play fair in a game that is unfair

(151) duties to each other without their being duties to society (not to be cruel, to help the needy, not cause unnecessary suffering, etc.)

(152-153) there is also the duty of justice -- obligation to help bring just institutions into existence (applies to both the wealthy, and the poor provided that it doesn't impose particularly onerous burdens on the latter)

(in sum) criticism of the ghetto poor is legitimate--but hardly ever of the traditional sort (deviance in an unjust society can be justified). instead, criticism has to be founded on progressive grounds--the basic, natural duties remain important, and we should also be working for a better world

jeremy waldron, homelessness and the issue of freedom (1981)

(309) homelessness as troubling on liberal grounds

(313) homeless forever at the mercy of others, regarding where they can be

(315) "[Homelessness] is one of the most callous an tyrannical exercises of power in modern times by a (comparatively) rich and complacent majority against a minority of their less fortunate fellow human beings" [let's not hold all the non-homeless reponsible, but ok]

(316) [Take-away is that everyone needs certain prerequisites in order to make use of freedom--one of which is a place to be, but others can be freedom from want, etc., etc.]

(317) In other words, it's absurd to speak of freedom separate of 'needs'--denial of basic needs is emphatically a denial of freedom

(318): the point about homelessness can be made in terms of 'negative freed' -- this is not about enabling people, but ensuring that they're not banned  [of course, this speaks to the ambivalence of the positive vs. negative distinction]

(321) to justify a property system that condemns some to unfreedom, you need to summon other values. not freedom.

(329-330) you don't need individual intention for unfreedom to be of concern. [the 'invisible hand' can intend it, that's enough]

nozick (excerpt: 'how liberty upsets patterns')

(163) why 'forbid' capitalist acts between consenting adults'? in other words, maintenance of a given distribution requires continuous intervention (Wilt Chamberlain, etc., etc.)

[but, it should be clear that Wilt is a terrible analogy for social institutions, and the 'choice' that people make. if we could agree that people voluntarily opt for work in which they consistently lose 25 cents to their boss, then this has some merit. but that's just a terribly impoverished conception of what makes an act voluntary.

in response, Nozick's analogy--that the condition of the low-wage worker is like the condition of a man stuck with an unattractive bride--is idiotic, for three reasons. first, he takes it to suggest that unfreedom can only be the product of deliberate human intervention, which is simply untrue. second, our intuitions from one don't travel to another, because the stakes of the two realms are different. third, it depends on our assuming a limited supply of good jobs, which is not at all a natural fact in the same way that the distribution of attractiveness/unattractiveness is.]

thomas nagel, moral conflict and political legitimacy (1987)

(219) convergence (Hobbes--right because it's rationally accepted) vs. common standpoint theories (rationally accepted because it's right)

(220) liberalism as a mixture of the two, because it involves 'a form of reasoning that includes moral concerns'. more than Hobbesian convergence

(222) Is liberalism more than just another sectarian doctrine? Why should antagonists abandon their conception of the good and accept impartiality?

(223-228) this depends on interpreting impartiality in a particular way, that depends on 'loose epistemological preferences'. not asserting oneself against others who believe differently, but also not ceding to their beliefs everywhere [epistemelogically. politically, no limit on the latter save for the harm principle]

(229-230) Nagel calls this 'epistemological restraint,' not skepticism. 'liberalism should provide the devout with a reason for tolerance' (i.e., even when you're convinced in the correctness of a position, you cede). this is because our beliefs should be regarded as just that (our beliefs), unless they can reasonably be defended from an entirely impersonal standpoint. no society should legislate on the assumption that they're truth.

scanlon, tanner lectures

(151, 166) contractualism/system of co-deliberation--"an act is right if it would be required or allowed by principles which no one, suitably motivated, could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement" [a good starting point, certainly, but the devil is in the details of 'suitably motivated' and 'reasonable rejection,' it seems to me]

