nicos poulantzas,
political power and social classes (1973)
part 1, section 1
(37): classes as the 'effect' of certain levels of structures
(37): 'political' vs. 'politics' -- distinction between 'juridico-political superstructure of the state" (which is the political), and 'political class practices' (political class struggle, or 'politics)
(38): historicism--which "makes superfluous the theoretical study of the structures of the political and of political practice" (Lukacs, Korsch--an 'over-politicization')
(40): towards anti-historicism--the political as that "crucial level in which the contradictions of a formation are condensed" (only this, he's arguing, allows you to appreciate the anti-historicist character of the argument that the political class struggle is the motive force of history)
(41): a la Lenin, the 'political class struggle' (or political practice) as the nodal point where contradictions are condensed
(42): political structures are the 'institutionalized power of the state' [as distinct from political practice, no?]
(44-45): state's specific function is to constitute 'the factor of cohesion' in a social formation (a 'complex unity'), with two implications:
part 1, section 1
(37): classes as the 'effect' of certain levels of structures
(37): 'political' vs. 'politics' -- distinction between 'juridico-political superstructure of the state" (which is the political), and 'political class practices' (political class struggle, or 'politics)
(38): historicism--which "makes superfluous the theoretical study of the structures of the political and of political practice" (Lukacs, Korsch--an 'over-politicization')
(40): towards anti-historicism--the political as that "crucial level in which the contradictions of a formation are condensed" (only this, he's arguing, allows you to appreciate the anti-historicist character of the argument that the political class struggle is the motive force of history)
(41): a la Lenin, the 'political class struggle' (or political practice) as the nodal point where contradictions are condensed
(42): political structures are the 'institutionalized power of the state' [as distinct from political practice, no?]
(44-45): state's specific function is to constitute 'the factor of cohesion' in a social formation (a 'complex unity'), with two implications:
- equilibrium is not given by the economic, but has to be maintained at the level of the political
- transformation can only unfold at the level of 'political practice'
(46): a key point--under capitalism, the
state acquires a 'specific autonomy', which underlies the
'specificity of the political'
(47): the problem of the overlapping of several modes of production in any concrete instance
(48): relating the state to the political class struggle demands relating the state to the 'ensemble of the levels of structures--to the articulation of instances that characterize a formation'
(49): the State as the official resume of society--the condensation or fusion of contradictions
(50): following Bukharin, State as 'regulator' -- maintaining conditions of production and conditions for the existence of the unity of a mode of production/formation
(53): the State and a 'twin role--corresponding to 'exploitation' and 'organization-cum-supervision'
(53): economic function, ideological function, political function
(53-54): in sum, two results
(47): the problem of the overlapping of several modes of production in any concrete instance
(48): relating the state to the political class struggle demands relating the state to the 'ensemble of the levels of structures--to the articulation of instances that characterize a formation'
(49): the State as the official resume of society--the condensation or fusion of contradictions
(50): following Bukharin, State as 'regulator' -- maintaining conditions of production and conditions for the existence of the unity of a mode of production/formation
(53): the State and a 'twin role--corresponding to 'exploitation' and 'organization-cum-supervision'
(53): economic function, ideological function, political function
(53-54): in sum, two results
- State's 'global role' as cohesive factor unfolds in particular modalities (economic, ideological, and political'
- State's functions can be grapsed only their interrelation (and their role in 'political class conflict') [i.e., not just directly political, but also generally political]
(55): State intervention in the economicvs.
