thomas nagel, moral conflict and political legitimacy (1987)
(219) convergence (Hobbes--right because it's rationally accepted) vs. common standpoint theories (rationally accepted because it's right)
(220) liberalism as a mixture of the two, because it involves 'a form of reasoning that includes moral concerns'. more than Hobbesian convergence
(222) Is liberalism more than just another sectarian doctrine? Why should antagonists abandon their conception of the good and accept impartiality?
(223-228) this depends on interpreting impartiality in a particular way, that depends on 'loose epistemological preferences'. not asserting oneself against others who believe differently, but also not ceding to their beliefs everywhere [epistemelogically. politically, no limit on the latter save for the harm principle]
(229-230) Nagel calls this 'epistemological restraint,' not skepticism. 'liberalism should provide the devout with a reason for tolerance' (i.e., even when you're convinced in the correctness of a position, you cede). this is because our beliefs should be regarded as just that (our beliefs), unless they can reasonably be defended from an entirely impersonal standpoint. no society should legislate on the assumption that they're truth.
(219) convergence (Hobbes--right because it's rationally accepted) vs. common standpoint theories (rationally accepted because it's right)
(220) liberalism as a mixture of the two, because it involves 'a form of reasoning that includes moral concerns'. more than Hobbesian convergence
(222) Is liberalism more than just another sectarian doctrine? Why should antagonists abandon their conception of the good and accept impartiality?
(223-228) this depends on interpreting impartiality in a particular way, that depends on 'loose epistemological preferences'. not asserting oneself against others who believe differently, but also not ceding to their beliefs everywhere [epistemelogically. politically, no limit on the latter save for the harm principle]
(229-230) Nagel calls this 'epistemological restraint,' not skepticism. 'liberalism should provide the devout with a reason for tolerance' (i.e., even when you're convinced in the correctness of a position, you cede). this is because our beliefs should be regarded as just that (our beliefs), unless they can reasonably be defended from an entirely impersonal standpoint. no society should legislate on the assumption that they're truth.
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