(152) the Causlal Thesis (i.e., according to which morality is bunkum if every act can be explained]

(168) praise and dispraise to replace praise and blame]

(174) "the most general moral demand is that we exercise our capacity for self-governance in ways that others could reasonably be expected to authorize"

(184) "in my view, to show that a social institution is legitimate one must show that it can be justified to each person affected by it on grounds which that person could not reasonably reject"

(184-185): it's the obligation of SI to offer agents 'reasonably favourable conditions' under which to make choices [and then, of course, we can hold them responsible. similar to Shelby's argument about the ghetto]

(189) [This then becomes a principle on the basis of which institutional arrangements are erected -- i.e., they should safeguard the value of choice]

(192-193): the 'forfeiture view' -- if alternative routes exist [depending, of course, on their quality or quantitiy] people cannot complain

(198) objective (primary goods) vs. subjective (preferences) measures of well-being [the question of responsibility for preferences arises here, to which GA Cohen has a response to Dworkin. 'expensive tastes' can not be punished if agent isn't responsible for them]


(203) the intentional infliction of harm (punishment) carries a heavy burden of justification [extraordinarily radical implications, I should think]

(208) Frankfurt's two drug addicts (one who has a second-order desire to resist his desire, one who doesn't), only the first is 'unfree' [unhelpful, but interesting]

(212) "to feel onself subject to moral blame is to be aware of a gap between the way one in fact decided what to do and the form of decision which others could reasonably demand'

(216) "Moral indignation towards lawbreakers is entirely in order, and the sufferings we inflict upon them may be justified. But in justifying these sufferings, and inflicting them, we have to say not 'You asked for this' but 'There for the grace of god go I.'

nagel, libertarianism without foundations (1975)

(137) Nozick offers no foundations for his defense of what he deems fundamental rights (to property, etc.). [right, they absolutely beg this foundation]

(140-141) Nozcik scales up from micro-inter-personal interactions to macro-generalizations about the world (a logically illegitimate technique, because a whole host of considerations are introduced)

(142) 'benefit to others, for Nozick, can never outweigh the cost to oneself [Nagel rightly insisting this is outrageous. millions starving can be Pareto optimal, which is an absurd def of justice]

(148) Nagel arguing, though, that the arbitrariness of inequality is not sufficient grounds to object to it [I disagree. provided we begin with our bare-bones premise]

scanlon, nozick on rights, liberty and property (1976)

(4) historical (depends on how something came about) vs. end-state/patterned (targetd)
conceptions of justice

(5) for Nozick, any voluntary transfer is 'just,' irrespective of patterns that result (thus, his conception of justice is historical and unpatterned)

(9) one of four justifications of egalitarianism -- 'all differences in treatment require justification' [absolutely. based on bare-bones premise that we are undeniably all human]

(13) nozick's objection to 'unfreedom' of workers on low wages-metaphor is marrying an unattractive bride [the obvious failing here is that only human action can be a source of unfreedom. can't be social institutions. and here, too, there is the implicit importing in of limits of what's possible (i.e. not everyone can be attractive). but, certainly, everyone can have a lovely standard of living, so the comparison is moot]

(17) actual consent vs. hypothetical consent

(19) consent can't rule considerations of justice

(23) in Locke, the justification of perperty rights is limited to what's needed to store up 'conveniences of life' [hmm, interesting]

sanyal, review of humeira iqtidar

(2) key claim is that individual, unmeidated understanding of qur'an empowers individual. empowers, in fact, women whose membership inthese organization can widen option and life trajectories [problem, of course, is that this only works as a negative corrective to militant liberals. there is still an obvious problem of freedom limitation in this process]

ben selwyn, gershcenkorn and trotsky (2012)

(426) institutional innovation enables adoption of technology, its not a given

(429) backwardness generates an industrial response (Gerschenkron)

(433) elements of Nazi ideology present in Junkers' attempt to win over peasantry

(436) Gerschenkron saw principal barriers as internal--but political sovereignty and w-system are important, obv. 

