the global gamble, peter gowan

(4): the international monetary regime as US-centric and 'political' (not outcome of technical/economic shifts)

(5): this form of globalization was Nixon's response to the crisis of the 60s, but it was one of a range of possible responses

(8): imp--most of what happens in global 'capital markets' is not oriented towards productive investment--what does happen is not useful, should be viewed as a 'charge' upon that more basic, important duty. in fact, very large flow of funds into productive investment don't pass through capital markets.

(10): 1/2 of biggest banks in Europe publicly-owned in early 1990s

(11): the secondary market in securities doesn't contribute to productive investment, at all

(11): this kind of 'parasitism' is the preserve of 'rentiers' and 'speculators'

(12): again, much of the activity doesn't facilitate productive investment.

(12): key division in capitalism--money-dealing capital vs productive capital [hmm]

(13): balance of power between two sectors governed by business cycle (former more powerful in recession, latter in boom), but also by institutional configurations

(14): former like hot flows, latter like cold flows [why, necessarily? a bit too stylized, this]

(14): with the end of Keynesianism has come the 'resurrection of the rentiers'

(17): pressure on US dollar the late 1960s causing Nixon to break up Bretton Woods

(19): key--break-up of Bretton Woods was a strategy for restoring dominance of US capitals (two decisive moments--ending convertibility, 'engineering' of oil price rises)

(20): a 'fake', re: SDRs, in order to push people towards dollar std

(20): key--what happens is that the US is able to move the exchange price of the dollar without suffering consequences that others would suffer, if they tried similar things (privilege of seigniorage)

(21): key--Nixon admin tried very hard to take international financial relations out of hands of state banks, into hands of private financial operators. this was done through exploiting US control over oil supplies, its influence on OPEC--'economic statecraft' [taking pains to emphasize that this is not conspiratorial]. other gov'ts wanted to recycle through IMF, US said no

(22): US had to lean on banks to lend to the South [different from Sunkel and Griffith-Jones' story, where it's the competition between banks that leads to this]

(23, 31): key--all this was a tactic to avoid US economic weakness--this would preserve the privileged position of the US.

(23): imp--stability of a State's currency would depend not only on balance of payments position, now, but also on State's creditworthiness in private international financial markets [of course, these won't be entirely decoupled, right?]

(25): US vs. Chad-- privilege of printing the reserve currency

(26): DSWR has had four effects

1. private banks become central
2. lack of public supervision
3. developments in US financial markets became very influential
4. competitive pressures within banking systems, where deregulation in US prompts deregulation abroad

(27): not a global financial market, as much as an American financial market dominating other national markets

(28-29): US has power over interest rates, regulation, via bailouts

(32, 41): in the 80s, after initial hesitation, there was a concerted move to use the IMF/WB to exert influence. under Baker.

(35-36): regime generates crises in the South [a bit stylized, the story, but OK]. but financial crises in the South don't weaken the regime, they strengthen it. all heightens the centrality of the dollar (capital flight, exports to earn dollars, etc.)

(40): the switch comes with the Volcker shock

(40): but to take advantage of high IR's without choking the US economy, Reagan needed to eliminate capital controls overseas

(42, 57): key--interests behind SAPs are US rentiers, US industry (cheaper inputs), US companies (take advantage of privatization) [insufficient--but this is the 'international story,' i guess]. the later excerpt highlights also domestic money-capital (which escapes to Wall Street), export sectors, and capital as a whole. ISI elites suffer, though, is the implication.

(44): intra-European monetary union as defensive response to DSWR

(45): Mitterand's last Keyneisan hurrah, 1981-1983

(45): Atlantic neo-liberalism as 'forced' on the economies of Europe, almost, through competitive/private pressures issuing from DSWR

(47, 51): Japan --> SE Asia in 80s [much later than in Vivek's book...]

(48): easy borrowing was response to crisis of ISI

(49): citing Rodrik--ought to have adjusted, rather than borrowed [but like Rodrik, this misses the fundamental points that Vivek's book makes, about productivity, etc. you can't devalue your way into international competitiveness]

(50): Mexico 1994-1995 as neoliberalism's first crisis. shocking.

(53): high level of fragmentation of US banking system

(54): a 'speculative strike force' in the form of the hedge funds, attakcing currency

(55-56): imp--why has the US allowed this? fundamentally, not b/c of links to speculators, campaign contributions, but because all strategic social groups have been captured by finance (industry, pensioners, etc.) [satisfying? and what exactly is this an explanation of?]

(62-63): unlike both mainstream and neo-mercantilist views of IR, we see both cooperation and conflict between capitalist economies. it is precisely because they don't see capitalism that they can't grasp this.

(64): imp--there are different ways for capitalists to increase their profits, only a few of which will coincide with growth on a national level

(65, 69): State has to see to the international interests of its domestic capitalists, as well. five hypotheses in this regard.

(69, 75): strategic problem confronting Clinton--'historic strategic review'

(70-71, 129): nice--India/Asia saved Lancashire, just like 'dependent' regimes will save US (as captive markets, in other words--as well as providers of cheap inputs) [nice, though I'm not sure how well this holds. worth exploring this parallel in more detail]

(77): Clinton's political team were holdovers from Carter. it was the economic team that really did the work.

(80): nice--while America's capacity to kill has gone up several fold, it's capacity to die has not

(90): seeking allies with domestic rentiers

(92): currency warfare with the Yen, which was reversed by Summers in 1995 all laid the groundwork for the Asian crisis. undermined their export capacity significantly.

(94): considering questions of intentionality, no definite conclusions. parallels to Reagan vs. France, in 1981-1983

(96): attacking hedge fund speculation [awesomely parasitic and harmful, this]

(134): interesting argument that 'fiannce' gains power in times of stagnation

(134): causes of 'long stagnation' in overproduction/etc. (and not, then, in neoliberalism--which is an attempt to deal with this, not its cause)

(134): missed opportunity b/c of DSWR