a 'liberal State' (non-intervention in the economic) [question of the
dominant role--none of this, though, changes the general facts, he's
arguing convincingly]
part 1, section 3
(99): power is 'constituted' in the field of class practices (i.e., not at the level of structures, but is an effect of the ensemble of these levels')
(102): 'power' cannot be enumerated at the level of structure (relations of production), but only at level of political class struggle
(104): rejecting class-for-itself/class-in-itself [why? interrogate]
(104): definition--power as capacity of a class to realize its specific objective interests
(107): important--a class can exist at the level of the class structure, without making itself felt in the political arena [it seems like in this case we will want to say they exist as a 'social force' but not politically -- though this is inconsistently the case in his argument, if it is the argument. the idea is fairly clear, though]
(108): ok--"power reveals relations not directly determined by the structure"
(111): important, needs interrogation--similarly, interests can only be related to the field of practices (not at the level of structures) [but in what sense can you have objective interests; this is where he introduces the 'near-side'/'far-side' stuff]
(112): class interests always relational
(112): 'objective', then, seems to refer to 'interests' once have abstracted away from 'ideology' and the way in which their represented by agents. it doesn't, though, mean that we understand them at the level of 'structure'--there can be no interests at this level, remember
(113): ok--'power relations' are determined 'in the last instance' by 'economic power'
(115): the 'relative autonomy' of the state is not due to the fact that the Stae has its own power, but because it constitutes 'power centers' (again, this function of unity/cohesion')
(116) state apparatus (personnel of the state) vs. state power (the social class or fraction of a class which holds power)
(117): not an 'instrumentalist' conception
(118): not zero-sum power--i.e., loss of power by the bourgeoisie does not mean gaining of power by the working-class
part 2, section 1
(124-125): we are not proceeding on the state/civil society schema, precisely because it abstracts from the 'class struggle' and hides real problems in the concept of separation
(128): important--the constituting of individuals as juridical-political individual citizens (which has 'real' and 'ideological' components)
(129): it is the separation of the direct producer from the means of production that produces the 'specific autonomy'
(130-131): at the level of the economic class struggle, the State has the effect of concealing the fact of classes from individuals (it imposes isolation, individualization). this is what makes it possible for the State to be implicated in the constitution of classes, at the level of the political class struggle.
(133): the capitalist State relates to the socio-economic relations in the form in which they appear in their isolation, insofar as socio-economic relations are already class practices [but consider our objection, here]
(133-134): in sum, two functions
part 1, section 3
(99): power is 'constituted' in the field of class practices (i.e., not at the level of structures, but is an effect of the ensemble of these levels')
(102): 'power' cannot be enumerated at the level of structure (relations of production), but only at level of political class struggle
(104): rejecting class-for-itself/class-in-itself [why? interrogate]
(104): definition--power as capacity of a class to realize its specific objective interests
(107): important--a class can exist at the level of the class structure, without making itself felt in the political arena [it seems like in this case we will want to say they exist as a 'social force' but not politically -- though this is inconsistently the case in his argument, if it is the argument. the idea is fairly clear, though]
(108): ok--"power reveals relations not directly determined by the structure"
(111): important, needs interrogation--similarly, interests can only be related to the field of practices (not at the level of structures) [but in what sense can you have objective interests; this is where he introduces the 'near-side'/'far-side' stuff]
(112): class interests always relational
(112): 'objective', then, seems to refer to 'interests' once have abstracted away from 'ideology' and the way in which their represented by agents. it doesn't, though, mean that we understand them at the level of 'structure'--there can be no interests at this level, remember
(113): ok--'power relations' are determined 'in the last instance' by 'economic power'
(115): the 'relative autonomy' of the state is not due to the fact that the Stae has its own power, but because it constitutes 'power centers' (again, this function of unity/cohesion')
(116) state apparatus (personnel of the state) vs. state power (the social class or fraction of a class which holds power)
(117): not an 'instrumentalist' conception
(118): not zero-sum power--i.e., loss of power by the bourgeoisie does not mean gaining of power by the working-class
part 2, section 1
(124-125): we are not proceeding on the state/civil society schema, precisely because it abstracts from the 'class struggle' and hides real problems in the concept of separation
(128): important--the constituting of individuals as juridical-political individual citizens (which has 'real' and 'ideological' components)
(129): it is the separation of the direct producer from the means of production that produces the 'specific autonomy'
(130-131): at the level of the economic class struggle, the State has the effect of concealing the fact of classes from individuals (it imposes isolation, individualization). this is what makes it possible for the State to be implicated in the constitution of classes, at the level of the political class struggle.
(133): the capitalist State relates to the socio-economic relations in the form in which they appear in their isolation, insofar as socio-economic relations are already class practices [but consider our objection, here]
(133-134): in sum, two functions
- sets up agents of production so as to produce the effect of isolation
- represent the unity of the isolated relations (the "unity of an isolation" which is "largely its own effect")
(135): the 'specific autonomy' of the State from
the relations of production is reflected by the autonomy that the
'political class struggle' possesses viz-a-viz the economic
(137): again, in sum [rich passage, needs some unpacking]--in constituting class unity out of the isolation of the economic class struggle, the State serves the interests of the dominatn classes. it has to constitute their unity, first of all. but it also, ideologically, constitutes their particular interests as the interests of the whole--this is made necessary by the autonomy of the political class struggle, and made possible by the isolation of the dominant classes.
