04/23/2010

New Deal was put into place through an intensification of 'class struggle'--that was the point of last week's lecture. (Debate took place in the 80's—started by Skocpol, who wrote about it as the action of bureaucrats acting against the whims of Capital).

The Marxist response was to say that she was partly right, insofar as Capitalists didn't want the New Deal. But she was wrong in missing the importance of labor mobilization. (There is debate amongst Marxists, of course—some refer to 'enlightened capitalists' addressing the system's contradictions)

What the readings therefore emphasized was the power of labor.

This week's readings attend to the limitations of the New Deal legacy. These do not analyze the weaknesses of the New Deal (a full analysis would have to include thinking about Southern Planters and the weakness of the legislation itself).

The extent to which Labor did well in the Golden Age masked, in effect, the weaknesses of the movement—these readings tried to identify the structural sources of the labor movement's weakness. Whatever the list is, it will include the following: though the labor movement grew, it was never able to extend unionization across a plurality of the workforce; union membership was regionally highly concentrated, which gave American corporations a serious regional flexbility—before 'globalization', American capital began a migration within the continental land mass of the US; the internal source of weakness was the defeat at GM in the late 30's, where the parameters of the agreement shifted to a 'committeeman' system, leaving the rank-and-file less necessary for officials (shifted towards a 'monological' culture).

Added to this is two strategic decisions: the decision of the Communist Party in 1937 to draw back from its militant line, and especially after 1939—this took the most reliable wing of the trade union movement, and effectively neutralized it; the civil war within the labor movement, as the Left was basically kicked out by the late 1940s by Reuther and co—related also, obviously, to towing the line of the Dem. Party.

Thus, by the 1950s, the trade union movement is seriously weak—even while it's still growing, of course, until 1953-1954 (peak of union density). Union officials now relied much more on partnerships with Capital. It seemed to be working, though, only because of uniqueness of the conjucture, i.e., the unprecedented expansion of the economy—no company wanted to disrupt the inflow of profits, at this stage. This, for trade union bureaucrats, clarified that an 'accord' with management was the future. What they were relying on was not a mobilized rank-and-file, but the hesitance of employers, at a time of growth, to attack labor at a time when revenues were flowing in. [Doesn't the Brenner reading also argue that this had to do with 'wildcat strikes', etc.?]

This, it goes without saying, masked the serious weakness of the Labor movement.

After a few strikes in the late 50s, a 'honeymoon' takes on the guise of a confrontation. The beginnings of a total war. You see a serious, noticeable 'speed-up' of the labor-process at the shop-floor—made possible by the fact that shop-stewards are impotent. They file grievances, but this does nothing, of course.

It's in this context, that you see an explosion of unrest—from the late 1960s to early 1970s, the mid-west is rocked by a wave and wave of wildcat strikes. Workers fighting not just management, but their own officialdom, as well.

Thus, serious fissures are showing themselves, in the 'liberal' order. By the 1960s, you see the structural weakness of American liberalism. It is after the upsurge, of course, that you see the full-frontal assault on Labor—Reagan, and the rise of the Right within the Democratic Party.

This week the important moral was the structural weakness of the Labor movement, even at its height, which lays the basis for understanding what it is that American capital is motivated by, when it launches its assault. They realize that they cannot recapture their profits without attacking labor: because of higher costs, and the welfare state that it supports.

- - - -

A big problem for T. World countries is lack of domestic market, which produced underutilized capacity (insofar as your importing machinery designed for bigger markets). Another reason for underutilized capacity is the lack of suppliers for spare parts, etc. [Important discussion here of 'racism', and whether it matters sui generis in determining whether 'farm workers' are excluded from the Wagner Act]

Roosevelt's AAA mechanizes agriculture—this has knock-on effects that lead, ultimately, to the collapse of the racial order, the agglomeration of workers in Southern and Northern cities, and the civil rights movement. In the 1920s, even the murmur of mobilization meant death—but in the 1950s, planters can accommodate this.

Why not organizing the South? 1. change from mobilization strategy, to corporatist strategy; 2. resources problem; 3. level of racial antagonism.