(439) Gershenkron's c-tendencies anticipate cumulative causation

(444) Chang and company are guilty of the 'fallacy of composition' because they don't quite acknowledge that conditions change (i.e., become more exacting) as time and the world-system advances

guy robinson, philosophy and mystification


essay 1 

(5) vs. social constructivists--our 'inputs' are products of our own tussle w/ nature (no 'starting point')

(5) against 'foundationalism

(5-6) nature/material world <--> human history (superior to both idealism and ahistorical materialism)

essay 2

(9) against 'empiricism'--without sociall-given categories or capacities, we wouldn't be able to process the world
 

post, what is left of leninism (2012)

(2-3) three waves of struggle: early 1890s, 1905-1907, 1912-1914

(3) metal workers particularly important to revolutionary LW of social democracy

(3): reformism is not the struggle for reforms, but the substitution of routinized bargaining for mass struggle

(6) SD key difference w/ Bolsheviks was not aspiration to build a different kind of praty, but fact that they built in different conditions. b/c of absence of parliamentary institutions, official co-optation of Bolsheviks was not possible

(7) 'left communism' in post-WWI Communist movement was a reaction to the routinization of SD

(7) minority went into the 3rd international; most of pre-war Left remained on the LW of SD (France, Italy, USPD). at least until '20-'21, with the turn towards UF and efforts to bring these elements into Comintern

(8) pre 1924-1925 Leninism just meant organization of rev workers against officaldom

(9) after 1935, Communist parties adopted the political strategy of SD, as well as its social composition. and all w/o internal dem norms [Hmm]

(10) [seems far too unfair a portrait of CP's, because it can't account for resilience]

(11) SD strategy of CP's was exposed in mid-60s, as slowdown --> struggle (1968-1974) [definitely true]

(14) efforts to build new parties in 60s/70s w/ radicalizing workers were ultimately unsuccessful because of the reduced size/weakness of militant minorities [this, of course, begs its ownquestion]

(19) revival of 'rational core' of Leninism is the goal 

acemoglu et. al., the consequences of radical reform (2009)

(4) effects of FR were positive, but didn't show up till 1850 [mechanisms in this argument are essentially Smithian--freeing of people from 'fetters']

(5) Radical reforms can be more efficacious than limited reforms [responding to Burkean wisdom]

(7) [Terrible lit review!]

(9) Guild restrictions as 'fetters'

(13) in most places Napoleon made 'a genunine attempt' to implement reforms

(22) postivie effects started showing by 1900, process kicked in by 1850 [difficulty is that there were a series of political upheavals before this--admittedly, they attempt to control for varoius things. but they don't control for impact of 1848 rev. too much happens in the interim]

(31) [Data hardly supports the notions that fetters were 'burst']

 

Civil-Military Relations in 'Islamic Democracies', Lenze 2011

(198-199): useful for Turkey timeline

(208): distinguishing characteristic of Turkey is army's possession of broad popular support

(229: Though, still, occasionally take pains to avoid the 'poor, conservative, peasant electorate'

(241): Kemalist shift to the Left in the 1960s

(252): 1980 coup in context of an economic crisis

(258): After 1980 coup military imposes restrictive constitution before handing back power

(261): Military continuity into civilian era (i.e., re-democratization with persistent powers)

267): 1989, Turkey gets its first civilian president

(272): International incentives to be democracy (EU, etc.)

(283): AKP successfully passed legislation that increased civilian control over the military

(285, 298): Here, an (1) individual-based explanation of why the military didn't intervent after the AKP intruded on its privilege; plus (2) fact that the economy was doing well

Christian Democracy and the AKP: Parallels and Contrasts, Hale 2007

(294): CD has its origins in the immediate post-WWII environment (as fascism was discredited but communism ascendant)

(295): Vatican came to democracy only in 1944

(297): These were 'catch-all' parties that followed the general drift towards neoliberalism; always strongly pro-Europe

(302): AKP inherited an economic mess, initially turned to IMF

(304): CHP/Military involved in public devates [This has to be distinguished from praetorianism]

(305): Political Parties Law a serious intervention--prohibits unions from affiliating with political parties..

