the global gamble, peter gowan

(4): the international monetary regime as US-centric and 'political' (not outcome of technical/economic shifts)

(5): this form of globalization was Nixon's response to the crisis of the 60s, but it was one of a range of possible responses

(8): imp--most of what happens in global 'capital markets' is not oriented towards productive investment--what does happen is not useful, should be viewed as a 'charge' upon that more basic, important duty. in fact, very large flow of funds into productive investment don't pass through capital markets.

(10): 1/2 of biggest banks in Europe publicly-owned in early 1990s

(11): the secondary market in securities doesn't contribute to productive investment, at all

(11): this kind of 'parasitism' is the preserve of 'rentiers' and 'speculators'

(12): again, much of the activity doesn't facilitate productive investment.

(12): key division in capitalism--money-dealing capital vs productive capital [hmm]

(13): balance of power between two sectors governed by business cycle (former more powerful in recession, latter in boom), but also by institutional configurations

(14): former like hot flows, latter like cold flows [why, necessarily? a bit too stylized, this]

(14): with the end of Keynesianism has come the 'resurrection of the rentiers'

(17): pressure on US dollar the late 1960s causing Nixon to break up Bretton Woods

(19): key--break-up of Bretton Woods was a strategy for restoring dominance of US capitals (two decisive moments--ending convertibility, 'engineering' of oil price rises)

(20): a 'fake', re: SDRs, in order to push people towards dollar std

(20): key--what happens is that the US is able to move the exchange price of the dollar without suffering consequences that others would suffer, if they tried similar things (privilege of seigniorage)

(21): key--Nixon admin tried very hard to take international financial relations out of hands of state banks, into hands of private financial operators. this was done through exploiting US control over oil supplies, its influence on OPEC--'economic statecraft' [taking pains to emphasize that this is not conspiratorial]. other gov'ts wanted to recycle through IMF, US said no

(22): US had to lean on banks to lend to the South [different from Sunkel and Griffith-Jones' story, where it's the competition between banks that leads to this]

(23, 31): key--all this was a tactic to avoid US economic weakness--this would preserve the privileged position of the US.

(23): imp--stability of a State's currency would depend not only on balance of payments position, now, but also on State's creditworthiness in private international financial markets [of course, these won't be entirely decoupled, right?]

(25): US vs. Chad-- privilege of printing the reserve currency

(26): DSWR has had four effects

1. private banks become central
2. lack of public supervision
3. developments in US financial markets became very influential
4. competitive pressures within banking systems, where deregulation in US prompts deregulation abroad

(27): not a global financial market, as much as an American financial market dominating other national markets

(28-29): US has power over interest rates, regulation, via bailouts

(32, 41): in the 80s, after initial hesitation, there was a concerted move to use the IMF/WB to exert influence. under Baker.

(35-36): regime generates crises in the South [a bit stylized, the story, but OK]. but financial crises in the South don't weaken the regime, they strengthen it. all heightens the centrality of the dollar (capital flight, exports to earn dollars, etc.)

(40): the switch comes with the Volcker shock

(40): but to take advantage of high IR's without choking the US economy, Reagan needed to eliminate capital controls overseas

(42, 57): key--interests behind SAPs are US rentiers, US industry (cheaper inputs), US companies (take advantage of privatization) [insufficient--but this is the 'international story,' i guess]. the later excerpt highlights also domestic money-capital (which escapes to Wall Street), export sectors, and capital as a whole. ISI elites suffer, though, is the implication.

(44): intra-European monetary union as defensive response to DSWR

(45): Mitterand's last Keyneisan hurrah, 1981-1983

(45): Atlantic neo-liberalism as 'forced' on the economies of Europe, almost, through competitive/private pressures issuing from DSWR

(47, 51): Japan --> SE Asia in 80s [much later than in Vivek's book...]

(48): easy borrowing was response to crisis of ISI

(49): citing Rodrik--ought to have adjusted, rather than borrowed [but like Rodrik, this misses the fundamental points that Vivek's book makes, about productivity, etc. you can't devalue your way into international competitiveness]

(50): Mexico 1994-1995 as neoliberalism's first crisis. shocking.

(53): high level of fragmentation of US banking system

(54): a 'speculative strike force' in the form of the hedge funds, attakcing currency

(55-56): imp--why has the US allowed this? fundamentally, not b/c of links to speculators, campaign contributions, but because all strategic social groups have been captured by finance (industry, pensioners, etc.) [satisfying? and what exactly is this an explanation of?]

(62-63): unlike both mainstream and neo-mercantilist views of IR, we see both cooperation and conflict between capitalist economies. it is precisely because they don't see capitalism that they can't grasp this.

(64): imp--there are different ways for capitalists to increase their profits, only a few of which will coincide with growth on a national level

(65, 69): State has to see to the international interests of its domestic capitalists, as well. five hypotheses in this regard.

(69, 75): strategic problem confronting Clinton--'historic strategic review'

(70-71, 129): nice--India/Asia saved Lancashire, just like 'dependent' regimes will save US (as captive markets, in other words--as well as providers of cheap inputs) [nice, though I'm not sure how well this holds. worth exploring this parallel in more detail]

(77): Clinton's political team were holdovers from Carter. it was the economic team that really did the work.

(80): nice--while America's capacity to kill has gone up several fold, it's capacity to die has not

(90): seeking allies with domestic rentiers

(92): currency warfare with the Yen, which was reversed by Summers in 1995 all laid the groundwork for the Asian crisis. undermined their export capacity significantly.

(94): considering questions of intentionality, no definite conclusions. parallels to Reagan vs. France, in 1981-1983

(96): attacking hedge fund speculation [awesomely parasitic and harmful, this]

(134): interesting argument that 'fiannce' gains power in times of stagnation

(134): causes of 'long stagnation' in overproduction/etc. (and not, then, in neoliberalism--which is an attempt to deal with this, not its cause)

(134): missed opportunity b/c of DSWR

moving politics, gould

(3-4): not a question of dismissing other factors, but seeing how emotion 'articulates with' more frequently studied actors

(8): mourning -- > militancy

(9-10): imp-- earlier, anger had been one of many emotions. towards the end it was dominant. this will be the 'overarching argument' [begs questions, of course]

(10): political opportunities doesn't help. ACT UP developed despite (because of) lack of pol opportunities (Reagan era)

(13-14): against 'rationality' (the way it was presented). not an account of 'emotion' as irrationality, though.

(15): critique of p. process for 'evacuating emotion' from study of protest (they shared assumption, with c. behavior theorists, that 'emotions are irrational')

(15): in short--protestors are 'broadly rational', but this is not the whole story.

(17): emotion doesn't preclude rationality. irrationality doesn't preclude thought [i am getting confused. she hasn't yet defined rationality]

(18): imp--key concepts (pol opportunties, greivances) matter only insofar as 'emotional charges' are attached to them

(19, 21, 22): definitions--'affect' as nonconscious exp. of bodily energy; 'emotion' as the vague naming of that sensation. 'feeling' as both taken together.

(23): unlike Goodwin et. al., argument is that 'feelings' can diverge from reasoning selves. can't be folded into cognition [save me!]

(24): argument that 1981-1986, gay shame + some gay pride prohibited anything more confrontational than what was done. 'contradictory and unsettling' feelings.

(24): affect as always 'nonrational'--not necessarily irrational. outside of rather than contrary to decision-making.

(25): affective ontology offers three insights

1. complexity/indeterminacy of motivation/behavior
2. affect is a dimension in which social reproduction and social change takes place (attachment to leaders, etc.) using affect to explain the hold of ideology. [here we see invoking affect to explain inaction, when rationality will do just fine, and she doesn't realize it]
3. affect as itself motivating. you want to know what you feel--movements fulfill this function, often. help make sense of affective states [?!?]

(31): affect is not 'presocial'

(32-38): 'emotional habitus' [gobbledygook]

(41): main claim--emotional habitus shapes what people feel, and thus can be tremendously influential in moving people to action.

(50): question is why the movement took to the streets in May 1987 (before there were vigils, etc., and then there was direct action)? (no pol opportunities is established; devastation was ongoing for ages; grievances/strain seems inadequate?) [could it be that emotions are adequate to explain this question, but--aside from being impossible to substantiate properly--the claim is rendered unimportant because the question is so narrow?]

(52): ACT UP as a revitalization of early gay liberation politics

(55): claim -- emotional habitus generates a political horizon.

(56): between 1981-1986, movement stayed off the streets? why? [nature of emotional habitus is going to be the answer]

(58-59): importance of fear and shame in this period, at limiting people to the forms of activism they adopted

(62, 63-64, 90): argument of chapter 1--'ambivalent' feelings shaped the response. political horizon formed authorized some forms of activism, but deligitimized more confrontational activism.

(72): influence of 'lifestyle theories' on early gay response--the 'shame', she's arguing

(93-94, 97-98): some calls for stepping it up -- but didn't resonate widely, even though it got some response. her argument is that this is because the people making the call had no background int he movement, no credibility. but the response was made in a way that bolstered existing emotional habitus [she is at a stage where she can say anything she wants]

(100): of course, if emotional habitus shapes response to new proposals in a way that closes them off, the implication is that it's stuck, unchanging..

(101): Cecchi's speech. [is this empirical evidence for a movement-wide 'emotional habitus'?!?!]

(114): 1985-1986 as transitional moment

(116): new movement suggests a new emotional habitus was forming [um. if this is your reasoning, then the argument is entirely tautological: what causes the new movement? new emotional habitus. how do we know a new emotional habitus is forming? a new movement is forming.]

(118): exploding AIDS crisis was a factor--snowballing cases, gov't attempts to cut funding. but this is not sufficient, she's suggesting.

(121): outrageous Supreme Court Opinion, on homosexuality--can't cast asside millenia of moral teaching

(121, 173): imp--June 1986 ruling 'triggered' a collective response on the part of the lesbian/gay community [so, emotion here is only a vehicle ('outrage', etc.)--the real work is being done by repressive legislation, etc. in other words, if there isn't a viable counterfactual where the SC ruling doesn't result in outrage, then emotion doesn't add anything? if there is, then what explains the fact that this resulted in outrage, rather than something else?]

(131): a movement certainly--shut down W. Street for four hours, etc.

(133): imp--she rightly notes that pol. process model doesn't really work here--this was a closing of political opportunities, but it was the 'spark'. she wants to go from here to a theory of the event! [what we need, instead, is to realize that pol. opportunities isn't everything. intuitively, it doesn't seem to make sense to rule out movements that begin b/c of provocation ('threat')]

(134): Sewell on 'event' [no Hardwick ruling, no ACT UP? are you sure you want to commit to this]

(134-135): Jasper on 'moral shock' [reasonable. but this can only be a 'trigger', the underlying causes should also be part of our 'model': 'escalating grievances,' etc.]

(136): imp--'moral shock' of Hardwick --> change in emotional habitus --> direct-action movement [as noted, two problems: (1) emotions doing independent work? (2) Hardwick as only cause?]

(137): two problems--why Hardwick ruling? why reaction with direct-action? b/c of political terrain of already bad responses (pg. 139), and b/c emotional habitus was already shifting (pp. 139-140). [hmmm--this is just meddling to try and make things fit. confusing the model totally]

(144-145): did the fact that ACT-UP was predominantly white, male, middle-class help explain the turn to direct-action? in other words, did something like 'organizational resources' matter

(150): media reinforced this

(151): mainstream became militant, as well

(156): ACT-UP had 60 people at 1987 parade [so, hold on--what are we explaining, exactly?]

