Bruce Western, A Comparative Study of Working-Class Disorganization (1995)
(179, 197) institutions matter -- these countries were experiencing a common structural transformation, but they had divergent experiences -- > the transformations of institutions that protected class identities (centralized wage bargaining, SD parties) produced declining union density
(180) increased dispersion of union densities in post-war period
(180) strike wave of 1960s --> increase in union density of 15 pts (Western dismisses this, summarizing other arguments)
(181) Table of union densities [Graph this]
STRUCTURAL FACTORS
(181) [Assuming that trade is the context of the change in economic conditions that set the stage--there are echoes of Brenner here, but this narrative could be better, regardless]
(182) Freeman shows union decline rooted in employer resistance (recognition of elections, etc.)
(182) Flexible work --> decline in union density (except in Germany?)
LABOR MOVEMENT EXPLANATIONS
(182) where unions were strong, they stayed strong-- this is where they most successfully organized service sectors [though, as per the other article, service sector growth was not as important as it was in other countries]
(183) strike waves in Sweden and Denmark, 1979-1985, encouraged unionization [again, Western will dismiss this, partly on grounds that these don't distinguish between lockouts and strikes]
WESTERN'S INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS
(183) two-fold (a) decentralization of labor-market institutions; (b) decline of SD parties
(184) Table 2 --> decentralization of bargaining across much of Europe
(185) 'wage drift'
(186) Aroux laws under Mitterand, strengthening power of labour [hmm]
(186) four reasons decentralization leads to declining union density
(a) extends union wages to the unorganized, muting employer oppositoin (so, in the US, the higher the union wage premium, the more employer's will oppose unions) [good support for the Henwood line]
(b) weakens demand [?]
(c) weakens central confederations, in turn reducing movement's power to influence economic policy and increasing corporation-friendly policy
(d) interunion rivalry peaks
(187) SD lost power in Scandinavia, throughout the 1976-1991 period, as well as changing its character
(187) in US and UK, 'active union constraint'
(190) modeling 'first differences'/hazard rate
(192-194) finding that 'everything matters' (except strike rates)
(195) Sweden and Finland defy model's predictions
(196) institutional factors could be tied up with economic conditions, of course
(194) openness --> decline in density
(179, 197) institutions matter -- these countries were experiencing a common structural transformation, but they had divergent experiences -- > the transformations of institutions that protected class identities (centralized wage bargaining, SD parties) produced declining union density
(180) increased dispersion of union densities in post-war period
(180) strike wave of 1960s --> increase in union density of 15 pts (Western dismisses this, summarizing other arguments)
(181) Table of union densities [Graph this]
STRUCTURAL FACTORS
(181) [Assuming that trade is the context of the change in economic conditions that set the stage--there are echoes of Brenner here, but this narrative could be better, regardless]
(182) Freeman shows union decline rooted in employer resistance (recognition of elections, etc.)
(182) Flexible work --> decline in union density (except in Germany?)
LABOR MOVEMENT EXPLANATIONS
(182) where unions were strong, they stayed strong-- this is where they most successfully organized service sectors [though, as per the other article, service sector growth was not as important as it was in other countries]
(183) strike waves in Sweden and Denmark, 1979-1985, encouraged unionization [again, Western will dismiss this, partly on grounds that these don't distinguish between lockouts and strikes]
WESTERN'S INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS
(183) two-fold (a) decentralization of labor-market institutions; (b) decline of SD parties
(184) Table 2 --> decentralization of bargaining across much of Europe
(185) 'wage drift'
(186) Aroux laws under Mitterand, strengthening power of labour [hmm]
(186) four reasons decentralization leads to declining union density
(a) extends union wages to the unorganized, muting employer oppositoin (so, in the US, the higher the union wage premium, the more employer's will oppose unions) [good support for the Henwood line]
(b) weakens demand [?]
(c) weakens central confederations, in turn reducing movement's power to influence economic policy and increasing corporation-friendly policy
(d) interunion rivalry peaks
(187) SD lost power in Scandinavia, throughout the 1976-1991 period, as well as changing its character
(187) in US and UK, 'active union constraint'
(190) modeling 'first differences'/hazard rate
(192-194) finding that 'everything matters' (except strike rates)
(195) Sweden and Finland defy model's predictions
(196) institutional factors could be tied up with economic conditions, of course
(194) openness --> decline in density
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