(306): AKP less middle-class than the CD parties

The evolution of civil-military relations in post-war Turkey, Karabelias (2006)

(131): 1876, Turkey's first constitution and Parliament

(132): DP punished for pursuing policies that hurt military, 1950-1960

(133): Between 1960-1965, and 1971-1973, military in power--able to resolve pol/organizational problems [Did this better than Pak military? Why?]

(133): 1980 Coup happened after economic crisis and 'mobilization'

(133): 12 September 1980 to 6 December 1983, military rule

(134): important--military sponsored a constitutional intervention to safeguard its powers (Constitution of 1982), and institutionalized themselves in power, shaping the terrain of political competition, banning parties, etc. [How is this different from praetorian democracy?]

(139): in the early-mid 1990s, a series of crises meant that the Military still wielded substantial control

(140): military as an institution was (1) very large and important; (2) very cohesive [True of Pakistan as well, though. This can't explain much of anything]

(140): Details re: military's independent economic power [Again, here important to see what exactly the contrast with Pakistan consists in]

(141): Civilians have relatively less legitimacy [Means miltary can open the democratic process w/o as much fear?]

A Paradigmatic Shift for the Turkish Generals.., Aydinli (2009)

(585): The popular coup? "Society" supports its Army [Overstated, of coruse--but certainly greater legitimacy has something to do with its ability to relinquish power more quickly than in Pakistan. Something like, 'better institutionalized']

(587): Two groups in military: Bukukenit (conservative bloc), and Ozkok (progressive bloc)

(593): 'soft power' now, 'hard power' before [same idea as 'support from society']

religion and culture in turkey, andrew mango (2004)

(999): education in Turkey coresponds to lower level of mosque attendance; opposite of Europe

globaliation and capital mobility in the automobile industry, aschoff (2010)

(1): perception of competition over wages is at the root of declining union power (i.e., that unions' subscription to the globalization narrative explains their failed strategies) [interesting but surely marginal]

(6): not 'race to the bottom' [this is better framed as 'filling out' the other pressures that capital faces]

1. large market
2. skilled workforce
3. proximity to assemblers/suppliers
4. state policies
5. pressures from finance

(9): US has been the site fo much new investment

(11-12): Serious pressures to move to low-wage sites [The point of the argument, then, can only be that this isn't the only thing going on. Not that it's entirely unimportant, which is sometimes how the claim is presented]

(16): New jobs have been created by new assembly/component firms, thanks to foreign capital moving to the US (and this is equal to the job loss)

(19): why capital moves? 1. location theory; 2. political conditions; 3. laobur

(29): Aschoff wants to introduce four dynamics: 1. intercapitalist competition; 2. capital-labour competition; 3. gepolitics; 4. financialization

(44): for Delphi, "a tacitcal decision' was made to move abroad--it wasn't mandated by economic exigencies, but was a strategic decision

Chapter 2

(49): 1. There have been more oepneings than closings in the US, based on Aschoff's sample

(53): 2. Investment is also happening in 'traditional' regions

(59): 3. US assemblers opened almost as many as Asia suppliers have; US suppliers have opened far more

(63): 4. There's been a 'stretching' of production, rather than a replacement of North by South

(65): Low-value added production has moved to Mexico; high value-added has stayed within US

(68): in sum, we have seen 'restructuring,' rather than simple job loss

(71): in the 1990-2005 period there was expansion (but without addition of labour)

(74): important--new investment in traditional regions has remained unorganized [strongly suggesting that it's union bankruptcy rather than the bogey of the 'US South' that's prohibited expansion]

Chapter 3

(84-85): suggestion of ways in which apartheid was dysfunctional for Capital

Chapter 4

(131-132): Delphi's trajectory is not a 'production costs' one, but (1) rise of finacne + (2) inter-capitalist competition story [Again, these are all pressures, yes--but it's still true that lowering costs would still be a way of alleviating pressures. It's distinct from the globalization story, but it is not a total refutation of that story's central mechanism, for good reason.]

