capitalist coalitions, the state, and neoliberal economic restructuring

(526): state autonomy insufficient

(528): imp--ISI had created coalitions favoring (1) protection; (2) sectoral policies that shifted resources to industry (away from agriculture, trade(?), and finance). earlier argument was that State autonomy was important in repressing this segment; didn't think about the sectors of capital that would be interested in liberalization...

(529): FN--always the possibility of responding to the crisis by 'deepening' industrialization, as the BA regimes in Brazil and Argentina did in the 1960s

(530, 534): pace Haggard, authoritarian regimes have only large-scale capitalists/landowners affecting policy (small-scale are sidelined)

(531): pace Frieden, what matters is whether firms have liquid assets, or fixed assets. former favour market-oriented (banking, real estate, trade), latter favour sectoral (industrialists, landowners)

(532): pace Gourevitch, international- vs domestic- producers. uncompetitive domestic producers should favour protection; all others should favour liberalization.

(531): FN--thus attempting to disaggregate the 'dominant class' much more thoroughly than is typically done by Marxists

(535-): three periods

1. 1973-1975, gradual neoliberalism -- UP had split the ISI coalition, by polarizing things on class lines. gradualist coalition composition (pg. 536); labour's gone, which decreases protectionist coalition's leverage (pg. 537); diversified interests eased burden of adjustment for old protectionist coalition (pg. 538) [implications?]
2. 1975-1982, radical neoliberalism -- (1) radical deflation, and (2) reduction in protections. the power of this radical internationlist coalition was increased by (1) increasing role of private commercial banks, and (2) international liquidity, but also (3) weakness of other firms due to recession, privatizations, etc.
3. 1983-1988, pragmatic neoliberalism -- external economic shock was main catalyst, as well as intense business pressure after the debt crisis (pg. 548-550). commitment to radical neolibearlism had been thing. also the protests that were starting in '83-84 proved important.

(543): int point about accomodation between elites--gradualist coalition evidence of elite willingness to settle differences, to which underdevelopment has been attributed. bourgeoisie unwilling to play historic role. but then we got neoliberalism!

(546): between '74 and '78 Pinochet star rising, as well

(546): C. Boys were more than just technocrats

(547): Pinochet needed radical internationalists--why, exactly?

(550): recovery program--high exchange rates, some protection, reflationary monetary policy, low interest rates, debt relief, sectoral policies, etc.

(556): int. claim that States become more attentive to demands of factions, because neoliberalism gives capitalists control over investment [not sure if this is superior way to frame arg]

(556-557): argument summary

(558): Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay had less support from capitalist elites, so less 'success' in restructuring?

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[1] int contrast to the fact that, in general, ISI was given its last legs by liquidity boom. here it is neoliberalism that becomes particularly radical as a result of liquidity boom (because previous alignments have already taken place)