(163): people were still ambivalent, of course

(164): the 'emotional-imaginative' space--an attempt to show that emotions are not necessarily individual. processes structure political possibilities (but don't determine them) [yes, the don't determine is necessary because you have no idea what you're committed to, as an argument]

(169-170): the 'genocide frame' [this whole discussion of meaning-making is full of BS. no real claim. multiple processes, interpretive context, etc.--total waste of paper]

(172): against 'rationality' explanation, she's operating with an 'optimizing' conception of rationality--all you have to say,though, is that they didn't persist with a strategy that was demonstrably 'irrational'. not that they pursued the best tactics at all times.

(194): recuperating queer sexuality

(196-197): um, humour, too

(200, 207): intense, as well; 'collective effervescence'

(212, see also 255): in sum-- importance of feelings in sustaining/nourishing activism [this is intuitive, but serious problems nonetheless: (1) research design. movements that don't sustain themselves lack this factor? movements that have sustained themselves always have this factor? (2) if you tweaked everything but this factor about ACT UP, it wouldn't have succeeded [perhaps] (3) most importantly, can we not take it for granted that these practices will evolve, as a movement evolves? (4) if not, what determines whether these practices will evolve, or not? [surely we can't leave this hanging?]

(224): competing use of people's grief--into activism, rather than into passivity [but what esactly is this meant to explain? if activism was this easy, then we'd all be revolutionaries. you could stitch a story together about many an unsuccessful movement]

(234): Ashes action--how many people, though? a movement?

(253): prevailing emotional habitus discourages protest

(255): if ACT UP had not engaged in emotional work, it would not have succeeded? [implications?]

- - -

1. q. of replicability. participant more likely to concentrate on emotional aspect of movement, of course.

2. q. of difficulty of 'proving' shifts in emotional habitus, whether they're your explanans, explanandum, or whatever. much more difficult to operationalize than something like 'organizational resources'. becomes too much like political opportunities at its worst

3. how to establish a theory of social movements, when the explanandum varies so widely?

4. people 'feeling' differently might be good enough an explanation for a student group. but if we have a movement as our explanandum, feelings just can't be enough. (1) they vary randomly; (2) if they don't vary randomly, and everyone feels the same way at some time, there is something to be explained--which will invariably be structural/political in nature

breakdown of democratic regimes, juan linz (introduction)

(3): intention is to look at dynamic process of breakdown, rather than offer 'stable' correlates

(4): acknowledging importance of structural factors (all operating via a worried elite), concerned to represent the 'how' of breakdown more carefully. implication is that c-factuals re: tactics for p-democratic forces, will be raised. what they could have done better.

(5): 'political processes actually precipitate the ultimate breakdown.'

(5-6): def. of democracy is closer to a classical liberal one (universal suffrage not necessary)

(7-8): imp--analysis not applicable to Pakistan/Nigeria, where breakdown had something to do with the difficulties of 'state-building'. all these regimes have stable states before they have democratic regimes.

(10): again, against broad explanations (like Moore's), in favor of looking at the specifics of the breakdown process

(13, 14): in effect, suggestion here is that the blame for breakdown of democracy rests on those seeking 'revolutionary change' and not valuing democracy. they invite the counterrevolution.[silly, but predictable]

(14): most breakdowns have been 'counterrevolutionary', as in seeking to guard against changes of the social order

(15): importance of the direct intervention of the military in effecting breakdown of stabilized states (this explains why Left has not been responsible for democratic breakdown, despite mass support) [int, but inadequate]

(16): democracy depends on some measure of collective legitimacy--more so than other regimes

(18): minimal definition of 'legitimacy'--considered to be least evil form of government.

(18-19): efficacy (20) effectiveness (22) also important

(20): extra importance of well-organized sectors--giving example of capital flight [not really the fact that they're well-organized. linz is inviting charge of pluralism, here]

(21): problems of consolidation exacerbate issues [but if problems of consolidation last 60 years, they can't really be called 'consolidation' problems!]

(23): using 'ineffectiveness' to characterize bourgeois-Socialist failiure, in Spain, to effect agrarian reform [but 'ineffectiveness', in this case, clearly obscures much more than it clarifies]

(24-25): two-party system encourages 'ideological polarization' [this essay is degenerating. and it didn't start out very well]. the proximate thing that worries us in democratic breakdown is large ideological distance separating political competitors.

(25-38): discussion of 'loyal'/'semiloyal' opposition, its importance re: breakdown. [skipped]

(39): again stressing bias against using 'structural' factors to do anything but set the stage. quote from Tilly

the fourth round: history of land reform in pakistan, haris gazdar

(2): half of rural population is landless; top 5 percent own 33% of cultivatable land

(5): three 'estates': (1) collective self-governance, in Fata/Balochistan; (2) malawari, which ended up empowering landowners rather than village in Punjab, etc. (see pg. 9); (3) Ryotwari, which ended up regarding zamindar as cultivator in Sindh (see pg. 12)

(10): canal colonization as technically progressive but socially conservative

(13): in partition, about 1/5th of the cropped area was vacated (7 million acres, 18%). in 1965 40 million acres in cultivation. today 48 million.

(20): LR discussions had three components--tenancy reg, abolition of 'superior claims', redistribution above ceiling.

(21): Shariah Court ruled against '77 LR, upheld by Supreme Court

(22): here is that not enough attention was paid to non-cultivators, which seems a reasonable point [a lot of the rest of this is an exercise in mystification. silly]

(23): in Sindh, due to arid character, irrigation management has always been central. you can't make haris into owner-operators unless you do something about distribution of water, in other words.

(28): 2.3 million acres have been distributed to military officers as career incentives--this is roughly equivalent to the total area ever distributed by the state in LR!

---

of the rest of this article is quite unhelpful. calling for moving beyond an 'agrarian reform' framework, it opens with a statistic that still shows its applicability. totally lacking comparative context--other countries succeeded at LR, within this conventional framework. the lack of 'imagination' charge rings quite hollow.

reassessing the three waves, doorenspleet

(385-386): two problems with huntington--conceptual, not taking suffrage seriously; empirical, confusing creation of new states after decolonization with reversion from democracy.

(395): in 1972, only 8 out of 44 new states in Africa were democratic

bizarre coding of Pakistan!

it was like a fever, polletta

(ix): narrative ambiguity --> political resources [WTF]

(3): two claims

1. there are risks (storylines are limiting) and benefits (sustains groups, etc.) to storytelling for disadvantaged groups.
   
2. stories will depend on the context of their telling/hearing

(5): possibilities following from culture are 'unlimited', under structural conditions [WTF is going on here].

(15): relationships between culture, structure, story are variable. sometimes one way, sometimes another. [i.e., you have no idea what you're saying]

(19): example of child abuse laws [where are the movements? this is just insulting]

(34, 51-52): stories as galvanizing for orgs [sometimes, maybe, might be--aside from everything else, the obvious flaw is that there's no evidence that the 'story' being selected is representative of the way in which the movement was actually described. this is the least of the problems, of course.]

(55): need an account of the 'cultural/ideological' context that forecloses some strategic options [yawn]

(58): SNCC abandons participatory democracy when it becomes symbolically associated with 'white' dominance of the org. this in turn rules out local leadership, rules in central leadership which it turns to [hmm]

(84, 107-108): narrative in public deliberation can be both harmful for or facilitative of deliberative democracy, because wile it's normatively powerful it's also considered politically unserious [this arg makes no sense to me, but surely it's important that she is observing a public forum where there is basically no political disagreement?]

(111): casting oneself as victim doesn't necessarily reduce agency. narrative of victim with agency is possible

(143): officials constrained by institutional conventions of storytelling--King integrated into pluralist framework, and elected officials were the bearers of his dream. this was awkward [no shit]

(164-165): Mexicans had Zapata, whereas Sandinistas lacked Sandino, b/c of respective government attitudes [WTF!?!?!]

(166): narrative is both subversive and hegemonic [ok. what are the conditions that produce one or the other?]

(169): for activists, familiar stories are often more an obstacle than a resource. [ok--but the implied counterfactuals, here, are still ludicrous. alternative is to say we weigh tthis with other factors. but when we do that, this is revealed as basically unimportant, i think]

(179): narratives can help you arrive at causal stories [really? bs]

the market as prison, lindblom (1982)

(325-326): business posesses unique power to sanction policy, by withdrawing investment, etc.

(328): other groups don't have same power

(329): mkt imprisons policy-making, as a result. Polanyi underestimated the constraints

(332): no mkt society can be a fully democratic society (though not taking a position on whether this is possible, desirable)

(333): fact of mkt society has also imprisoned our premises/ways of thinking. mkt is taken for granted, when argued that higher wages will lead to inflation

holzner, the poverty of democracy

(88): Przeworski warning that free market will weaken democracy, b/c it requires demobilization of trade unions, leftists, etc.

(91): in sum--not encouraging developments with neoliberalism. democracy has weakened, especially amongst poor

(95): 'apathy' as learned

(95-111): three mechanisms

1. poverty decreases resources. participation requires resources
   
2. weakenes lower-class organizations, denies them resources
   
3. reduction of size and scope of State activities

(104): political participation becomes irrelevant (if not irrational)

(110): decentralization is not accompanied by actual empowerment in local gov'ts

palma, why has productivity growth stagnated (2010)

(4): imp of ideology to the arg [bizarre--b/c of lack of social cohesion in LA?]

(8-9): in LA growth decline in GDP growth absorbed by productivity, in EA by employment [raises question about welfare effects, etc.--Patnaik q.]

(12-13): productivity growth not sustained in LA, unlike other places ['asia'! the more undefined the bloc, the more absurd the explanation that's suggested]

(21, FN): LA taxation makes income distribution more unequal

(22-23): rapid productivity growth is linked to rates of investment [immediately, of course, the question becomes what explains this, in the case of LA]

(25): LA exhibits high employment elasticities--but the key fact being that this is all in services. in other words, the absorbtion effect of employment is absorbtion by a sector with little to no prouctivity growth [probably a better way to think about this sector--'faux' jobs]

(25): his screed against the N. Left, which has acceded to this hook, line, sinker

(28-29): critical--difference between LA and EA is not explained by exogenous demand. eplained instead by LA's exceptional flexibility. the informal sector acts like a 'reserve army lof labour', thus employment is almost a 'fake effect', again. LA has been hemorraging productive jobs.

(31): declining investment in LA

(32): back to a coordination problem. the market locks this pattern in place, no disciplining of the capitalist elite. productive, useful investment isn't forthcoming.

(33): two sectors in LA -- a modern primary sector, and informal sector

(33): loose labour markets disincentivize competition [?]

(36): imp--as prod increases, need for industrial policy increases exponentionally

(39-41): useful export-competitiveness graph (Figure 20)--LA stuck, endogenous mkt forces are not going to push the region upward. will stay stuck in comparative advantage

(42): the heterodox plea

(43): LA de-industrialization. LA and EA basically switch places. from three out of every four dollars in manufacturing value added, to one out of every six!