(137): hegemony as based in political practices, not structures
(138): we are not going to use 'hegemony' in the sense of 'legitimacy' in the eyes of the dominated classes
(140-141): rather, hegemony will have a two-fold meaning applied to the political practices of the dominant classes
(137): again, in sum [rich passage, needs some unpacking]--in constituting class unity out of the isolation of the economic class struggle, the State serves the interests of the dominatn classes. it has to constitute their unity, first of all. but it also, ideologically, constitutes their particular interests as the interests of the whole--this is made necessary by the autonomy of the political class struggle, and made possible by the isolation of the dominant classes.
(137): hegemony as based in political practices, not structures
(138): we are not going to use 'hegemony' in the sense of 'legitimacy' in the eyes of the dominated classes
(140-141): rather, hegemony will have a two-fold meaning applied to the political practices of the dominant classes
- so, as they constitute themselves as the 'general interest'
- also, though, to talk about the dominant role within the dominant classes (the leadership of the power bloc'
part 3, introduction
(187-190): useful summary of the claims thus far
(187-190): useful summary of the claims thus far
- CMP has specific autonomy of instances
- state is the cohesive factor in the unity of a formation, which has several functions (economic, ideological, political) which are condensed in its strictly political function--"its function in relation to the field of the political class struggle"
- the State 'determines' the class struggle, but only in the sense that it unfolds within limits set by it--additionally, the political class struggle redounds on the State, too [sense that he is trying to make sense of the Welfare State, social democracy, etc.]
(188-189): critical claim
- for the dominated classes, the function of the capitalist state is to prevent their political organization which would overcome their economic isolation (an isolation which is partly produced by the state). for this the ideological role is critical, but obviously other functions have their place, too [the political-repressive, presumably].
- for the dominant classes, the capitalist state is "permanently working otheir organization" by cancelling out their economic isolation (which is also the effect of the State and the 'ideological'--how so? this needs unpacking)
(189): nicely put--the State's contradiction is
that it presents itself in its institutions as a class state, ruling
over a society that it says are not 'divided into calsses' -- in
other words, it is as if it believes that all people are part of the
bourgeois class in whose interest it rules. [on second thought, this
may be a liberal summary of his claim]
part 3, section 1
(190): capitalist state represents the political interests of the dominant classes, not their economic interests--it is the 'organizing agent'
(190-191): it can move against their immediate interests in the favor of the dominated classes, but only to secure the hegemony of the dominant
(191-192): crucial--the fact that the dominated classes can impose themselves, within limits, on the State, shows imply that the State presides over a society divided into classes (and functions not, then, as the simple tool of the dominant classes). it respects, though, these interests only to the extent that it can accommodate them into prolonged domination [there is an important question, then, about the institutionalization of these gains]
(193): explicit mention of the Welfare state, in this regard--making economic sacrifices in order to safeguard political power
part 3, section 4
(229): against a 'dualist' conception of the struggle between dominated and dominant
(230): point 1--the rule of a 'power bloc' is made possible/necessary by the nature of the capitalist state [unpack this--it doesn't seem terribly important to the larger argument, but worth understanding all the same]
(231): point 2--insofar as CMP is characterized by a plurality of dominant classes (citing landlords)
(232-233) point 3--the bourgeoisie appears as divided into fractions [the question, here, is along what lines it splits--due to competition (and thus as individuals), or due to circuits, etc.--he seems to imply the latter, but is this convincing?]
(234): definition of power bloc--contradictory unity of the politically dominant classes as related to the capitalist state
(237): hegemonic leadership within the power bloc
(239): summary of claims here--contradictory unity, and class struggle within power bloc
(243): the question of the 'supporting classes', who don't demand any real political sacrifices from the power bloc but offer their support primarily on the basis of 'ideological illusions' and also due to the fear of the power of the working class (specially the petty bourgeoisie). all this depends, he reminds us, on the state of political disorganization prevailing amongst these classes.
(247): political practice vs. political scene (parties, etc.) [which corresponds to form of state vs. form of regime, see 252--this is not a chronological distinction, though]
(250): discussing question of 'staffing' of the State, dealing with England through concept of hegemonic leadership and power bloc
(251): we need to be able to distinguish between 'party relations' and 'class relations', which is something that political science is not good at doing
part 4, section 1
(255): enumeration of the concept of 'unity', as it is peculiar to the capitalist state (due to the 'autonomized juridico-political superstructure')
(256): important--again, against the notion of the State as instrument--instead, a 'relative autonomy' viz-a-viz the power bloc and viz-a-viz allies/supports, which is unique to the Capitalist state.
