(2): fallacies
- not due to dictatorial nature of Pinochet regime
- return to democracy took mass protest, not thanks to economic growth
- nationalization+state intervention were not obstacles to neoliberalism, but made it possible (redirection rather than reversal)
- capitalist revolution, but not a bourgeois revolution (not a civic rebellion)--State 'gave birth' to civil society
(14): with Chile coup, 7 out of 11 countries in LA were under military governments
(17): weakness of social movements after Pinochet takeover, due to extreme repression
(18): 1983-1984 as turning points
(21): why protest began? [not insignificantly unconvincing, here]
(23): two trade union movements -- the radcial, and the more professional/strategic (copper workers, etc.)
(30): structural handicap in first part of dictatorship, where smaller portion of w-class formally employed, etc.
(32-33): imp--splits in middle-class because of the memory of Allende, when agitation got underway. no organization, point of unity amongst protestors
(35): from 'lions to foxes'
(36): communists, from broad front to popular rebellion (by 1979-1983)
(37): socialists became much more moderate/tamed
(39): mobilization for 'no' vote, 1988
(43): the 'underdevelopment of civil society'
(44): imp--neoliberal reforms mostly imposed by technocratic elites, supported by business [hmm]
(45): imp--State's autonomy was made possible by Allende reforms, since they weakened the power of the national business class (distinct from Uruguay and Argentina) [almost opposite the argument of the other reading!?]
(47-48): two periods [rather than three] -- (1) '73-'83 (reduction of tarriffs, end of state controls, privatizations); (2) '83-'90 (began with external debt crisis, etc.)
(48): gov't had to 'get prices wrong' in second period, to recover from the first
(50): good table of principal neoliberal reforms, and how they changed period to period
- foreign trade
- prices
- privatization
- fiscal policy
- internal credit
- external debt
- labour markets
- land market
- social security
(53): Chile had comparative advantage of its resource endowments--so neoliberalism would result in export-economy based on this sector
(55): state socialized losses after the debt crisis, of course. neoliberalism in practice
(58): imp--the 'opening up' in late 70s was accompanied by very little productive investment--most went into consumpiton, etc.
(62): LR redistributed 60% of arable land
(64): reform of pension funds was attempt to liberate funds for accumulation
(65-67): the neoliberal state--highly interventionist in Chile, five features
(73): four forms of resource transfer
- from State to large capital
- from wages to profits
- towards export sector
- destruction of natural resources
(78): Allende couldn't retain support of small and medium companies, because of policy over labour. worker conflict over wages affected them adversely.
(80): int--the anti-Allende coalition was not motivated by a positive vision; held together by 'socialist threat' [some evidence for this in the other reading, but more a question, there, of competing positive visions rather than all negative]
(81): key--autonomy permits something grater than state 'reaction'--it permits capitalist revolution [this is key contrast to other reading]
(83-84): very odd claim -- C. boys appeal rooted in their creating something 'new', 'universalist' appeal
(85): need autonomy from the political right
(86): key--very different explanation of how 74-75 crisis mattered. here it weakens business, bringing technocrats to the front [in other reading, the mechanism is liquidity overseas]
(87): again--a technocratic elite 'autonomous from immediate class considerations'
(88-89): imp-- newcomers take commanding heights -- a new class being constituted by the policy shift
(94): technocratic elites' task made possible by total power being in Pinochet's hands
(95): imp--after '82, call to temper ideological policy. business coming back into picture [BUT when they come back in, in this story, they are a largely undifferentiated class]
(97): here you get an 'active' State, in the service of a 'pragmatic neoliberalism', but willing to 'get prices wrong' to serve business
(98): in sum--State autonomy explains 'radical transformation'
(99-100): again, story of political elite being outmanuevered by Pinochet and the technocrats in this exceptional period
(105): a new working class is born, of a different composition than the old one
(111-115): int. reflections on the informal sector
(121): creation of reserve army in late 70s--w/ unemployment, and whatnot
(124): capitalist recovery took place w/ heightened levels of inequality
(127): 'precarity' was not backward, but emphatically 'present'
(130): a 'weak' sense of continuity, across the two periods [what's the point of this? v. odd]
(132): nationalization was a clear prelude to 'successful' neoliberalism
(134): three points, critical
- Allende weakened business class, which was critical to implementation of neoliberalism [in the other story, they are weakened more as a result of labor withdrawal, and international changes]
- w/o copper nationalization, not possible to avoid fiscal crisis
- extensive agrarian reform was critical to modernization of agriculture
(138): neoliberalism destroying its grave-digger in the 1980s (unions and left-wing parties)
--
[1] contrast w/ other reading, particularly the neoliberal period (different mechanisms are diong the explaining--in one, autonomy; in other, power of 'radical internationalists')
[2] this one is, of course, compatible with relative autonomy of State--it is just that the State is being brought to heel after 8-10 years of experimentation. whereas in the other the State depends upon the power of a new coalition.
[3] weakening of business class important to explaining neoliberal period? why weakened, in both accounts different story
[4] lessons for generalizing to other experiences (of course no a priori reason that this should be straightforward), given (1) claim of enabling (exceptional) autonomy; (2) land reform/nationalizations, etc.
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