(44): this neglect of manufacturing is at the heart of LA's prod problems [so this is the key to the causal story]

(46): ISI was not really proper infant industry protection

(47): Asia always doing things right [no 'wrong' period, now? strange]

(48): speaking, principally, of policies to discipline the elite

(49): unfortunate--an 'ideological' argument about why this is stable.

kuritz, dilemmas of democracy (2004)

(263, 264): arg--democracy less likely to emerge because organized social mobilization is weaker in neoliberalism, b/c of changed state-economy relationship

(265): peasants and informal sector associationally disadvantaged

(268): int--acknowleging radical critique, but writing in basically pluralist framework

(269): problem was one of interest group autonomy in ISI period, now one of 'formation'

(272): two causal mechanisms

1. collective action problems for groups
2. reduce scope of State's decision making

(287): looks at three areas, where thesis is borne out

1. labor mobilization--finds workers as fragmented, no longer prone to strike, subject to disorganization
2. political protest--event counts
3. individual political activity--regression on voter turnout, where impact of liberalization is strongly negative

(298): two counter-arguments--(1) satisfaction, which is dismissed--too many grievances; (2) selection, which is accepted--need more research.

karl marx, capital: volume III

part one: the transformation of surplus-value into profit, and of the rate of surplus-value into the rate of profit

chapter 1: cost price and profit

(118): definitions--"cost price (k)" as c + v (wages); "commodity value (C)" as c + v + s

(120): an important difference between when the value of constant capital rises/falls (the change is transferred to the value of the product), and when the price of labour-power rises (the commodity value will remain unchanged--only the ratio between the necessary and surplus components of the value added by labour will change)

(121): a 'mismatch' between the value of the labor-power purchased (which will not figure in the production process), and the operation of living labour-power itself (which does, obviously). this disconnect makes possible exploitation, of course.

(122): review fixed/circulating capital, if necessary (this is the only thing that appears important, with respect to the formation of the cost price)

(124-125): important--this is also a question of perspective, fundamentally. for one, the valorization process of capital is mystified, as labor-power and constant capital are lumped together under the heading of circulating capital (i.e., you no longer see the unique role of labor-power in adding new value). for the capitalist, the additional value seems, to him, to derive "equally" from the different value elements of the means of production and labour both (because both are involved equally in the formation of the cost price -- they both add their value to the cost price)

(126, see also 133): insofar as the capitalist can no longer think of the surplus value as having come from a 'transfer' of the capital value advanced and used up (for this can only be an equivalent), surplus value will be thought to come from the whole stock of capital (equally from the fixed and circulating components).

(126): this, then, means that the surplus-value for the capitalist takes the form of profit (since he's measuring against total capital advanced).

(127): remember, commodity value = cost price + profit

(128): capitalist will come to treat the cost price as the 'inner value' of the commodity, as this is the price he needs merely to preserve his capital.

(128, see also 134): key --excess value he gets appears, to the capitalist, as having emerged out of the act of sale (ie not simply realized in sale, but derived from it). [can we think of this as the second feature of bourgeois thinking about commodity, as enumerated in this chapter?]

(131): but it is obvious from the example Marx gives here, that if we're attached to some notion of value as distinct from price, there can be no such thing as creation at the point of sale .

chapter 2: the rate of profit

(133): important--an already mentioned aspect of mystification, then, is that capitalists look at the rate of profit and not the rate of surplus-value (they will calculate on the basis of their total capital advanced, naturally)

(134): here speaking of 'surface level' (profit and rate of profit) and 'inner essence' (surplus-value and rate of surplus-value)

(135): the capitalist might be alive to the importance of labour, but:

1. he spends so much time in circulation, too, that he will be encouraged to stress the importance of this moment, too
2. extortion of unpaid labour is hidden by the accounting of 'wages' for value of labour-power

(136): interesting argument that subject becomes object (labourer becomes commodity), and object becomes subject (value/dead labor, as capital, dominated living labour), and this inversion gives rise to a "transposed consciousness"

(137): there is an indirect relationship between constant capital and surplus-value -- but only that the constant capital has to maintain the technical conditions necessary for the production of a certain amount of surplus-value (not a precise, quantitative connection, in other words)

(138): again, Marx is invoking his Kant, and speaking explicitly of how it looks from the world of pheonemona, and noting two consequences:

1. surplus-value as excess of the sale price over the cost price
2. profit and rate of profit, rather than surplus-value and rate of surplus-value

(139): profit is still, though, but a "transformed form of surplus value" (one in which its origin and the secret of its existence are veiled, though)
chapter 3: the relationship between the rate of profit and the rate of surplus-value
(142-143): mentioning several factors that affect the relative magnitudes of c, v, and s: the value of money, the turnover, the productivity of labour, the length of the working day, the intensity of labour, and wages.

(144): imp--a "special organic connection" between the variable capital and the movement of the capital as a whole (something that can't be said for the constant capital"). constant capital is important only on account of the value it has -- it doesn't matter, at all, how this value is divided up (whether its raw materials, etc.), for the formation of value and for the rate of profit. but for the variable capital, it matters greatly what proportion of the total labour will go to wages, of course.

(145-161): important--here Marx considers seven, and evaluates their impact on the rate of profit, in turn (there are two major subheadings)

I. rate of surplus value is constant, organic composition of capital is variable (i.e., v / c + v) [as a rule, in this case, the rates of profit will stand in proportion to the respective variable components]

1. rate of surplus value constant and total capital (c + v) constant, v is variable (pp. 147-151) [rate of profit is proportional to the change]
   
2. rate of surplus value constant, v variable, and (c + v) allowed to vary with these changes as well (pp. 151 - 152) [rate of profit is proportional to the change, though less dramatically than in case I]
   
3. rate of surplus value constant, v constant, and c (and therefore c + v) allowed to vary (pp. 152-153) [the rate of profit is inversely proportional to the change]
   
4. rate of surplus value constant, v, c, and (c+v) all variable (pp. 153-156) [this will depend on the degrees to which the different variables change]

II. rate of surplus value variable (see also p. 160, where this is summarized)

1. rate of surplus value variable, v/c constant (pp. 155-158) [obviously the rate of profit will be proportional to the change]
   
2. rate of surplus value variable, v variable, but (c+v) held constant [the rate of profit willcan do anything--depends on the relative directions and magnitude of the variation of the rate of surplus value and the variable capital]
3. rate of surplus value, v and (c+v) all allowed to vary [offers no new cases]
   

(151): here Marx is clear that he's looking at the logical possibilities not because they're all economically realistic -- but rather because he wants to tease out the relationship between variables

(151): also, here there's an acknowledgment that the variable capital is typically only a small part of the total capital (and, obviously, they would recognize this to be increasingly true over time)

(157): a corrective to Ricardo, presented in II, subheading 1 -- it is not just wages, but also the intensity of labour or the length of the working day that will affect the profit rate.

(160): here he clarifies what is perhaps among the main objectives of this section--to show that the same rate of surplus-value can be expressed in the most varied profit rates (depending on the organic composition of capital)

chapter 4: the effect of the turnover on the rate of profit (written by Engels)

(163): the argument is simple -- the more capitalists can reduce turnover, the greater their rate of surplus-value (and hence their rate of profit) will be in relation to their rivals. examples might be useful (can clarify the equation argument on p. 167)

chapter 5: economy in the use of constant capital

(171): if you need to produce more relative surplus-value, you will have to employ more constant capital (assuming a constant working day). this will require a greater outlay of capital.

(173): concentration of workers and of the means of production greatly facilitates returns (more things can be consumed in common, rather than separately)

(175): interdependence of capitalists, via the advantages of social labor (capitalist makes use of the benefits of the entire system of social labour)

(178): mention of alienation--worker alienated viz-a-viz the conditions of realization of his own labour (the social character of his work confronts him as a power that is alien to him).

(179, 182): contradictory character of capitalist MoP, disregard for life and health of the worker (economy in the use of constant caiptal).

(181): dynamics of capital size - absolutely, we see a growth in the size of capital outlay; but relative to the mass of material to be worked up and the labour to be exploited, relative decline.

(198): again, it is concentration/socialization that makes these savings in the use of fixed capital possible.

(199): a trial and error kind of argument, re: technological change (putting 'theory into practice')

(199): universal labor (all scientific work, all discovery and invention) vs. communal labour (the direct cooperation of individuals)

chapter 6: the effect of change in price

(201):a simple point -- natural riches in the shape of iron, etc. appear as a natural fruit borne by capital, and become an element in the determination of the rate of profit (i.e., rising price hurts the rate of profit)

(203): rate of profit as determined over total value applied?

(204): with rising labour productivity, the value of raw material becomes an increasing part of the total product

(205): key--competition as critical

(206, 212): tying-up of capital (a certain additional proprotion has to become constant or variable capital, for the old scale) vs. release of capital (some becomes superfluous for the continuation of production on the old scale). depending on the revaluation or devaluation of capital value.

(209): advantageous to work through machinery as quickly as possible, in intense competiton.

(213): fluctuating prices can be catastrophic for the 'reproduction process' (and fluctuation is particularly true of agricultural products, which depend on uncontrollable natural conditions and also vary on account of the 'lag' that is the production process--you can't rush supplementary supplies to market, etc.)

(214-215): hints at crisis (overproduction, etc.) and socialism (a common far-sighted control over raw-material production is beyond the pale of the current MoP)

(216): capitalism is incompatible with a rational agriculture (small farmers working for themselves, or associated producers--both can escape this irrationality, in diff ways)

(230): golden period for profits, during crisis (because the workers were desperate for work, and thus wages were duly depressed)

Chapter 7: Supplementary Remarks

(235-236): Marx recognizing that business acumen of the individual is critical in deciding whether the same rate of surplus-value will translate into a higher or lower rate of profit on the market (recognition, in short, of competition on the mkt)

Chapter 8: Different Compositions of Capital in Different Branches of Production, and the Resulting Variation in Rates of Profit

(242): while the study of 'frictions' is important for any 'specialist' understanding of wages, here they are considered accidental and inessential. competition is at the heart of this whole account, of course.

(243): introducing the notion that you can have simultaneous distinctions between the rates of profit on different capital investments (owing to either different turnover times, or distinct organic compositions of capital)

(243): when talking about org. composition of capital, we are talking about sector-wide average (not individual capitals)

(244): definitions--technical composition (definite number of workers corresponding to a definite quantity of the MoP) vs. value/organic composition (depends on the value of the commodities involved) [question of how you judge the 'amount', if not by value?]

(249): assuming that commodities sell at their values[neccesary?], a given organic composition of capital tells you that the mass of profits will be in proportion to the mass of capital applied. different organic compositions of capital across sectors will give you different rates of profit.

(251): the proportion in which the capital is composed of fixed/circulating elements matters not at all for the profit rate, except insofar as this maps on to a variable/constant capital distinction.

(252): summary passage--and stating, of course, that unequal profit rates across sectors would violate the entire system of capitalist production. so how do we get to the equalization of profit rates?

Chapter 9: Formation of a General Rate of Profit (Average Rate of Profit), and Transformation of Commodity Values into Prices of Production

(257): prices of production---the prices that arise when the avg. of the different rates of profits is added to the cost prices of these different spheres of production (calculated on total capital applied--not simply the capital consumed in its production)

(257): depends on competition, of course

(258): the cost price is governed by the outlay within each sphere of production, but the profit added to the cost price is governed by the mass of profit that falls on average to each capital invested.

(259): total price = total value (of course)

(260-261, 265): key--here Marx raises the problem of inputs being determined in cost prices (rather than values), but suggests that it doesn't matter. you can't 'double-count' profit. on the next page, the solution seems a bit different--which is that the wide variety of commodities that go into constant and variable capital lead Marx to suggest that there will be a canceling out ('the general law prevails as the dominant tendency') [Mandel's suggestion fits how, here? he suggests that we need not worry about inputs, they are static 'givens']

(262): average rate of profit, remember, is a weighted average--weighted by magnitude of capital invested

(263): so, the general rate of profit is determined by two factors:

1. the organic composition of capitals
   
2. the distribution of the total social capital between these different spheres

(264): key--a higher composition of capital means more constant capital than the societal average, which in turn means that prices of production in this sector will exceed the value of the commodities being produced

(265): hand-waving on the input question?

