iversen and cusack, the causes of welfare state expansion (2000)
(313) technology-induced structural transformations are what's at issue in discussions of de-industrialization
(315) in US, expansion of services faster than loss of traditional jobs [losses which look quite minimal, in comparison, because the recent peak was lower], so there's been employment growth
(316) the growth in transfers has been explained by endogenous employment loss, not "globalization"
(317): Rodrick: trade openness/globalization --> insecurity --> WS expansion
(318) domestic market volatility > international market volatility
(319) US is far and away least trade dependent of the OECD economices, yet has highest volatility (wage, output, employment) (volatility = std dev of wage/output/employment)
(320) no evidence that volatility is related to exposure to trade, nor evidence for capital mkt openness --> volatility
(321, FN 20) for less developed countriy, this relationship probably doesn't hold, because trade-dependence on primary goods brings volatility associated with primary goods
(321) Garrett operationalizes 'Left Labor power'
(324) Garrett: WS is compatible w/ globalization; Cusack and Iversen agree, but also want to insist that globalization is not what's responsible for it's expansion (which is what Garrett goes ahead and argues)
(325) mass sectoral shift to services, away from industry --> growth in transfers
(325) find little evidence for a 'pricing out' effect, from trade with LDC's [this is interesting, but needs more specification--disaggregate by industry, country, etc.]
(325) w/o State intervention, transferability of skills > transferability of benefits (i.e., firms are never going to give benefits on a basis wider than the skills that their employee has. I will give firm-level benefits to extract firm-level skills, and to make sure that my worker is bound to me). when people loss a job and they have to transgress a skill boundary to seek benefits, the State has to step in (to re-skill, etc.)
(326) employers can support this because it minimizes risks of investing in nontransferable skills to workers, who are then more likely to get trained, etc. [perhaps understates employer's power over employee, but OK]
(328, 341-342) the rise and fall of industry as % of the population in the US is much smaller than elsewhere (the amplitude is higher in all late industrializers, for understandable reasons--given the period that we're looking at)
(329, 334) WS expansion can be more or less egalitarian depending on political parameters--partisan effects matter
(332-334) findings
(337) US/Canada/etc. are more effective at generative service self-employment because of wage disperson (i.e., inequality). Where you have centralized bargaining, these sectors don't grow as fast [their argument involves growth of productivity, etc., but I might be missing something b/c this seems clear-cut example of sectors growing that are parasitic on rich people's ability to live luxuriously]
(313) technology-induced structural transformations are what's at issue in discussions of de-industrialization
(315) in US, expansion of services faster than loss of traditional jobs [losses which look quite minimal, in comparison, because the recent peak was lower], so there's been employment growth
(316) the growth in transfers has been explained by endogenous employment loss, not "globalization"
(317): Rodrick: trade openness/globalization --> insecurity --> WS expansion
(318) domestic market volatility > international market volatility
(319) US is far and away least trade dependent of the OECD economices, yet has highest volatility (wage, output, employment) (volatility = std dev of wage/output/employment)
(320) no evidence that volatility is related to exposure to trade, nor evidence for capital mkt openness --> volatility
(321, FN 20) for less developed countriy, this relationship probably doesn't hold, because trade-dependence on primary goods brings volatility associated with primary goods
(321) Garrett operationalizes 'Left Labor power'
(324) Garrett: WS is compatible w/ globalization; Cusack and Iversen agree, but also want to insist that globalization is not what's responsible for it's expansion (which is what Garrett goes ahead and argues)
(325) mass sectoral shift to services, away from industry --> growth in transfers
(325) find little evidence for a 'pricing out' effect, from trade with LDC's [this is interesting, but needs more specification--disaggregate by industry, country, etc.]
(325) w/o State intervention, transferability of skills > transferability of benefits (i.e., firms are never going to give benefits on a basis wider than the skills that their employee has. I will give firm-level benefits to extract firm-level skills, and to make sure that my worker is bound to me). when people loss a job and they have to transgress a skill boundary to seek benefits, the State has to step in (to re-skill, etc.)
(326) employers can support this because it minimizes risks of investing in nontransferable skills to workers, who are then more likely to get trained, etc. [perhaps understates employer's power over employee, but OK]
(328, 341-342) the rise and fall of industry as % of the population in the US is much smaller than elsewhere (the amplitude is higher in all late industrializers, for understandable reasons--given the period that we're looking at)
(329, 334) WS expansion can be more or less egalitarian depending on political parameters--partisan effects matter
(332-334) findings
(337) US/Canada/etc. are more effective at generative service self-employment because of wage disperson (i.e., inequality). Where you have centralized bargaining, these sectors don't grow as fast [their argument involves growth of productivity, etc., but I might be missing something b/c this seems clear-cut example of sectors growing that are parasitic on rich people's ability to live luxuriously]
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