(142): Volcker shock hit manufacturing hard (tight credit, high dollar)

(143): Ec recovery by 1982, but interest rates were still high

(145): 'State policies "matter" [But of course they do. It seems an odd 'central mechanism' for an analysis of why capital moves, though]

(146): Now, three processes matter: (1) export restrcitions; (2) financialization; (3) GM-UAW relations

(153): 'quick-fix' solutions to deep problems were pursued

(155): key--restructuring in response to pressures int he 1980s undermined post-war compact between Capital and Labour (through (1) geographical mobility; (2) technical changes; (3) firing [In this sense, the post-war compact was unwound as much by the normal operation of capitalism, as it was by 'bureeaucracy'. The key question, which Aschoff doesn't really ask, is what could labour have done realistically. Counter-factually, had a different strategy been pursued, how might this have looked?]

(157): a 'cooperative' stance didn't work [so, again, what would have? Militancy?]

(159): There's a 'lazy' argument here that the Reagan counterrevolution made it difficutl to resist [At best this ignores the effects of bureaucratization; at worst, this ignores capitalism!]

(177, 183): Accessions, concessions, etc. [Good place to ask the counterfactual question]

(187): Firms closed above and beyond what was necessary--used this opportunity to restructure/streamline so as to better position themselves to be competitive

(203): Labour costs are a small % of value [for a diss that wants to evaluate the importance of labour costs in determining capital mobility, surely this has to be brought up earlier!?]

Kollmeyer 2009, "Explaining Deindustrialization"

(abs): two-way fixed-effects regression indicates that rising consumer affluence, differential productivity growth, and expanding trade all matter to deindustrialization (18 OECD countries, 1970 to 2003), but single greatest factor is rising consumer affluence

Nordhaus 2005

(Abs): Productivity has grown, and has increased employment on its own--it is not responsible for decreased employment, which is instead a function of the fact that producers overseas have better increased their productivity

Alderson 1995

(706): distinguish between positive deindustrialization (rising real income leading to change in consumer preferences, or differential productivity growth), negative industrialization (poor performance leading to being outcompeted), and 'trade-related' deindustrialization

wood 1995, "how trade hurt unskilled workers"

(61): using Olin model, trade w/ developing country brings the wages of the unskilled down
(61): the recent period has seen a shift from 'manufacturing autarky' for developed countries
(62): larger increase in important penetration is associate with a larger fall in manufacturing employment
(68): based on revised estimates, calculated to have reduced share of manufacturing employment by 5 percent
(70): there's been an increase as well ithe labour supply
(77): basically, low-skill manufactured goods are no longer produced in the US

rowthorn and ramaswamy 1999

1/5th of deindustrialization attributable to N-S trade (even then the effects are indirect), 4/5 are 'internal' to advanced economies

luke

(1744): written 40-60 yrs after death of Jesus

(1830): Zecharaiah asks a rational question, and is made mute [what kind of God is this?]

(1831): blessed is she who believed [what kind of a conception of faith is this? compare to dictionary definition]

(1831): social justice passage--"he has brought down the powerful..." [but, again, is this accidental to the position of Christianity? think of its evolution, into Church doctrine. why does it abandon this? why are certain parts of the text picked up on, at certain moments?]

(1833): "and for glory to your people Israel" [is this a God who looks after all people? or just Israel? two wholly different implied projects]

(1834): wrath/punishment, but as part of a compassionate project?