(266): question whether prices of production are simply 'monetary expression of these values', or something between value and market price [Mandel in the intro makes a big deal of the line on this page that suggests the latter--but it seems, also, like he's taken it out of context]

(267): surplus-value denies its own origin in its transformed form (in the rate of profit)

(268): even the worker is deceived, insofar as any given sector can violate the law that value translates into price

(268): the 'inner essence' of price becomes ever more concealed, in short

(269): a picture, here of dynamic equilibrium -- various local fluctuations that are constantly neutralizing one another. in short, a "constant source of change in the general rate of profit," which leads to a general paralysis given its uninterrupted and all-round movement.

chapter 10: the equalization of the general rate of profit

(275): tendency for capitalism is to eliminate 'practical frictions' (the more capitalist MoP is developed, the less it is adulterated by survivals of earlier economic conditions -- enter Kautsky, et. al.)

(276): Marx's rendering of a rude and early state, in which different values of constant capital are used [the proof is that the difference in the profit-rate is irrelevant to workers, but i'm not entirely following]. this is to be understood as 'theoretically and historically prior' to capitalism and the law of value.

(279): individual value (the commodities of a single producer) vs. market value (average value of the commodities produced in a particular sphere)

(280): here, prices of production, it is suggested, can be understood as 'natural price', more or less (the center around which daily market prices revolve)

(281): intra-sphere competition establishes a uniform market value and market price; inter-sphere competition brings forth prices of production that equalize rates of profit

(282, 288, 290): Marx's term 'social need' [not 'political',--see p. 290; anything for which demand exists is a commodity that satisifes a social need]. there is simply a fortuitious connection, Marx suggest on p. 288, between the total quantity of social labour spent on an article, and the proportion in which society demands satisfaction of that need (part of society's labour-time will be wasted, of course, in the event of mismatch) [here enters his allusion to socialism]

(282, 291): pithy statements of the argument that nothing can be explained by the relationship of demand and supply, without explaining the basis on which this relationship functions.

(284-285): three cases

1. in case I, market value of mass of commodities in a given sphere is determined by its average values (though for products produced in worse and better conditions, this is an 'average value' imposed upon them)
2. in case II, in the event that supply is weak in relation to demand, the worse-condition commodities can assert themselves on market value (meaning all other producers benefit, of course)
3. in case III, in the even that demand is weak in relation to demand, the better-condition commodities can assert themselves on market value (meaning all other producers suffer, of course)

(292): reciprocal relationship between demand/supply and market price (mutually determining)

(297): capitalist production is indifferent to the use-values it produces--all that matters is to produce surplus-value [strictly speaking this is incorrect--all that matters is profit, right]

(297): statement of the overall claim -- the constant migration of capital to and from different spheres, due to variations in the profit rates, is what ensures that values are transformed into prices of production.

(298): two conditions for this

1. free trade within the society in question
2. abolition of all laws that prevent workers from moving from one sphere of production to another

(299): a collective exploitation -- capitalists, Marx is suggesting, would have an interest in the exploitation of the working class, even if they employed no variable capital themselves (mathematically, through the redistribution of surplus-value) [is he suggesting that they are supposed to be aware of this fact? that is probably not a solid claim].

(299): a collective interest, for two reasons

1. mass of use-values in which average profit is expressed is greater, the more the social productivity of social labour applied by total capital
2. value level of the total capital advanced decreases with the advance of productivity (thus representing a check on the tendency of the rate of profit to decrease)

(200): thus, despite their fierce mutual competition, a 'freemasonry' vis-a-vis the working class

chatper 11: the effects of general fluctuations in wages

(305): here, more-or-less reproducing Ricardo's argument [though he adds that Ricardo didn't walk us through the example of falling wages] -- a rise/fall in wages affects prices in different spheres of production differently, depending on their relative value compositions (in those with higher value compositions, prices of production will fall/rise; in those with lower value composition, prices of production will rise/fall.

chapter 12: supplementary remarks

(307-308): prices of production can vary for two reasons:

1. a change in the general rate of profit (if the average rate of surplus-value itself alters, or if the ratio between the sum of surplus-value appropriated and total social capital advanced alters). [question: is the only way in which this happens through productivity increases in those sectors producing wage-goods? or is the second part alluding to the effects of technical change elsewhere?]
2. production price of a commodity can change if its value is altered (though he notes that this is not necessary, since this change can be compensated for by movements elsewhere)

(309): 'average' composition might seem a bit deceptive, since even sectors with average compositions will have to by inputs not at their values (but at their prices of production). yet this doesn't affect, Marx is arguing, the correctness of the principles put forward for commodities of average composition [my understanding of this is that we have calculated average composition after taking all this into account--in other words, an 'average' sector is a theoretical inevitability, regardless of this fact. this might be a misinterpretation, though]

(311): 'fixed' capital will present an obstacle to capital mobility--but capital will learn to deal with this, Marx is arguing

(311): competition leads to certain impressions, at the level of appearences ('everything appears upside down')

1. that average profits are independent of organic composition of capital
2. rises and falls in the prices of production (across the board) as a result of changes in the wage level (which seems to contradict the value relationship of commodities)
3. fluctuations in market prices around the market prices of production (and not around value, which capitalists can't see

(312-313): interesting passage on 'compensation' -- suggestion that, once capitalism has reached a certain stage in its development, certain differences are balanced out in the equalization process, and these are taken into account as 'compensation'. so, for example, capital's with a long turnover time or greater risk will be 'compensated' in higher prices (which is actually just the result of competition amongst capitals). nonetheless, it appears to them as extra 'profit' following from their endeavour. (Marx notes a difference between this case and the intra-sphere(/inter-sphere?) case, where given a certain market price, exploitation of labour, savings on the cost price might depend on talent/attention/productivity)

Part Three: The Law of the Tendential Fall in the Rate of Profit

Chapter 13: The Law Itself

(317-319): pithy statement of the argument that this is a general tendency under capitalism (and "peculiar to capitalism", given the progressive development of the social productivity of labour.

(320): some mention of the relationship between interest and profit

(323-326, 329, 336): imp-- the decline in the rate of profit does not, at all, mean that there is an end to growth/accumulation (quite the opposite--it is, in general, going to be associated with a rise in the mass of profit) and all this, of course, independent of the fact that we are dealing, also, with a progressively rising mass of use-values. [he notes, later, that a rising mass of profit is not a necessary fact (if workers are fired, for example, we might have a different story)--rather, "by and large" it will be true that a growth in the total capital takes place more rapidly than the fall in the rate of profit]

(330): the rising productivity of labour will give rise to a "permanent apparent surplus working population" [must be absorbed; none of the Malthusian population arguments, here, correct? opportunity to reprise the gen. law]

(331): the mass of profits are not irrelevant -- big capitalists can make practical use of this advantage in order to drive smaller capitalists from the field (by intentionally lowering their prices)

(332): a good ideology passage--"crude as these notions are [about rate/mass of profit], they are a necessary product of the upside-down way that the immanent laws of capitalist present themselves within competition"

chatper 14: counteracting factors

(338-348): Marx notes several

1. more intense exploitation of labour -- by raising rate of surplus-value
2. reduction of wages below their value
3. cheapening of the elements of constant capital -- value of the constant capital won't increase in the same proportion as its material volume
4. the relative surplus population
5. foreign trade -- by cheapening constant capital, and by loweirng amount of time needed to reproduce labour-power (raising rate of surplus-value)
6. increase in share capital --by taking some of the more capital-intensive branches of production out of the 'equalization' of profit rate calculation
   

(344): allusion to services, here, as pushing up the rate of profit (because of their use of relatively larger proportions of variable capital?)

(345): foreign branches of production/investment (where domestic capital can be freely invested) can enter into the equalization of the rate of profit

(347): writing against a 'wage-squeeze' sort of argument, noting that--typically--the fall int erate of profit is associated with a rise in the rate of surplus value [though this is not substantiated--why is this the case, even if only 'typically'?]

chapter 15: development of the law's internal contradictions

(349): leads to a fall in the rate of profit rate (b/c of higher composition of capital), which in turn accelerates the concentration and centralization of capital (b/c bigger capitalists wipe out smaller ones, as the profit rate falls)

(350): a 'fall in the rate of profit' "leads to" overproduction/speculation/crises, and thus the simultaneous existence of excess capital and surplus labour ('mono-causal')

(350): *'solely historical and transitory character of the capitalist mode of production (not an absolute mode of production, but comes into conflict with the dev. of productive forces/societal wealth [note: not necessarily the same thing, though equated in marx's account])

(351): profit, interest and rent -- the aliquot parts of surplus-value. the total rate of all will have to be declining, but this doesn't preclude shifts in the share of the decline captured by each measure

(352): *crux--the specific character of the capitalist mode of production is production for the sake of accumulation (the transformation back into capital) [not for consumption, not for need; this is the source of all the contradictions enumerated in this chapter]

(352): *the production of surplus-value, remember, is not the same as the realization of surplus-value: the former is restricted by society's productive forces, the latter is a function of (a) the proportionality between branches, and (b) the society's power of consumption.

(354): *a rise in the mass of profits promotes the concentration of capital (since the conditions of production require the use of capital on a massive scale), and the centralization of capital (swallowing up of small capitalist by the big) [clarify mechanisms for each--for the former, it is technical; for the latter, has to do with (a) what big producers can do in aggravated competition, and also (b) indirect effects of concentration, no?]

(355): *tendencies toward decentralization as well--else capitalism would break down due to excessive centralization

(355): proxies for increasing social productivity of labour: (1) size of the productive forces, scale of production in value and mass; (2) relatively low proportion of capital laid out on wages

(356): noting, once again, that there are limits to the extent to which the rate of surplus-value can be increased to compensate for the declining rate of profit

(356): also, the cheapening of commodities (both those that go into the reproudction of labour-power, and the constant capital) act as a check on the declining rate of profit

(357): *rising productivity can spur accumulation, because any given mass of capital (in value terms) represents a greater amount of capital (in use-value terms).

(357): three 'contradictions'

1. while accumulation promotes increase in working population, it also produces a relative surplus population
2. the fall in the profit rate is associated with a devaluation of existing capital, which is a check on this fall
3. the development of productivity brings a relative decline in variable proportion as against constant

(358): (re)statement of the contradiction, in general terms: the methods capitalists use to strive for the greatest possible valorization of their capital have the effect of producing a decline in the profit rate, devaluation of existing capital, and the development of the productive forces at the cost of the productive forces already produced

(358-359): imp, more to the point--"the true barrier to capitalist production is capital itself."the means (development of forces of production) come into conflict with the end (the valorization of the existing capital)

(359): *the same process that produces a relative surplus population can also produce surplus capita [so you get the ultimate statement of capitalist irrationality: 'surplus capital on the one hand, and an unemployed working population on the other]

(360): *imp--this happens as a result of the overaccumulation of capital--as soon as capital has grown such that expanded application of capital will not produce any more profit (mass?) than it did before its expansion. there would be an absolute decline in the mass of profit, in short, in the event of attempted accumulation.

