scanlon, nozick on rights, liberty and property (1976)
(4) historical (depends on how something came about) vs. end-state/patterned (targetd)
conceptions of justice
(5) for Nozick, any voluntary transfer is 'just,' irrespective of patterns that result (thus, his conception of justice is historical and unpatterned)
(9) one of four justifications of egalitarianism -- 'all differences in treatment require justification' [absolutely. based on bare-bones premise that we are undeniably all human]
(13) nozick's objection to 'unfreedom' of workers on low wages-metaphor is marrying an unattractive bride [the obvious failing here is that only human action can be a source of unfreedom. can't be social institutions. and here, too, there is the implicit importing in of limits of what's possible (i.e. not everyone can be attractive). but, certainly, everyone can have a lovely standard of living, so the comparison is moot]
(17) actual consent vs. hypothetical consent
(19) consent can't rule considerations of justice
(23) in Locke, the justification of perperty rights is limited to what's needed to store up 'conveniences of life' [hmm, interesting]
(4) historical (depends on how something came about) vs. end-state/patterned (targetd)
conceptions of justice
(5) for Nozick, any voluntary transfer is 'just,' irrespective of patterns that result (thus, his conception of justice is historical and unpatterned)
(9) one of four justifications of egalitarianism -- 'all differences in treatment require justification' [absolutely. based on bare-bones premise that we are undeniably all human]
(13) nozick's objection to 'unfreedom' of workers on low wages-metaphor is marrying an unattractive bride [the obvious failing here is that only human action can be a source of unfreedom. can't be social institutions. and here, too, there is the implicit importing in of limits of what's possible (i.e. not everyone can be attractive). but, certainly, everyone can have a lovely standard of living, so the comparison is moot]
(17) actual consent vs. hypothetical consent
(19) consent can't rule considerations of justice
(23) in Locke, the justification of perperty rights is limited to what's needed to store up 'conveniences of life' [hmm, interesting]
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