sachs and shatz, "trade and jobs in US manufacturing" (1994)
(3,4) sum of findings is that trade matters, but doesn't explain most of the job loss
(5) macroec summary (good data)
(5) Krugman and Lawrence say the 'trade --> decline in manufacturing' argument is spurious; for them, it's a success of productivity story [use]; this is generally correct, but the 70s and 80s were particularly sharp declines--an 'unexplained gap' of about 3 million jobs. the final estimate is that about 1.2 million of these job losses are explained by trade.
(7) growing inequality between skilled and unskilled is an 80s phenomenon
(9) international trade would matter through putting pressure on output prices
(11) consistent with timing of trade with developing countries
(15) did lead to job losses [though this is rooted in what seems to me to be a particularly naive view of the labour market]
(16) capital flight (remember, trade model assumes immobile capital)
(17) table of skill deciles (ranked by ratio of productive/nonproductive workers)
(18) the US' basic relation with developing countries--the US exports h-skill, imports l-skioll
(21) w/ low wage countries trade is interindustry, w/ high wage countries intra-industry
(21) and because of this, lower job losses expected according to skill intensity [don't quite grasp logic]
(23) '78-'91, tarriffs were more intense on l-skill than high-skill industries; this pattern became slightly stronger in '91 than in '78
(25) decline in employment was clearly greatest in 'low-skill' secotrs
(23) skill-intensity of production rises in every decile
(26) employment fell most in (a) low skill sectors; (b) capital-intensive sectors [collinearity problems?]; fell least in (a) high-skill sectors
(28) c-factual model: rise in net imports resulted in 7.2 and 2.1 % job loss from developing countries
(30) certain industries experience declines unrelated to trade shifts (steel, in particular)
(34) Wood: "understating job loss by using average skill-intensity". but showing that this is not borne out by data
(34) manufacturing trends can't explain income inequality in US (mainly because of hos small a fraction of LF is in manufacturing)
(36-37) effective prices in low-skill goods fell vs. not fell (Sachs vs. Lawrence/Slaughter)
(40-41) Biased technical change--increase in proportion of skilled to nonskilled [v. strange assertion that this might raise the relative wage of low-skilled workers--assuming full employment + all gains to worker?]
(44) TNC-based trade declined w/ developing countries, raised w/ developed countrieds
(46) factors that drive trade (can't trade w/ poor countries)
(52) China-US trade details
(54) wage gap at outset of trading ties was enormous! (1.9% of US wages)
(3,4) sum of findings is that trade matters, but doesn't explain most of the job loss
(5) macroec summary (good data)
(5) Krugman and Lawrence say the 'trade --> decline in manufacturing' argument is spurious; for them, it's a success of productivity story [use]; this is generally correct, but the 70s and 80s were particularly sharp declines--an 'unexplained gap' of about 3 million jobs. the final estimate is that about 1.2 million of these job losses are explained by trade.
(7) growing inequality between skilled and unskilled is an 80s phenomenon
(9) international trade would matter through putting pressure on output prices
(11) consistent with timing of trade with developing countries
(15) did lead to job losses [though this is rooted in what seems to me to be a particularly naive view of the labour market]
(16) capital flight (remember, trade model assumes immobile capital)
(17) table of skill deciles (ranked by ratio of productive/nonproductive workers)
(18) the US' basic relation with developing countries--the US exports h-skill, imports l-skioll
(21) w/ low wage countries trade is interindustry, w/ high wage countries intra-industry
(21) and because of this, lower job losses expected according to skill intensity [don't quite grasp logic]
(23) '78-'91, tarriffs were more intense on l-skill than high-skill industries; this pattern became slightly stronger in '91 than in '78
(25) decline in employment was clearly greatest in 'low-skill' secotrs
(23) skill-intensity of production rises in every decile
(26) employment fell most in (a) low skill sectors; (b) capital-intensive sectors [collinearity problems?]; fell least in (a) high-skill sectors
(28) c-factual model: rise in net imports resulted in 7.2 and 2.1 % job loss from developing countries
(30) certain industries experience declines unrelated to trade shifts (steel, in particular)
(34) Wood: "understating job loss by using average skill-intensity". but showing that this is not borne out by data
(34) manufacturing trends can't explain income inequality in US (mainly because of hos small a fraction of LF is in manufacturing)
(36-37) effective prices in low-skill goods fell vs. not fell (Sachs vs. Lawrence/Slaughter)
(40-41) Biased technical change--increase in proportion of skilled to nonskilled [v. strange assertion that this might raise the relative wage of low-skilled workers--assuming full employment + all gains to worker?]
(44) TNC-based trade declined w/ developing countries, raised w/ developed countrieds
(46) factors that drive trade (can't trade w/ poor countries)
(52) China-US trade details
(54) wage gap at outset of trading ties was enormous! (1.9% of US wages)
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