(361-362): *imp--this state of affairs is not one of evenness: there will be a struggle to see who is forced to bear more of the losses in this state (surplus capital would sit idle) -- a portion of the old capital will have to be wiped away/destroyed before accumulation can be re-started. (in other words, the distribution of losses is an open question)

(363): here, tracing the fallout of the crisis--interesting read

(364): *important to remember that overproduction is only overproduction of commodities 'as capital', not absolute overproduction. this is the only thing that bothers capitalists, remember.

(365): the 'export of capital' at times of crisis [hints to Lenin]

(365): hints at socialism--social production asserts itself as a blind law, not as a law mastered by the combined reason of producers

(366): nice statement of the irrationality of MoP -- the barriers are barriers for capitalism; not afflicted by an absolute inability to dispose of surplus commodities (as use-values), given that there are surplus goods that the mass of people are short of.

(367): nice statement, again, of irrationality -- it is profit that determined the expansion or contraction of capital, instead of the proportion between production and social needs

(368): another indication that monopoly cannot be a steady state--'the animating fire of production would be totally extinguished'

(368): Ricardo as an uniwtting soothsayer of bourgeois worries about falling rate of profit

(370-371): *imp-- again, hint at socialism with a restatement of the orthodox problem of capitalism: namely, that it can imperil the development of productive forces -- example of an innovation that would decrease toil, but (because of more depreciation) would not be profitable to employ. capitalism would not employ it [discuss: (1) question of contingency of the example; (2) whether or not this is specific, this is not the best argument, it seems to me. productive forces do increase at phenomenal rate--better argument is to combine with the earlier statements around 'social need' and say development of technology is inefficient.]

(373): again--capitalism increases suprlus-value (surplus-labour time of workers), but not absolute spare time needed for material production in general (which is what socialism would be interested in).

(373): another lassic statement of the contradiction -- contradiction between general social power which capital has developed and the private power of individual capitalists hints at general, communal, social production (which it hints at, obviously).

(375): list of six reasons that falling rate of profit can spur accumulation:

1. relative surplus population, increasing rate of surplus-value
2. mass of use-values increasing
3. increasing diversity of branches of production
4. development of the credit-system
5. growth in needs, desires
6. growing mass of investment of fixed capital [?]

(375): three cardinal facts, re: laying the groundwork for the society to come (the first two 'abolish private property and private labour')

1. concentration of means of production transforms production into social production (even if this is private property)
2. organization of labour as social labour
   
3. establishment of world market

Part Four: Transformation of Commodity Capital into Commercial Capital

Chapter 16: Commercial Capital

(382): pithy statement -- commercial capital is nothing more than the commodity capital of the producer which has yet to go through the process of transformation into money -- instead of being the incidental function of the producer, it appears as the exclusive operation of a particular species of capitalist

(384): commercial capital appears to be an independently functioning capital b/c

1. it is in the hands of an agent distinct from the producer (a particular form of division of social labour)
2. independent agent advances money capital in this posiiton

(386): not productive capital -- penned into the sphere of circulation

(387): the merchant does facilitate reproduction (without the merchant, the capitalist would be handicapped--either because he wouldn't be able to sell at the same pace, or because he wouldn't be able to accumulate the same pace (b/c some part of his capital would have to be kept apart as reserve)

(391): commercial capital as nothing but the portion of money capital that belongs to the merchant himself -- circulated in the purchase and sale of commodities (represents the portion of capital advanced for production that always had to exist as a reserve, before -- now it's found in the hands of merchant capitalists)

(392): again -- the crux, here, is that we are dealing simply with changes of form (in the process of circulation, no value is produced; and thus also no surplus-value)

(393): in short, this whole endeavor can 'contribute' to an expansion of surplus-value, but it is not productive of surplus-value itself

Chapter 17: Commercial Profit

(395): again -- commercial capital creates neither value nor surplus-value, but simply facilitates its realization

(397): the 'appearence', here, is that merchant capital gets its profit by 'adding to' prices of production [this is incorrect, of course; it doesn't sell at prices of production, but some price short of the 'real price of production']

(399): crux -- the price of production (i.e., the price at which the industrial capitalist sells) is less than the real production price of the commodity

(400): two conclusions follow

1. the bigger commercial capital is, as a proportion of total social capital, the smaller the rate of industrial profit
2. the rate of surplus-value will overshoot the rate of profit by that much more

(400): relative size of commercial capital will be in inverse proportion to the speed of its turnover [?]

(401): historically, it is commercial profit that preceded industrial profit -- which first fixed the prices of commodities, and determined industrial profit

(402): interesting--when talking about the costs proper to commercial capital, we set aside production processes that continue during the act of circulation (even though they're assisting it). here Marx mentions "the transport industry proper," and the "dispatch of goods," etc. he sets this apart from 'accounting, book-keeping, marketing, correspondence, etc.'

(404-405): imp-- even though the labour employed in commercial capital/act of circulation isn't value-creating, the investment of commercial capital can still be profit-faciliating (b/c if industrial capital had to assume these tasks, the overall rate of profit might be lowered below what it is, with the application of an independently operating commercial capital)

(406-407): the condition of wage-labour in circulation is two-fold. imp, these workers are beest understood as "creating the capitalist's ability to appropriate surplus-value."

1. on the one hand, still paid by the production/reproduction costs of labour-power
2. on the other hand, employed in a sector that doesn't produce value.

(414-415): a la Braverman, the advance of the division of labour /capitalism the effect of (1) reducing the level of skill needed; (2) making more widely available said skills, such that competition for the positions increases

(416): from the point of view of capital, outlay that is made on circulation costs is productive, and the commercial labour it buys is also directly productive [is there even a productive/nonproductive distinction, from this perspective?]

chapter 18: the turnover of commercial capital. prices

(418, 424-425, 427): turnover for commercial capital means something distinct, of course -- since, unlike industrial capital, more rapid turnover does not mean a greater exploitation of labour. in other words, whereas for industrial capital, a greater number of turnovers translates into a greater mass of profit, it is different with commercial capital. the mass of profit will not change --the overall rate of profit is indirectly affected by the relative size of the commercial capital, which will be affected by the speed of its turnover ("the absolute size of the commercial capital required stands in inverse proportion to the speed of its turnover")

(419): again -- the formal autonomy of commercial capital allows industrial capital to move beyond the limits imposed upon it by the demands of reproduction.

(421): the two limits to the merchant's sale price are:

1. the production price of the commodity (over which he has no control)
2. the average rate of profit (over which he has no control)

(428): interesting paragraph on the "tasks of science" -- to reduce the visible and apparent movement to the actual inner movement." task to take leave of the heads of the agents of capitalist production and circulation.

(430): obviously, turnover does matter centrally for individual merchant capitalists -- they can capture more or less of the share of surplus-value going to merchant capital, in general, depending on their individual turnover.

chapter 19: money-dealing capital

(431): money-dealing capital refers to the purely technical movements that money undergoes in the circualation process of industrial capital.

(433): a double division of labour -- at the level of capital, and at the level of the individual money-dealing firm

(437): a common reserve fund -- a reserve fund managed on behalf of the capitalist class as a whole, which will not need to be as great as it would if each individual capitalist manages their own reserve fund.

(438): just as with commercial capital, there is a duplication of functions here -- but a duplication that is still functional, for capitalist production as a whole

chapter 20: historical material on merchant's capital

(440): merchant's capital is not to be understood as a separate 'sphere of production' (i.e., as yet another variant of industrial capital), but as the result of the tasks of circulation having assumed an autonomous form.

(441-442): 'great economists' Smith and Ricardo didn't deal with commercial capital (but didn't do what the vulgar economists do, which is equate it to industrial capital). Ricardo, in the section on foreign trade, admits that it creates no value--this applies to commerce within a country as well, Marx adds.

(443): question-- here Marx refers to merchant's wealth as 'capital', even when it functions on the periphery of earlier modes of production ('his money always functions as capital') [what has happened to capital is a social relation? here it is simply a function of buying something with the intention of selling at a profit]

(444): right--in capitalist production, commercial capital appears simply as capital in a particular function; in previous modes of production, it appears as the function of capital par excellence.

(444): Marx suggests that the development of commercial capital is a precondition for capitalist production, while clarifying that this cannot be understood as its trigger ('insufficient to explain the transition')

(446): here a 'law' -- "the independent development of commodity capital stands in inverse proportion to the level of development of capitalist production" [relates to the point, two above]

(448, 454): int--a stronger claim being made here about the role of commercial capital in forming the capitalist MoP -- specifically, that trade has a 'solvent effect' on the pre-existing organizations of production. though simultaneously Marx notes that this effect depends on the solidity and inner articulation of this mode of production itself [enough evidence for the Brenner/Wood line that Marx was not Smith, but evidence also that Brenner/Wood are making an original contribution to Marxist view of history]. on p. 454, framed arguably even more strongly (Smithian?): 'trade is the precondition for the transformation... develops the product into a commodity...' but then it becomes the servant of industrial production.'

(452): very int passage on India -- Marx notes that the English have simply destroyed spinning and weaving in India, 'tearing the community to pieces'. at the same time, he suggests that there is some dissolution underway -- his gripe is that it is suceeding only very gradually (though more rapidly than in China, where the British don't have the benefit of force). a central point is that the direct connection of agriculture and manufacture is not being broken. [of course, this is important -- though it can't stand in for the actual Marxist argument about Indian underdevelopment]

(453): formal vs. real subsumption

Part Five: The Division of Profit into Interest and Profit of Enterprise

Chapter 21: Interest-Bearing Capital

(460): interest as payment for the acquisition of the use-value of the capital function

(461): no such thing as 'justice' in the transaction between agents -- discussion of this cannot be sustained because transactions are simply logical outcomes of underlying relations of production. judgements at the level of the 'phenomena' are inadequate. there's further the allusion that, as a result of all this, the tendency is to 'naturalize' things that will, under successive relations of production, be found unfair.

(462): M - M - C - M' - M' (double expenditure, double reflux)

(463-464, 466): important--lending for interest is different from other instances of capital changing hands (i.e., as money capital, as commodity capital), insofar as in the former capital changes hand expressly because of its promise/function 'as capital', whereas in the latter examples it has always changed hand for its function as a commodity [this, as he shows, changes the whole notion of 'price', and what/how buyers will pay]

(467-468): vs. Proudhon

(469): the first expenditure and the last reflux are merely arbitrary legal transactions; the real movement is what takes place once capital is in the hands of the functioning capitalist.

(470): the act of lending is the 'irrational form of the real capital movement'

(471): the successful 'real movement of capital' is the assumption of the lending act, of course

(472-473): in lending, the 'use-value' is simply transferred; it's not consumed by the seller, but preserved and even expanded

(473): the analogy to labour-power is limited; industrial capitalist pays the value of labour-power, but 'repays' the value of loaned capital [clarify?]

(474): again, lending is unlike other transactions -- the buyer does not pay the 'value' of the money he receives

(475): the relationship that appears here would be irrational in simple commodity production [is this true? there could be other ways of making 'profits'?]

(475): imp--interest is not best thought of as the 'price' of capital, except insofar as this is formally true, since the 'price' is qualitatively distinct from value.

(477): imp--value of loaned capital is determined by the quantity of surplus-value that it produces. it's a title to the appropriation of others' labour (and not payment for the labour of the rentier, of course!)

(478): no equilibrium interest rate

(482): the maximum limit for the interest rate is the average profit rate.