(257): important, on two species of relative autonomy--to try and make all this explicit: the political class struggle has a 'relative autonomy' viz-a-viz the other instances; and the State, has relative autonomy viz-a-viz the dominant classes in this political class struggle (and, importantly, the latter fact 'reflects' the former) [unpack this, a bit]
(258): Bonapartism as a theoretical model of the capitalists state, when we abstract away from the historical story, there
(260): relative autonomy is not, at all, premised on some notion of equilibrium between the forces in the class struggle
part 4, section 2
(266): the 'ne0-liberal' theory of the State
(267-268): the institutionalist ('institutionalization of the class struggle')
(272): state socialist and Bismarckian illusions, premised on a notion that social forces are in equilibrium (and that the State form is foreshadowing the future--'planning', etc.) [return to text, if interested in his rebuttal]
(273): again, against instrumental theory of State monopoly capitalism
(274): again, the unique relation between the economic and political undergirds this theorization ('a new articulation of the economic and the political')
part 4, section 3
(275-277): again, useful summary section
part 3, section 1
(190): capitalist state represents the political interests of the dominant classes, not their economic interests--it is the 'organizing agent'
(190-191): it can move against their immediate interests in the favor of the dominated classes, but only to secure the hegemony of the dominant
(191-192): crucial--the fact that the dominated classes can impose themselves, within limits, on the State, shows imply that the State presides over a society divided into classes (and functions not, then, as the simple tool of the dominant classes). it respects, though, these interests only to the extent that it can accommodate them into prolonged domination [there is an important question, then, about the institutionalization of these gains]
(193): explicit mention of the Welfare state, in this regard--making economic sacrifices in order to safeguard political power
part 3, section 4
(229): against a 'dualist' conception of the struggle between dominated and dominant
(230): point 1--the rule of a 'power bloc' is made possible/necessary by the nature of the capitalist state [unpack this--it doesn't seem terribly important to the larger argument, but worth understanding all the same]
(231): point 2--insofar as CMP is characterized by a plurality of dominant classes (citing landlords)
(232-233) point 3--the bourgeoisie appears as divided into fractions [the question, here, is along what lines it splits--due to competition (and thus as individuals), or due to circuits, etc.--he seems to imply the latter, but is this convincing?]
(234): definition of power bloc--contradictory unity of the politically dominant classes as related to the capitalist state
(237): hegemonic leadership within the power bloc
(239): summary of claims here--contradictory unity, and class struggle within power bloc
(243): the question of the 'supporting classes', who don't demand any real political sacrifices from the power bloc but offer their support primarily on the basis of 'ideological illusions' and also due to the fear of the power of the working class (specially the petty bourgeoisie). all this depends, he reminds us, on the state of political disorganization prevailing amongst these classes.
(247): political practice vs. political scene (parties, etc.) [which corresponds to form of state vs. form of regime, see 252--this is not a chronological distinction, though]
(250): discussing question of 'staffing' of the State, dealing with England through concept of hegemonic leadership and power bloc
(251): we need to be able to distinguish between 'party relations' and 'class relations', which is something that political science is not good at doing
part 4, section 1
(255): enumeration of the concept of 'unity', as it is peculiar to the capitalist state (due to the 'autonomized juridico-political superstructure')
(256): important--again, against the notion of the State as instrument--instead, a 'relative autonomy' viz-a-viz the power bloc and viz-a-viz allies/supports, which is unique to the Capitalist state.
(257): important, on two species of relative autonomy--to try and make all this explicit: the political class struggle has a 'relative autonomy' viz-a-viz the other instances; and the State, has relative autonomy viz-a-viz the dominant classes in this political class struggle (and, importantly, the latter fact 'reflects' the former) [unpack this, a bit]
(258): Bonapartism as a theoretical model of the capitalists state, when we abstract away from the historical story, there
(260): relative autonomy is not, at all, premised on some notion of equilibrium between the forces in the class struggle
part 4, section 2
(266): the 'ne0-liberal' theory of the State
(267-268): the institutionalist ('institutionalization of the class struggle')
(272): state socialist and Bismarckian illusions, premised on a notion that social forces are in equilibrium (and that the State form is foreshadowing the future--'planning', etc.) [return to text, if interested in his rebuttal]
(273): again, against instrumental theory of State monopoly capitalism
(274): again, the unique relation between the economic and political undergirds this theorization ('a new articulation of the economic and the political')
part 4, section 3
(275-277): again, useful summary section
- the autonomization of the political class struggle viz-a-viz the relations of production, owing to the unique nature of capitalism. this induces isolation in the agents of production, despite a socialization of the labor-process. the effect of this is to conceal class rleations from the agents, for all classes. this fact of the 'isolated' economic class struggle is precisely why the political class struggle is of such importance.