(1835): social justice passage--'whoever has two coats must share' [what might this imply, today?! and for our 'Christian' candidates?]

(1837): Jesus performing more miracles [well what, again, does this imply about Faith?]

(1838-1839): curing the leper [here, question of the prior condition--i.e., where does evil come from? Satan? things we bring on ourselves? 'your sins are forgiven you'. these two are inconsistent]

(1840): what role do the Pharisees play? [dogma vs. principle behind laws. in a sense, opens up space for a re-interpretation of laws, based on principle. in other words, it suggests (either implicitly or explicitly), that laws can shift (cf. circumcision, not washing before eating, the 'sabbath')]

(1840): social justice passage--"Blessed are you who are poor..."

(1841): "Woe to you who are full now..." [NB: (1) not, everyone will be full; (2) God is not doing this now--why? one can understand why Marx would call this opiate]

(1842): the good slave [restored to good health, but never freed, of course]

(1843-1844): "faith saves" the woman who wept at his feet [but she's seen miracles! what kind of conception of faith is this, again?]

(1845): rebuking wind and raging waves [well, why were they raging in the first place?]

(1846): miracle, after miracle

(1852): "ask and you shall receive" [plainly not true.]

(1854): injunction to fear God [what does this add to conception of Faith]

(1854): life does not consist in "abundance of possessions"

(1855): "blessed are those slaves" who work their asses off [hmm, what kind of model of social justice is this? inconsistent, at the very least]

 (1858): why do you act humble, or do whatever else [b/c you will eventually be exalted? not because it's the right thing? how does this compare w/ previous ways of thinking about morality? very similar, and interesting, b/c it contrasts to Kantian, which is how we today think about Christian morality]

 (1861): Lazarus vs. the rich man [doesn't bode well for the 1%, eh? implies a very serious moral obligation on us, no? again, inconsistently very radical, this text]

(1863): sucks to be a slave..

(1863): why isn't everyone praising God?! [what kind of god, again? discuss this passage]

(1864): Sodom is the model for judgement day, Lot's wife example to avoid [nuts! the most reactionary incident in the Bible in it's most progressive book]

(1871-1872): question of Judas' responsibility [whence evil?]

(1875): "we deserve our cruxificion" [on the one hand text proclaims radical forgiveness, on the other hand crucifixion is just desert? today we wouldn't accept this for any kind of crime. just another example]

corinthians I

(2002): class composition of early Christian community (poor are the foolish, the unwise) [this is critical to understanding the framing, here. use as introductory point]

(2006): civic judgement [same basis as today's 'uncivilized' communities who claim right to sharia]

(2007): "the body is meant not for fornication but for the Lord" [example of different, new attitude to pleasure and the body]

(2008): celibacy is highest [again, shifting mores]

(2011): Paul defending his laboring [interesting, in light of class base, again--see 2012]

(2014): Paul's misogyny ["Christ is the head of every man, and the husband is the head of his wife"]

(2015): again, the lower-class appeal--musn't humiliate those who have nothing

(2017) in contrast to Plato, a different conception of the interdependence of parts of the body. the 'weakest' is the most important [again, do we understand this as intrinsic to Christianity, engrained in it forever more? no, it's a product of whom Paul is appealing to, and it changes rapidly as Christianity evolves]

(2021): eternal soul argument. [more like an assertion]

da bible, God

(4): standard view is that Torah was divine word mediated by Moses, but narrative indicates otherwise (instances pointing to authorship later than Moses)

(4-5): modern theory is that Toran is not a unified whole—rather, composed of four sources that were redacted together (earliest source 10^th century BC, latest was sixth century BC)

(7): claims that Moses wrote Genesis appear only in Greco-Roman period—originally anonymous

(8): earliest parts of Genesis were written by scribes in the context of monarchies of early Judah/Israel, but later parts were written as late as after fall of monarchy in 586BCE

(8): in short: “Genesis was written over centuries by multiple authors…” [what are the implications of this, for the religious? for the sociological?]