(483): for two reasons, it displays a tendency to fall:

1. increasing size of the rentier class [what is the mechanism, here?]
2. the development of the credit system (which concentrates savings, lowering the interest rate) [clarify]

(485-486): imp--the determination of the average rate of interest is subject to competition, and is consequently accidental/contingent (a "purely empirical fact" that confronts businesses) [is there not some middle-ground here? while it makes sense that it isn't theoretically determined, surely we can make more systematic sense of patterns/trends, especially if it's supposed to follow the profit rate? also, what place public policy interventions?]

(486): imp-- division between surplus-value and wages is a quantitative division emerging from a qualitiative distinction (rent and profit will be the same story); division betwen interest and profit is a qualitative division emerging from a purely quantitative (contingent) division of the same piece of surplus-value

(488-490): loanable capital confronts capital en masse, with a common rate [public policy?]. the "common capital of the class"

Chapter 23: Interest and Profit of Enterprise

(493): it's the division of function, btw money capitalists and industrial capitalists, and their consequent competition which produces the rate of interest.

(496): definition-- profit of enterprise = average profit - rate of interest

(497): the qualitative separation between money capital and industrial capital (interest and profit of enterprise) rests on an objective fact, not just a subjective conception

(498): all capitalists' accounting contains space for the calculation of 'interest' and 'profit of enterprise', whether they are using borrowed capital or not [what is the reasoning here? now it seems quite clear--you can always avail of interest. but this is not exactly Marx's argument here]

(499): interest-bearing capital as "capital par excellence" in the popular mind (pre-dated the capitalist MoP)

(501): the individual choice that the capitalist has to dispose of capital as 'money capital' or 'productive capital' is obviously not a choice that the capitalist class can make, as a whole [he doesn't add this, but it's worth saying that--what regulates this, conceivably--is the equalization of profit rates. this raises the question of how profit rates across these different deployments of capital equalize; they have to take 'risk' into account]

(503): profit of enterprise doesn't form an 'antithesis' with wage-labour, but rather with interest

(503-504): the 'productive capitalist' starts to see himself as a worker (in the pay of the money capitalist) -- entire transaction between the money capitalist and the functioning capitalist assumes 'profit', so it doesn't raise the question of its creation

(506): the division is presented as a relationship between two capitalists, with no relationship to labour

(506): in fact, the process of 'exploiting labour' emerges, from this, looking like labour

(507-508): imp -- Marx here divides 'supervisory labour' into the (a) conductor-of-an-orchestra-labour, which is productive, and owes to the fact that labour is being carried out as 'social labour'; (b) disciplinary role, which owes to the class character of the labour process [it isn't made clear whether or not the latter is 'unproductive' -- we can say it is, though the stakes aren't clear.]

(508-510, 513): using the example of slavery to show that the domination of slave/wage-labourer (the relationship and its effects produce the justification for the relationship -- it is the fact of the slave's domination that becomes the ideological justification of his further subjugation). [ideology, dare we say]

(512): int, very often "there remains only the functionary" -- the money-capitalist becomes the bank (which doesn't actually own capital), the functioning capitalist outsources supervisory work to a supervisor

(513): discussing the justification in the case of the capitalist's wage -- first, this appears 'honestly' as the antithetical relationship of money capitalist to functioning capitalist, but soon develops an apologetic function (as 'unpaid labour'). socialist demand is that profit be reduced to wages for supervision

Chapter 24: Interest-Bearing Capital as the Superficial Form of the Capital Relation

(515): money-bearing capital is capital in its most fetishized form (M - M')

(516): it appears, in fact, like labour-power (with the apparent use-value of creating more money, in a given amount of time)

(516): fetish in its most "flagrant form"

(518-519): Luther's naive polemic against usury

(524): two reminders: preservation/reproduction of value contained in money capital is (1) only the result of it's with living labour; (2) the command that it exercises over living labour lasts only as long as the capital relation (the relation in which living labour is dominated by dead)

Chapter 25: Credit and Fictitious Capital

(527): deposits and bills of exchange can perform the function of money

(528): bankers become the 'general managers of money capital' -- the representatives of all lenders of money

(534): 'Opium War' opening up a new market, which was very welcome for textile manufacturers dealing with an oversaturated domestic market. Railways performed a similar function.

Chapter 26: Accumulation of Money Capital and its Influence on the Rate of Interest

(543): surplus capital often finds an outlet in public debt, when all else fails (risk-'free' rates of return)

(544): relevant-- a trade deficit --> rise in the interest rate (because of increasing scarcity of capital)

(550): speaking of the crisis of 1847, an overproduction in industry led to increasing demand for money capital. imp, a rise in the interest rate is therefore entirely compatible with a falling rate of profit.

(553): foregrounding what will be discussed later in more depth -- an accumulation of claims on wealth (in the form of credit) is compatible with problems in the realm of real accumulation. indeed, it is this 'health' that the capitalist economy displays before a crisis.

(558): advance of capital is different from advance of money (or mere means of circulation) -- a person is advanced capital when given on credit, but when he is withdrawing from deposits already made this doesn't represent an advance of capital (simply getting 'currency').

Chapter 27: The Role of Credit in Capitalist Production

(566-567): credit obviously makes possible a tremendous expansion in the scale of production by reducing circulation costs.

(567): capital also receives the form of 'social capital', with the 'joint-stock' company.

(568): the manager of a firm becomes an employee, as his function is separated from the ownership of capital. this is true of all functions previously associated with ownership.

(569): the rise of social capital and cartels as "the abolition of the capitalist mode of production within the capitalist mode of production itself" [and generations of monopoly school thinkers are happy]

(570): nicely put--right to social capital gives bankers command over social labour. and speculators now risk 'social property', rather than their own.

(571): the co-op! "a new mode of production develops and is formed naturally out of the own" (though there is the strong qualifier that it reproduces the defects of the existing system, since workers are doing little more than collectively becoming their own capitalist)

(572): if only--credit's dual character--both develops the 'forces of production', but also accelerates the violent outbreaks (and the 'dissolution' of the old mode of production)

Chapter 28: Means of Circulation and Capital: The Views of Tooke and Fullarton

(575): imp, reviewing the money form -- it is money if it mediates the expenditure of revenue (individual consumers buying from retail traders); it is capital if it mediates the transfer of capital. distinction is between money form of revenue and money form of capital.

(577): money as means of payment vs. as means of purchase is a distinction within money itself (it is not the money vs. capital distinction) [clarify]

(579): prosperity leads to 'elastic and easy credit'

(590); securities (like government bonds) might function as 'capital', but they are not 'genuine capital'. they are only creditor claims; property titles. we should not confuse banking capital for actual capital, as the two often don't align.

(591-592): in a crisis, credit becomes worthless--only cash/gold 'counts'

Chapter 29: Banking Capital's Component Parts

(596-597): important-- capital is 'fictitutious' where it has no connection to 'productive investment' (such as capital on the national debt). this represents the absurdity of the capitalist's way of conceiving things--instead of deriving valorization of capital from exploitation of l-power, they explain productivity of labour-power by understanding it as a form of interest-bearing capital!

(598-599): movements of ownership titles/gov't bonds, etc. give the illusion of real capital, but they are not; nothing but accumulated claims to wealth

(599): depreciation of these claims to wealth is often a powerful means of centralizing wealth (in a crisis, i.e.)

(600): greater part of banker's capital if purely fictitious

Chapter 30: Money Capital and Real Capital: I

(607): two 'difficult' questions

1. is the accumulation of money capital an index of genuine accumulation?
2. to what extent does monetary scarcity (shortage of loan capital) express a lack of real commodity and productive capital?

(609): imp--share capital is a form of genuine titles to real capital, even though they give the owner no control of the capital (but they can also become nominal representatives of non-existent capital, once they are bought and traded themselves). so, insofar as the accumulation of these securities contributes to accumulation of 'real' things, it is an index of expansion; but when it circulates as duplicates, it is not (so only IPO's, etc.?)

(609): more and more this comes to resemble gambling

(610): it is the accumulation of usable loan capital that is critical -- we are concerned with tangible loans made to industrialists/merchants

(611): commercial credit is the more primitive form of credit--it is industrialists lending to each other, more or less, and it is conducted to mediate transactions/cut circulation costs.

(612): but the speculative element becomes increasingly dominant, as credit is prolonged--and the gap between loan and 'reflux' gets bigger and bigger [but this is all still within the realm of commercial credit, remember]

(613): even loans to merchants count, since they mediate a phase of the reproduction process.

(613): in commercial credit, therefore, we are never loaning 'unoccupied capital' but facilitating the necessary change in hands of real capital.

(614): nice--in a crisis we see that there is never a shortage of real capital (commodity, productive, what have you), but a crisis of credit. we can't mediate transactions, because no one will loan anything to anyone else [hallmark of capitalism's irrationality, of course]

(615): important--the classic passage used to support for Marxist underconsumptionism ("the ultimate reason for all crises always remains the poverty...")

(616): commercial credit has shown us that the accumulation of loanable capital can be an index of genuine accumulation. but this is obviously not necessarily the case.

(620): thus, there are phases of this relationship--at the beginning and ends of cycles, these two things are not aligned (low rate of interest coincides with contraction at beginning, high rate of interest coincides with over-abundance at end)

(621): "no bank legislation can abolish crises themselves" (even as ignorant banking laws may exacerbate them)

(621): Engel's FN: crises becoming increasingly violent

(623): in crises, to everyone it appears that the 'balance of payments' is against them--whether running deficit or surplus (because neither can one pay for imports, nor is one receiving payments for exports)

(625): the value of fictitious capital is enormously reduced during crises--but obviously this often has nothing to do with the value of the real capital it 'represents'

Chapter 31: Money Capital and Real Capital: II (Continuation)

(626): imp--it is only if the money being lent out comes from revenue that it can be said to be an index of genuine accumulation [directly?].

(631): hint that variations in the rate of interest over longer periods are conditioned by variations in the general rate of profit

Chapter 32: Money Capital and Real Capital: III (Conclusion)

(637): the accumulation of revenue (i.e., not capital accumulation) can give rise to an increase in the accumulation of money capital (capitalists putting money in the bank, what have you).

(639): at certain times, there are barriers that prevent the profitable employment of money capital (over-supply, etc.). these are intrinsic to capitalism.

(640): nice--the final illusion of capital--that it is a product of one's own thrift--is destroyed with the credit system. not only do capitalist's work with others' labour, but also with others' property.

(644): average interest rate over several years is determined by the average rate of profit

(645): imp--long-term determination of the interest rate (by profit rate) vs. short-term determination of interest rate (ebbs and flows of money market)

(645): it's not true that a high interest rate means that there's lots of demand for industrial capital--at times of crisis people are demanding not in order to invest, but in order to pay off loans

(646-647): main point here, it seems, is to show that the 'interests' of loan capital and industrial capital are not identical--despite the best efforts of Mr. Overstone

(648): in crisis, capitalists remember the universal commodity (money becomes the only means of payment)

(649): int passage on crisis, in Hegelian language--but needs unpacking.

Chapter 33: The Means of Circulation under the Credit System

(660): during regular business, expansion and contraction of circulation is governed by the needs of industrialists/merchants

(663): the absolute quantity of circulation does not determine the interest rate always--only in times of pressure.

(678): credit system as one enormous centralization scheme--benefits the "class of parasites"!

