scanlon, tanner lectures
(151, 166) contractualism/system of co-deliberation--"an act is right if it would be required or allowed by principles which no one, suitably motivated, could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement" [a good starting point, certainly, but the devil is in the details of 'suitably motivated' and 'reasonable rejection,' it seems to me]
(152) the Causlal Thesis (i.e., according to which morality is bunkum if every act can be explained]
(168) praise and dispraise to replace praise and blame]
(174) "the most general moral demand is that we exercise our capacity for self-governance in ways that others could reasonably be expected to authorize"
(184) "in my view, to show that a social institution is legitimate one must show that it can be justified to each person affected by it on grounds which that person could not reasonably reject"
(184-185): it's the obligation of SI to offer agents 'reasonably favourable conditions' under which to make choices [and then, of course, we can hold them responsible. similar to Shelby's argument about the ghetto]
(189) [This then becomes a principle on the basis of which institutional arrangements are erected -- i.e., they should safeguard the value of choice]
(192-193): the 'forfeiture view' -- if alternative routes exist [depending, of course, on their quality or quantitiy] people cannot complain
(198) objective (primary goods) vs. subjective (preferences) measures of well-being [the question of responsibility for preferences arises here, to which GA Cohen has a response to Dworkin. 'expensive tastes' can not be punished if agent isn't responsible for them]
(203) the intentional infliction of harm (punishment) carries a heavy burden of justification [extraordinarily radical implications, I should think]
(208) Frankfurt's two drug addicts (one who has a second-order desire to resist his desire, one who doesn't), only the first is 'unfree' [unhelpful, but interesting]
(212) "to feel onself subject to moral blame is to be aware of a gap between the way one in fact decided what to do and the form of decision which others could reasonably demand'
(216) "Moral indignation towards lawbreakers is entirely in order, and the sufferings we inflict upon them may be justified. But in justifying these sufferings, and inflicting them, we have to say not 'You asked for this' but 'There for the grace of god go I.'
(151, 166) contractualism/system of co-deliberation--"an act is right if it would be required or allowed by principles which no one, suitably motivated, could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement" [a good starting point, certainly, but the devil is in the details of 'suitably motivated' and 'reasonable rejection,' it seems to me]
(152) the Causlal Thesis (i.e., according to which morality is bunkum if every act can be explained]
(168) praise and dispraise to replace praise and blame]
(174) "the most general moral demand is that we exercise our capacity for self-governance in ways that others could reasonably be expected to authorize"
(184) "in my view, to show that a social institution is legitimate one must show that it can be justified to each person affected by it on grounds which that person could not reasonably reject"
(184-185): it's the obligation of SI to offer agents 'reasonably favourable conditions' under which to make choices [and then, of course, we can hold them responsible. similar to Shelby's argument about the ghetto]
(189) [This then becomes a principle on the basis of which institutional arrangements are erected -- i.e., they should safeguard the value of choice]
(192-193): the 'forfeiture view' -- if alternative routes exist [depending, of course, on their quality or quantitiy] people cannot complain
(198) objective (primary goods) vs. subjective (preferences) measures of well-being [the question of responsibility for preferences arises here, to which GA Cohen has a response to Dworkin. 'expensive tastes' can not be punished if agent isn't responsible for them]
(203) the intentional infliction of harm (punishment) carries a heavy burden of justification [extraordinarily radical implications, I should think]
(208) Frankfurt's two drug addicts (one who has a second-order desire to resist his desire, one who doesn't), only the first is 'unfree' [unhelpful, but interesting]
(212) "to feel onself subject to moral blame is to be aware of a gap between the way one in fact decided what to do and the form of decision which others could reasonably demand'
(216) "Moral indignation towards lawbreakers is entirely in order, and the sufferings we inflict upon them may be justified. But in justifying these sufferings, and inflicting them, we have to say not 'You asked for this' but 'There for the grace of god go I.'
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