(8): divided into two sections: I. the primeval history, chs 1-11; II. ancestral history, chs 12-50

(10): not scientifically accurate, butthis is a modern concern [hmm]. treat it metaphorically or allegorically [OK—what does this mean? take an example]

Genesis

(12): humanity is made in the image of God [what does this imply about our status? about good/evil? about free will?]

(14): two stories about creation, side-by-side [compare/contrast]

(15): the serpent and Evil, and God’s humanity [good place to raise problem of omniscience/omnipotence]

(19): the wickedness of humanity, and God’s commitment to destroy them [again, the problem of Evil]

(25): God fears the unity of humanity [God’s pettiness in nipping a rivalry in the bud? what’s this all about?]

(32): God demanding sacrifice after sacrifice [why? God as petty, jealous, craving attention]

(35): God sometimes in the plural, sometimes in the singular [the evolution of monotheism]

(35): God asking about whereabouts of Sarah [omniscience?]

(36-37): raining hellfire on Sodom and Gomorrah [genocide and destruction. what kind of God, again?]

(64): Onan spills his semen on the ground, and is put to death. 

(65): making slaves of the Egyptians

(80): Joseph’s brothers are not morally culpable, because his explusion was all a part of God’s plan [This raises some very thorny questions about morality and responsibility. In fact, it suggests that there can be none. We’d have to find some way to distinguish between this action, and others—so?]

Exodus

(81): similarly, “best understood as a composite of traditions shaped over many centuries by an unkown number of anonymous storytellers and writers.” clearly not written by Moses. 

(81-82): explusion of Pharaoh’s workforce, figure like Moses, mass emigration—none of this is mentioned in nonbiblical sources. likely that it drew on some sort of liberation of ‘West Asiatics’

(84): God is rewarding the midwives’ fear of him [again, God as petty, vainglorious, etc.]

(85): God ‘remembers’ his covenant, after decades of their being oppressed! [it took long enough—again, what kind of omniscient, omnipotent God]

(87): God gives Moses evidence of his authority, via miracles [what does this imply, for faith? Isn’t faith supposed to be precisely the opposite?]

(88-99): astonishing--God keeps hardening the Pharaoh’s heart, but then holding him and the Egyptian people responsible for the Pharaoh’s intransigence [sadism, pure and simple]

(91): referring to his future crimes as ‘wonders’

(97): the mass murder of Egyptian firstborns

(98): and Passover, to consecrate this ‘blessing’

(101-102): Pharaoh was going to let them be, but God hardens his heart so that he pursues Moses. Motivation is to ‘gain glory for myself’[Anything to give Him an opportunity to murder dozens of people, of course. ]

(109): the Chosen people (“you shall be my treasured possession out of all the peoples”)

(110): “I am a jealous God” [damn right]

(110): collective punishment (“punishing children for the iniquity of parents”) 

(111): God, again, demanding that the people ‘fear’ him

(112): injunctions regarding how to handle slavery

(114): you shouldn’t charge interest to the poor [shall we take this one to heart, then?]

(116): injunction to demolish and expel the Amorites, Hittites, Perizittes, Canaanites, Hivites, Jebusites.. 

(129-130): where Moses convinces God not to commit genocide, once again. though Moses returns from the Mountain and orders the death of three thousand brothers, sons, etc. 

(131): again, collective punishment (“visiting iniquity of the parents upon the children and the chidren’s children”)

- - - - 

(1) The problem of evil: whence does it arise?

(a) On the one hand, if God is omniscient/omnipotent, he’s caught in a contradiction. Surely you can’t hold people responsible. 

(b) But let’s say he’s not, and that we allow humans free will. Interestingly, there’s plenty of evidence for his not being, throughout what we read. Doesn’t this mean we’re working with a different conception of God than many of us probably imagine the Semitic tradition as defending? Maybe that’s OK. 

