sharon street, objectivity and truth: you'd better rethink it
(1) practical standpoint vs. theoretical standpoint
(2) normative realism (some normative facts/truths that hold independent of our evaluative attitutudes) vs. normative antirealism (reasons to act are not objective, but particular to agent)
(3) Kantian anti-realism (you begin from individual judgement, but this entails burdens that rule out a whole host of acts) vs .Humean anti-realism (strong substantive conclusions do not follow from particular points of view)
(5-6) naturaist realists (normative facts exist as natural facts) vs. non-natural realists (Dworkin, Scanlon, etc.)
(10) the puzzle is to make sense of this coincidence--that what I belive also happens to be what's objectively true
(11) constructivism is a response--moral reason are internal to individuals
(12) Dworkin's response, of course, is that if it's a coincidence, so be it
(18) the 'normative lottery'--just like it should be crazy to think you won the lottery, so it should be crazy to accept Dworkin's coincidence
(18-21)
(1) practical standpoint vs. theoretical standpoint
(2) normative realism (some normative facts/truths that hold independent of our evaluative attitutudes) vs. normative antirealism (reasons to act are not objective, but particular to agent)
(3) Kantian anti-realism (you begin from individual judgement, but this entails burdens that rule out a whole host of acts) vs .Humean anti-realism (strong substantive conclusions do not follow from particular points of view)
(5-6) naturaist realists (normative facts exist as natural facts) vs. non-natural realists (Dworkin, Scanlon, etc.)
(10) the puzzle is to make sense of this coincidence--that what I belive also happens to be what's objectively true
(11) constructivism is a response--moral reason are internal to individuals
(12) Dworkin's response, of course, is that if it's a coincidence, so be it
(18) the 'normative lottery'--just like it should be crazy to think you won the lottery, so it should be crazy to accept Dworkin's coincidence
(18-21)
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