bronfenbrenner, uneasy terrain (2000)
(1) 1990’s, US economy grew at 4%; labor productivity at double the rate in last economic expansion, unemployment below 4%
(2) gains in 1990s were very modes, though. tight labour markets should have resulted in benefits, but they didn’t [her explanation will be threat of flight]
(5) FDI explosion, post-NAFTA
(6) ‘net loss’ of 3.2 million jobs (9, 48) weakness of labour law enforcement (HRW report) (10) tight labour markets in the 1960s were unlike tight labour markets in 1990s b/c (1) unionization rates; (2) capital mobility [and (3) union cravenness, we’d have to add]
(16) unions shifted to organizing the service sector, in the late 90s
(18) increase in number of campaign w/ threats, pre- and post-NAFTA and trade agreemetns
(29) v. weak enforcement of law against unjustified threats
(32) reluctance to file charges against employers (resources at NLRB, etc.)
(33-34) shift to organizing companies that are subsidiaries of large, foreign companies, or the public sector
(37) employer financial condition ahd very little do with whether or not they issued a quit threat
(55) story of Tultex, where a union victory in 1994 (largest in manufacturing in a decade) was compromised because the company moved to Mexico/Jamaica in 2000
(55) mobile industries: apparel/textile, auto parts, electronics, telecommunications, steel fabrication, food processing
(in sum) the claim is not just that companies threaten to use capital flight to undermine unionization efforts (which is true, and they do plenty of the time), but it is also that capital does use capital flight to undermine unionization efforts. the solution, for her, is building restrictions on capital mobility, through protections in trade agreements, etc., etc.
(1) 1990’s, US economy grew at 4%; labor productivity at double the rate in last economic expansion, unemployment below 4%
(2) gains in 1990s were very modes, though. tight labour markets should have resulted in benefits, but they didn’t [her explanation will be threat of flight]
(5) FDI explosion, post-NAFTA
(6) ‘net loss’ of 3.2 million jobs (9, 48) weakness of labour law enforcement (HRW report) (10) tight labour markets in the 1960s were unlike tight labour markets in 1990s b/c (1) unionization rates; (2) capital mobility [and (3) union cravenness, we’d have to add]
(16) unions shifted to organizing the service sector, in the late 90s
(18) increase in number of campaign w/ threats, pre- and post-NAFTA and trade agreemetns
(29) v. weak enforcement of law against unjustified threats
(32) reluctance to file charges against employers (resources at NLRB, etc.)
(33-34) shift to organizing companies that are subsidiaries of large, foreign companies, or the public sector
(37) employer financial condition ahd very little do with whether or not they issued a quit threat
(55) story of Tultex, where a union victory in 1994 (largest in manufacturing in a decade) was compromised because the company moved to Mexico/Jamaica in 2000
(55) mobile industries: apparel/textile, auto parts, electronics, telecommunications, steel fabrication, food processing
(in sum) the claim is not just that companies threaten to use capital flight to undermine unionization efforts (which is true, and they do plenty of the time), but it is also that capital does use capital flight to undermine unionization efforts. the solution, for her, is building restrictions on capital mobility, through protections in trade agreements, etc., etc.
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