Chapter 34: The Currency Principle

(683): imp--the 'currency school', tied to the QTM and underlying Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage

(685): imp--Marx's response to currency theory--not fully developed, but focusing on the rise and fall of interest rates as opposed to rise and fall in commodity prices (this has the implications that Shaikh draws, but they aren't drawn here)

(689, 694): Bank Act of 1844 intensified the crisis, made money for the bankers

Chapter 35: Precious Metal and Rate of Exchange

(707): gold and silver distinguished from other forms of wealth because they autonomously express the 'social character of wealth' -- they do this by way of serving as money

(708): nice passage--drain of gold is evidence that we lack social control over social wealth--it exists, independently, as a thing that can be privately wielded

(715): form of capital exported/imported matters, when considering impact (and, he will add, the context in which it's exported/imported)

(720): once again, reminding us that loan capital has a different movement from industrial capital. can't deduce much from rise and fall of interest rates, for this reason.

(721-722): vs. Economist, connection between low prices and the interest rate is not one-to-one, but differs depending on where we are in the business cycle

(727): nice-- monetary system is Catholic, credit system Protestant. latter not emancipated from foundations of former

Chapter 36: Pre-Capitalist Relations

(729): whether or not usury 'dissolves' old mode of production depends on 'historical level of development' and 'conditions this provides' [i.e., ambiguous. no specific hints here.]

(731): usury undermines ancient and feudal property, but also small peasant/pett-bourgeois production--all forms in which producer appears as owner

(731): usury centralizes monetary wealth

(732): usury has 'capital's mode of exploitation without its mode of production'

(733): usury develops monetary wealth independent of landed property [but this, of course, doesn't mean that it produces capitalism. far from it.]

(735): credit vs. usury -- the former adapted to conditions of capitalist production, given in the expectation that recipient will act as capitalist

(740): int FN by Engels, on Marx being too kind to the Saint-Simonians

(742): again, emphasizing the social character of credit -- 'credit abolishes the private character of capital and thus bears within it... the abolition of capital itself'

(743): Proudhounite, petty-bourgeois dream of interest-free credit

(745): Usury relates to the mode of production 'from the outside' (like trade)

Part Six: The Transformation of Surplus Profit into Ground-Rent

Chapter 37: Introduction

(750): the assumption of this section is that capitalism has fully permeated agriculture

(752): one of Smith's contribution is to show that ground-rent for production of other products is determined by ground-rent yielded in production of the 'staple crop' [hmm. so not determined by rent-less production of relevant product?]

(755): presuppositions for capitalism (note three classes: wage-laborers, capitalists, land-owners)

1. cultivators are wage-laborers, employed by a capitalist farmer (for whom agriculture is just a way of applying capital)
2. capitalist pays the landowner a contractually-fixed sum of money (ground-rent).
   

(757): imp--as soon as new leases are agreed, innovations/incentive in agricultural land will fall to the landowner, and become incorporated into the calculation of ground-rent (they become part of the 'natural' fertility of the landowner's holding). this has the effect of disincentivizing improvements--especially when leases are short, farmers will avoid improvements.

(760): landed property comes to appear superfluous, at a certain level of development of the capitalist MoP

(761): the price of land is simply capitalized ground-rent

(761): price of land has a tendency to rise (because interest rate has a tendency to fall, and so any given amount of rent becomes comparatively more prized--i..e, would require a greater outlay of capital to produce the same returns, if invested)

(763): tenants and ground-rent [re-read]

(770, 773): conditions for surplus labour are that the necessary means of subsistence can be produced in an amount of labour-time that doesn't swallow up the whole working-day

(771): industry/agriculture does not map on to surplus/necessary--they both have necessary and surplus components, within them

(772): three confusions in ground-rent

1. confusing varying forms of rent that correspond to different levels of development
2. 
   

(773): use-value allocates labour-time, on social scale [but here we have the problem that use-values are being allocated through exchange-values--i.e., on the mkt--so impossible to say you're really determining what society wants produced]

(775): key--capitalist mode of production constantly reduces agricultural population in relation to non-agricultural, b/c in industry growth of constant capital is linked to abs. growth in variable capital, while in agricultural capital the variable capital required for cultivation declines absolutely (can grow only insofar as new land is cultivated) [what's the status of this claim? empirically? a law of captialist production]

(777): things acquire value only in a specific social context

Chapter 38: Differential Rent in General

(780): differential rent is like being a favoured producer--capital functions under exceptionally favourable conditions

(782-784): imp--but there is a difference, insofar as surplus profit is a feature of the capital applied for manufacturers--but for those benefiting from a waterfall, they are profiting from a natural force that is not available to all capital in the same sphere of production

(785): of course, there is a legal-institutional element to this--it depends on the ability of capitalists to monopolize access to this natural force

(785): differential rent is not about absolute productivity--it always has to do with relative productivities

(786): natural force is not source of surplus profit, but basis of it

(786): landed property does not create surplus profit--it simply enables it to be captured as ground rent (otherwise it would be captured by capitalist as surplus profit) [question of equalization enters here, perhaps]

Chapter 39: The First Form of Differential Rent (Differential Rent I)

(789): two general causes are 'fertility' and 'location'--but there are also things like uneven taxation, differential development of agriculture (imp. implications), uneven division of capital

(790, 795): imp--fertility is never really 'natural'--always depends on 'chemical development of agriculture'. properties that would previously make land 'unfertile', now might make it 'fertile, as techniques change

(798): imp--unlike Ricardo's presentation of the argument, Marx is remindering us that you don't need to move towards worse soil to get differential rent. you can move towards better soil--what's relevant is the emergence of 'differential fertility'.

(799): nice--market value is a 'false social value', it will always be above the total production price (b/c of profit and ground-rent, i.e.). if we had a 'conscoius association working according to a plan), society would not purchase this product at 2.5 times the labour-time contained in it. this would eliminate the land-owners.

(802): expansion of production will lead to the expansion of rent, provided that not all expansion happens exclusively on the worst lands

(804): rate of rent will rise when expansion is concentrated in lands with high productivity. fall if opposite is true.

(805): summary of claims regarding rent, average rent per acre (rent/area), average rate of rent (rent/capital). the latter two depend on proportionate shares that make up total cultivated area.

(806): rent appears as determined by absolute fertility (b/c expansion on better lands gives more rent), but in reality is regluated by differential rent

(807): price of untilled land will be determined by potential rent--i.e., will reflect capital investment in tilled lands

(808): Michigan given as example of 'location' mattering more than 'fertility' (with the railroad, though, the West takes its revenge)

(809): int--novel character of colonies which come into cultivation with the world market--they can dedicate their entire productive capacity to one product, because of the possibility of acquiring necessary goods from elsewhere. they give appearance of producing large surplus product, but this is a feature of qualitatively new level specialization.

(810): extensive agriculture makes fertility matter less, because you can exploit 'new' land rather than worrying about exhausting fertility (this is not available to places in Old Europe, where old social relations put fetters on expansion)

Chapter 40: The Second Form of Differential Rent (Differential Rent II)

(813): farmers, obviously, like long tenancies because there's less opportunity for 'fertility' to be re-evaluated

(813): surplus profit becomes 'ground-rent' where fertility is re-assessed

(815-817): imp--differential rent I is the historical basis for differential rent II (which is the rent that arises temporally--when same area is cultivated with varying effects, over time) [question re: differential rent II is why 'surplus-profit' isn't measured simultaneously, to rent-less producers at same time, rather than to worst year on same plot of land? i.e., what is the ruling price?]

(817): q. of equalization can be raised here, as well [why don't 'surplus profits' figure into the 'profit rate'? certainly capitalists locked in competition don't make the distinction between profits and surplus profits, when deciding where to invest? my explanation would be that laws of competition don't apply, exactly, and that this is why. remember, 'rents' accrue precisely because certain features of the land aren't 'open' to competition (institutionally-protected 'monopolies'). is this right? is that any less true of manufacturing? doesn't seem so]

(819): vs. Ricardo, he argues that declining yields lead to increasing rent only in the case where demand for corn grows, leading to higher prices for bread, higher wages, lower profits (and no oppportunities to improve productivity) [of course, the ticket out of this doomsday scenario is increasing productivity]

Chapter 41: Differential Rent II -- First Case: Price of Production Constant

(829): distinction between petty commodity producers and capitalists--the former can sell below value, but still see themselves as making a 'profit' (self-exploitation)

(829): from the standpoint of competition, everything stands on its head--the less labour you apply, the more productive you are (more constant capital, less variable capital-->increasing productivity)

(830): rent per acre will grow with increasing capital investment (on same acre), which is peculiar to differential rent II, of course

Chapter 42: Differential Rent II -- Second Case: Price of Production Falling

(833-846): three possibilities

1. with productivity of extra capital investment remaining constant (if inferior land drops out)
2. with productivity of extra capital investment falling (if enough inferior land drops out)
3. with productivity of extra capital investment rising
   

(846): in all cases, rent rises if increased productivity is result of new addition of capital

Chapter 43: Differential Rent III -- Third Case: Rising Price of Production

(847): presupposes a decline in productivity on lowest quality land, of course

(851-852): Engels' summary of the three cases

(859): in sum, the more capital is applied to land (the more developed agriculture), the higher are the levels of rent per acre and the total sum of rent--the more tribute goes to land-owners. this explains their vitality

(859-860): at the same time, Engels notes that the opening up of the temperate regions of the world (the prairies, Russia, India) to railways will spell their doom. they won't be able to charge these rents, given ruling production prices.

(870): imp--landed property becomes an 'artificial' barrier to further capital investment, because he stands to take the gains, but farmer forced to bear the losses. therefore prices will rise faster than they otherwise would, in order to attract requisite investment and meet supply.

Chapter 44: Differential Rent Even on the Poorest Land Cultivated

(874): FE fixes some calculations, but principle holds--differential rent II allows better land to govern land (after next round of capital investment), which allows previously devoid lands to bear rent

(876, 878): it depends on the circumstances--i.e., how general the improvements are (a 'general revolution in agriculture') vs. improvement only affecting a small portion.

(877): here, again mentioning that 'rent' is an obstacle to equalization; you won't get A's 'average production price' because landed property artificially raises production prices [specify the circumstances, though]

Chapter 45: Absolute Ground-Rent

(884): price must be higher than production price to attract investment (because as soon as supply expands, price will fall. if it falls below production price, capitalist wouldn't have invested)

(884): imp--landlord is not going to give away land at rent=0. so there will be an artificial blockage to investment, here, unless the price charged increases.

(889): it is landed property that creates this 'rent'. this extra bit would not have existed had landed property not prevailed

(892): remember--the fact that it's being sold above it's production price does not mean that it's being sold above it's value. production prices diverge from values, as we've developed already [who's he responding to? why is this important?]

(893): a direct relationship, obviously, between productivity and the organic composition of capital

(895-896, 899): key--the reason you have what he is calling 'absolute rent' is because--unlike in other spheres of production, where you have also have divergences of prices of production, from value--the fact of landed property involves the levying of a toll.

(899): absolute rent would disappear if the overall composition of capital in agriculture matched the average composition of capital [why, if we've established that it's not the fact of divergence from values that matters (because that happens everywhere), but the existence of landed property]

(902): citing Smith to argue that prices of other agricultural goods can be affected by the rent landowners charge for the cultivation of staples

(904): no such thing as 'natural' fertility. it will depend on the level of technology in society, at large

(904): there is a political element to which lands are open for cultivation, which lands aren't.

(906): for investment to arrive, it has to be attractive to capital

(906): in sum--landed property is a block on the equalization process. it captures a portion of surplus-value that would otherwise go into equalization [here, we are using surplus-value intentionally? don't mean profit?]

