tanel demirel, "soldiers and civilians" (2010)
(127, 131) blaming soldiers' self-perception
(129) 1923-1945, single-party regime under RPP; 1945, transition to multi-party
(130) with each intervention, the military acquired legal privileges and economic resources [it's important to clarify where exactly the difference w/ Pakistan lies--the explanans and explanandum]
(131) military's perception of civilians impedes their acceptance of civilian supremacy [but he goes on to say that this is something that they've 'chosen', which begs the important questions]
(132) military had praetorian powers ("continued to wield significant powers over the elected governments when it did not directly step in"), its willingness to let civilians govern [more than in Pakistan, say] is explained by its traditions. [which is to say that he has explained nothing]
(132, FN 23) long-term military rule was made difficult because it couldn't find a real constituency (Turkey didn't have a large, land-owning class, and foreign capital was weak) [bizarre that he is suggesting this, but seems plausible--at least the first arm. resurrecting Alavi, ahh!]
(133-134) evolution of military-civilian balance hasn't suggested that military's role has been ebbing--indeed, it's been 'increasing'
(137) TUSIAD (business organization) is pro-democracy because it's pro-EU
(138) the flimsiness of the civilian challenge to the military is an important explanation for military supremacy [important to incorporate into paper]
(138) claim, implicitly, is that democracy isn't seen as important by the man on the street--that there is more trust in the army than in the civilians [this is important--true about Pakistan but probably not true about Latin America] [here it's important to make two theoretical points: (1) democratization has been pushed by worker's organizations because workers need political rights to win their economic rights, typically; (2) when workers haven't been aware of this, it's been because their organizations have been weak, and thus the 'commonsense' has been lacking]
(140-141): the three military interventions never reached violent proportions (Chile, Argentina)--the military has maintained its popular standing [this is a bit different from Pakistan, though that might have to do with what he's qualifying as violent. need to read more]
(146) the 'military mind' [but this is stupid. this is true everywhere, how can you explain variation? something like this applies to aqil shah's stuff too, I should think]
(127, 131) blaming soldiers' self-perception
(129) 1923-1945, single-party regime under RPP; 1945, transition to multi-party
(130) with each intervention, the military acquired legal privileges and economic resources [it's important to clarify where exactly the difference w/ Pakistan lies--the explanans and explanandum]
(131) military's perception of civilians impedes their acceptance of civilian supremacy [but he goes on to say that this is something that they've 'chosen', which begs the important questions]
(132) military had praetorian powers ("continued to wield significant powers over the elected governments when it did not directly step in"), its willingness to let civilians govern [more than in Pakistan, say] is explained by its traditions. [which is to say that he has explained nothing]
(132, FN 23) long-term military rule was made difficult because it couldn't find a real constituency (Turkey didn't have a large, land-owning class, and foreign capital was weak) [bizarre that he is suggesting this, but seems plausible--at least the first arm. resurrecting Alavi, ahh!]
(133-134) evolution of military-civilian balance hasn't suggested that military's role has been ebbing--indeed, it's been 'increasing'
(137) TUSIAD (business organization) is pro-democracy because it's pro-EU
(138) the flimsiness of the civilian challenge to the military is an important explanation for military supremacy [important to incorporate into paper]
(138) claim, implicitly, is that democracy isn't seen as important by the man on the street--that there is more trust in the army than in the civilians [this is important--true about Pakistan but probably not true about Latin America] [here it's important to make two theoretical points: (1) democratization has been pushed by worker's organizations because workers need political rights to win their economic rights, typically; (2) when workers haven't been aware of this, it's been because their organizations have been weak, and thus the 'commonsense' has been lacking]
(140-141): the three military interventions never reached violent proportions (Chile, Argentina)--the military has maintained its popular standing [this is a bit different from Pakistan, though that might have to do with what he's qualifying as violent. need to read more]
(146) the 'military mind' [but this is stupid. this is true everywhere, how can you explain variation? something like this applies to aqil shah's stuff too, I should think]
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