- as well we have to consider other isolated classes in the social formation (they are overdetermined in their isolation by the state effects, in addition to what it already means to be a peasant or petty-bourgeois in the CMP)
- state presents itself as the public unity of society--it represents the 'people nation', the 'poltical unity' of an 'economic isolation' which is its own effect'.
- this is an ideological function, which is to occlude the class structure. (of course, this isn't the only function of the State's juridico-political superstitious--it also has 'real' effects)
(279): again, unique fact of capitalism is that
class membership is absent from political institutions
(279): all this allows the State to function as the 'unambiguous' power of the dominant classes (how? follow the argument, now--this is where he begins to justify this claim, he's saying)
(282): key--it is precisely through the relative autonomy of the State that the State upholds the political interests of the politically dominant classes (he is noting some confusion about multiple uses of the term autonomy--both autonomy of political from economic, and of the State from the political). he is saying that unity is a condition of possibility for this autonomy--but isn't what he's actually arguing the other way around? that political unity is only possible if the State has relative autonomy.
(284): key--and this is the answer to why that's the case, again, which is specific to CMP
(279): all this allows the State to function as the 'unambiguous' power of the dominant classes (how? follow the argument, now--this is where he begins to justify this claim, he's saying)
(282): key--it is precisely through the relative autonomy of the State that the State upholds the political interests of the politically dominant classes (he is noting some confusion about multiple uses of the term autonomy--both autonomy of political from economic, and of the State from the political). he is saying that unity is a condition of possibility for this autonomy--but isn't what he's actually arguing the other way around? that political unity is only possible if the State has relative autonomy.
(284): key--and this is the answer to why that's the case, again, which is specific to CMP
- because the bourgeoisie is incapable of raising itself to the level of internal unity
- because of the bourgeoisie's struggle with the dominanted classes, against whom it finds it difficult to realize political hegemony
(285): to rule better in its name, in sum; the
political organizers of the dominant classes. [again, i think the
question of dependence of the State on the bourgeoisie is less clear,
in this formulation]
(287): again, we are not talking about those instances of relative autonomy that arise from 'equilibrium' in the class struggle' (this is something much more regular) [this does elide the question of what happens at those moments to the State--but one would think he would turn to Lenin and the constitution of a 'dual State', for answers]
(287-288): more summary--how does relative autonomy follow?
(287): again, we are not talking about those instances of relative autonomy that arise from 'equilibrium' in the class struggle' (this is something much more regular) [this does elide the question of what happens at those moments to the State--but one would think he would turn to Lenin and the constitution of a 'dual State', for answers]
(287-288): more summary--how does relative autonomy follow?
- because of the isolation of the bourgeois calss, who can't raise themselves to the level of unity. the State must organize class domination
- it must function to politically disorganize the working class, by presenting itself as the representative of the 'people-nation'
- its important role viz-a-viz supporting classes.
(288): again, the conscious paradox of his
formulation--that the State assumes relative autonomy from dominant
classes precisely in order to serve them better.
(289): the question of equilibrium resulting from social forces--not much said, but just distinguishing it from the stable formulation of the concept of autonomy
(291): aspiration to legitimacy in the State's presentation of itself as representative of people-nation
(294): 'totalitarianism' is not actually that distinct from 'unambiguous class power in the capitalist state'
part 4, section 4
(298): again, bourgeoisie as a 'uniquely fractured class', which has its origins at the level of the actual relations of production [here we have a quote that suggests a competition-centered interpretation of this fact]
(299): State as 'political organizer' of the power bloc, precisely because individual parties and its fractions are unable to do so ['only because', he is saying--worth interrogation, because of its 'functionalist' implications]
(300): the State, remember, doesn't confront a politically unified dominant class--it is the agent of this unification
(303): question of separation of powers
(289): the question of equilibrium resulting from social forces--not much said, but just distinguishing it from the stable formulation of the concept of autonomy
(291): aspiration to legitimacy in the State's presentation of itself as representative of people-nation
(294): 'totalitarianism' is not actually that distinct from 'unambiguous class power in the capitalist state'
part 4, section 4
(298): again, bourgeoisie as a 'uniquely fractured class', which has its origins at the level of the actual relations of production [here we have a quote that suggests a competition-centered interpretation of this fact]
(299): State as 'political organizer' of the power bloc, precisely because individual parties and its fractions are unable to do so ['only because', he is saying--worth interrogation, because of its 'functionalist' implications]
(300): the State, remember, doesn't confront a politically unified dominant class--it is the agent of this unification
(303): question of separation of powers
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