breakdown of democratic regimes, juan linz (introduction)

(3): intention is to look at dynamic process of breakdown, rather than offer 'stable' correlates

(4): acknowledging importance of structural factors (all operating via a worried elite), concerned to represent the 'how' of breakdown more carefully. implication is that c-factuals re: tactics for p-democratic forces, will be raised. what they could have done better.

(5): 'political processes actually precipitate the ultimate breakdown.'

(5-6): def. of democracy is closer to a classical liberal one (universal suffrage not necessary)

(7-8): imp--analysis not applicable to Pakistan/Nigeria, where breakdown had something to do with the difficulties of 'state-building'. all these regimes have stable states before they have democratic regimes.

(10): again, against broad explanations (like Moore's), in favor of looking at the specifics of the breakdown process

(13, 14): in effect, suggestion here is that the blame for breakdown of democracy rests on those seeking 'revolutionary change' and not valuing democracy. they invite the counterrevolution.[silly, but predictable]

(14): most breakdowns have been 'counterrevolutionary', as in seeking to guard against changes of the social order

(15): importance of the direct intervention of the military in effecting breakdown of stabilized states (this explains why Left has not been responsible for democratic breakdown, despite mass support) [int, but inadequate]

(16): democracy depends on some measure of collective legitimacy--more so than other regimes

(18): minimal definition of 'legitimacy'--considered to be least evil form of government.

(18-19): efficacy (20) effectiveness (22) also important

(20): extra importance of well-organized sectors--giving example of capital flight [not really the fact that they're well-organized. linz is inviting charge of pluralism, here]

(21): problems of consolidation exacerbate issues [but if problems of consolidation last 60 years, they can't really be called 'consolidation' problems!]

(23): using 'ineffectiveness' to characterize bourgeois-Socialist failiure, in Spain, to effect agrarian reform [but 'ineffectiveness', in this case, clearly obscures much more than it clarifies]

(24-25): two-party system encourages 'ideological polarization' [this essay is degenerating. and it didn't start out very well]. the proximate thing that worries us in democratic breakdown is large ideological distance separating political competitors.

(25-38): discussion of 'loyal'/'semiloyal' opposition, its importance re: breakdown. [skipped]

(39): again stressing bias against using 'structural' factors to do anything but set the stage. quote from Tilly