Chapter 46: Rent of Buildings. Rent of Mines. Price of Land

(909): ground-rent is not the same as house-rent

(910): monopoly price creates rent in the case of special, limited goods. rent creates a monopoly price when corn is sold above its value (not just above its price of production[?]), because of the barrier that landed property puts in the way of rent-free investment

(911): rent is capitalized in the price of land--so the buyer thinks he's escaping it, but he's actually not

(911): relations of production create rent. without them, it would not exist.

(911): a forward-looking passage--we will look at private property in goods the way that people once looked at private property in men.

(914): capital realizing itself in soil like a 'pig in potatoes'[!]

(916): earth, in agriculture, as an 'instrument of production', not just the spatial basis of operations

Chapter 47: The Genesis of Capitalist Ground-Rent

(918): prior to that society where 'capital has subsumed production', we can't talk about rent in the modern sense--as excess over profit. pre-capitalist rent is a different beast altogether.

(919): hint at importance of 'protective duties' to speeding up industrial development

(921): right--until society has achieved a certain level of agricultural productivity, and 'hands have been freed', you can't have civilization--i.e., they're not available for exploitation in other spheres.

(922): dialectical appraisal of 'vulgar economics--superseded by context

(922): in the natural economy, industry and agriculture were connected--economic unit of production of agricultural output and handicrafts was the same. capitalism severs this connection.

(925-930): labour rent--where direct producer devotes one part of the week to working on land that is the landowners. at the root of this relation, of course, is extra-economic compulsion

(927) : imp--great statement of core premises of HM ('the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social edifice' is 'the specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of the direct producers')

(929): the legal/political superstructure congeals as a result of the constant reproduction of the economic situtation [nice, Fields-like passage]

(930): productivity of direct producer will develop with (1) experience; (2) new needs; (3) growing of mkt for his product; (4) growing security of disposal of labour-power (i.e., increased std of living?) [this contravenes the 'rules of reproduction' argument, it seems]

(930): 'innate racial character'[!]

(930-932): rent-in-kind--found, typically, at a higher stage of development of relations of production--surplus labour isn't performed under direct supervision of landlord's representative (force of circumstances, rather than whip)

(931): we are still in a 'nautral economy'--which is where economic conditions are produced in the main by economic unit, reproduction out of its gross product. where the union of domestic industry and agriculture prevails.

(932): natural economy is eminently suited to the 'static' Asiatic MoP

(932): the limits that rent demands place on production are severe--typically reducing direct prodcuers to subsistence. particularly when conquering trading nations arrive, like the British in India

(932-938): money rent--represents a formal transformation of the rent in kind. presupposes a certain level of social development (the Romans failed to implement it)--i.e., need trade, urban industry, 'commodity production in general' [q. about the causal order--can 'money rent' lead to dissolution, via monetization. suggestion of the Roman example would say that it can't really induce direct producers to sell on mkt, if they don't have the incentives in place. see p. 934, though--money rent leads to dissolution?]

(934): definition--rent is the normal form of surplus-value/unpaid surplus labour to be performed for owner of conditions of production (not an excess over profit, remember--sets a limit to profit, in fact)

(934): either (A) the peasant is expropriated and the capitalist farmer takes his place, or (B) he becomes an independent peasant-farmer with full rights of ownership

(935): Marx telling classic story--capitalist mode of production is growing up in the town

(935): enter the capitalist farmer (landowner recedes to background, collecting 'excess')

(936): in sum--now, profit is the normal form, and rent is the excess part of the surplus value (and it is extracted also by the capitalist)

(936): nice--'before only an excess over the means of subsistence were transformed into a commodity, now a minute part of these commodities are transformed into his means of subsistence.'

(937): town has always exploited countryside through high prices, etc.

(938): with 'money rent', the price of land (capitalized rent) becomes an important aspect [but land isn't necessarily alienable, is it?]. this facilitates transition to capitalism

(939): imp, share-cropping is a transitional form--landowner doesn't draw purely rent, but also something like profit (because he owns some of the means of production); similarly, the share-cropper doesn't claim product only as a worker, but also as a partial capitalist (he co-owns some of the means of production) [this is not to say, of course, that there is any relation of equality, here]

(940): capitalist 'mode of conception' [seems to be suggesting that this changes the way in which the surplus is perceived to be extracted--as profit, where present, as rent, where not.

(942): imp, small-scale peasant ownership--because there is no question of their expropriation, peasants aren't compelled to make the average rate of profit. they survive as long as they produce enough to live. this allows them to sell at below value. but this lower price should not be mistaken as higher productivity, of course. it is an effect of the poverty of the producers.

(943): five factors lead to its decline

1. destruction of rural domestic industry (necessary complement, for peasants)
2. exhaustion of the soil
3. usurpation of communal property by landowners ( necessary complement, for peasants)
4. competition by large-scale agriculture [but why leading to expropriation? indebtedness?]
5. improvements in agriculture, which lower prevailing values and stretch peasants even further

(944): FN about King's speech?!

(946): buying land is not equivalent, of course, to handing the direct producer a capital investment (this is one sense in which, landed property is an obstacle to a rational agriculture)

(947): int--typically you only see high prices with low interest rates. but in small-scale peasant ownership, you can see high prices with high interest rates, because (1) laws of credit don't apply, yet (raises rate of interest); (2) formation of capital is weak (raises rate of interest); (3) because lots of small farmers competing for land sold on parceled lots (raises price of land, irrespective of rate of interest)

(949): imp--arguing that a critique of small-scale agriculture is reducible to a general critique of private property as barrier to rational agriculture. both restrict the farmer in the productive investment of capitalism [presumably targeted at those who critique the former but celebrate the latter. not sure if this is thoroughly convincing (one can still be better than the other, in terms of productive investment), but the idea is clear]

(949): the concept of the 'metabolic rift'

Part Seven: The Revenues and Their Sources

Chapter 48: The Trinity Formula

(955): imp--the trinity formula of classical political economy (Capital, Land, Labour) ranks Capital, which is a specific historical phenomenon, alongside two material elements of any process of production which have nothing to do with its social form.

(956): all science would be superfluous if form of appearance of things coincided with essence [this is used to make anti-realist claims, of course--that all science can be, then, is theorizing to reduce appearance to essence. but it should only allow a realist claim--we understand things to appear not as they are, for various reasons, but work the best we can to arrive at some understanding of the world unmuddied by this fact. which does exist, contra Latour]

(957): definition of economic structure--totality of relations that producers have towards nature and one another

(958): nice statement of the central importance of labour productivity--reduction of the working day will depend on the productivity of labour. the greater necessary labour can be reduced, the greater the realm of freedom.

(959): nice, contrast between freedom in necessary sphere, and real freedom--people can be more free in the necessary sphere, insofar as labour is collectively managed. but the true realm of freedom begins only where this realm of necessity ends. 'the reduction of the working day is the basic prerequisite'

(961): Capital, land, and labour appear to agents in a distorted form

(964): Rent, profit, and wages appear to grow out of natural roles played by earth, means of production, and labour. but of course this obscures all issues (and it is what got many a classical political economist into defining 'value' in circular fashion)

(965): nice summary passage, re: land, capital, wage-labour. this relation obscures the role of labour-power in producing surplus-value, that is then divided into three components. instead, each seems to produce value on its own.

(966): with the development of relative surplus-value, further mystifcation, as capital seems to take on more of the role of being productive in the production process

(966): for capitalists, of course, it has always seemed as if profits arise from circulation, because of (a) importance of cheating/cunning in circulation; (b) importance of cutting the circulation-time

(967): as capitalism develops and prices of production deviate from values, the mystification only increases.

(968): profit and interest become autonomous from their origins in surplus-value, in appearence--profit comes from wage-labour of capitlaist, and interest from capital itself.

(969): classical political economy is nothing more than the translation of everyday experience.

Chapter 49: On the Analysis of the Production Process

(981, 983, 984, 985): imp-- circularity of Say's understanding of total output--it's reducible to wages, profit, and rent. but when you understand the whole product as revenues, you obviously can't understand how constant capital will be consumed [the answer, of course, is that the premise is mistaken--total output is not just revenues, but also the value of the old constant capital, which gets preserved]

(983): FN--nice quote, re: vulgar economics--"the well-meaning good intention of finding the bourgeois world to be the best of all possible worlds makes any desire for truth and any impulse towards scientific investigation unnecessary."

(988): 'profit' is, in one sense, just a mediating category--because the new constant capital represents nothing more/nothing less than the productive consumption of surplus labour

(991): the 'socialist law of value'--even though there won't be 'value' in a capitalist sense, after capitalism, you will still have to keep accounts of labour-time. the task of distributing social labour across production, moreover, becomes essential.

Chapter 50: The Illusion Created by Competition

(993): if you leave aside constant component of capital, then you can reduce to the three elements

(998): it is the mass of value, worked up by labour, that is pre-given and is to be divided.

(999): value of all revenues has a 'natural limit', which is the total working day minus that portion of the working day that is necessary for a worker to reproduce him/herself at minumum level of subsistence

(1001): monopoly price has to 'get' its value from somewhere else, of course

(1002): just because the variable component of a commodity's value breaks down into wages, profit, and rent, it does not mean that these represent the constituent elements

(1004-1005): competition doesn't create profit, of course; it can only help it equalize around a pre-given level

(1007): several reasons that all this is obscured to agents inside capitalism

1. value components confront another as independent revenues, in the form of separate agents of production
2. from the experience of seeing wages rise and fall in proportion with prices--but what isn't 'experienced' is the secret regulation by other factors [might be worth clarifying all of these, and how they matter]
3. because values of components (wages, profit, rent) are expected/established prior to production process
4. capitalists themselves are indifferent to whether commodities are sold at their values; always aiming to capture extra profit. the limiting elements, for him/her, are wages, interest, and rent
5. because of the preceding four, we see the trinity formula even where it makes no sense (as in the case of the individual small-holder)

(1011, 1019): nice statement of systemic reproduction re: ideology--capitalism reproduces not only the material product, but also the socio-economic relations.

Chapter 51: Relations of Distribution and Relations of Production

(1020): law of value operates on agents only as a 'blind natural force'

(1020) mention of reification--the "subjectivfication of the material bases of production which characterize the capitalist MoP"

(1021): interesting, contrast this with the idea of capitalism reaching a stage where it fails to advance the "forces of production" (see 1024)--production for profit impels capitalists to minimize labour costs, and thus acts as "the strongest lever for raising the social productivity of labour"

(1021): great--capitalists confront workers as a "strict governing authority," but amongst them "complete anarchy" reigns.

(1023): nice, what capitalism does to the landlord--reduces him from "guide and master of the production process and the entire process of social life to a mere leaser of land, usurer in land, and simple recipient of rent"

(1023): relations of distribution correspond to (are derivative of) specific forms of the relation of production

(1024): contradiction between relations of distribution/production and the development of the productive forces [classically problematic]

Chapter 51: Classes

Chapter 52: Engels' Supplement

(1034): dissolution of primitive communist community, into family groups

(1035-1037): labour became the barometer, when 'simple exchange' first arose. the only reliable way to compare goods, prior to trading products of unskilled labour. "thus Marxian law has universal validity from early millenia (maybe as far back as 6,000 BC) to today

(1038): the merchant as the revolutionary element in society (even though acknowledged to be "essentially a guildsman")

(1041): as trading companies went into decline, an individual merchants arose, you started to see the equalization of profit emerge as a consequence of competition

(1046): development of a class of rentiers/stock exchange can reasonably be regarded as functional to capitalism, given the need to generate larger and larger single sums for investment (i.e., companies can no longer come up with the investments out of their own returns)