(c) This doesn’t, though, free God of the obligation to respond to much of how he deals with Evil, in what we read. Tare several instances where he is clearly responsible for the actions of certain humans (cf. Pharaoh), yet he punishes them nonetheless. There are also clear examples of punishment being levied against those who are responsible only because they have the misfortune of being linked, by blood, to the ‘criminal’ (cf. the Egyptian people). What is the principle being advanced here, then? [Hint: it is totalitarian]

(d) And the awfulness of punishment? Genesis and Exodus show a God running roughshod over civil liberties. In other words, even if we think there is free will, and we argue that certain humans sinned, the punishments are fierce. 

(2) The question of the Bible’s historicity. There are a whole host of laws and edicts that we would deem insane, by today’s standards [Examples?]. We might explain these by arguing that the Bible ought to be set in its historical and social context (punishments are severe, but they’re par for the course; endorsing slavery, yes, but it was a modal social institution at the time). But we’ve then stripped the text of its sacred character. It becomes a historical document. This raises a few questions. 

(A) Doesn’t this spell trouble for believers? Why follow injunctions laid down in this text, versus others, if it’s not actually the work of God, but of any number of anonymous humans working over centuries to codify common wisdom? (Related: if not sociologically, what might it mean for a believer to interpret this text allegorically/metaphorically [I have no idea])

(B) It raises a whole new line of questioning: why are certain parts of the text are emphasized, and others de-emphasized. Politicians may appeal to God, but they’re not discussing God’s injunction that you can’t charge interest on loans to the poor. Why do certain ideas get picked up at certain times, and not at others? In other words, if we accept that organized religion is historically embedded, what explains its character, and its evolution? 

(3) The problem of Faith. What is it? Here God ‘proves’ his authority by appealing to a series of miracles, in the presence of Moses. But if the people’s faith is grounded in miracles (and, what’s a corollary, God’s destructive power), is it really Faith? Isn’t Faith what prevails in the absence of evidence, not in the presence of it? 

(4) The principle of ‘a Chosen people.’ What is the principle being advanced here? And to what extent do we expect the chosen people to be favoured over others? At what point does it become wrong? 

(5) Emancipatory possibilities. Corradi spoke about the Bible as inaugurating a sense of social justice. Do you see this, in the liberation of the Israelities, from Egypt? [As a weak claim about ‘liberation’ in the abstract, this is bizarre (i.e., that a general sense of justice is produced by this incident): how do you highlight this specific instance (since there are probably plenty of others that could be adduced as general origins), how do you substantiate the causal chain (this weak sense is supposed to become a strong sense, somewhere down the line)? As a strong claim, God save us from this definition of social justice (since it coincides with his Wrath against the Egyptians). And there is the absurdity of all the counterfactuals raised (had this not been written down by any number of scribes, we would not have had a sense of ‘social justice’?!). Surely it’s sufficient to say that appeals to social justice emerge wherever we see a concrete clash of interests. 

(6) Looking at religion ‘sociologically.’ Corradi discussed this at length, in lecture [What did he say? Durkheim, etc.] . This follows from stripping the Bible of its sacred character (though it’s not necessary to do so, to examine this angle of religion). We look at its role, in this world, in creating a sense of community through ritual, shared belief, etc. Compare, for example, what it means to celebrate Passover sociologically, and what it means ideologically/religiously [community ritual vs. commemoration of the slaughter of Egyptian firstborns]

(7) The Western tradition. The purpose of this class is to substantiate the claim that there is something universal, in the particular. We’ll talk about this more, with Pericles. But do we see anything in the Bible that we would identify as either factually universal (i.e., it actually prevails universally), or desirably universal (i.e.,  part of what we think a good society should have)? 

(8): The question of monotheism. Corradi discussed observing the evolution of this sense of God’s oneness. And indeed, there are several moments in the text that hint at a plurality of Gods.